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Awe appears often in the communication of science. This emotion is commonly described as 
a universal and innate emotion resulting from evaluating an object as vast and forcing a 
change in people’s worldviews. In its association with curiosity and learning, this emotion 
has been portrayed as a potential tool for science communicators to engage with their 
audiences. This narrow description mostly ignores, however, the many layers of sociocultural 
reality within which an emotion is bound. I approach awe in science communication using a 
constructionist view of emotions, a theoretical framework that accounts for the historical and 
cultural specificity of emotions within biological constraints, their enculturation and 
acculturation processes, and their multiple representational varieties. Throughout this thesis, I 
present evidence indicating that awe is valued in the culture of science communication, that 
people who engage with this culture are more skilled at conceptualizing awe, and that there 
are multiple types of awe in this space, each being privy to the historical and sociocultural 
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Chapter one - Introduction 
 
How can a concept like ‘Awe’ have such diversity: awe of the vastness of the universe; awe of 
Erik Weihenmayer, who scaled Mount Everest while blind; and awe that a tiny worker ant 
can carry five thousand times its body weight? The classical view proposes that you are born 
with these concepts, or that your brain finds emotion fingerprints in people’s expressions and 
internalizes them as concepts. But we know that scientists haven’t found such fingerprints, 
and infants show no evidence of being born knowing ‘Awe.’  
– Lisa Feldman Barrett, How emotions are made (2017a, p. 94) 
 
It was in my first month after starting my research project when I realized I had to scrap my 
original proposal and go back to the drawing board. I had picked up Lisa Feldman Barrett’s 
book How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain (2017a) at a bookstand at the 
airport in Doha and had begun reading it on that long flight to Auckland. The book’s claims 
about the cultural contingency of emotion and varieties of emotional experience were in 
direct contradiction with all I had previously learned about emotion and the research proposal 
I had submitted for my PhD. In that proposal, I had claimed that ‘awe’ could be used to get 
anyone interested in science, yet what Barrett articulated in her book suggested that people 
across cultures experienced emotions differently; ‘awe’ was not necessarily going to appeal 
to everyone.  
 
This revelation, however, seamlessly matched with my own intuitions and experiences with 
emotion across cultures. Having lived in three countries and speaking their distinct 
languages, I had long struggled with the ‘problem of translation’ of emotion words (Lutz, 
1988, p. 8). I found that words such as ‘amor’ and ‘querer’ used to express different forms of 
affection in my native Colombian Spanish, didn’t correspond to words such as ‘aşk’ or 
‘sevmek’ in Turkish and ‘love’ or ‘liking’ in English, which were used in similar yet different 
circumstances. Being unaware of the many cultural nuances that characterized the 
appropriateness of each of these terms in context had resulted in many awkward situations, 
which were often accompanied by feelings of confusion, rejection, and even guilt. Those 
types of experiences had always left me with a nagging sense of the difficulty of conveying 
meanings across cultural contexts, and amazement over the variety of ways in which people 





It turns out, if one subscribes to Barrett’s arguments in her book, that it is quite common for 
immigrants such as myself to feel a mismatch between our emotions and those of the places 
we move to (Barrett, 2017a; see also De Leersnyder et al., 2011). Instead of being a 
straightforward problem of mistranslation or misreading social cues, it is, instead, an issue of 
lacking the conceptual knowledge to construct experiences in line with the cultural-specific 
meanings of our new environments. That is, it is primarily a problem of not knowing the 
corresponding emotions of our adopted cultures. 
 
My original PhD project proposal assumed, wrongly, as I will argue, that everybody 
experienced awe the same way that I do. Exposed to images from the Hubble telescope or 
descriptions of the ingenuity that took humans to the moon, I expected people would be 
overcome with a wonderous delight that would challenge whatever mental pre-conceptions 
they had, becoming curious about the scientific topic of the day, and ultimately becoming 
enamoured with science; awe as a sort of gateway drug to science. Consequently, my initial 
proposal was all about instrumentalizing this emotion to increase people’s engagement with 
science communication. 
 
After all, that had been my own experience with awe and science growing up. Or at least, it 
was the story I had told myself. I considered myself to be the poster child of how encounters 
with awe from consuming science communication in one’s youth can spark a life-long 
passion for science. Growing up, nobody in my family or extended circle was a scientist nor 
cared much about it. We lived a comfortable middle-class lifestyle in a society where access 
to science was not common. However, science communication punctuated our little cocoon 
when science-related occurrences shook our routines and momentarily captured our attention. 
It was like that in 1986, for example, when Halley’s comet returned to Earth’s proximity after 
seven decades of meandering around the solar system. This news event gave my parents the 
astronomy bug, from which they bought a small telescope, took me to the local planetarium, 
and sat me with them to watch reruns of the series Cosmos on public television. It was this 
last thing which gave me the strongest impression. Although I was too young to understand 
much of the science described by Sagan, the visuals were like nothing I had seen before. The 
strong affective experience imprinted upon me by the show led to a fascination for science 




interest in producing scientists and growing up surrounded by people who couldn’t care less 
about such matters, I still carried a deep interest in science. Whether reading a science article 
in the newspaper or watching some documentary on the Discovery Channel, science quickly 
became an essential part of my life. Years later, after having stumbled upon the scientific 
literature on the study of awe (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Valdesolo et al., 2016), I would 
remember the emotions I had experienced as a four-year-old glued to Carl Sagan on the TV. I 
assumed that my love for science, one that in fact led me to pursue a PhD in science 
communication, had been the result of those early encounters with awe. My belief in the 
transformative power of this emotion, and somehow harnessing it to get more people into 
science, was the theme of my initial research proposal to the Centre for Science 
Communication at the University of Otago. 
 
So, when I read Barrett’s views on the constructed origins of emotions, this was a stumbling 
block for me, but it was a critically important turning point in my thinking. The book had 
given me grave apprehensions about my original PhD proposal, and you can perhaps picture 
the depth of the crisis I was thrown in just as I arrived in Dunedin. I realized that emotions 
are much more nuanced and complex phenomena than the “classical” view tended to present 
them as, and I was drawn back to the drawing board, trying to grapple with the implications 
of what Barrett’s constructionist view of emotions meant for the study of awe in science 
communication. To dissociate myself from much of what has been written about awe and its 
role in science communication, I went back to square one. The present thesis is therefore the 
result of my attempts to come to terms with Barrett’s novel insights and reflects my efforts to 
apply these to understand the nature of awe in science communication. 
 
The constructionist view of emotions revolutionized my understanding of emotions and 
science communication, and in fact, it changed my understanding of the human experience. It 
opened me up to the idea that discrete emotions result from deeper layers of domain-general 
processes and assume various forms and functions, which are situated in sociocultural 
contexts. This broadened the space of investigation from the individual to include the broader 
cultural and historical contexts in which people moved. This also gave me the opportunity for 
combining quantitative and qualitative methodologies through which to study emotions in 
culture. Moreover, it helped me reconceptualize science communication not as an activity of 




groups of people and represented in a wide range of products and practices. More 
importantly, I came to see science communication as a multiplicity of spaces, each of which 
has different sets of meanings due to the contrasting and sometimes contradictory sets of 
values, beliefs, norms, goals, and worldviews present in these spaces. In this thesis, I have 
tried then to articulate these larger frameworks of meaning to the various ways in which awe 
gets represented in science communication. I hope that my enthusiasm and intellectual 
“conversion” to the constructionist view of emotions has percolated into the writing, as I 
believe it has revolutionary implications for how we talk about and practice science 
communication. 
 
The ensuing chapters represent my journey through the worlds of emotion research, trying 
especially to ascertain how awe has been regarded and conceptualised in science 
communication. The second chapter presents a literature review of some of the main topics 
discussed in the rest of the work (i.e., emotions, awe, knowledge, science communication, 
and emotions in science communication). Here I argue that the literature on awe and that of 
emotions in science communication is inadequate to the task of capturing the culturally 
specific varieties of awe in this space as it has been for the most part conceptualized within 
the classical view of emotions. The third chapter introduces my distillation of the analytical 
and theoretical framework that permeates the studies in the following chapters. In this 
chapter, I present the situated conceptualization framework for studying emotion categories, 
describe my take of the constructionist view of emotions, and conceptualize science 
communication as a cultural space. Having defined awe as a culturally and historically 
contingent emotional category chapter four heeds the call made by Daniel Gross and 
Stephany Preston to “always historicize” (2020, p. 9) emotion research. Consequently, this 
chapter outlines a brief history of the emotion category awe, its early social meanings as a 
religious emotion, its jump to popular expressions of science in the late 18th and early 19th 
century, and the evolution of its themes in science communication until today. Importantly, 
this chapter suggests that awe has historically been a valued emotion in this cultural space, a 
hypothesis I set out to test in the fifth chapter. This chapter reports a study which describes 
differences in the frequency and centrality of social representations of awe in science and 
non-science picture books. Finding some evidence of how the culture of science 
communication values this emotion in the analysis of picture books, the sixth chapter sets out 




engagement with this cultural space using a word association paradigm. After arguing that 
emotions are learned in the socialization practices and interaction with cultural products in 
the contexts where people spend their time, I attribute the observed differences in people’s 
representation of awe to differences in their level of skill resultant from their engagement 
with science communication. Then, I present the results of my analysis of interviews about 
awe with science communicators. Here, I identify a variety of awe types in science 
communication around particular themes. These themes, I argue, correspond to the different 
cultural mandates (i.e., values, beliefs, goals, norms) that are co-constructed in the various 
science communication spaces. Finally, I conclude with a summary chapter that includes a 
brief discussion of the results, a broader examination of the implications of the 
constructionist view of emotions in science communication, and potential future directions. 
Together, the review, framework, studies, and discussion presented here contribute to the 






Chapter two - Literature review 
 
2. Introduction 
Throughout this thesis I draw upon knowledge from many disciplines in social science and 
the humanities, including psychology, science education, anthropology, communication 
studies, sociology, philosophy, history, and theology, to study the nature of awe in science 
communication. This interdisciplinarity, I believe, fits well within the current debate over the 
nature of science communication as a discipline (Gascoigne et al., 2010; Trench & Bucchi, 
2010), which corresponds to a larger dialogue within social science about the need for 
syncretic and holistic cross-collaborations (Nissani, 1997). 
 
In this chapter, I present an overall review of five different literatures that look at the topics 
of emotion, awe, mental representation, science communication, and the study of emotions in 
science communication. First, I briefly review the literature on the nature of emotions and, in 
particular, the literature that asks, ‘what is awe’. Because most of this work has been done 
from the classical view of emotions, I do a brief overview of this paradigm before delving 
into the developments in the study of this emotion of the last two decades. I conclude this 
section by briefly introducing a competing paradigm in the study of emotion – the 
constructionist view. The nature and ramifications of this novel paradigm will be elucidated 
in the theoretical and analytical framework (chapter three). Following this, I turn my attention 
to the literature on knowledge and representation, centring on four debates on the topic. 
Focusing on theories of mental representation, I discuss whether knowledge is grounded or 
not (modal vs amodal), the role of language, the meaning of meaning for these theories, and 
the topic of abstract concepts. This discussion precedes the situated conceptualization 
framework developed in the next chapter. In the third section, I review the dominant 
theoretical framing of science communication around three models (deficit, dialogue, 
participation). In this section, I argue that these not only describe forms of transmitting 
information but also serve to describe the various contrasting and competing cultural 
mandates within science communication. I conclude with a brief review of the literature of 
the study of emotions in science communication. I argue that most work on emotions in 
science communication has failed to take into account the latest developments in the science 





Due to the broadness and ambitiousness of the project and topics in this chapter, I will not be 
delving into the minutiae of every discussion. This is the case for the discussions on theories 
of emotions, theories of knowledge, and theories of science communication, where multiple 
in-depth reviews already exist that tell the history, describe the important concepts, and 
highlight the current debates in each of these fields. Hence for these topics, I try to focus on 
some of the landmark studies and cite the most significant reviews where the reader can delve 
further into these discussions. Moreover, this chapter does not present the framework I use 
throughout the rest of this PhD thesis. The theoretical and analytical framework of this thesis 
is presented in chapter three, while the methodological framework for each of the studies is 
presented in their corresponding chapter (i.e., chapters four through eight). 
 
2.1. Emotion research in affective science 
There is profound disagreement among specialists in the field of affective science when it 
comes to a stand-alone definition of emotion. The core disagreement is in the way that the 
different theories conceptualize the ontological status of the category ‘emotion’. Barrett 
(2012, 2016, 2017b) describes two camps separated for the most part around one dimension: 
essentialism. Essentialism in emotion is defined as “the belief that a category of instances 
named by the same word (such as ‘anger’, ‘pride’, ‘awe’, etc.) or a phrase (e.g., ‘basic 
emotion theories’, ‘appraisal theories’, etc.) share a deep, underlying causal mechanism” 
(2016, p. 33) and a “fingerprint” or “prototype” (2016, p. 34). Barrett (2006a, 2016, 2017b) 
argues that the urge to essentialize has been present in the science of emotion from its early 
discussions and that models which essentialize the nature of emotions stand in stark contrast 
to the models that do not. This division divides the field into two camps, those who follow a 
classical view of emotions (i.e., essentialist), and those who argue that emotions are 
constructions (i.e., non-essentialist) (Barrett, 2016, 2017a, 2017b; see also Averill, 2012). 
Based on these opposing views of emotion, investigators from each camp ask different 
questions, use different definitions and assumptions, and have distinct research agendas in 
which they rely upon divergent analytical tools and procedures. For most of the 20th century, 
most emotion researchers favoured the classical view (Gendron & Barrett, 2009). However, 
over the first decades of the 21st century, there has been an ongoing shift towards the 
constructionist view. Barrett (2017c) has referred to this shift as a ‘scientific revolution’ and a 




essentialist (i.e., the classical view of emotions) and non-essentialist (i.e., the constructionist 
view of emotion). 
 
2.1.1. The classical view of emotion 
The models and theories in the classical view treat emotions as discrete faculties made from 
independent and distinct processes (Barrett, 2016). Emotions are described as separate from 
other cognitive and perceptual processes (e.g., memory, attention) and cannot be 
ontologically reduced to more basic mechanisms (i.e., psychologically primitive) (see Tracy 
& Randles, 2011), making emotion research its particular research niche. The differences 
among emotions are the result of physical and/or psychological mechanisms that are different 
for each emotion (e.g., a fear mechanism, an awe mechanism, etc.) and instrumental to the 
emotional episode. Moreover, the classical view of emotions conceives every instance of 
emotion as having a particular ‘fingerprint’ – a set of physical and psychological 
manifestations that repeats itself on every occasion – and these can be identified through 
objective measures such as facial expressions (e.g., Cordaro et al., 2018; Ekman & Friesen, 
1971), responses of the autonomic nervous system (e.g. Ekman et al., 1983; Shiota et al., 
2011), patterns of distinct appraisals (e.g. Lazarus, 1991), and/or distinct brain activation 
configurations (e.g. Vytal & Hamann, 2010). The causal mechanisms and the ‘fingerprints’ 
are usually treated as biologically pre-wired, which means that most authors identify these 
underlying aspects as being present across cultures (e.g., Cordaro et al., 2018; Ekman, 1992) 
and contiguous across species (e.g., Panksepp, 1998). According to Barrett (2016), there are 
two variants of the classical view of emotions: basic emotion1 and causal appraisal models2. 
Each of these variants has dozens of different exponents that disagree about the minutiae of 
 
1 Basic emotion models view emotions such as anger and fear as discrete mental events triggered by a stimulus and expressed by facial displays 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1971), neural (Ekman et al., 1983), motivational (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989), and phenomenological outputs (e.g., Matsumoto 
et al., 2007), and coordinated by a specialized mechanism (e.g., affect programs) (Tomkins, 1962). Most basic emotion models credit the 
adaptive interaction between behaviour and environment as selecting for the basic emotions. According to their framework, these outputs 
facilitated a set of behaviours that enabled individual members of the species to solve recurring problems in the environments of evolutionary 
adaptedness (Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; Keltner et al., 2006; Tracy & Randles, 2011).  
2 Causal appraisal models (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; for a review, see Moors et al., 2013) share various characteristics with basic emotions 
models, situating them in the classical view of emotions. The term ‘appraisal’, coined by Arnold (1960), is used to refer to a cognitive 
mechanism of evaluation of the environment for the satisfaction of the individual’s concerns (i.e., interests, goals, values, beliefs) (Moors et 
al., 2013). For these theories, appraisals function as causal mechanisms that regulate which stimuli create an emotion, which emotion is 
elicited, and the intensity of the elicited emotion (see Moors, 2010a). Causal appraisal models argue that once a stimulus is evaluated through 
an appraisal mechanism, it triggers a series of other components, which can be motivational (i.e., action tendencies, action readiness) (e.g., 
Frijda, 1986), somatic (i.e., peripheral nervous system responses) (e.g., C.A. Smith, 1989), motor (i.e., behaviour, expressions) (e.g., Scherer, 
1992) and phenomenological (i.e., feelings) (Moors, 2010b). These components have a specific ‘fingerprint’ that an external observer can 
objectively measure. Therefore, the emotion episode is the summation of everything that happens between the stimulus and the end of the 
interaction between the different components. This conceptualization of appraisals as causal mechanisms and the different components as 
having specific ‘fingerprints’ characterizing between and among emotions, makes causal appraisal theories part of the classical view of 




the categories and mechanisms of emotion but for the most part converge around a set of 
principles, definitions, and a common research agenda.  
 
This is particularly true of their description of culture as secondary to biological imperatives. 
The basic emotions view argues that emotions such as anger, fear, and sadness evolved 
independently to deal with ancestral problems, such as restoring relations (e.g., Keltner et al., 
2006), coping with a threat (e.g., Tracy, 2014), and soliciting help when facing harm (e.g., C. 
A. Smith & Lazarus, 1990). As a result of this evolutionary heritage, such affective programs 
are seen to be universal and hardwired among humans. For most researchers who adopt this 
basic emotion perspective, culture moulds people’s regulation mechanism, such as display 
rules (Ekman et al., 1969; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011), emotional suppression (J. J. Gross & 
Levenson, 1993), or cognitive styles (Engelmann & Pogosyan, 2013), which mask, restrain, 
and augment people’s emotions, combining these to create more sophisticated and diverse 
emotional experiences (Plutchik, 1991). As part of this conceptualization, basic emotion 
theories do not view culture as constitutive, but rather as supportive of an emotion episode 
(for a review, see Tracy & Randles, 2011). Likewise, many causal appraisal models take 
some basic core group of appraisals such as novelty, intrinsic pleasantness, and fairness as 
present in all humans (e.g., Scherer, 1997). Some of these models also assume that specific 
combinations of these appraisals always lead to the same emotional experience. For example, 
a novel situation in which an agent can be made accountable and obstructs a person’s goals 
should lead to an experience of anger (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Lazarus, 1991). This 
should happen regardless of the person’s cultural background; the same appraisal pattern in 
any situation should always trigger the same emotional episode. The universality of this 
appraisal-to-emotion correspondence has been termed the hypothesis of universal 
contingencies (e.g., Ellsworth, 1994; Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001; Scherer, 1997). In this 
scenario, culture only explains the differences in the relation between the stimulus and how it 
is appraised.  
 
Recent iterations of some of the classical view models have given a more significant role to 
culture in the emotional episode, both in the basic emotions (e.g., Keltner et al., 2019) as in 
causal appraisal models (e.g., Scherer & Fontaine, 2019). In their view, culture regulates the 
relationship between the stimulus and the emotion, impacting the interaction between the 




observed in the empirical studies. However, the attention paid to culture still casts it in a 
subordinate position, as a mostly tangential component of the emotional experience. Overall, 
the classical view does not see culture as constitutive but rather as regulating an emotion 
episode. 
 
2.1.2. Awe in the classical view of emotions3 
Throughout the 20th century, most of the scant literature describing awe in affective science 
dealt with these states as discrete and composite events constituted from a series of primary 
or basic emotions. Early emotion authors such as Stanley Hall (1897), Floyd H. Allport 
(1924), and William McDougall (1908/2015) saw states such as awe, wonder, surprise, 
reverence, and sublimity either as refined and complex forms of fear or as secondary and 
tertiary emotions resulting from amalgamating more basic ones. In a similar vein, Lazarus 
(1991) refers to awe as a mixture of amazement and fright. By contrast, Ekman (1992), who 
saw awe as a complex emotion, for the most part, toyed with the idea that perhaps one day it 
could be upgraded to basic emotion status4. While most of these theories of emotion 
dedicated a few lines to awe, most references were made in passing, as the bulk of these 
researchers’ attention was devoted to ‘basic’ emotions such as fear and anger.  
 
A theoretical breakthrough in awe research occurred when Keltner and Haidt (2003)5 
authored a landmark review article on awe, drawing from various traditions to define and 
operationalize this emotion. The authors used a prototype approach (Fehr & Russell, 1984) to 
do a hermeneutic distilment of the core themes of awe in the different conceptualizations of 
 
3 Related emotion categories such as wonder and elevation have been referred to as belonging to the awe family of emotions (Shiota et al., 
2007) or as awe-like emotions (Silvia et al., 2015). Although there have been many attempts to define and empirically examine such other 
emotions (e.g., Darbor et al., 2016; Shiota et al., 2014; Valdesolo et al., 2017) these are few and far between. This next section will be then 
devoted primarily to the literature from the affective sciences focusing on the category ‘awe’. However, I will come back to other literatures 
exploring emotion categories such as wonder and the sublime which I will treat throughout this thesis as analogous to awe. 
4 In later iterations of his model, Ekman corrected that he was referring to ‘wonder’ in his work when using the word ‘awe’ (Ekman, 2003). 
Moreover, he continued to argue that ‘wonder’ could be promoted to basic emotion (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011). 
5 Researchers such as Dacher Keltner and Michelle Shiota are currently the heirs to the classical view of emotions. While defending many of 
the ideas presented by Ekman, Frijda, and Levenson, these scholars have turned their attention to the so-called positive emotion categories 
such as pride, gratitude, amusement, and love, after these were somewhat neglected by the previous generation of affective scientists (Keltner 
et al., 2019; Shiota et al., 2017). In a recent review, Shiota et al. (2017, p. 633) write: “We anticipate that data will ultimately point to a 
convergence of the discrete function, appraisal component, and dimensional theories of emotion, in which each understanding of ‘emotion’ 
maps to a psychological mechanism that is real in the neural, behavioural, and phenomenological sense.” This call to find ‘real’ ‘psychological 
mechanisms’ in the ‘neural, behavioural, and phenomenological sense’ that ‘map’ to ‘each’ emotion, parallels claims about the ‘fingerprints’ 
of emotions such as affect programs and/or appraisals as causal mechanisms, throughout the 20th century. The research program proposed by 
Shiota et al. (2017) continues to focus on describing emotions as discrete, universal, and primitive, aiming at defining the core components 
(i.e., appraisals, expressive behaviour, physiological responses, neural mechanisms, motivational characteristics) that characterize each 
emotion, and observing the consequences of emotional episodes on things such as cognition, behaviour, and well-being. Despite much debate 
about the nature of emotions, these authors and their peers continue to produce an ever-increasing body of work to support their views of 




the subject, using works from religious studies, sociology, philosophy, and psychology. After 
pointing out the commonalities and core themes in these different theoretical treatments, the 
authors defined awe as the result of two central appraisals, vastness and a need for 
accommodation. By vastness, the authors meant evaluating a perceptually, or metaphorically, 
information-rich stimulus, one that is experienced as larger than the self. The need for 
accommodation refers to an adjustment process of the new information being 
“accommodated” into a new or expanded mental structure. Keltner and Haidt (2003) also 
distinguished five other appraisals that give nuance to the awe experience. These other 
appraisals include the perception of threat, beauty, ability, virtue, or supernatural causality in 
the stimulus, which give the emotion a different valence and vary the ‘flavour’ of the 
emotional episode. Finally, the authors present an account of awe whereby the emotion is 
defined as an adaptive response to specific environmental situations. For the particular social 
circumstances in which humans evolved, ‘primordial’ awe served as a way of regulating 
relations between lower and higher status individuals, reinforcing social hierarchies. This 
primordial awe response is presumed to be present in contemporary environments where the 
implicit cues for social dominance now spill over to other stimuli associated with power and 
enormity, such as natural disasters, celebrity sightings, large vistas, and grand theories.  
 
Keltner and Haidt’s (2003) definition of awe fits squarely within the classical view of 
emotions. Appraising a stimulus as vast and in need of accommodation is conceptualized by 
the authors as sufficient and necessary conditions for the ensuing affective episode to be 
considered ‘awesome’. While most prototype approaches define emotion categories as having 
no sharp boundaries that separate experiences from non-experiences (Russell, 1991b), the 
authors carve out a unique space to discriminate between members and non-members of the 
emotional category, giving it the discreteness that emotions in the classical view have. This 
definition is based on Aristotelian essentialism, whereby the boundaries of what is and what 
is not, is at the core of its description (Gelman & Rhodes, 2012). Interestingly, while 
prototype studies tend to form conceptualizations of emotion from empirical research to first 
understand the folk usage of emotion words in people’s day-to-day lives (e.g., Fehr & 
Russell, 1991), Keltner and Haidt derive their definition from academic discussions in 





This conceptualization of awe discards the inherent variability of the concept in actual usage, 
favouring a prescriptive stance that in psychology tends to fall inadvertently into essentialism 
(e.g., Palmer, 2002). Their definition of appraisals as triggers of the emotional experience is 
well within the appraisal theories that treat these antecedents as causal mechanisms required 
for the emotion episode to occur. This form of Lockean essentialism – every emotion having 
an underlying causal mechanism – is also the hallmark of the classical view (Barrett, 2016). 
Finally, the idea of ‘primordial’ awe, whereby this emotion is envisaged as having evolved 
alongside others to cope with a particular recurrent adaptive problem in our ancestors’ social 
environment (see Keltner et al., 2006), is very much in line with basic emotions theories that 
treat particular emotions as the result of natural selection pressures, making it universal 
amongst our species. These essentialist and universalist characteristics of the definition of 
awe proposed by Keltner and Haidt (2003) incorporate both basic emotion and causal 
appraisal ideas to describe the sources, experience, and possible consequences of an 
emotional episode. Though Ekman (1992) insinuated the possibility that awe might be a 
‘basic emotion’ a decade before Keltner and Haidt’s (2003) account, the latter’s 
conceptualization has defined the research agenda of this affective state since its publication. 
As a result, the vast majority of studies appearing since this time fit squarely within the 
confines of the classical view of emotions. The rest of this section highlights some of these 
studies that have looked at the different aspects of an awe episode.  
 
2.1.3. The awe episode  
Theoretical and empirical accounts of awe suggest that this emotion can be ‘triggered’ by all 
sorts of social, physical, or cognitive events, such as meeting powerful people (e.g., a famous 
actor, a talented sports star), looking at a grand vista (e.g., the Grand Canyon, Earth from 
space), or contemplating a grand theory (e.g., Darwin’s theory of evolution, Einstein’s theory 
of general relativity) (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). A few experiments have used slideshows with 
static images of panoramic views of nature (Shiota et al., 2011) or deep space (Silvia et al., 
2015) to ‘cause’ this emotion. More common is the use of videos of natural settings such as 
panoramic views of waterfalls, oceans, and deserts (e.g., Prade & Saroglou, 2016; Saroglou et 
al., 2008; Van Cappellen & Saroglou, 2012), sometimes taken from the BBC Planet Earth 
series (e.g., Bai et al., 2017; van Elk et al., 2016; Piff et al., 2015). Other studies used videos 
that compare the sizes and distances in the universe (e.g., A. M. Gordon et al., 2017; Stellar 




couple’s days before and after having a child (Saroglou et al., 2008; Van Cappellen & 
Saroglou, 2012). In some cases, participants are asked to read short stories such as going to 
Paris and standing atop the Eiffel Tower (Griskevicius et al., 2010; Rudd et al., 2012), or one-
liners that capture a powerful experience in nature (Cordaro et al., 2018). In vivo inductions 
of awe have also been employed; for example, participants have been asked to look at a 
Tyrannosaurus Rex replica (Shiota et al., 2007), stand amongst tall Tasmanian Eucalyptus 
trees (Piff et al., 2015), stare from the top of a bell tower (Stellar et al., 2018), visit Yosemite 
National Park (Bai et al., 2017), or go white water rafting (Anderson et al., 2018). All of 
these studies point toward the variety of agents, objects, and settings, whereby people 
describe experiencing this emotion.  
 
When it comes to the evaluations that occur during an awe episode, data have suggested that 
Keltner and Haidt’s (2003) conceptualization that vastness and challenges to one’s worldview 
(i.e., need for accommodation) indeed occur during awe episodes (Shiota et al., 2007; Yaden 
et al., 2019). Moreover, studies have also observed the five extra appraisals – beauty, threat, 
exceptional ability, virtue, and supernatural causality – proposed by these authors to 
complement the initial two appraisals (e.g., A. M. Gordon et al., 2017; Yaden et al., 2019). 
Other authors have proposed that additional appraisals, such as attributing agency of the 
events surrounding the episode to others and sensing that the events are beyond anyone’s 
control, could complement Keltner and Haidt’s original appraisals (Tong & Jia, 2017). While 
there is some consistency across studies around the stereotypical appraisals, there are also 
reports that describe various idiosyncratic ways in which participants evaluate awe-inspiring 
situations (e.g., Dobson, 2015). 
 
Studies looking for similarities in the production and recognition of expressions during awe 
episodes have focused on facial, vocal, and body displays. Using the Facial Action Coding 
System (FACS) introduced by Ekman and Friesen (1976), a study observed that participants 
who were asked to display awe non-verbally frequently raised their inner eyebrow, widened 
their eyes, displayed an open drop-jawed mouth, sometimes tilted their head forward, and 
produced visible inhalations (Shiota et al., 2003). Another study that analysed images of 230 
participants using FACS found consistent results for facial expressions of awe (Du et al., 
2014). However, this study also described how facial displays of awe could be confused with 




vocalisations associated with awe. Simon-Thomas et al. (2009), for example, observed that 
participants could recognise vocal displays for awe at above-chance levels. Similarly, the 
‘wow’ vocal burst that is stereotypically used to express awe was strongly recognised as “the 
awe vocalisation” across cultures (Cordaro et al., 2016). However, such studies have been 
criticised for using methodological practices such as forced-choice, which raise questions 
about their validity and generalizability (see Barrett et al., 2019). 
 
Further studies have looked at the affective component of awe experiences. Studies that have 
examined the basic affective attributes of valence and arousal, associated with the somatic 
component and captured in the concept of core affect (Russell & Barrett, 1999) produced 
conflicting results. Arousal, measured in autonomic nervous system changes, has shown 
contradictory patterns of activity in the different studies (e.g., Chirico et al., 2017; A. M. 
Gordon et al., 2017; Maruskin et al., 2012; Schurtz et al., 2012; Shiota et al., 2011), 
suggesting that the emotion may come with feelings of both excitement and calm. With both 
sympathetic activation and withdrawal being reported in the literature as accompanying awe, 
such mixed results led one group of authors to describe awe as having a “novel and complex 
autonomic profile” (Shiota et al., 2014, p. 365). Furthermore, while the initial results 
described awe as a positively valenced emotion (Shiota et al., 2007), one recent study has put 
that assumption into question with at least one-fifth of participants describing the experience 
as negative (A. M. Gordon et al., 2017). This affective ambivalence is also reflected in some 
of the qualitative studies (e.g., Dobson, 2015).  
 
People also report a variety of phenomenological themes related to the meanings ascribed to 
the awe episode. Perhaps the most important recurring theme appearing in reports of awe-like 
experiences is the so-called small-self effect. In general, this effect refers to a diminishment 
of a person’s sense of self (Piff et al., 2015). Several quantitative (e.g., Campos et al., 2013; 
van Elk et al., 2016) and qualitative studies (e.g., Bonner & Friedman, 2011; Dobson, 2015) 
have corroborated this theme. In addition to the small self, other themes appear in the awe 
literature, although most of these have yet to be adequately defined and/or assessed. One such 
conceptualization of feeling is that of self-transcendence. Self-transcendence has been 
identified with a feeling of going beyond mundane concerns and desires and is associated 
with a decrease in the salience of the self and a feeling of connectedness (Shiota et al., 2014; 




quantitative (e.g., Rudd et al., 2012) and qualitative studies; it has been described as akin to a 
feeling of presence (Bonner & Friedman, 2011) or detached observation (Dobson, 2015). 
Likewise, feelings of uncertainty are also regularly observed in the awe literature (Dobson, 
2015; Valdesolo & Graham, 2014). Other themes have included subjective feelings of not 
wanting the experience to end (Shiota et al., 2007), overwhelmingness (Dobson, 2015; 
Gallagher et al., 2015), and profoundness (Bonner & Friedman, 2011; Silvia et al., 2015). 
Again, however, such themes, have not been thoroughly explored, and in many cases have 
been lumped together with definitions of vastness and need for accommodation (e.g., A. M. 
Gordon et al., 2017; Piff et al., 2015; Shiota et al., 2007). 
 
Behavioural and motivational drives have also been conceptualised for awe. Over a century 
ago, McDougall (1908/2015) argued that wonder accompanies the curiosity instinct. More 
recently, researchers have argued that awe motivates exploration and causal explanation, in 
that the emotion is evoked by the violation of expectations and the need for accommodation 
that ensues (Valdesolo et al., 2017). Valdesolo & Graham (2014) found that awe decreases 
people’s tolerance for uncertainty, motivating them to seek answers. Valdesolo et al. (2016) 
also found that awe drives non-theists towards scientific descriptions that provide an 
explanatory framework. This motivational drive was argued to be the source of increased 
play in children in an awe condition (Colantonio & Bonawitz, 2018). This explanatory drive 
has also been found in some of the few qualitative studies done in this area. Dobson (2015) 
observed that some of her participants expressed an urge to seek patterns and meanings in 
their awe experiences, while Gallagher et al. (2015) reported that seven astronaut reports and 
22 interviews conducted after space simulations contained instances of inquisitiveness. These 
findings contrast with those of a study by Joye and Dewitte (2016), which suggested that awe 
led to behavioural freezing rather than exploratory activity. These latter data would seem to 
challenge the argument that awe can be instrumentalised in some straightforward way that 
motivates people to explore and learn (e.g., Valdesolo et al., 2017). 
 
Many studies have also examined changes in cognition, perception, behaviour, beliefs, and 
wellbeing in the wake of an awe experience. Griskevicius et al. (2010), for instance, observed 
that individuals who experienced awe displayed a more systematized scrutiny of the message 
and were less convinced by the weak argument. Similarly, Danvers and Shiota (2017) found 




less on their internal knowledge of how things ‘should be’ (i.e., accepting fewer false details 
that were consistent with the traditional ‘dinner script’) than were control participants. 
Chirico et al. (2018) reported how, after experiencing awe in virtual reality, participants’ 
creative thinking increased, in that they exhibited greater fluidity, flexibility, and elaboration. 
Rudd et al. (2012) also reported that participants in the awe condition felt less impatience and 
more willing to help other people by volunteering and favouring experiences over material 
goods (e.g., a movie theatre pass vs a jacket). Similarly, Van Cappellen and Saroglou (2012) 
found differences in behavioural intentions: participants who experienced awe chose a 
spiritual over a hedonistic travel destination (e.g., Tibet vs Haiti). Saroglou et al. (2008), 
reported that participants described higher levels of spirituality after being exposed to awe-
eliciting videos. Similar results were found by Valdesolo and Graham (2014), who observed 
that, compared to controls, people exposed to awe stimuli scored higher on various measures 
of supernatural beliefs. Other changes that have been attributed to awe include pro-social 
behaviours (Piff et al., 2015), humility (Stellar et al., 2018), increases in personal growth 
goals (Seaton & Beaumont, 2015), decreased desire for money (Jiang et al., 2018), less 
aggressive impulses (Yang et al., 2016), improvements in life satisfaction (Rudd et al., 2012), 
and increases in wellbeing (Anderson et al., 2018). Such studies indicate an assortment of 
outcomes from an experience of awe in both daily life and under laboratory conditions.  
 
Less, however, has been written about the cultural sources of awe as, for the most part, 
studies have been aimed at showing the universality of this emotion across cultures. Cordaro 
et al. (2016, 2018), for example, reported universal aspects of awe through vocal and facial 
expressions across cultures. Similarly, Razavi et al. (2016), Bai et al. (2017), and Nakayama 
et al. (2020) also reported its universality. However, these other studies also described 
differences across cultures. Razavi et al. (2016) found that U.S. participants reported 
significantly more day-to-day awe episodes than their Iranian counterparts. They attributed 
these findings to differences in extraversion between the two countries. Another study 
reported a few differences in the external objects present during awe episodes and in the 
magnitude of the small-self effect between Chinese and American participants (Bai et al., 
2017), which they ascribed to the individualist/collectivist construct in social psychology 
(e.g., Hui, 1988). Finally, a recent study by Nakayama et al. (2020) reported differences in 
the valence of dispositional awe in a sample comprised of North Americans and Japanese 




studies have observed differences in the conceptualization of this emotion across cultures, 
these differences are mostly seen as cosmetic and described as epiphenomenal to the classical 
view’s universalist claims. 
 
The studies reviewed here are only some of the many studies on awe published since Keltner 
and Haidt’s (2003) landmark article. Despite this wide range of awe experiences, most of 
these articles remain rooted firmly within the classical view of emotions, which argues for a 
universal, discrete, and relatively narrow definition of this emotion. However, given the 
increasing evidence of the weaknesses of the classical view, alongside advancements in the 
field of affective science over the last decade more generally, there is reason to suspect that 
this theoretical grounding is flawed. 
 
2.1.4. Beyond the classical view of emotions 
Over the last thirty years, the classical view of emotions has been increasingly challenged, as 
many studies find little to no evidence of emotion essences. These studies are not only 
presenting data disconfirming the classical view but are also uncovering multiple 
methodological and analytical issues with many of the original studies claiming support for 
basic emotions or causal appraisal models (Barrett, 2006a; Barrett et al., 2019; Gendron et al., 
2018; Russell, 1994). These include significant differences in findings from slight 
methodological changes (Russell, 1994), disparities in results from different research groups 
(Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), and significant variability within and across studies (Barrett et 
al., 2019). More importantly, the results of meta-analyses and literature reviews from the 
science of emotion cast serious doubts on claims of emotion ‘fingerprints’ being universal 
and consistent across the species (e.g., Barrett, 2006a; Barrett et al., 2019; Cacioppo et al., 
2000; LeDoux, 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012; Russell, 1994; Siegel et al., 2018).  
 
Studies that treat awe as a discrete and universal emotion with a measurable, observer-
independent essence should be seen with these problems in mind. Arguments that awe has 
clear and specific facial expressions (e.g., Shiota et al., 2003), appraisals (e.g., Shiota et al., 
2007), vocalizations (e.g., Simon-Thomas et al., 2009), and patterns of peripheral nervous 
system activation (e.g., Shiota et al., 2011), and that the emotion is also recognized in every 
culture (e.g., Cordaro et al., 2016, 2018) and experienced universally (Razavi et al., 2016), 




view of emotions) that stands on very shaky ground. This larger body of evidence casts doubt 
on the existence of emotion ‘essences’, shows that emotional variability is not the exception 
but the norm, and finds little evidence of universality in emotions. Thus, it must be 
considered when researching every emotion, including discussions about the nature of awe6.  
 
However, taken together, these studies show a very large range of experiences that people 
describe as awe-some. Whether it is the many situations that ‘elicit’ this emotion (e.g., Yaden 
et al., 2019), its complicated affective tones (e.g., A. M. Gordon et al., 2017; Shiota et al., 
2011), the variety of themes described as accompanying its episode (e.g., Bonner & 
Friedman, 2011; Dobson, 2015), or the many outcomes from its experience (e.g., Bai et al., 
2017; Griskevicius et al., 2010), the observations in the literature suggest a much richer, 
complex, and nuanced reality for this emotion, beyond Keltner and Haidt’s (2003) narrow 
conceptualization. The reviewed literature on awe is a useful starting point, taking it for what 
it is: descriptions of some of the dominant stereotypes of awe in the particular cultural 
contexts in which these studies took place. This is one of the many insights of the 
constructionist view of emotions, whose scope and breadth represent a paradigm shift to the 
study of emotions (Barrett, 2017c). 
 
2.1.5. The constructionist view of emotion 
The current models in the constructionist view draw inspiration from a much longer tradition 
in philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, and sociology. Many of the intuitions of 
the constructionist view of emotions were already present in philosophers such as Kant, 
Hume, and Spinoza (Barrett, 2017a). However, it was the work of scholars such as William 
James, Wilhelm Wundt, Elizabeth Duffy, Harry Harlow, and Ross Stagner, (Gendron & 
Barrett, 2009), and the work of many anthropologists, historians, and sociologists who 
challenged universalist claims (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1988; Averill, 1980; Boddice, 2018; Lutz, 
1988), that inspired the many theories in this new wave of constructionist models.  
 
Models for understanding emotions in the constructionist view can be catalogued in relation 
to the level of analysis and attention that they give to each of the different aspects of the 
 
6 Authors in the classical view have instead accommodated these inconsistencies to their models and explained them as the result of 
epiphenomena such as display rules (e.g., Ekman & Cordaro, 2011), emotional suppression (e.g., J. J. Gross & Levenson, 1993), or the 
weakness of the stimulus presented (e.g., Levenson, 2011). Nevertheless, other authors see these issues as inevitably refuting most of the 




construction process, with some focusing on understanding the supporting brain networks, 
others putting their attention on the different psychological and developmental processes 
involved, and others focusing on the cultural and social aspects of the emotional experience. 
Constructive appraisal models (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 2013) treat appraisals as descriptions of 
the psychological states that make one episode different from another. Social constructionist 
models of emotion (Averill 1980; 2012) argue that emotions are constructions resulting from 
a person’s interaction with their social environment. Such scholars contend that emotions 
cannot be reduced to physiological or behavioural variables, but are rather contextual, 
reflecting the meanings embedded in the norms, values, and institutions of a particular 
cultural setting (e.g., Mesquita et al., 2017; Mesquita & Leu, 2007). Cultural constructionist 
models move beyond the social-relational to focus on the systems of meaning, such as 
discourses, through which people make sense of emotions (e.g., Lutz, 1988; Illouz, 2008). 
This approach raises questions about the political and social structures that support the 
practice, expression, and socialization of emotions (e.g., Harding & Pribram, 2002; Lutz & 
Abu-Lughod, 1990). Historical constructionist approaches put the onus on thick descriptions 
of the time and place where the emotion categories circulate (e.g., Scheer, 2012; Boddice, 
2018). Meanwhile, neuroconstruction models highlight how the interaction of dynamic large-
scale intrinsic brain networks could correspond to the emergence of emotions from domain-
general processes (e.g., Barrett, 2017c; Barrett & Satpute, 2013; Barrett & Simmons, 2015; 
Chanes & Barrett, 2016; Lindquist et al., 2012). These are just a few of the many 
constructionist proposals out there; models that nurture each other through evidence and 
discussions, often providing insights, concepts, and methods through which to study 
emotions in context.  
 
The specific theoretical framework that I will use throughout this thesis and developed in the 
next chapter is a mixture of different approaches. However, I will mostly focus on Lisa 
Feldman Barrett’s theory of constructed emotions. Initially introduced in 2006 as a 
psychological model of emotions called the conceptual act theory (Barrett, 2006b), this 
theory has continually been updated by incorporating the latest insights from neuroscience, 
cognitive science, cultural psychology, philosophy of the mind, and the results from 
empirical studies (Barrett, 2012, 2013, 2017a, 2017c; Barrett et al., 2014; Gendron et al., 
2018, 2020; Hoemann et al., 2019; Lindquist & Barrett, 2012). A fundamental element of the 




representation in the form of a conceptualization from previously learned emotion knowledge 
(Barrett, 2006b). This account of how emotions work relies on a specific kind of theory of 
knowledge and representation. Mainly, it takes a grounded cognition view of knowledge and 
borrows from the situated conceptualization framework developed by Lawrence Barsalou 
(Barsalou, 2003, 2009, 2016a; Barsalou et al., 2003; Barsalou et al., 2008; Barsalou et al., 
2018). 
 
In the next chapter, I will introduce the situated conceptualization view of constructed 
emotions as an analytical framework. For now, I turn my attention to a brief review of the 
various theories of knowledge and mental representation in the psychological sciences. As 
with the work on emotions, there are many reviews of the various models and theories of 
conceptual processing in cognitive science and neuroscience (e.g., Barsalou, 2007, 2016c; 
Dove, 2009; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Mahon & Hickok, 2016; Murphy, 2004), and in 
discussions about word meaning (e.g., Meteyard et al., 2012) and abstract concepts (e.g., 
Borghi et al., 2017). These go much deeper into the various debates about the nature of 
mental representations, the interaction between different representational systems, and the 
role of context, than I am able to here. In the next section, I delve into some of these issues, 
highlighting those aspects especially relevant to my work in the subsequent chapters. 
 
2.2. Theories of knowledge and mental representation 
After decades of behaviourism, the mid-century cognitive revolution brought back the idea 
that mental operations in the form of mental representations7 and a representational system 
that can perform operations on those representations, mediate the relation between human 
stimulus and response (e.g., Fodor, 1975). These internal representations stand for things in-
the-world other than themselves (i.e., have intentional content) providing information that 
allows the interaction with these to achieve some goal (Barsalou, 1999, 2017a; Prinz, 2004).8 
The basic unit of representation is the concept which roughly stands for the categories into 
which people differentiate the world (e.g., Goldstone et al., 2013; Murphy, 2004; Prinz, 
2004).9 The human representational system seems to be involved in practically all cognitive 
 
7 Mental representations are also called internal representations and can be described as predictions within the emergent predictive paradigm 
of psychology research (Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019). 
8 In this section I focus, for the most part, on Barsalou’s account and definitions. 
9 These are all contentious topics. Barsalou and others have suggested that the category of ‘concept’ is probably not useful for making science 




processes, including online processing (e.g., perception, categorization, inferences), offline 
processing (e.g., semantics, memory, reasoning), and in the productive construction of novel 
concepts (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2007; for reviews see Goldstone et al., 2003; Kiefer & 
Pulvermüller, 2012). As a consequence, Barsalou, citing Rupert (2011), has argued that the 
mind and the brain are “massively representational” (Barsalou, 2016b, p. 84) making 
representations one of the brain’s domain-general processes from which emotions are made 
(Barrett et al., 2014).  
 
While most researchers agree that the representational system is essential to cognition, there 
is disagreement over its format and function, as well as the content of the representations it 
produces. In what follows, I focus on four primary debates in this area. First, I investigate 
whether the format of the representations is amodal and abstract or modal and grounded. 
Then I examine different positions concerning the role of language in representation. Third, I 
look at the relation between concepts and meaning, discussing whether they are contextually 
dependent. Finally, I briefly explore the current debate over the content of abstract concepts.  
 
2.2.1. Amodal vs modal representations 
Early theories of mental representation in cognitive psychology argued that conceptual 
knowledge is stored in the form of amodal symbols (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Fodor, 
1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Amodal symbols refer to representations that are not bounded 
by the content of the concept they stand for and have a certain degree of arbitrariness 
inscribed in them (see Mahon & Hickok, 2016). Various proposals for the form of these 
amodal symbols exist, such as a feature list (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975) and distributed 
semantic networks (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975). Their central assumption is that the 
perception of an object (e.g., seeing, smelling, touching a flower or tree or apple) is 
transduced into a concept (e.g., FLOWER, TREE, APPLE) which is stored in a separate 
module, usually termed semantic memory, and where the format of storage is as abstract 
symbols that have no relation to perception or action. These amodal symbols are fully 
equipped to perform all the computational activity such as productivity functions, type-token 
distinction, and the constitution of abstract concepts through different operations in a fully-
fledged representational system that supports all other cognitive processes, such as memory 
 
the brain that represents a category in the environment or experience and that controls interactions with the category’s instances” (Barsalou, 




and imagination (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984). Many of these theories have been 
formalised using logic, probability, and other tools that hinge on a metaphoric understanding 
of the brain as a digital computer and amodal symbols as its code (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1984).  
 
Multiple theoretical and empirical challenges to the strongest versions of amodal symbols10 
have been mounted in philosophy (e.g., Harnad, 1990; Prinz, 2004; Searle, 1980), cognitive 
science (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan, 2004), and neuroscience (e.g., Pulvermüller, 1999). 
One primary concern involves the so-called symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 1990): 
amodal models fail to answer comprehensively how these symbols map onto perception and 
objects in the real world (Barsalou, 1999). Moreover, strong versions of amodal theories have 
had to respond to the strong empirical evidence showing the extensive involvement of 
sensorimotor areas in representational processes (Barsalou, 2007; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 
2012; Meteyard et al., 2012; c.f., Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Mahon & Hickok, 2016). 
 
The counterparts to these amodal theories of mental representation and concepts have been 
labelled as embodied11 or grounded12 views, which overall argue that mental representations 
are re-enactments or simulations of multimodal states learned from experience (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999, 2007; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Prinz, 2004; Zwaan, 2004). While versions of 
this idea have circulated throughout history (e.g., Hume, Locke) (for a brief historical review, 
see Barsalou, 2010) over the last few decades these have been brought back to the centre of 
the debate on human cognition from various disciplines, including linguistics (e.g., Lakoff & 
M. Johnson, 1980), philosophy (e.g., Prinz, 2004), psychology (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Paivio, 
1971) and neuroscience (e.g., Pulvermüller, 1999). These theories by and large share the idea 
that mental representations and cognition, in general, are not constituted exclusively by 
abstract amodal symbols, but rather are made of perceptual symbols grounded in, and 
distributed across perceptual, motor, affective, and other systems. Empirical evidence 
 
10 Meteyard et al. (2012) distinguish between four views of the representational system in relation to the symbols’ format. On the one extreme 
are the strong amodal or disembodied theories (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975, Fodor, 1975), while on the other are strong embodiment theories 
(Gallese & Lakoff, 2005, Zwaan, 2004). The weak embodied and disembodied (amodal) theories lay somewhere between recognising certain 
levels of association between sensorimotor regions and an amodal (or supramodal) integration. While other authors have criticised this 
heuristic for its simplicity (e.g., Mahon, 2015) it still helps for thinking about the differences in positions about the format of mental 
representations. 
11 People mean very different things when they use the term embodiment (Shapiro, 2013). The embodiment view expressed here has been 
labelled the conceptualization hypothesis (Matheson & Barsalou, 2018), which is concerned for the most part with the nature of mental 
representations and meaning as sources of causal force. This contrasts with other embodiment perspectives, such as the replacement and 
constitution views which focus more on the relation between the organism and the environment. 
12 Barsalou argues that the term grounded captures much better the nature of the research “by including other forms of grounding beside 




provides correlational and causal evidence of representations grounded in these systems 
(Barsalou, 2007, 2016c; Kiefer & Barsalou, 2013; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; c.f., Dove, 
2009; Mahon & Hickok, 2016)13.  
 
Some theoretical positions with grounded views have found various uses for amodal symbols. 
Several of these ‘hybrid’ versions of embodiment include amodal symbols as a source of 
information in mental representation (e.g., Louwerse, 2008) and support in the simulation of 
abstract concepts (e.g., Dove, 2009). These hybrid versions contrast with another set of 
models, those which argue that language and abstract concepts can be represented in a 
grounded fashion (e.g., Borghi et al., 2019). 
 
2.2.2. The role of language in mental representation 
The role of language in mental representation is also a matter of contention. Some of the 
early models argued that linguistic forms (i.e., words, phrases, sentences) mirror closely the 
concepts constituted in amodal symbols (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975). In many of these 
proposals, whether concepts were organized in networks, prototypes, or feature lists, 
language symbols closely resembled this organization. Moreover, many of these earlier 
theories treated the structures and operations of language as closely resembling the structures 
and operations done by concepts (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). This language-as-mapping 
view (Lupyan & Lewis, 2019) saw language merely as a sort of sticker, not a source of 
information that could enhance or transform the mental representation. 
 
However, evidence from the distributional models (Andrews et al., 2009; Vigliocco et al., 
2009), property verification tasks (e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Solomon & 
Barsalou, 2004), and other conceptual experiments (e.g., Louwerse & Connell, 2011) suggest 
that mental representations derive information from multiple systems including linguistic 
symbols (see Dove, 2009; Louwerse, 2008). This has led to a re-thinking of the role of 
language in conceptual processing. 
 
13 While there is still a debate about the interpretation of many of these results (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Mahon & Hickok, 2016), these 
have for the most part led to the re-evaluation of many of the previously held amodal views and the appearance of the so-called ‘hybrid’ 
accounts of weak disembodiment. These include theories that argue for the offloading information from the representational system to 
sensorimotor areas (e.g., Machery, 2016) and others that argue for the interaction in shared spaces between amodal symbols and perceptual 
or motor areas (Leshinskaya & Caramazza, 2016; Mahon, 2015). These more recent models recognise the association of the sensorimotor 






These newer models go beyond the language-as-mapping view; words, phrases, and 
sentences assume a constitutive role in mental representation. Such proposals include those 
by Vigliocco et al. (2009) and Dove (2016) in which language resembles traditional amodal 
symbols, and others that describe it as fully or partially grounded in the mouth (see also 
Borghi et al., 2019) or in chains of associates (e.g., Connell, 2019; Louwerse, 2011; 
Louwerse & Connell, 2011). Some of these models increasingly argue that language 
modulates and transforms mental simulations14 by processes such as attuning people to 
conceptual similarities and supporting conceptual inferences (e.g., Dove, 2020; Lupyan, 
2012; Lupyan & Lewis, 2019). 
 
To summarize, the evidence suggests that there are multiple representational systems and that 
language, being one of them, plays an important role in conceptual processing. This has 
evoked a series of discussions about the degree to which language contributes to conceptual 
processing and how it is grounded in the modalities. Barsalou et al. (2008) take a middle of 
the road approach in their Language and Situated Simulation (LASS) proposal, which argues 
that while language is important in conceptual processing, it is less essential than the 
simulation of the situation grounded in the modalities. The description and ramifications of 
this proposal will be further explored in the theoretical and analytical framework chapter. 
 
Whether words act as pointers (Barsalou et al., 2008), maps (Vigliocco & Vinson, 2007), 
tools (Borghi et al., 2019), cues (Lupyan & Lewis, 2019), labels (Connell, 2019), or 
neuroenhancements (Dove, 2020), all these hybrid models rely heavily on metaphorical 
language to capture how the language and the simulation systems interact to produce mental 
representations. One issue that has not been adequately addressed, however, but that is 
nonetheless at the centre of these discussions of conceptual processing, is the question about 
context. Because many cognitive scientists assume that words refer to a mental 








2.2.3. Concepts, context, and word meanings15 
There is an ongoing debate in cognitive science regarding the role of context in conceptual 
processing. The different proposals can be put on a continuum of stability where, at one end, 
are models assuming an absolute invariance of concepts or ‘context independence’, and, at 
the other end, are those that assume total dynamicity or ‘context-dependence’16. The former 
end of the spectrum includes semantic memory models, which argue that mental 
representations have a relatively stable core based on features, lists, prototypes, or another 
form of knowledge organization (Rosch, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). According to these 
theories, concepts are stored in an autonomous system of long-term memory (i.e., semantic 
memory) in the form of rules of necessary and sufficient features (classical rule-based 
theories) or of weighted family resemblance structures (prototype theories) (for discussions 
see Barsalou, 2003; Goldstone et al., 2013). As these theories assume a sort of one-to-one 
correspondence between concepts and words, communication between members of a 
community is possible as a result of the stability at the core of their mental representations 
(Rey, 1983)  
 
On the other end of the spectrum, many grounded models of mental representation argue that 
concepts are dynamic and situated17. Mental representations are constructed as partial re-
enactments of previous patterns of activation learned in experience and in relation to the 
goals of a specific context; meaning that there are no conceptual cores (Barsalou, 2016a; 
Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015; Connell & Lynott, 2014; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016). In that 
sense, the mental representations which serve as referents of words are always changing in 
response to the situations in which they are constituted (i.e., they are always ad hoc) 
(Barsalou, 1983; Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015). The resulting infinite polysemy gives rise to 
 
15 In the question about semantics, psychologists, and cognitive scientists tend to oppose many of the traditional theories of word meaning 
derived from linguistics and philosophy, which for the most part study language “as it occurs” (Pelletier, 2017, p. 43). Many in the latter group 
take a position known as externalism, wherein the relationship between linguistic forms and mental representation is “far too uncertain, 
changeable, and individual to serve as a possible object of principled investigation” (Riemer, 2015, p. 5) and instead, focuses on the 
relationship between words and their referents in the ‘external’ world. By contrast, many in cognitive science, which is the position taken 
here, assume that mental representations contain the content of the meaning of words - a position which has been labelled internalism (Pelletier, 
2017; Riemer, 2015). The meaning of a word is not an object in the world but rather the object’s mental representation in someone’s mind 
(Barsalou, 2017b). This is not to say that all mental representations have words attached to them, but rather that words label some of these 
mental representations. This is not a straightforward position to take. In some models, the content of a ‘mental representation’ (i.e., concepts) 
is separated between conceptual knowledge and linguistic knowledge, while others assume semantics lays only on the simulations (for a recent 
discussion, see: Meteyard & Vigliocco, 2018). 
16 This is also referred to as the invariantism vs contextualism debate (see Machery, 2015). 
17 It is worth adding here that many models are somewhere in between, including all sorts of mechanisms such as connectionist networks, to 
give contextual flexibility to concepts with stable cores and explain the many context effects observed in empirical studies (e.g., Medin & 




the problem of communication: if all words can take any meaning, how do we manage to 
communicate at all? The regularities of situations from our biology and culture, and the role 
of language and other communicative activities, among other things, serve as anchors that 
provide enough stability for “good enough” communication to happen (Casasanto & Lupyan, 
2015; Connell & Lynott, 2014; Davis & Yee, 2021; see also Ferreira et al., 2002). An 
increasing number of researchers have reached this same conclusion, which is that, in 
essence, concepts have no cores and meaning is always ad hoc.  
 
2.2.4. Abstract concepts 
One challenge to grounded theories is the question of abstract concepts (Borghi et al., 2017; 
c.f., Dove, 2009, 2016; Mahon, 2015; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). Abstract concepts are 
usually defined as the opposite of concrete concepts, in which the referent of the word that 
stands for the concept can be experienced through one of the exteroceptive senses (e.g., 
Brysbaert et al., 2014). The concreteness of a word is usually assessed in tasks whereby 
participants are given lists of words and asked to rank their materiality using point scales 
(e.g., Altarriba et al., 1999; Paivio et al., 1968). Words that present low averages on these 
concreteness scales are considered to stand for abstract concepts. Supporters of the amodal 
view have debated how mental representations for categories without sensory referents, such 
as ‘freedom’, ‘gist’, or ‘vanity’, are grounded (see Dove, 2009, 2016; Mahon & Caramazza, 
2008). Considering that emotion categories such as ‘joy’, ‘grief’, and ‘shame’ tend to score 
on the low end of the spectrum in these concreteness scales (see Brysbaert et al., 2014) and 
that Barrett and colleagues treat emotions as abstract categories (Barrett et al., 2014; 
Hoemann, Wu et al., 2020; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011), it is important to examine the 
different theoretical positions around the nature and representation of abstract concepts.  
 
Amodal symbols can allegedly effortlessly manage the levels of abstraction required to 
handle non-perceptual material (e.g., Dove, 2009). However, grounded theories of mental 
representation have come up with multiple proposals to deal with the problems posed by 
these concepts. One early proposal argued that abstract concepts can be reflections of 
concrete concepts grounded in the sensorimotor apparatus through metaphorical language 
(e.g., Lakoff & M. Johnson, 1980). Metaphors, however, seem limited in their potential to 
describe the diversity and multiplicity of abstract concepts (for a discussion, see Barsalou, 




internal experience. Such elements have included introspection (e.g., values, beliefs) (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005), affective states (e.g., Kousta et al., 
2011; Vigliocco et al., 2014), and metacognition (i.e., the ability to track cognitive states) 
(Borghi et al., 2018). This approach has been relatively successful, as some empirical 
evidence suggests that abstract concepts can be bootstrapped to affective states (Kousta et al., 
2011) and introspection (Zdrazilova et al., 2018). The third line of proposals are those which 
argue that abstract concepts can be represented through language. These claims are often in 
the form of those previously presented hybrid models that include both linguistic 
representations and simulation, and in which things like the distributional structure of 
language (Andrews et al., 2009) or the work words perform in social contexts (e.g., Borghi et 
al., 2019) contribute to the flexibility of the conceptual system, providing knowledge, and 
allowing the construction of concepts whose referents cannot be related to the senses. 
Whether through metaphors, internal experience, or language, most observers agree that the 
representation of abstract words probably requires the use of a combination of all sources of 
information, each contributing to different degrees in the various contexts and tasks where 
the different forms of abstract concepts appear (for a discussion, see Dove, 2016). 
 
A complementary proposal grounds abstract concepts through the various modalities in the 
elements of a situation. For a while, empirical evidence has recognised the importance of 
context in constructing concepts in general and abstract concepts in particular (e.g., Barsalou 
& Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005; for a review, see Yee & 
Thompson-Schill, 2016). The dynamicity of conceptualization in relation to the context in 
grounded models synergistically fits the ideas of situated cognition, which give background 
situations a central role in the processes of the representational system (Barsalou, 2003, 2009, 
2016a, 2019; Barsalou et al., 2018; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). According to this view, concepts 
are not processed in isolation as a list of their properties, but rather, conceptual knowledge 
includes all sorts of external and internal situational elements from the context where the 
category is encountered, including the settings, objects, actions, emotions, and motivations 
surrounding the occasion. This model recognises a person’s embeddedness in its context, 
highlighting the role of the representational system to support situated action and bridging the 






While the situated conceptualization framework will be further developed in the next chapter, 
it is important to note that the latest iteration of this model regards the distinction between 
abstract and concrete concepts as a ‘misnomer’ (Kiefer & Barsalou, 2013) and argues for 
moving beyond this distinction (Barsalou et al., 2018). Because both abstract and concrete 
concepts are grounded in situations, and situations include both external and internal 
elements, all concepts include elements that are stereotypically considered concrete and 
abstract to a different degree; there is no real boundary between these two kinds of concepts. 
 
Overall, the cumulative body of work reviewed suggests the multiplicity of available 
frameworks through which to describe the human representational system. The most recent 
iterations seem to have moved away from amodal symbols and embraced the multiple 
sources of information that contribute to the construction of mental representations. Most 
importantly, the newest models seem to agree that concepts and meanings are constructed ad 
hoc and that abstract concepts, such as emotions, incorporate elements from the context that 
are both internal and external. Capturing all these developments, Barsalou’s situated 
conceptualization framework (2005; 2009. 2016a), I believe is the best framework suited to 
the task of describing how the representational system works. This framework will be further 
developed in chapter three. For now, however, I turn my attention to the science 
communication literature, assessing the theoretical discussion about this emerging discipline 
and how emotions factor into its study. 
 
2.3. The study of science communication  
At the centre of this thesis is the conceptualization of science communication as a cultural 
mosaic composed of a collection of subcultural spaces. However, to show how I arrive at this 
perspective, it must be contrasted with the dominant view of science communication as a 
series of models for transferring information (Bucchi, 2008; Trench, 2008). Discussions 
about the values, goals, and worldviews implicit in each of these models serve as a vehicle 
towards reframing science communication as culture. As such, in this section, I review the 
main framework currently used to describe science communication. I then present several 
alternative conceptualizations, particularly those that approximate my definition of science 
communication as culture. Following this, I develop my framework for studying science 





2.3.1. The three-model view of science communication 
The study of science communication as a subdiscipline is relatively recent18. It was only in 
the early 1990s with the appearance of the first journal dedicated exclusively to science 
communication – The Public Understanding of Science – when a systematic theoretical and 
empirical program of assessing the public communication of science acquired its own 
identity (Bucchi, 2008). In its effort to distinguish the communication of science from the 
communication of other social practices (e.g., politics, sports, fashion), the newly minted 
discipline introduced various frameworks to articulate its nature. 
 
Much of what has been written about the theoretical underpinnings of science communication 
has defined communication in terms of the transfer of knowledge (Bucchi, 2008). Initially 
introduced in Shannon and Weaver’s Mathematical Theory of Communication (1963), early 
transmission models of communication describe it as a simple linear one-way line between 
two points. Further theoretical developments increased the model’s complexity, assuming 
multiple communication channels coming from different sources and interacting in parallel, 
drawing a richer ecosystem of networked sources, mediums, and arrangements for conveying 
information between different actors. The development of the three main models of science 
communication – from deficit to dialogue and participation – corresponds to these 
developments from simple linear one-way models of communication as transmission to its 
more sophisticated networked versions. 
 
These three models have been constitutive of both the study and practice of science 
communication. Trench (2008) describes them as part of a ‘grand narrative’ of the discipline, 
whereby before the 1990s, most science communication practices were conceptualised using 
the deficit model (experts filling “knowledge gaps” of non-expert audiences), but since then, 
there has been a trend towards more dialogic and inclusive forms of engagement. This 
narrative has established the limits of the field, constituted the identities of its scholars and 
practitioners, and established many of the practices through which science communication 
regulates itself (Davies & Horst, 2016); it is still very much part of the language used in the 
field both by academics and practitioners, serving as the discipline’s shared collection of 
 
18 Work in the rhetoric of science, the philosophy of science, the history of science, science education, science and technology studies and 
communication studies touched on issues about the communication of science to non-scientists before the creation of science communication 




meanings that constitute much of its practices and analytical frameworks (Davies & Horst, 
2016; Perrault, 2013; Trench, 2008). 
 
Notably, each of the three models is sometimes presented as having different, contrasting, 
and competing sets of values, beliefs, norms, goals, and worldviews (i.e., cultural mandates) 
(e.g., Perrault, 2013; Metcalfe, 2019, Trench, 2008). These reflect deeper ideas about the 
aims of science communication, how it should be practised, and its value in our societies, 
among other things (see Davies, 2021; Medvecky & Leach, 2019; Perrault, 2013). In that 
sense, deficit-style models have been characterized as paternalistic, top-down, hierarchical, 
and instrumental (e.g., Hilgartner, 1990) while dialogic and participatory models are 
generally described as tending towards more egalitarian and democratic worldviews (e.g., 
Durant, 1999; Priest, 2018). Although the classification of science communication activities 
in a tri-partite model and the unidimensional dichotomization of their ideological shell masks 
the heterogeneity and complexity of the cultural mandates in its practices and products (see 
Davies, 2021), this taxonomy serves as a steppingstone towards the conceptualization of 
science communication as a mosaic cultural space with a wide variety of values, beliefs, 
norms, goals, and worldviews. 
  
In what follows, I briefly describe these three ways of thinking about and practising science 
communication, reviewing some of their cultural mandates, and highlighting some of the 
challenges presented to each of these. I will argue that a reconceptualization of these models 
in terms of the values, beliefs, norms, goals, and worldviews shared by researchers and 
practitioners, can set the stage for the constructionist conceptualization of science 
communication as a multiplicity of cultural spaces developed in the next chapter.  
 
2.3.1.1. The deficit model of science communication 
The deficit model19 presupposes the existence of two kinds of people: the scientist and the 
general public. The former is envisioned as having important scientific knowledge that the 
 
19 After various surveys through the 70s and 80s consistently showed little improvement in the general population’s scientific knowledge in 
countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the science literacy movement galvanized in these countries to push for increasing 
the levels of public knowledge of basic scientific facts, processes, and science-related policy issues (S. Miller, 2001). This was a concerted 
public effort to increase scientific knowledge both through education and communication campaigns; efforts which were epitomized in the 
work of J.D. Miller (1983) and the Public Understanding of Science (PUS) movement (Bodmer, 1985) who argued that science communication 
should encourage people to make better rational decisions, have a basic knowledge of scientific facts accompanied by positive attitudes 
towards science, support technocracy as a form of management of public affairs, reject superstition and pseudoscience, and increase support 




latter does not (Bucchi, 2008; Trench, 2008). Because scientific knowledge is seen as 
rational, objective, and progressive, the content of the ‘science of the day’ is universal and 
hence communicable in every context without much alteration (Bucchi, 2008). This black-
box version of science does not account for the many social, political and economic aspects 
of how science is made, the uncertainty in its results, and the idiosyncrasies and biases of 
scientists, among other things (Perrault, 2013). Furthermore, although the general public is 
understood as a passive actor, they are rational nonetheless, hence they take incoming 
scientific information a-critically, as they are thought to understand this type of knowledge as 
superior to other forms. A form of positivism and scientism serves then as much of the 
ideological backdrop to the cultural mandates behind the deficit model (Perrault, 2013; 
Trench, 2008; Wynne, 2006)20. 
 
According to these deficit-style views of science communication, its products and practices 
serve a variety of functions that aim primarily at sustaining the privileged place of science in 
society. The public is ignorant or even hostile about science; a problem that is fixed through 
communicating effectively the ‘science of the day’ to either fill in the ‘knowledge gap’ or to 
change their beliefs and behaviours that are seen as irrational or noxious (Bucchi, 2008; 
Lewenstein, 2003; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009). Moreover, deficit-style science 
communication also aims at cementing the provision of political, financial, and human 
resources to maintain and increase scientific activity. This is done through activities that 
increase support for science funding (Scheufele, 2014), promote science as a potential career 
choice (Trench & Junker, 2001), and market science in ways that grow the public’s positive 
attitudes towards it (Trench, 2008), among other things (see Metcalfe, 2019). Instrumental 
and strategic concerns characterize many of the goals of much of this type of science 
communication (see Priest, 2018). More importantly, many of the values, beliefs, norms and 
goals underwritten in deficit-style practices constitute hierarchically structured dynamics 
such as those between scientists and the public, knowers and learners, and science and 
society (Hilgartner, 1990). 
  
 
20 Perrault (2013) links the deficit model to an attitude of science boosterism, whereby communication practices revel in the wonders of science 
and practitioners see themselves as filling in a lack or void in consumers’ minds (Perrault, 2013). Popular symbols of science communication 
such as the TV series NOVA, outlets such as Scientific American, and the work of science popularisers such as Carl Sagan and Richard Dawkins 




Many of the issues that have been identified with deficit-style science communication 
practices and research have to do with these hierarchical ideological underpinnings. First of 
all, the model defines scientists and the public in a very broad and homogenous way 
(Perrault, 2013). It does not recognize that scientists outside their field of speciality are part 
of the public, and that the public includes various stakeholder groups that have different 
degrees of interest in the scientific topics of the day. Second, it ignores that communication, 
besides being non-linear, is also neither a discrete nor a one-way process (Bucchi, 2008; 
Trench, 2008). The different actors provide and receive continuous feedback through which 
they constantly adjust their messaging. This view rather presents a static view of science 
communication that fails to allow for the gradual shifts that occur in the way messages are 
performed and packaged. Third, the deficit model also mostly overlooks the contexts in 
which science communication occurs (Lewenstein, 2003). For the most part, the histories, 
idiosyncrasies, and social conditions of the people involved are not considered (Nisbet & 
Scheufele, 2009). Replacing the diverse, non-linear, and networked contexts in which 
different sociocultural realities meet in science communication for a stratified, static, and 
simplistic view of communication is perhaps the reason why the deficit model fails to engage 
people in the way that practitioners aspire (Lewenstein, 2003; Perrault, 2013). 
 
Despite this, the deficit model continues to be the preferred model for science 
communication, not just in its practices (Simis et al., 2016), but also research on science 
communication, which continues to frame the discipline in terms of audience knowledge gaps 
(Suldovsky, 2016). In many studies, the public is problematized as irrational, biased, and 
subjective, needing to be cured at an individual level (F. Mellor, 2018). This view does not 
acknowledge the role that cultural, social, and political forces play in the contexts in which 
science gets communicated, driving researchers towards simplistic laboratory stimulus-
response studies (see Chapman et al., 2017). Importantly, this issue disregards qualitative 
case studies that may give a much more complete, and complex, picture of how scientific 
knowledge is communicated in specific contexts (Lewenstein, 2017). Problematizing the 
public as the source of conflict, seeing science as a black-box, and not acknowledging the 
many contextual factors involved in the science being communicated, are just some of the 
many lingering issues that reveal the ideological commitment of the deficit model to the 





2.3.1.2. The dialogue model of science communication 
By the late 1990s, the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) 
suggested the need to “enhance public access to science and scientists with a view to 
improving public confidence and stimulating open debate about science and technology” 
(Trench, 2006, p. 2). This signalled an already occurring move21 in the practice of science 
communication, from a top-down, one-way, homogenous streak, towards an open, two-way 
conversation, known as the transition “from deficit to dialogue” (Trench, 2008, p. 120). 
 
This change translated into public outreach programs, consensus conferencing, national 
hearings, focus groups, open debates, cafés scientifique, and various other formats that 
function to reapproach the scientific community and the public on a variety of issues, such as 
genetically modified foods (e.g., Horlick-Jones et al., 2007) and nanotechnology (e.g., 
Krabbenborg, 2012). This includes activities aimed at gaining insight into different public 
attitudes and beliefs of science (Bucchi, 2008, Scheufele, 2014) and learning from lay-experts 
(Irwin, 2014; Trench & Junker, 2001). Importantly, issues of trust became central to 
discussions about the goals of science communication (Wynne, 2006). Science museums, 
research institutions, universities, and other organizations seeking to improve people’s 
attitudes towards science and scientists, also turned to engagement activities, such as science 
festivals (e.g., Bultitude et al., 2011), education outreach (e.g., Jeffers et al., 2004), and social 
media (e.g., Brossard, 2013), whereby science communicators interact regularly with target 
audiences to cultivate their trust. In parallel, there were numerous calls for science 
communication to function as a place for the transparency and accountability of science 
towards the public (Bucchi, 2008). Today, the language of dialogue, which questions much of 
the hierarchical worldview of deficit-style science communication, is deeply embedded in 
many science communication practices (Irwin, 2014). 
 
However, various issues have been pointed out about a dialogic understanding of science 
communication. Perrault (2013) points out that as with the deficit models, science in most 
dialogue models is still seen as an unproblematic institution. Engagement is then a potential 
manipulative tool for reaching a specific political, financial, or ideological goal that could 
 
21 After a series of science-related issues that undermined public trust in science starting in the 1980s (e.g., Bhopal crisis, AIDS, ‘mad cow 





arise from related scientific research. Issues about the science that might cast doubt over its 
practices and products are usually assuaged or ignored. In that sense, scientism and 
technocracy continue being much of the ideological underpinnings of this form of science 
communication. While the goal of the dialogue models is not getting people to “simply” 
understand the science of the day, its aims can still be dubious, especially if it fosters 
uncritical views of the science at hand (Lewenstein, 2003; Perrault, 2013)22.  
 
More importantly, dialogic views of science communication continue focusing on public 
deficits; not about knowledge but rather about issues such as engagement and trust (Bauer et 
al., 2007; Davies, 2011; Wynne, 2006). Over the past few decades, researchers of science 
communication have become increasingly concerned with measuring people’s confidence, 
agreement, expectations, and support for scientific practices and products, measured through 
batteries of multi-dimensional attitude questionnaires that have tried to capture the public’s 
general demeanour towards science (e.g., Hendriks et al., 2016). Although many of these 
studies try to incorporate the psychological complexity of the relation between the audiences 
and science, contextualizing this dynamic by adding measures on people’s values, identity, 
and worldviews to their surveys, these continue to rely on the assumption that science 
communication should aim at changing the public’s minds, and that the public should go 
through this attitudinal and belief transformation (Perrault, 2013). 
 
In sum, dialogue-style practices are usually recognized as an improvement over the deficit-
style hierarchical view of science communication (e.g., Lewenstein, 2003; Perrault, 2013). 
However, these do not fully commit towards establishing an even relation between science 
and the public, open spaces for a critical assessment of the issues, or acknowledge the fluidity 
of the communicative activity. Addressing the continuation of some of these imbalances is 





22 Questions about the efficacy of its practices have also been raised. Dialogue events are supposed to foster different forms of feedback from 
the public. The question about how much of the feedback gets taken into account into the products and practices of science is a question that 
is up for debate (see Einsiedel, 2008). Moreover, it is unclear whether dialogic activities such as festivals, actually change the public’s views, 
attitudes, trust, or knowledge around science issues (e.g., Wiehe, 2014). While some evidence suggests the importance of engagement activities 
assuaging people’s concerns and improving their attitudes about an issue (e.g., Walls et al., 2010), other studies also suggest these fall short 




2.3.1.3. Participatory models of science communication 
The participation model is, in many ways, an extension of the dialogue model. Both can exist 
in a continuum of two-way engagement activities where both scientific knowledge and 
various audiences interact (Trench, 2008). However, the power relations between actors in 
these two models are conceptualised differently. Whereas in the dialogue model decisions are 
ultimately placed in the realm of science, the participatory model of science communication 
takes power away from the scientist and places it with other stakeholders – many times those 
who have been traditionally disempowered as players within the deliberation process (Davies 
& Horst, 2016). Here, the public’s knowledge is not seen as of inferior value but rather 
qualitatively different from scientific knowledge (Bucchi, 2008). Herein is the main 
difference between the dialogue and participatory models of science. While the former takes 
many of the power asymmetries for granted, the latter aims to solve, or at least recognise, the 
existence of such differences in part through practices of co-production of knowledge 
(Bucchi, 2008; Durant, 1999). This kind of democratic and egalitarian worldviews permeate 
participation-style practices, aiming to redress some of the many social, economic, and 
political inequalities that science and its communication have generated and helped 
perpetuate.  
 
The co-production of knowledge in the participation models occurs within a network of 
participants in multidimensional spaces where interactions are open-ended, continuous, and 
potentially conflictual (Bucchi, 2008; Bucchi & Neresini, 2007; Davies & Horst, 2016; 
Metcalfe, 2019; Perrault, 2013). The direct relationship between scientific knowledge and the 
public disappear, complicating the dynamics between the many actors through time, and 
constraining the parsimony of linear representations of this relationship. Moreover, thinking 
of the cultural dynamics in these interactions means that science is not treated as a ‘black-
box’ in these formats (Perrault, 2013). Rather, science is seen as a cultural institution, where 
experts are treated like any other member of society, and techno-scientific issues are dealt as 
having a political nature (Bucchi & Neresini, 2008). This opens science up to scrutiny, given 
that other stakeholders can critically assess the practices, norms, and ideas in their merits and 
failings, being able to raise concerns about risk, ethics, equity, participation, legitimacy, 
transparency, or other issues that may arise in the interface between science and society 
(Einsiedel, 2008). Subsequently, one of the main goals of participatory-style models is to 




and economic aspects of science (Nisbet and Scheufele, 2009) and criticize science when it is 
due (Perrault, 2013). 
 
There are issues, however, with participatory-style models. Besides the costs and scalability 
that they share with dialogic models (France et al., 2017; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009), certain 
actors feel challenged due to participatory formats’ open-ended and political nature, where 
conflict is an inherent feature. Individuals and institutions not comfortable with these may 
feel an urge to “tame unruly public participation” (Bucchi & Neresini, 2008, p. 463) through 
the sponsoring of very formal activities. These sponsored formats may hide the fact that 
institutions have already taken decisions beforehand, with these formats becoming a cover for 
public legitimation (Bucchi & Neresini, 2008). Many participatory activities then tend to 
devolve into a dialogic format. This relates to perhaps a more insidious issue about 
participatory frameworks in that many such practices mask the power imbalances that exist 
through society (Davies & Horst, 2016). While many of these formats explicitly state the role 
of levelling the playing field for the various stakeholders, these can also create the “illusion 
of a dominance-free space” (Phillips, 2011, pp. 53–54) hiding the many deep social, 
economic, cultural, and political inequalities that exist in contemporary societies. While some 
practical issues of participation formats have straightforward solutions in terms of, opening 
spaces, getting access to resources, and changing how participatory spaces are set up, others 
such as the many entrenched and unstated power asymmetries of participatory forums where 
science knowledge is part of the discussion may be harder to recognise and tackle. 
 
Together, the deficit, dialogue, and participatory models of science communication represent 
the central attempts by the discipline to categorise and understand the different science 
communication formats, processes, and functions, in a taxonomy that allows for a structured 
analysis of the many spaces where these activities take place while at the same time creating 
a coherent narrative of the discipline’s evolution through time (Davies & Horst, 2016). 
However, various authors have pointed out the many issues confronting this classification 
scheme that go from its lack of historical awareness to their use of a limited definition of 
communication (e.g., Broks, 2006; Bucchi, 2008; Davies & Horst, 2016; Horst & Michael, 
2011; Michael, 2002; Trench, 2008). There are many reasons why these models have been so 
pervasive in science communication research, including the influence of transfer metaphors 




to relive the entire history of communication studies in just three decades (Trench, 2006), and 
the force that the ‘from deficit to dialogue’ grand narrative has had in the demarcation and 
constitution of the field (Davies & Horst, 2016; Trench, 2008). 
 
While imperfect, however, these three models can be seen as reflecting the contrasting and 
competing sets of values, beliefs, norms, goals, and worldviews present in science 
communication that serve as a backdrop to many of its products and practices (see Metcalfe, 
2019). While the ideological core in many deficit-style activities reflects a top-down 
understanding of science communication’s role in society, dialogic- and participatory-style 
conventions address in different ways some of these hierarchies. The cited studies that have 
pointed towards the various worldviews and cultural mandates that permeate each of these 
three different models serve as a steppingstone that moves us away from the 
conceptualization of communication as transmission, towards rethinking of science 
communication as a mosaic cultural space. 
 
2.3.2. The study of science communication as culture 
Over the last few decades, an increasing number of researchers have questioned the transfer 
metaphor and begun to frame research in terms of meaning-making. These authors have 
asked questions about the role of science communication in the formation of identity (e.g., 
Davies & Horst, 2016), the preservation of power structures (e.g., Hilgartner, 1990; Wynne, 
1992) and the circulation of different discourses (e.g., Fuller, 1998; Myers, 2003; Perrault, 
2013) among other issues. They also have highlighted the importance of practices such as 
ritual (e.g., Blue, 2019) and performance (e.g., Hilgartner, 2000), analysed the production, 
circulation, and consumption of cultural artefacts (e.g., Macdonald, 2002) and observed 
differences in epistemologies (e.g., Jasanoff, 2011) and framing schemas (e.g., Nisbet et al., 
2009). This ‘cultural turn’ in science communication studies (Blue, 2019, p. 4) has 
highlighted the need for new analytical frameworks to study the subject. 
 
Various authors have taken the task of proposing new analytical frameworks for studying 
science communications that go beyond the three-partite model. Some of these propose 
studying science communication as an emergent event (Horst & Michael, 2011) using actor-
network theories to describe it (Davies, 2018), rethinking the practices in terms of Carey’s 




humans and non-humans interact as rhizomic organisms (Michael, 2002) or through a koru 
model that uses a tree as a metaphor for the interconnectedness and flow of its many products 
and practices (Longnecker, 2016). More recently, research has begun to focus on the 
communicative values, goals, and worldviews that permeate science communication 
activities. These have come up with taxonomies that acknowledge the variety of cultural 
mandates beyond the ‘from deficit to dialogue and participation’ narrative (e.g., Davies, 
2021). These recent re-conceptualizations of science communication are trying to move the 
researcher’s attention to the role of meaning-making, addressing the representational systems 
and ideologies that permeate much of its practices and products, and situating its different 
manifestations in context. 
 
In the theoretical and analytical framework chapter, I will introduce a constructionist version 
of science communication as a mosaic cultural space, borrowing from theorists such as 
historian Peter Broks (2006), STS scholars Sara Davies and Maja Horst (2016), rhetorician 
Sarah Tinker Perrault (2013), and science education researcher Glen Aikenhead (1996), 
among others. In doing so, I aim to position science communication properly as a distinctive 
cultural space, one held together, constituted, and reconstituted by a shared set of meanings, 
passed on to others through social learning in the practices and products of this space. More 
importantly, I will argue that science communication is composed of a mosaic of subcultures, 
each of which contains different cultural mandates and which are in constant interaction 
within larger cultural frameworks.  
 
For now, I turn to the final section of this literature review, where I provide a brief overview 
of the study of emotions in science communication, drawing more closely toward my 
particular empirical focus on the role of awe in the culture of science communication. 
 
2.3.3. Emotions in science communication research 
Although a complete review of the research of emotion in science communication is well 
beyond the scope of this research, it is worth highlighting that, for the most part, these studies 
take the classical view of emotions and a transmission understanding of communication. 
Most of these studies can be organised into three groups. First is the research that investigates 
the role of emotions in the processing and communication of risk information. Empirical 




relatively common in health communication (e.g., Witte & Allen, 2000) and most recently in 
environmental communication, in particular, climate change communication (e.g., 
Leiserowitz, 2006; Meijnders et al., 2001). Risk communication is the most robust area in the 
study of emotions in science communication yet has relatively low relevance to the present 
thesis.  
 
Second is the literature that examines the role of emotions in the formation and change of 
people’s knowledge, beliefs, motivations, perceptions, behaviours, and other cognitive 
processes on various science communication topics. These studies have used both 
correlational (e.g., Doherty & Clayton, 2011, N. Smith & Leiserowitz, 2014, Ojala, 2012) 
and experimental methods (Bilandzic et al., 2017, O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009, Lu & 
Schuldt, 2015) to describe the relationship between emotions such as hope, guilt, fear, and 
grief and a particular cognitive event. Overall, these studies have observed how emotions and 
messages framed to elicit emotional reactions can have a persuasive effect, changing people’s 
attitudes and behaviours towards science-related topics such as climate change.  
 
The instrumentalist view of emotions taken in most of these studies, however, has been 
criticised for ignoring the complexities of the interactions between context, cognition, and 
affect, for disregarding the ethical issues that manipulations of this sort might invoke, and for 
discounting the wealth of moral knowledge that emotions can contribute to important 
discussions about issues as urgent as climate change (Chapman et al., 2017; Roeser, 2012). 
These studies have treated emotions as “simple levers to be pulled to promote the desired 
outcomes” (Chapman et al., 2017, p. 850) rather than being part of a “more complex and 
integrated interpretive and learning system” (Chapman et al., 2017, p. 851). For most of these 
studies, emotions are either catalysts or barriers to the effective transfer of information, 
failing to consider the contextual dynamics of meaning-making processes, the cultural and 
historical contingent nature of the categories of emotion used, and the variety of ways in 
which these are experienced and expressed, among other things.  
 
Finally, some studies have looked at how people and cultural artefacts represent emotions on 
topics related to science communication. For example, studies of social representations of 
climate change done through interviews of people in various European countries (Fischer et 




engineers (Lefsrud & R. E. Meyer, 2012) and Tibetan villagers (Byg & Salick, 2009) have 
found the critical role that emotion categories such as anxiety, fear, guilt, and worry, play in 
how these participants talked about climate change (Wang et al., 2018). Similarly, in 
interviews with science communicators and members of the public, Davies (2019) identified 
the negotiated nature of how people talk about emotional states such as wonder and interest at 
science events. In addition, a few studies have investigated representations of emotions in 
science communication cultural artefacts. Thagard (2002), for example, examined the word 
counts of stereotypically positive and negative emotion categories in James Watson’s classic 
book The Double Helix. The author found that emotion words, particularly positive emotions 
such as happiness and interest, were common in the description of scientific work, with both 
positive and negative emotions used to describe the scientist’s motivations. In another study 
related to climate change, Höijer (2010) observed in the Swedish press and television how 
this issue’s communication is often anchored on emotions such as compassion, fear, guilt, 
hope, and nostalgia. Most recently, researchers have begun to look for representations of 
emotion in a broader variety of science communication cultural artefacts, including 
comments on social media websites (Hwong et al., 2017), non-fictional medical television 
programs (Verhoeven, 2008), and pop music (Huang & Allgaier, 2014). 
 
While some of this work acknowledges the impact of emotions in the construction of 
people’s perception of risk (e.g., Görke & Ruhrmann, 2003), their construction of climate 
change (e.g., Nerlich & Jaspal, 2014), and in the constitution of identity (e.g., Lefsrud & R. 
E. Meyer, 2012; Norgaard, 2006), no study has looked at the learning of emotions from their 
engagement with science communication or the distinct and various ways in which these are 
represented within this cultural space. Rather, emotions are largely taken for granted as 
universal categories existing a priori, utilising variations of the classical view of emotions 
including explicitly naming basic emotions theories (e.g., Nabi et al., 2018; N. Smith & 
Leiserowitz, 2014) or appraisal models (e.g., Bilandzic et al., 2017; Feldman & Hart, 2015; 
Lu & Schuldt, 2015; Volkman & Parrott, 2012) or rather implicitly without describing their 
nature (e.g., Davies, 2019; Simons et al., 2009; N. Smith et al., 2011; Thagard, 2002). Even 
those studies that have suggested a reassessment of the way emotions are treated in science 
communication in general, and climate change communication in particular (e.g., Roeser, 
2012), ignore the various developments of affective sciences and the constructionist views of 




emotions in the study of science communication (Davies et al., 2019), no research program 
has taken these developments seriously into account. In that sense, this thesis is the first 
attempt to use the constructionist account of emotions to study their role in the 
communication of science. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
In this first chapter, I have combed through a large swath of various literatures to describe the 
theoretical, analytical, and scholarly space that my work occupies. I critically assessed how 
most work on awe and emotions in science communication has taken a classical view of 
emotions – an increasingly outmoded paradigm for doing emotion research. Similarly, I 
observed how science communication research can move beyond the transfer metaphor using 
the deficit to dialogue to participation story as a steppingstone to the description of science 
communication as a mosaic culture with various subcultural spaces. Describing what came 
before, I can now move forward with presenting the framework used in my analysis: the 
situated conceptualization take of the constructionist view of emotions (particularly applied 
to the affective state of awe), as well as a constructionist argument to describe science 





Chapter three - Theoretical and analytical framework 
 
3. Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the theoretical and analytical framework underlying the studies in 
this thesis. First, I introduce Barsalou’s (2005, 2009, 2016a) grounded cognition model 
known as situated conceptualization. In particular, I focus on two aspects of this theoretical 
framework: the language and situated simulation theory (or LASS; Barsalou et al., 2008) and 
the brain as situation processing architecture hypothesis (or BASPA; Barsalou et al., 2018). 
In the next section, I present a version of the constructionist view of emotions which 
combines ideas from different authors. Here, I focus on the work of Barrett and her 
colleagues (e.g., Barrett, 2006b, 2012, 2017a; Gendron et al., 2020; Gendron & Barrett, 2018; 
Hoemann et al., 2019), which describes how a brain, wired by culture, constructs emotions as 
the result of the combination of various domain-general processes. I complement this 
material with other constructionist models of emotion that highlight how a culture moulds 
and constrains the construction of emotion (Mesquita et al., 2016; 2017) and how it can be 
understood as a kind of skill that is learned and cultivated (Hoemann et al., 2019; Hoemann, 
Nielson, et al., 2020). I conclude this section by proposing the situated conceptualization 
framework as an analytical scaffolding to the constructionist view of emotion presented in 
this chapter (see Lebois et al., 2018; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). 
 
I then turn my attention to the study of science communication from a constructionist 
perspective. Synthesizing different literatures, I conceptualize science communication as a 
mosaic cultural space nesting a variety of subcultural spheres with contrasting and competing 
cultural mandates and worldviews. I conclude with a brief integration exercise, putting 
together the constructionist view of emotions and science communication, to illustrate how 
awe is represented both mentally and socially in this cultural space.  
 
3.1. The situated conceptualization framework 
Barsalou’s situated conceptualization theory23 (e.g., Barsalou, 2003; Barsalou et al., 2008; 
Barsalou, 2009, 2016a; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006) is 
 
23 Although the situated conceptualization theory is arguably the best approximation we currently have of conceptual processing, multiple 
criticisms have been levied against the work of grounded cognition in general, and Barsalou’s work in particular. Scholars, for example, 
point out that the theory fails to acknowledge the possibility of amodal symbols (e.g., Dove, 2009; Machery, 2016), gives only a secondary 




largely an attempt to bridge grounded theories of knowledge (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2007; 
Prinz, 2004) with the physical and social environment in which the body is situated (e.g., 
Gibson, 1979). At the core of this framework is the idea that the human conceptual system 
evolved to support perception, cognition, and other processes that stand between stimuli and 
outcomes in the form of goal-directed action (see Barsalou, 2016b). This then is a 
comprehensive theory, one that not only accounts for mental representations and their role in 
cognitive, perceptual, and motor processes, but also connects a person’s internal milieu to the 
external physical and social worlds in which their body is located (Barsalou, 2016a, 2017a). 
 
3.1.1. Categories, conceptual knowledge, and concepts 
The human conceptual system holds the knowledge that people have acquired through 
experience in memory and uses this knowledge to support both basic and high-level cognitive 
processes (Barsalou, 2012). Barsalou (2016b) distinguishes between two kinds of processes 
in the conceptual system, which I will refer to as conceptual knowledge and concepts. The 
repeated interaction with a category in the external world (e.g., agents, objects, events) and 
mental experience (e.g., affect, metacognition) constitutes the conceptual knowledge of the 
category. This is stored in distributed systems in the form of a full brain mental 
representation (Barsalou, 2016a, 2016b, 2017b; Barsalou et al., 2018; Simmons & Barsalou, 
2003)24. Statistical learning mechanisms continuously encode conceptual knowledge in the 
brain in the form of a population of exemplars and limited abstractions that are dynamically 
changing as a person accumulates experiences throughout their lifetime with the category 
(e.g., Aslin, 2017; Barsalou, 1999; Xu & Kushnir, 2013). Mechanisms such as language, the 
brain’s organization, and the basic operations of the conceptual system (e.g., categorization, 
inference, propositions, productivity) constrain, modulate, and dynamically fine-tune the 
content of conceptual knowledge (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Lupyan & Lewis, 2019; Simmons & 
Barsalou, 2003). Conceptual knowledge never remains static, dynamically changing through 
a person’s lifetime as more exemplars, and more finely tuned abstractions accumulate (see 
also Connell & Lynott, 2014). 
 
 
2016; Löhr, 2019; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008), and does not recognise conceptual cores (e.g., Machery, 2015) (see the previous chapter). 
However, Barsalou’s account is, in my opinion, the most compelling to date, as it is backed by considerable empirical evidence (see 
Barsalou, 2003, 2007, 2020) and avoids the “quixotic dead ends” (Barsalou, 2016, p. 1122) of amodal theories and abstract concepts. 
24 This is similar to the idea of simulators in some presentations (Barsalou, 1999). The language used here is closer to that used in various 




Moreover, conceptual knowledge is stored throughout the brain within multiple 
representational systems. In particular, the simulation system grounded in the modalities, and 
the language system (Barsalou et al., 2008). The information of the simulations is distributed 
in representations in the various sensory-motor and interoceptive systems (e.g., smelling a 
rose, touching a rose, seeing a rose, holding a rose, feeling excitement for a rose) (Barsalou, 
1999, 2003) while linguistic information is encoded in its statistical relationships present in 
language use (Andrews et al., 2009; Connell & Lynott, 2013; Louwerse, 2008, 2011; 
Vigliocco et al., 2009)25. Conceptual knowledge in this framework is not the abstract symbols 
of amodal theories (c.f., Mahon, 2015, Machery, 2016) but is instead grounded in people’s 
perceptual, motor, interoceptive, social, and linguistic experiences26 (see also, Borghi et al., 
2017). 
 
On certain occasions, a small subset of conceptual knowledge of a category becomes 
activated to construct a multimodal concept representing the category (Barsalou, 2009, 
2016a). This second form of mental representation (i.e., concept) is an ad hoc situated 
conceptualization constructed on the spot as an aggregation of the information from the 
various representational systems (e.g., linguistic, simulation) integrating it to support situated 
action in a predictive fashion (Barsalou, 2016a; Barsalou et al., 2008, 2018; Lebois et al., 
2015). Concepts are highly flexible, resulting from the activation of conceptual knowledge 
unique to the particular circumstances in which they are created. This means that concepts 
have no fixed content that activates independently of context, but rather work as tools or 
skills to tackle the specifics of the situation in which they are constructed. As Connell and 
Lynott, (2014. p. 390) put it, “you can’t represent the same concept twice.” Hence, the study 
of people’s mental representations becomes the study of people’s skill to construct concepts 
dynamically in different situations and contexts (Barsalou, 2003). 
 
The human conceptual system performs different operations that support all cognitive 
processes (for reviews, see Barsalou, 1999, 2012, 2016c). First, concepts are necessary for 
categorization. Categorization is the ability to identify individual units by assigning them a 
 
25 Language is itself grounded in the modalities (e.g., Borghi et al., 2019) complicating, even more, the alleged distinction between the 
grounded and linguistic (distributional) systems in conceptual processing (see Davis & Yee, 2021). 
26 According to the situated conceptualization framework, conceptual knowledge contains information that includes the perceptual 
characteristics and motor affordances of a category, its relational structure to other categories (e.g., functions, goals), the internal states that 
accompany dealing with it (e.g., affect, mentalizing), and background information of the situation where the category was found (Barsalou, 




unit of conceptual knowledge. Through categorization, type-token relationships between an 
entity and a concept that are either true or false are established (i.e., propositions). 
Categorizations and propositions are not the objective of the conceptual system but rather 
serve to make inferences (Barsalou, 1999). The brain’s inferential abilities appear to be a 
central element of its functioning, as increasing evidence and models suggest that its 
architecture is organized for prediction (see A. Clark, 2013; Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019). 
Moreover, concepts can be mixed and combined in myriad ways in relation to the context, 
giving us the ability to produce potentially infinite new concepts. This combinatorial ability 
works in tandem with the language system to go beyond our sensory experience and through 
which we constitute the concepts that make our socio-cultural realities (see Lupyan, 2016). 
More importantly, concepts support all sorts of offline and online cognitive processes. These 
include high-level offline processes such as planning, episodic memory, problem-solving, 
and socio-cognitive activities on the one hand, and online activity such as pattern completion 
and the identification of the motor affordances of objects, among many other processes 
(Barsalou, 1999, 2005, 2012). More essential for the purposes of this thesis, conceptual 
processes are at the centre of the construction of emotions (Barrett, 2006b; Barrett et al., 
2014; Barrett, 2017a; Lebois et al., 2018; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011; Wilson-
Mendenhall, 2017; Wilson-Mendenhall & Barsalou, 2016). Through its various operations 
(e.g., categorization, inference) conceptual processes stand at the centre of all cognition as a 
domain-general system subject to all the biological and environmental constraints of our 
brains, bodies, and contexts (Barsalou, 2012). 
 
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that concepts are not randomly constituted, but are instead 
constructed statistically, a fact which helps to address the puzzle of how concepts with no 
core still seem similar across people (see Barsalou, 2017a). Concepts that are more easily 
constructed reflect the effects of frequency, recency, and context (Barsalou, 2003, 2009, 
2011). Lebois et al. (2015), for example, argue that concepts are constructed in a Bayesian 
manner, as a function of, on the one hand, information stored as conceptual knowledge from 
frequent and recent encounters with the category and, on the other hand, the information in 
the current context. A complementary account argues that because “we largely experience the 
same world” (Davis & Yee, 2021, p. 18), the statistical regularities we have encountered in 
our personal experience, as well as those of the current situation, allow people to construct 




(Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015; Connell & Lynott, 2014; Ferreira et al., 2002; Yee & 
Thompson-Schill, 2016). 
 
3.1.2. Language and situated simulation (LASS) 
Barsalou et al. (2008) argue that concepts are mainly the results of the interaction of the 
simulation and language systems, among the various representational processes occurring in 
the brain. The language and situated simulation (LASS) theory is a hybrid approach to 
explaining the dynamics of representation; it holds that, in a situated conceptualization, both 
simulation and linguistic systems are immediately engaged in conceptual processing. 
However, in most situations, the language system will activate first, providing faster 
information about the content of the concept. The information from the linguistic system rests 
on shallow associations between words, forming a network that is computationally and 
metabolically cheap. This heuristic shortcuts the much deeper processing in the simulation 
(Connell, 2019; Santos et al., 2011). Importantly, knowledge in the language system is 
organized in a network that resembles the statistical regularities found in natural language, as 
described by distributional theories (e.g., Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Vigliocco et al., 2009). 
In this early stage of conceptual processing, a concept is only partially grounded in 
language27, in that its referents temporarily are the words to which it is statistically related 
within the distributed network. Although shallow, the constituted concept can carry enough 
information to sort out a simple task that does not require deep processing. 
 
In parallel to the foregoing processes, the simulation system activates a few seconds after the 
language system (e.g., Simmons et al., 2008) 28. However, in the LASS, executive 
functioning focuses on the linguistic system until it “stops being useful” (Barsalou et al., 
2008, p. 250), after which a multimodal simulation becomes more engaged, partially re-
enacting the interaction with the category using stored perceptual, motor, interoceptive and 
 
27 Again, language itself is grounded in action, interoception, and perception (Barsalou, 2016c), particularly, in the mouth (Borghi et al., 2019). 
28 There is evidence that conceptual processing uses the linguistic system first while simulation processes occur later. Santos et al. (2011) 
observed that the early words produced in word association and property generation tasks were linguistically related while the latter ones 
describe properties of the category or the situation. De Deyne and Storms (2008a) also observed that property, situation, and introspective 
features were produced more frequently in the latter responses of a word association task while taxonomic and lexical responses declined as 
the task progressed. Finally, on a neuroimaging study, Simmons et al. (2008) observed that both systems became active from the beginning 
of a 15-second property generation task, but that the language system dominated the first 7.5 seconds while the simulation system took charge 
in the second half of the task. Moreover, the LASS suggests that differences in task activate in different proportions and time scales the 
different representational systems involved in conceptual processing. For example, Wu and Barsalou (2009) observed differences between 
tasks where word associations produced less simulation-based responses than those participants asked to generate properties or use mental 
imagery. While simulations may activate slower, in most situations, they are the dominant form of conceptual processing. This will be 




other such forms of knowledge. This includes information about the properties, relations, and 
situations of a category, providing in-depth understanding and the tools for its manipulation. 
Moreover, the spreading activation of the linguistic associates of a category in its distributed 
network may also activate the corresponding simulation of other categories, compounding the 
dynamicity of the interaction between systems. Similarly, the elements of the simulation that 
go online, constitute their linguistic forms, which in turn activate even more words within the 
network. This ongoing process carries on recursively as simulation and linguistic systems go 
back and forth constituting different forms of information, cueing more linguistic forms and 
simulations, and producing the complex conceptual processing to support all other cognitive 
activities for engaging with the situation at hand. 
 
It is worth highlighting that the constructs of the simulation and linguistic systems are 
intended to be understood as broad simplifications; they are spread throughout the brain and 
are dependent on an array of neurological systems that contribute to many other activities 
aside from conceptual processing (Barsalou et al., 2008). Moreover, these systems are 
interconnected, supporting each other in ways that researchers in this area are only beginning 
to understand (Connell, 2019; Connell & Lynott, 2013, 2014; Davis & Yee, 2021; Yee & 
Thompson-Schill, 2016). This complexity scales up, for example, when increasingly 
developed linguistic forms, such as phrases, sentences, narratives, and other forms of natural 
language usage in real-world interactions, are applied to the distinction between the 
simulation and the linguistic systems. Through these interactions between simulation and 
language, humans are able to construct concepts in flexible ways that far exceed the abilities 
of any other species on the planet. These ideas about the LASS serve as the theoretical and 
analytical backbone of the word association study in chapter six. 
 
3.1.3. The brain as a situation processing architecture (BASPA) 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Barsalou’s model is the idea that concepts are never 
constructed in a way that is disconnected from the contexts in which they occur. Rather, they 
are constructed to support situated action (Barsalou, 2016b, 2019; Barsalou et al., 2018; Yeh 
& Barsalou, 2006). Conceptual knowledge of a category in the form of perceptual symbols 
includes information about the background (i.e., situation) where the object is experienced 
(see Barsalou, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2016a). When the brain constructs a concept, it uses this 




situation29, supporting the interface of the body and its goals (see Casasanto & Lupyan, 
2015). The ad hoc construction of concepts in a situation is called a situated 
conceptualization (Barsalou 2003; 2009; 2016a)30. According to Barsalou et al. (2018), 
situated conceptualization is the brain’s central processing function.  
 
These authors argue that the processing of the structure of a situation is reflected in the 
brain’s physical structure (i.e., BASPA; Barsalou et al., 2018). According to this hypothesis, 
the brain’s architecture comprises two kinds of multimodal neural systems: systems that 
process situational elements and those that integrate these elements into more extensive 
arrangements around their co-occurrence (Barsalou et al., 2018, p. 2). The first of these 
neural systems stores conceptual knowledge and constructs concepts for the independent 
elements of a situation. When a person repeatedly experiences a situation, its co-occurring 
external and internal elements are stored in memory as conceptual knowledge of those 
independent elements. These elements are captured by particular neural networks, each of 
which provides a continuous stream of information about a specific kind of both external and 
internal element. The authors identify neural networks for external situational elements such 
as settings (e.g., classroom, pub), objects (e.g., scissors, apple), agents (e.g., friend, dog), 
physical actions (e.g., thrown, kneel), and physical outcomes (e.g., bake a pie, finish the 
essay), as well as internal elements including self-relevance (e.g., hospitality, elegance), 
motivation (e.g., curiosity, interest), affect (e.g., tiredness, excitement), and mentalizing (e.g., 
thinking, questioning) (Barsalou et al., 2018). Each of these networks is continuously 
constructing situated conceptualizations (i.e., concepts) for each of the independent elements 
of a situation (e.g., settings, objects, agents, affect) as a person moves through the world from 
situation to situation. 
 
The authors also suggest a second kind of neural system that stores and processes conceptual 
knowledge about the many different relations between the external and internal elements in a 
situation. These systems produce situated conceptualizations that integrate the various 
information streams from the first system into a coherent totality (Barsalou et al., 2018). 
Different kinds of such situational integrators develop along with the different forms of 
 
29 Yeh and Barsalou (2007) define a situation as a “region of perceived space that surrounds a focal entity over some temporal duration, 
perceived from the subjective perspective of the agent” (p. 353) 




relational structures between the internal and external elements in a situation, including goal-
directed action (e.g., eating, borrowing), causal chains (e.g., prompt, finish), and themes (e.g., 
kitchen items, musical instruments). Whichever relations are learned as situational 
integrators, these can later be used as tools for interpreting the environment, predicting 
potential events through inferences, and allowing for goal-directed interaction, among other 
things. 
 
Notably, the BASPA scraps the distinction between concrete and abstract concepts. The 
authors introduce a more sophisticated taxonomy, one in which, on the one hand, some 
concepts refer to internal situational elements and some to external situational elements, and, 
on the other hand, some conceptualizations produce situational elements while others 
produce situational integrations (Barsalou et al., 2018). Although the first distinction between 
external and internal situational elements seems similar to the customary concrete/abstract 
division, the second element of categorization highlights how so-called concrete and abstract 
concepts include external and internal information. For example, the word ‘couch’ can refer 
to the concept for the external object in a situation (i.e., a piece of furniture). However, a 
‘couch’ is also always part of a relational structure (e.g., sitting, lounging, hanging out) which 
integrates agents (e.g., friends), physical actions (e.g., laying down), objects (e.g., cushions), 
settings (e.g., living rooms), affect (e.g., pleasure), goals (e.g., bonding), motivation (e.g., to 
relax), and so on. More importantly, so-called abstract concepts (e.g., freedom, feud, truth, 
criticism) work for the most part as situational integrators - relational structures that hold 
together external and internal situational elements. 
 
The BASPA provides an account of the mechanisms through which concepts carry with them 
information about their properties and the situations in which they are embedded. Concepts 
are never constructed in a vacuum, but rather they are always in a relational structure with 
other concepts that co-occur in time. The analytical framework through which I describe the 
elements of situations in chapters five and seven is based on the BASPA.  
 
I now move to a constructionist description of emotions, a theoretical framework that has 
taken much inspiration from Barsalou’s ideas, to explain the mechanisms through which 





3.2. A constructionist view of emotion 
According to the constructionist view of emotions31, emotions are emergent mental 
phenomena that result from the dynamic interface between domain-general processes in the 
brain and a body embedded in a socio-cultural context (Barrett, 2006b, 2017a; Boddice, 
2018; Gendron et al., 2020). These domain-general processes are the product of our 
evolutionary history and are generally involved in all cognitive affairs, such as memory, 
perception, and reasoning (Barrett, 2009, 2013). In the next section, I go through the domain-
general ingredients that make an emotion, exploring how these interact to constitute the 
situated experience of emotion and its practice in the sociocultural world.  
 
3.2.1. Domain general processes 
One of the brain’s primary functions is to efficiently distribute resources to the body by 
anticipating its necessities, a process known as allostasis (Sterling, 2012). According to this 
functional model of the brain, it is constantly adjusting its physiological systems, such as the 
endocrine and autonomic nervous systems, to promote the individual’s survival and 
reproduction. To maintain allostasis efficiently, the brain is not merely reacting to signals 
coming from the body, but rather producing an internal simulation of what is going on inside 
to forestall whatever needs might arise and prepare for acting upon these (Barrett, 2017c). 
The representation of this continuously running internal model is called interoception, which, 
when made available to consciousness, is in part experienced as feelings of valence and 
arousal, or what has traditionally been called affect (Barrett, 2017a, 2017c; Barrett & Bliss‐
Moreau, 2009; Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Interoception is a 
domain-general process involved in every aspect of cognition (Barrett, 2017c; Barrett & 
Bliss‐Moreau, 2009, Barrett & Simmons, 2015) and constitutes one of the core ingredients of 
 
31 Barrett (2006b) introduced the most recent iterations of construction models of emotion in 2006 as a psychological model of emotions called 
the conceptual act theory. The theory has matured since its introduction, having incorporated into its repertoire ideas and concepts from 
neuroconstruction, social constructionism, cultural constructionism, and rational constructionism on the one hand and various other insights 
from neuroscience, cognitive science, philosophy of the mind, and the result of empirical studies on the other (Barrett, 2012, 2013; Barrett et 
al., 2007, 2011; Barrett & Russell, 2014; Barrett & Satpute, 2013; Lindquist et al., 2012; Lindquist & Barrett, 2012; Siegel et al., 2018; Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2011). The theory is substantiated in its strong commitment to grounded theories of knowledge and in particular the situated 
conceptualization framework (e.g., Barsalou, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2016a) resulting in a series of collaborations between Barrett, Barsalou and 
many others within the same paradigm of cognitive science (Barrett et al., 2014; Lebois et al., 2018; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). More 
recently, Barrett and associates have articulated the situated conceptualization framework within the predictive coding accounts (e.g., Clark, 
2013; Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019) of brain architecture and functioning (e.g., Barrett, 2017c). These models are then works-in-progress, 
producing various empirically testable hypotheses that today multiple research groups worldwide are trying to tackle. The central hypothesis 





the construction of emotions (Barrett et al., 2014; Wilson-Mendenhall & Barsalou, 2016) and 
more broadly, of all situated experience (Barsalou et al., 2018). 
 
Other domain-general processes critical in emotion are statistical learning, selective 
attention32 and more importantly, language (Barrett et al., 2007; Hoemann et al., 2019; 
Lindquist et al., 2015). Emotion categories do not have concrete regularities in the world that 
allow inferring their properties and encoding them as conceptual knowledge. Emotion 
categories such as anger, joy, and love are what philosophers call ontologically subjective, 
that is, they are objects which acquire their realness and functions based on the social 
meanings that people collectively assign to them, meaning that they only exist in social 
reality (i.e., culture) as categories (Barrett, 2012; Searle, 1995, 1999). Language bootstraps 
conceptual knowledge, working as an important statistical anchor in its redundancy through 
which emotion category knowledge can be learned and stored (Barrett et al., 2007). Preverbal 
infants use their statistical learning tools to pick up regularities in speech patterns and word 
sounds; in the case of emotions, emotion words fix knowledge for emotion categories (Atzil 
et al., 2018; Barrett et al., 2007, 2014; Hoemann et al., 2019). Once the child has learned an 
emotion word (e.g., ‘angry’, ‘happy’) co-occurring with different elements and relations in 
situations (e.g., throwing a toy, smiling) the infant begins to aggregate a population of 
exemplars to the conceptual knowledge for the emotion category the word stands for. 
Importantly, emotion categories such as joy, sadness, disgust, and in our case, awe, are 
conceptual categories, meaning that their function or goal is what makes one occurrence 
similar to another (Barrett, 2012; Hoemann & Barrett, 2019). However, there is no one-to-
one equivalence between an emotion category and a function (Hoemann et al., 2019; Lebois 
et al., 2019; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). An emotion can have many functions, in 
relation to the specific contexts where it is utilized. As Hoemann et al. (2019) put it in their 
discussion of anger:33 
 
 
32 Newborns have almost no concepts, so their brain is, for the most part, receiving information through the senses (Atzil et al., 2018). Our 
evolutionary heritage equipped humans with a brain made to attend to the statistical regularities in the environment and extract knowledge 
from it (Atzil et al., 2018; Xu & Kushnir, 2013). This powerful statistical learning mechanism continuously encodes conceptual knowledge 
as the brain takes in more sensory input from experience. However, not all sensory information is encoded equally. Humans also have a set 
of attentional skills that allow for selecting the most important aspects of the sensory information and structure conceptual knowledge in 
ways that make its later use more efficient (Wilson-Mendenhall & Barsalou, 2016). As selective attention focuses on a category throughout 
various experiences, a unique population of mental representations forms in memory in the form of conceptual knowledge for that element 
of experience (Barrett et al., 2014; Barsalou, 1999). Attention mechanisms also focus and encode certain elements, which could be from the 
world, the body, or the mind, more than others in relation to the situational demands. 




[. . .] instances of anger can be associated with the goal to overcome an obstacle [particularly 
when the obstacle is another person], to protect against a threat, to signal social dominance or 
appear powerful, to affiliate and repair social connections, to enhance performance to win a 
competition or a negotiation, or to enhance self-insight (p. 1833). 
 
An emotion word can refer to a multiplicity of goals in relation to the many other elements 
present in a situation34. Clusters form around a frequent set of situations with similar goals to 
form emotion types35 (Boiger et al., 2018). These types create an illusion of coherence and 
stable conceptual knowledge when, in reality, emotions have no core set of properties 
(Barrett, 2006b). Moreover, once a population of conceptual knowledge becomes established 
around the emotion word, it is continuously updated, growing, and changing throughout a 
person’s lifetime as a result of every interaction and experience in which the category is 
involved. These experiences can be direct or vicarious, occurring through social interactions 
or the result of past reconstructions and future projections (Barrett, 2013, 2017a).36  
 
The last important domain-general process in the construction of emotion is the 
aforementioned conceptual system. Using emotion conceptual knowledge, brains create 
dynamic and flexible ad hoc emotion concepts in situated conceptualizations (i.e., 
predictions) that provide information beyond that presented by the immediate sensory inputs 
to guide situated action (Barrett et al., 2014; Barsalou, 2003; Hoemann & Barrett, 2019; 
 
34 The conceptual flexibility assumed in the theory (e.g., ad hoc concepts) means that the goals are also changing with the situations in 
which the emotion occurs (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011; Wilson-Mendenhall & Barsalou, 2016). 
35 Types can result from the frequency and recency with which people encounter elements, relations, and goals in situations, which 
dynamically establish which aspects of emotion conceptual knowledge become activated (Barsalou, 2003). The construction of types could 
explain the degree of similarities in responses observed in emotion research that has led observers to incorrectly believe in the existence of 
prototypes, schemas, or any other form of core features (i.e., essences) of emotion categories (Barrett et al., 2014, 2019). The type of 
statistical structures that emerge from the construction of types (e.g., family resemblances) is one reason for emotion coherence and 
communication (Lebois et al., 2015; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). 
36 Recent versions of the constructionist view of emotion argue that a brain is always constructing an internal model of the body and the 
environment by continually issuing an avalanche of top-down predictions signals simultaneously and in cascades throughout the whole brain 
that compete probabilistically as the hypothesis that is tested against the sensory input that is coming from inside and outside the body, 
filtering information, preparing the body for action, and guiding attention, among other things (Barrett, 2017a, 2017c; Barrett et al., 2014; 
Barrett & Simmons, 2015). The brain takes the sensory input of a situation and compares it to previous similar situations in the form of 
predictions in an effort to anticipate the future. These predictions anticipate the external and internal milieu, filtering out the information that 
comes in through the senses while mobilizing resources for the body to act and minimize the body’s metabolic costs (see Barrett, 2017a, 
2017c). When the sensory input does not match the prediction, a prediction error is issued, updating the brain’s content by fine-tuning it to 
improve performance in potential future predictions. Prediction error is learning, and the brain is continually going from issuing predictions, 
testing them against the incoming sensory input, and adjusting the next iteration when prediction error occurs. The brain constitutes its 
internal model of the world in the ongoing loop between prediction and prediction error, allowing for the efficient metabolic functioning of 
the brain through the use of experience, to anticipate the allostatic needs of a body in a dynamically changing context (Barrett, 2017a, 
2017c; Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019). This predictive coding account of the theory of constructed emotion presented in Barrett (2017c), 
Chanes and Barrett (2016) and other works, elaborates much more on the neurophysiological mechanisms through which emotions are 
created in brain networks. Here I present the version at the psychological level of analysis elaborated in Barrett et al. (2014) and other works 




Wilson-Mendenhall, 2017). Once an emotion concept has been created, inferences and 
predictions about the properties, elements, and relations of a situation are made, first 
interpreting their contents through categorization, and then re-enacting perceptual and motor 
representations, foretelling the immediate future, and summoning resources in ways tailored 
to the goals of the situation (Barrett, 2017a; Barrett et al., 2014). Situated conceptualizations 
are how the brain interprets a situation through an emotion category (e.g., sad funeral, joyful 
bike ride, angry political speech) giving emotion meaning to the sensory inputs from within 
and outside the body in a process that is automatic, dynamic, continuous, ongoing, enactive, 
mostly unconscious, and thoroughly grounded (Barrett et al., 2014; Wilson-Mendenhall, 
2017; Wilson-Mendenhall & Barsalou, 2016). 
 
Affect, statistical learning, attention, language, and conceptual processing are accompanied 
by other domain-general systems, such as the behavioural adaptations of fight or flight or the 
startle reflexes, to constitute emotions (Barrett et al., 2014). In addition, these domain-general 
processes are involved in all other cognitive activities, including perception, planning, and 
the construction of the self (Barrett, 2009; Barrett & Satpute, 2013; Hutchinson & Barrett, 
2019). 
 
3.2.2. The construction of emotion in biology and culture 
People construct an emotion episode when their brains produce a situated conceptualization 
in response to – and to predict – a changing element of an unfolding situation using 
conceptual knowledge of an emotion category (Barrett, 2006b, 2017a; Barrett et al., 2014). 
Emotions work for the most part as situational integrators, combining the elements of a 
situation within a relational structure to achieve a particular goal (Barsalou et al., 2018; 
Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). This means that the resulting emotion concept integrates 
external and internal elements into a unified totality, producing a series of inferences about 
the situation, recruiting cognitive, motor, physiological, and attentional resources to prepare 
and drive a person to act (i.e., it is integrative, predictive, enactive, embodied, and 
functional). The emotion concept is a partial re-enactment of the population of instances 
tailored to the situation created in a Bayesian manner, reflecting the availability of knowledge 




the present context (Barrett, 2017c; Barsalou, 2011, 2016a)37. Many times, the concept is 
constructed in response to and to predict a change in the body’s internal milieu (e.g., as an 
interpretation to increased arousal). However, it can also occur as a result of a change or 
prediction of the unfolding of any of the internal and external elements of a situation and 
their relations, or the inferences made from these elements (Barrett, 2006b, 2017a; Barrett et 
al., 2014). Emotion concepts are particularly good at mobilising physiological resources, 
leading to the strong interoceptive and affective changes traditionally associated with 
emotions (e.g., sympathetic and parasympathetic changes). Affect, however, is only one of 
the many accompanying and coordinating elements in a situated conceptualization.  
 
Importantly, emotion concepts guide action, and this is manifested in expressions, 
behaviours, habits, rituals, communication, and other forms of practice (Gendron, et al., 
2020; see also Scheer, 2012). The goal of these actions, whether social coordination, 
conceptual synchrony, product production, identity reinforcement, or any of the many things 
that emotions do, changes an aspect of the world. This can be something in the material 
world (e.g., a smile, an insult, writing a poem on a piece of paper, cooking your favourite 
meal), or someone’s brain wiring. This last includes the brain wiring of the person 
experiencing the emotion, meaning that every new situated conceptualization is somewhat 
stored in memory, becoming part of the conceptual knowledge from which potential future 
concepts can be constructed. Finally, because of the flexibility of conceptual processes, 
emotion concepts are always being combined and recombined in numerous ways with other 
concepts on-the-spot, creating an infinite collection of potentially new conceptual 
combinations for emotions (Barsalou, 1999; Hoemann et al., 2017). Together, from the 
moment that an emotion concept is constructed in a situated conceptualization, integration, 
inference, mobilization, action, combination, and all other processes occur together to make 
out the totality of an emotional episode. 
More importantly, the emotion categories (e.g., anger, love, fear) around which conceptual 
knowledge accumulates and from which people construct their emotions are historically and 
culturally contingent (Abu-Lughod, 1988; Averill, 1980; Barrett, 2017a; Boddice, 2018; 
Lutz, 1988). The emotion categories people use today have multiple histories shaped by the 
linguistic, economic, political, technological, social, and moral shifts of the cultures where 
 




these emotions circulate (Boddice, 2018; 2019; 2020b)38. As a result of these histories, each 
culture has landed today on its own particular set of categories to describe affective content39. 
More importantly, although the categories through which emotions are constituted are 
culturally relative, cultures create the conditions for standardising cultural experiences. 
Cultures foster regularities in the situational environments from which people learn the 
conceptual knowledge for an emotion category, following predictable patterns that can be 
studied systematically (De Leersnyder et al., 2015a; Gendron et al., 2020; Mesquita et al., 
2017). For example, cultures foster situations whereby people experience more emotions that 
are consistent with the culture’s mandates – the values, norms, beliefs, goals, and worldviews 
shared within a cultural space and that help people navigate the social world around common 
intentions (Mesquita et al., 2015, 2017)40. Other similar cultural standardisation and 
conventionalisation processes lead to particular emotion types; types that are promoted in 
their practices and products of a culture (Boiger et al., 2013) in the form of social 
representations (O’Connor, 2016)41. Additionally, people from a culture seek out situations 
that promote the emotion types of their culture (Tsai, 2007). The repeated exposure in 
situations to social representations of culturally normative emotion types leads to a certain 
degree of convergence of people’s emotion knowledge within a cultural space (Barrett, 
2017a; De Leersnyder, 2017; De Leersnyder et al., 2011). 
From the time we are born, people are enculturated and acculturated to the different emotion 
types present in the cultures they navigate. As children learn emotion words from listening to 
their caretakers, they begin to associate situations with no distinct observable similarities to 
an emotion category around some relevant goal (Hoemann et al., 2019). Being immersed in 
their culture, this social learning is reinforced and expanded through the interaction with the 
many social representations of these emotions in the behaviours, expressions, habits, 
traditions, rituals, stories, and other forms of emotion practices and products to which the 
child increasingly has access as they develop (Gendron & Barrett, 2018). This process of 
 
38 The topic of the history of emotion categories is better described in the next chapter. 
39 It is important to remember that although in the Western, industrialized world we have landed on the category emotion to describe a certain 
kind of affectively strong phenomena, many cultures around the world don’t have categories that correspond to what we mean by ‘emotion’ 
(see Russell, 1991). This doesn’t mean that they don’t have affective experiences but rather to say that the categories through which they 
demarcate what counts as ‘emotion’ or not is different from our categorization. 
40 This sentence appears in (Silva Luna & Bering, 2020, p. 5) 
41 Social representation refers to the stereotypical knowledge of a category that members of a cultural space share to a certain extent and which 
are represented in-the-world. As O’Connor (2016, p. 4) writes, “social representations are conceived as residing across rather than within 
individual minds, inhabiting the ‘between-space’ where individual and society connect.” They are related yet different from mental 




emotion enculturation does not stop in childhood but rather continues as acculturation 
through a person’s life (de Leersnyder, 2017). By adulthood, individuals have acquired a 
large population of diverse instances for each of the emotion categories that are important to 
the cultures in which they participate (Mesquita et al., 2016). Emotions can then be thought 
of as skills people develop to fit in their cultures (e.g., De Leersnyder et al., 2015b). Emotion 
learning as category learning and skill development means that people can potentially learn 
any new emotion at any stage of their lives while also being able to change the content of the 
conceptual knowledge for a particular emotion category through new experiences (Barrett, 
2017a, Gendron & Barrett, 2018). However, the effectiveness of emotion acculturation is 
limited by the previous conceptual knowledge and how frequently they are exposed to the 
new emotion types, which relies on how important these emotion types are to the 
sociocultural context that the person navigates (Gendron & Barrett, 2018; Mesquita et al., 
2016). Enculturation and acculturation processes mean emotions are not innate but rather 
learned (Barrett, 2017a; Hoemann et al., 2019; Lebois et al., 2018). More importantly, this 
means that recurrent exposure to an emotion category results in an increasing level of skill 
with that emotion (i.e., emotional expertise) (Hoemann, Nielson et al., 2020). 
It is worth highlighting, however, that emotions are not pluripotent or random. Foremost, 
emotions are constrained by the biological realities of the brain’s domain-general features 
(Barrett, 2017a). Domain-general features are universal and establish the “emotional 
potential” from which all emotions are constituted (Mesquita et al., 2015, p. 542). 
Nonetheless, they are inscribed within the normal energetic and physical limitations of our 
bodies. This may also lead to convergent cultural evolution (Richerson & Boyd, 2005), in 
which categories around universal elements of experience (e.g., affect, eating, dying) lead to 
a certain degree of similarity in people’s emotional knowledge (Gendron et al., 2020). 
Similarly, cross-cultural dynamics related to geographic proximity such as trade, migration, 
and translation, may lead to different forms of borrowing which result in the convergence of 
emotion categories across cultural spaces (Jackson et al., 2019). 
I believe that the construction description of emotions is to date the best multi-disciplinary 
explanation about their nature. This represents a paradigm shift in our understanding of how 
emotions work, bridging the gap between the individual and sociocultural contexts in which 
they are represented. More importantly, the theory supports my understanding of awe as 




science communication. In the next section, therefore, I present an analytical framework 
suited to my subsequent studies on this complex emotion. 
 
3.3. An analytical framework for studying constructed emotions 
In most instances, emotions work as situational integrators that combine the different 
elements of a situation through a relational structure around a specific goal (Barrett et al., 
2014; Lebois et al., 2018; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). An emotion can then be 
described in terms of the different co-occurring external and internal situational elements that 
define its form and function. Internal situational elements refer to the body and the mind, 
which include affect, motivation, self-relevance, mentalizing, and so forth. Similarly, external 
situational elements include elements of the immediate physical and social context where the 
person is situated including the settings, agents, actions, and objects in a situation (Barsalou 
et al., 2018). Together the different elements provide the form that an emotion takes. More 
importantly, in their relational structure, the elements direct the body towards a particular 
situated goal or outcome, giving the emotion its functional status. This might include situated 
movement, communicating a state, assigning value to something, influencing others, 
constituting an identity, or any of the many other functions that an emotion does (Barrett, 
2017a; Barrett et al., 2014; Gendron & Barrett, 2018). 
  
Barsalou et al. (2018) recognize that their taxonomy of the elements and functions of a 
situation is not comprehensive and can be further elaborated. I add to their taxonomy using 
other work that taxonomizes situations, particularly that which has investigated the elements 
that could be important during an emotion. Some componential appraisal models of emotion 
have developed a highly sophisticated description of the situational elements of emotional 
events (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2013; Moors, 2010b; Scherer, 1984; Stein & Hernandez, 2007). 
Moreover, various taxonomies coming from linguistics, semantics, cognitive science, and 
other subject areas, also describe different elements of a situation. For example, schemes 
evaluating the semantic content of words through so-called ontologies have listed a variety of 
objects and properties, such as people, living things, social organizations, social artefacts, 
buildings, locations, time, manner, physical states, and quantity that can be included as 
external elements of a situation (e.g., Cree & McRae, 2003; De Deyne & Storms, 2008a; 




models to complement the external and internal situational elements and functions proposed 
by Barsalou et al. (2018) and offer the following taxonomy: 
1) Actions 
a. Expressions (e.g., facial expressions) 
b. Behaviour (e.g., body movement) 
c. Approach/Avoid 
2) Motivations  




b. Bodily sensations 
















a. Cultural artefact 
b. Non-cultural artefact 
8) Agents 
a. Human 




9) Social environment 




Although incomplete, this taxonomy of situational elements represents my attempt to 
systematize the forms and functions that make up a description of an emotion. It includes 
four internal and six external elements of a situation that define its form, plus a category for 
the outcome or goal through which the function of the emotion is defined. The categories of 
analysis used in chapters five and seven are sketched from this taxonomy. 
 
Moreover, while I assume that emotions have no essentialized types and are always ad hoc 
constructions, they tend to present certain regularities, which I define as emotion types 
(Mesquita et al., 2016, 2017). Emotion types are the conventionalized and standardized 
cultural versions of emotion (i.e., social representations), made up of recurring forms around 
a particular function and which are represented with a certain regularity in a cultural space. 
Emotion types can also be thought of as those shared social meanings that constitute the basis 
of people’s emotion knowledge in a culture. For the case of awe, settings such as the 
outdoors (e.g., Bai et al., 2017), or outer space (e.g., Yaden et al., 2016), expressions such as 
the jaw-dropped mouth (Shiota et al., 2003), motivations such as altruism (e.g., Piff et al., 
2015), behaviours such as freezing (e.g., Joye & Dewitte, 2016), interoceptions such as 
positive affect (e.g., Shiota et al., 2007), appraisals of vastness and descriptions of the self, 
such as those of smallness and connectedness (e.g., Yaden et al., 2019), are elements of the 
types of awe that are common in the culture of English speakers. However, while common, 
these are but stereotypes that capture only a subset of the totality of ways in which an 
emotion can be represented. Importantly, the types for an emotion category will vary across 
cultures and subcultures, as a function of their cultural mandates. 
 
I also assume that a situational integrator such as an emotion not only carries information 
about the elements that make up an episode but also about the relationships between these 
elements (Barsalou, 2019; Barsalou et al., 2018). These structures could be described in terms 
of narratives, scripts, schemas, frames, scenarios, action cycles, themes or any other sort of 




(e.g., Bamberg, 1997; Barsalou, 2019; Davis, et al., 2020; Russell, 1991). These frameworks 
are tied to larger formations, such as discourses or aesthetics, which further cement the 
conventionalized ways in which the different elements of an emotion and their functions are 
represented (Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990). For example, narratives for awe such as those of 
the lone male wanderer who climbs atop a mountain and experiences awe at the sight of a 
vast view, feeling an overpowering positive affect – a story staunchly caught within 
discourses of the natural sublime (see the next chapter) – provide the relational frameworks 
that hold the elements of emotion together around the goals of transcendence and changing 
one’s mind. These relational structures not only establish the association through which an 
emotion is constituted from different elements of situations, but are also the framework 
through which emotions are constitutive of the representation of objects, agents, behaviours, 
identities, beliefs, values and all other elements encountered in situations – a productive 
capacity that has been highlighted by many anthropologists, critical theorists, and historians 
(Ahmed, 2004; Boddice, 2018; Boddice & M. Smith, 2020; Illouz, 2008; Lutz & Abu-
Lughod, 1990; Harding & Pribram, 2002). 
 
Lastly, I assume that as people spend more time within a particular cultural space, they will 
increasingly accumulate more experiences (i.e., emotion knowledge) developing the skills for 
the emotion types (their elements and relational structures) prevalent in that culture. As they 
increasingly acculturate into the emotions of a cultural space, they become more skilled in 
representing those particular conventions (i.e., social representations), moving along a 
continuum of expertise for those emotion types. Increases in skill on culturally specific 
emotion types will manifest in increasing efficiency, control, and ability to mentally represent 
this emotion, among other abilities (Hoemann, Nielson et al., 2020). 
 
The taxonomy for the elements of an emotion derived from the application of the situated 
conceptualization and the ideas derived from theories related to the constructionist view of 
emotions serves as an analytical framework through which to study emotions in situations 
and across cultural contexts. This framework will be utilized throughout the studies in the 
upcoming chapters. Now, I move away from descriptions of science communication as an 






3.4. Science communication as cultural space 
Science communication is a culture42. The people in this culture share, to a certain extent, 
similar kinds of knowledges from which they can construct a set of analogous representations 
in-the-head (e.g., perceptions, norms, beliefs, values, expectations, memories) through 
concepts, and representations in-the-world (e.g., written words, sounds, rituals, expressions, 
images, poems) through various forms of practice and the production of different artefacts 
(Gendron et al., 2020)43. Broks’ (2006) spatial metaphor can be used to describe science 
communication as the cultural space where people (e.g., scientists, science communicators, 
science enthusiasts, non-scientists) share a specific set of social meanings related to science. 
Those social representations related to science, however, are similar but not the same as the 
academic scientific knowledge used in science classrooms, conferences, papers, or other such 
spaces corresponding to other cultures such as science education and laboratory science. For 
example, the metaphors that are used to describe genes as maps, books, and blueprints are 
common in science communication, while scientists use other forms of representation when 
they talk amongst themselves to refer to the same topic (e.g., nucleotides, codons, and amino 
acid sequences) (Hellsten et al., 2008). These kinds of differences between the popular and 
academic scientific knowledge shared in science communication spaces result from 
contingent socio-historical processes that have led to diverging forms of social representation 
between the different cultures where science is the topic. However, while distinct, these 
cultural spaces are in direct and overlapping contact with each other, with boundaries that are 
both arbitrary and leaky, and bridges and trading zones where meanings flow from one space 
to the next (Broks, 2006). 
 
 
42 Definitions of culture abound. For example, in the 1952 monograph Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn (1952) do an extensive review of the literature on culture citing more than 100 authors including Freud, Parsons, Kant, Levi-
Strauss, Wundt, and Mead. I define culture as the mental representations (e.g., knowledge, beliefs, values) and their manifestation in external 
representations (e.g., behaviours, products, practices), “shared by a group and acquired by new generations through social learning” (Gendron, 
Barrett, Mesquita, 2020, p. 188). The broad definition presented here bridges the gap between competing definitions of culture as in-the-head 
(in the mind) and those of culture in-the-world (in objects and practices) (e.g., Gendron, 2017; Jahoda, 2012). Cultures establish a set of 
preferred and dominant social meanings, conventions, or stereotypes, which are the result of social dynamics, environmental pressures, 
historical contingencies, and the constraints set by our biology, among other things (Barrett, 2017a; Mesquita et al., 2017; for parallels from 
other disciplines see Fiske, 2011, S. Hall, 2006). From birth, a person is continuously interacting with these social meanings, a process that 
wires the brain into a particular kind of cultural artefact, moulding it to represent a person’s embodied experience and reproducing it to transmit 
it to future generations (Barrett, 2017a; Gendron et al., 2020). 
43 Culture is defined here as a transient phenomenon. In the same way that concepts are situated and dynamically constituted as a function of 
a person’s experience and the affordances of a situation, culture is always assembled ad hoc the moment when those shared meanings are 
activated and disassembled the moment when the situation stops being about the culture of science communication (see Davies, 2018). This 




Moreover, the set of meanings that correspond to the culture of science communication go 
beyond its distinct set of social meanings related to scientific knowledge (Davies & Horst, 
2016). The set of representations that circulate within this culture also includes social 
meanings for non-scientific content such as values, norms, beliefs, and other forms of social 
representations, which regulate the functioning of its practices and products. Notably, the 
social meanings in the culture of science communication are also constituted in bodily 
sensations and mental circumstances, something which can be referred to as embodied states 
(Davies & Horst, 2016). Beliefs, norms, identities, interests, and more importantly for this 
thesis, emotions, circulate widely within the meaning economy of the culture of science 
communication. Importantly, not only does the culture of science communication, as all other 
cultures, assign particular social meanings to emotion categories, but these meanings are also 
constitutive of the different forms of scientific and non-scientific knowledge in circulation 
within this space’s semantic economy. Considering that affect is a domain-general process 
which is better thought of as a ubiquitous aspect of all mental processes (Gendron et al., 
2020; Lebrecht et al., 2012), it is then important to consider how categories that are closely 
entwined with affect (e.g., emotions, moods, arousal states) permeate all other representations 
within this space. Affective categories such as emotions can then be described as particles in 
the constitution of the many other social meanings in this space represented in its practices 
and products (see Ahmed, 2004; Harding & Pribram, 2002; Illouz 2008, Cabañas & Illouz, 
2019).  
 
The science communication event is a cross-cultural moment where the social meanings of 
science communication are communicated (Aikenhead, 2001). Communication is not then 
just an act of transmitting information between a sender and a receiver, as in the transmission 
paradigm, but rather it is the ecosystem through which people produce, consume, regulate, 
and construct these shared meanings within the situations provided at the science 
communication event (Davies & Horst, 2016; see S. Hall et al., 2013). Whether it is reading a 
science magazine at home, visiting a science museum, retweeting a science tweet, or talking 
with friends about a scientific topic, people are continuously constructing meanings as a 
function of the specifics of the situation and the knowledge repertoire they bring from a 
lifetime of experiences, what Aikenhead (1996) calls their lifeworld culture. At this cross-
cultural event, a negotiation occurs between a person’s baggage of lifeworld cultural 




event. The construction of the preferred or dominant set of social meanings of science 
communication is then a function of the distance between a person’s lifeworld culture, the 
social representations at the science communication event, and the idiosyncrasies of the 
day44. Whereas people closer to the cultural space tend to construct congruent meanings at 
the event, people farther apart will give meaning in different or even discordant ways, 
potentially feeling alienated from this cultural space (Aikenhead, 1996). These are 
nonetheless not straightforward processes but rather multi-directional, highly contextual, 
complex, performative, and interpretative (Davies & Horst, 2016), all of which involve a 
heterogeneous ecosystem of agents and objects that come together at the science 
communication event (see Davies, 2018). 
 
However, the more time spent in the culture of science communication, the more they acquire 
the representational skills and adopt the social meanings of this space. People are 
continuously moving through the continuum of expertise for the different social meanings 
present in these spaces. This includes not just the popular scientific knowledge at the centre 
of this space, but also the values, norms, goals, worldviews, and all other cultural mandates 
that regulate it, among the different types of knowledge. Most importantly, with time, people 
increase their skills in the affective categories (e.g., emotions, moods) that are central to this 
culture. People learn and get better at representing wonder, curiosity, excitement, surprise, 
awe, and other such normative emotion categories that are valued in science communication. 
 
As they develop their skills in these emotions and their particular types, they also become 
better at representing the many social meanings tethered to these. For example, they slowly 
form identities that give them a sense of belonging to the space (Davies & Horst, 2016). 
Identities around science communication such as the science enthusiast, the amateur scientist, 
the supporter, the science museumgoer, the sceptic, and the rationalist are constructed in 
relation to people’s particular experiences in these science communication spaces, slowly 
becoming an intrinsic part of their lifeworld culture. Emotions such as wonder, curiosity, 
marvel, and awe are co-constitutive of these identities giving affective tones to the feelings of 
belonging that comes with identifying with a particular social group. This is just an example 
 
44 A myriad of factors, from the amount of sleep a person had the night before, to the structure of feeling of the day (R. Williams, 2009), can 





of how the many social meanings in this cultural space (e.g., objects, agents, values, ideas, 
beliefs) are entwined in deep networks of signification with emotions – networks through 
which people construct their experience and give shape to this cultural space.  
 
Importantly, I conceptualise science communication as not one but as a multiplicity or 
mosaic of subcultures45 (see Aikenhead, 1996; 2001). First, it is important to highlight that 
science communication is part of a larger cultural matrix, which includes cultural spaces such 
as the culture of mass media, the culture of museums, the culture of journalism, global 
western culture, capitalist culture etc. Moreover, science communication can be 
disaggregated into various types of subcultural units around issues such as those around 
nationality (e.g., the subculture of Aotearoa New Zealand), language (e.g., the subculture of 
science communication in Spanish), scientific discipline (e.g., the subculture of astronomy 
science communicators) or professional practice (e.g., the subculture of science journalists), 
and which can be further disaggregated into increasingly smaller subcultural intersectional 
units (e.g., the subculture of biomedical research journalist in Brazil, the subculture of the 
Manchester 2015 Science Festival organisers, the subculture of Vietnamese astronomy 
podcast enthusiasts, etc.). The people who participate in all these subcultural spaces share to a 
certain extent a set of social meanings that band them together under the large umbrella of the 
culture of science communication; the culture of science communication is a global culture. 
However, they will have their own local shared meanings that are unique to their specific 
sociocultural and historical idiosyncrasies. 
 
While each of the many subcultures of science communication around the world have their 
unique forms of representation, an aggregation of these into broad subcultural clusters can be 
made around the dimension of cultural mandates. As described in the previous chapter, these 
broad subcultures can be described in terms of the dominant three-model framework of 
science communication (i.e., deficit, dialogue, participation) (see Bucchi, 2008; Metcalfe, 
2019) and the different values, beliefs, and worldviews (i.e., hierarchical or democratic) that 
each of these models represent (e.g., Hilgartner, 1990). For example, Perrault (2013) 
identifies two critical sets of mandates in science communication the Public Appreciation of 
 
45 While what counts as a “subculture” is perhaps a matter of case-by-case considerations (e.g., Oyserman, 2017)45, they can generally be 
described as smaller groups of people in relation to a larger cultural space, which can be grouped by aspects such as shared identity (e.g., 
political scientists), geographical location (e.g., people in Aotearoa New Zealand), relational ties (e.g., family), or any other unit in which 




Science and Technology (PAST) and the Critical Understanding of Science in Public 
(CUSP). The PAST’s cultural mandates are tied to ontological and epistemological 
commitments such as naïve realism, instrumental rationality, positivism, and objectivism, 
which put it ideologically in the camp of scientism. By contrast, the CUSP describes 
scientific knowledge as tentative, theory-laden, and deeply embedded in social and cultural 
systems, values and norms akin to scepticism, critical engagement, and epistemic modesty. 
These two frameworks can be largely described as two subcultures within the deficit to 
participation framework. The PAST can be associated with deficit-style science 
communication while dialogic and participatory practices move toward the CUSP. Similar 
descriptions of the different cultural mandates and worldviews in science communication 
around the deficit, dialogue, and participatory models can be found in the work of other 
authors (e.g., Bucchi, 2008; Metcalfe, 2019).  
 
Other authors however propose taxonomies that complexify this simplistic dichotomy 
between deficit-style top-down science communication and bottom-up participatory practices 
by identifying other dimensions through which the mandates and worldviews in science 
communication practices can be described. Priest (2013, 2018) identifies most science 
communication practices as standing in a sort of continuum of either strategic or democratic 
goals. Strategic practices refer to those made with the intentions to influence a particular self-
interested outcome (e.g., a PR campaign to get people to consume more eggs), while 
democratic communication is oriented towards giving people the tools to engage in the 
techno-societies they inhabit (e.g., dietary labels on food packages). While there is a degree 
of concordance between the deficit model and strategic communications, and the same 
between participatory and democratic communications, Priest (2013, 2018) argues that this is 
not necessarily the case in all situations. Democratic ideals can have a degree of top-
downness while the same can be said about bottom-up strategic goals. This is complexified in 
the author’s description of all science communication practices as being both strategic and 
democratic (Priest, 2018). This distinction between strategic and democratic mandates in 
science communications suggests that rather than contrasting hierarchical and egalitarian 
values, beliefs, and norms, the cultural mandates behind communicative practices are much 
more localized within the cultural systems of the institutions, government, and other forms of 




identifies other potential mandates of science communication such as those of economic or 
entertainment goals that could serve as potential dimensions for analysis.  
 
Following this lead, Davies (2021) empirically identifies six different cultural mandates 
derived from interviews with researchers. The instrumental, promotional, accountability, 
enhancement of democracy, aesthetic/pleasurable, and economic goals of science 
communication observed by the author can also each be described as constituting different 
subcultures of science communication. These are just some of the values, norms, beliefs, and 
goals that permeate the products and practices in science communication, where other 
mandates such as Mertonian principles (e.g., universalism, disinterestedness), journalistic 
values (e.g., accuracy, fairness), naturalism, and environmental beliefs (e.g., Hansen, 2016; 
Medvecky & Leach, 2019; Perrault, 2013; Pigliucci, 2006; Sideris, 2017), infuse at different 
times and in various ways the social representation that constitute the many subcultures 
within the mosaic that is the larger culture of science communication. This view of science 
communication as a multiplicity of subcultures each with interacting, contrasting, and 
competing cultural mandates, moves away from the simplicity of the three-tier model 
framework, while recognizing its contribution to describe the various spaces where science is 
communicated.  
 
I want to quickly mention that throughout this thesis, I will use the term ‘culture of science 
communication’ to describe for the most part one particular subcultural space within the 
larger mosaic that is the actual culture of science communication. Although science 
communication has existed as long as there has been science, and science has been there “as 
long as there has been humans” (Alioto, 1993, as cited in Perrault, 2013, p. 37), the specific 
subculture that I am referring to in this thesis is the communication of Western science in the 
English-speaking world, with a particular focus on the British/US experience (Atkinson, 
1999; Perrault, 2013). Although I am cognizant of the many subcultures of science 
communication across and within national boundaries and linguistic communities, each of 
which differs in their historical trajectories and the social meanings that circulate within these 
(Gascoigne et al., 2020; Trench et al., 2014), I recognise the undue and hegemonic influence 
that the English-speaking science communication culture has had overall, as a result from 
many historical contingencies (e.g. the British Empire, US mass culture) that have led to 




Porras, 2020; Tardy, 2004). As such, many of the shared meanings for the global culture of 
science communication originate from the idiosyncrasies of the aesthetics and discourses in 
the culture of speakers of the English language in these countries. While this might tempt 
some to apply any of the results of this thesis beyond the Anglosphere, their generalizability 
to other cultural and subcultural contexts is a question for future research.  
 
It is also worth noting that the set of social meanings that hold together the culture of science 
communication are in a constant tug-of-war between stability and instability. Besides the 
dynamics of interacting, contrasting, and competing subcultural mandates within this space, 
new meanings are always being created, while old ones change and sometimes fade away 
(see S. Hall, 2006). Similarly, various cultural processes sustain these social meanings in time 
(e.g., conventionalisation and standards) (Fiske, 2011). Things such as rituals, customs, 
routines, mass consumption objects, and many other products and practices that rely on 
repetition and redundancy give a sense of firmness to the social meanings’ sustenance. For 
example, metaphors of science as a journey, where words and ideas such as “breakthrough, 
milestone, overcoming hurdles, moving a step closer, breaking new ground, [and] reaching a 
new frontier” (Hellsten et al., 2008, p. 104), are repeated over and over as conventions in 
science communication, constituting a core set of social meanings through which people 
interpret, communicate, and relate to science. While no dictionary definition says that science 
is a journey, the convention is used and understood by the people within the science 
communication culture, having various real-world practical and ethical consequences 
(Hellsten et al., 2008). Attentiveness to the continuous change and contextual nature of the 
content of the social representations of categories (see Boddice, 2018, 2019) counteracts the 
slippage into naturalizing meanings that are well understood to be cultural constructions46.  
 
Finally, I want to highlight how these standards, conventions, and stereotypes (i.e., social 
representations) work through different aesthetic and discursive formations47, supporting the 
redundancies from which people learn social meanings and define science communication’s 
 
46 For a discussion on emotion categories and how these are treated as natural kinds despite being cultural categories see (Barrett, 2017b).  
47 I use Frouws’ (1998) definition of discourse as a historically situated “organized set of social representation[s]”, “the terms through which 
people understand, explain and articulate the complex social and physical environment in which they are immersed” (p. 56). There are many 
definitions of the category ‘discourse’ along with a contentious debate about which of these is correct (e.g., I. Parker, 1990). The broad 
definition serves as an analytical tool to describe the repertoires that people use when talking about things and their ability to construct these 
objects while pointing at their historical and situated nature, without getting too involved in post-structuralist concerns with subjectivity and 




boundaries with the rest of society. These formations perform boundary work, defining what 
is and what is not science communication (Broks, 2006), while outlining what is appropriate, 
relevant, useful, true, and who is allowed to say what, where, when, and how (S. Hall et al., 
2013). For example, through how formations distinguish between science and what is non-
science or public and expert, boundaries are formed around these categories; performative 
acts that have a host of sociocultural and political implications48 (Myers, 2003; Perrault, 
2013). Through these aesthetics and discursive formations, objects, events, settings, beliefs, 
expressions, values, and more importantly for this thesis, emotions, acquire much of their 
social meanings in the repeated reproduction of particular social representations.  
 
To summarise, and to continue the spatial metaphor, I argue that science communication is a 
mosaic cultural space that has existed in the interface between science and society. People 
within this space share a set of social meanings represented in the products and practices of 
this space. Its main topic is scientific knowledge, though this is not the only set of social 
representations that circulate in this space. Beliefs, values, stories, identities, ideologies, 
emotions, and many other forms of representation are also co-constitutive of this space. 
Although this cultural space’s borders are fuzzy and always in flux, some actors are 
continuously performing boundary work through the use of discursive and aesthetic 
formations to demarcate and define its borders and the objects within it. At the science 
communication event, people bring their lifeworld cultures (i.e., experiences) through which 
they interpret the products and practices in this space, and the distance between their 
lifeworld culture and the culture of science communication regulates their representation of 
the social meanings from this space. As people spend more time in this cultural space, they 
learn the social meanings, slowly becoming more skilled in constituting the preferred and 
dominant representations, as the distance between their lifeworld culture and the culture of 
science communication closes. Finally, science communication isn’t a static and homogenous 
culture but rather it is made up of a multiplicity of subcultural spaces, each of which has 
different, competing, and sometimes contradicting sets of cultural mandates, through which 
the different discursive and aesthetic formations are mobilised and from which divergent 
social meanings emerge. All in all, the category of ‘the culture of science communication’ 
 
48 For example, many children still portray scientists as old white men with crazy hair and wearing lab coats (e.g., Rawson & McCool, 2014). 
This representation exists within a particular formation (ways in which we talk and represent scientists), and these ways through which we 
talk about things, drive children’s future career choices, which ends up reproducing and perpetuating the exclusionary (e.g., sexists, racists) 




aims to capture the broad and dynamic complex ecosystem of social meanings through which 
people outside academic spaces make meaning out of scientific knowledge, products, and 
practices. 
 
3.5. Awe in the culture of science communication 
I argue that awe, like all other emotions, is a historically and culturally contingent conceptual 
category with multiple types that correspond to the particular mandates of the cultures (and 
subcultures) in which this emotion is represented. People learn awe due to the developmental 
context in which they are enculturated and the uniqueness of the social interactions and 
cultural artefacts they encounter throughout their lives. In many situations, awe is mentally 
represented as a situational integrator, combining internal and external elements of a situation 
into one coherent script, narrative, schema, action cycle, or some other relational structure 
that solves a particular goal in a situation and through which a situation is made meaningful 
in its representation. People’s experience of awe is then the result of a situated 
conceptualization which integrates elements of the situation using the conceptual knowledge 
that they have acquired throughout a lifetime of interactions with this category to serve a 
specific function in the situation a person finds themselves in. According to this perspective, 
then, the stereotypical open-mouth display and “wow” vocal burst, or the feelings of 
smallness and connectedness that may accompany the exposure to vast and astonishing 
content, are not innate responses, but rather these are elements of a relatively narrow cultural 
stereotype through which a person constructs a situation where such responses are warranted. 
Many other types of awe are out there in the many cultures and subcultures where this 
emotion is important, assuming a variety of forms (i.e., objects, agents, affect, behaviours, 
expressions) and functions (i.e., outcomes) in relation to the different mandates in each of 
these spaces49. 
 
The category awe, I argue, is valued and has a variety of types in the culture of science 
communication. Each of these has their distinctive histories and idiosyncrasies responding to 
the various mandates of the different subcultures (e.g., entertainment, democratic 
participation, promotion of science) within the larger mosaic of this cultural space. As a 
result of its value, this emotion is frequently and centrally represented at the science 
 




communication event both as experience (i.e., mental representations) and in its products and 
practices (i.e., social representations). People learn the various types of awe in their 
consumption of science communication, over time becoming more skilled in representing 
these emotion types. More importantly, awe is co-constitutive of many of the objects, agents, 
beliefs, identities, and other forms of meaning circulated in this space. The various awe types 
present in science communication both constrain and support the different, contrasting, and 
sometimes competing cultural mandates.  
 
The history and value of awe in science communication, the skill to conceptualize this 
emotion displayed by people who participate in this culture, and the varieties of its forms and 
functions, however, have not been investigated. The few studies that have tried to capture the 
prevalence of this emotion have found, for example, that people in this cultural space can 
represent this emotion more often (Gottlieb et al., 2018). This kind of study, however, has 
been done within the classical view of emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). 
 
In the coming chapters, I try to tackle each of the four questions about the history, value, 
skill, and varieties of awe in science communication. Chapter four contextualizes this 
emotion category by presenting an outline of its history in the English-speaking world and 
the many varieties it has assumed in science communication through time. Chapter five 
assesses the value of this emotion by measuring the frequency and centrality of its 
representation in a cultural product commonly used to enculturate children: picture books. 
Chapter six evaluates the degree of people’s skill with this emotion category in science 
communication by comparing their representation of awe in a word association task. Finally, 
chapter seven describes the variety of forms and functions that this emotion takes and the 
themes unifying its description by science communicators. Throughout these chapters, I 
follow the situated conceptualization theory, the constructionist view of emotions, and the 
descriptions of science communication as culture presented in this chapter as the main 
theoretical and analytical framework, guiding the methods of data collection and analysis, 




Chapter four - An outline of the history of awe in science communication 
 
History is not merely additive to psychological methods, nor is it merely background. If 
history's contribution to emotion knowledge means anything then it should mean the 
disruption of the very starting point of emotion research. It alters the assumptions that 
researchers take with them to the lab, or to the field, and influences the kinds of questions 
that can be asked, as well as changing the stakes of the answers to be sought.  
– Rob Boddice, History looks forward (2020a, p. 132) 
 
4. Introduction 
The classical view of emotions argues that whatever representation of awe, there is a stable 
core to the form and function of this emotion that includes a series of properties (i.e., vastness 
and need for accommodation), which all descriptions of this emotion must measure against, 
or they are discarded as not being authentic (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). The term awe, however, 
tends to be applied to a vast, and elusive, array of experiences, many of which connote very 
different types of situations (see chapter two). It is used to describe a variety of objects, 
subjective feelings, phenomenologies, appraisals, behaviours, and other aspects of situations 
with sometimes very little in common. More importantly, the academic and popular literature 
invokes awe as a source of humility, surprise, curiosity, transcendence, admiration, 
connection, or learning among other outcomes - representational varieties of the same 
category that the classical view doesn’t explain (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Stellar et al., 
2018; Valdesolo et al., 2017). By contrast, the constructionist view of emotions holds that the 
many meanings that an emotion takes are localized within the cultural context in which they 
occur (Averill, 1980; Barrett, 2017a; Lutz, 1988; Mesquita et al., 2017). Awe, as I argued in 
the previous chapter, is rather a culturally constructed emotion category that refers to a 
variety of situations and outcomes inscribed in sociocultural reality. 
 
Where did the various meanings for awe, in general, and in science communication, in 
particular, come from? Over the past few decades, historians have observed that emotions 
have their own histories (Boddice, 2018, 2019). These studies have described the appearance 
and changes of the social meanings of emotions such as jealousy (Stearns, 1990), empathy 
(Lanzoni, 2018), and sadness (Sullivan, 2016) over time, demonstrating the situatedness of 




in anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience, means that emotion categories have histories 
and that to make sense of them in the present and future requires their proper historical 
contextualization (Boddice, 2018) This aligns with increasing interdisciplinary calls to 
“always historicize” (D. M. Gross & Preston, 2020, p. 9) the categories of emotion being 
studied in contemporary research. As the quote opening this chapter suggests, the execution 
and interpretation of a study on emotions will be significantly improved when the object of 
study is properly contextualized, meaning, when it is situated in time and space (Boddice, 
2020a). Situating the contemporary meanings of awe in historical context puts the studies in 
the coming chapters in their appropriate sociohistorical context, providing a sense of the 
spaces where this emotion is represented, the nuances of its multiple usages, and the cultural 
mandates that imbue them with meanings. More importantly, it might contribute to a deeper 
understanding of its current uses and functions in the communication of science.  
 
No study, however, has traced the history of the emotion category awe50. For the most part, 
classical view emotion research treats emotion categories as ahistorical (Boddice, 2018), with 
the research on awe being no exception. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace the outlines of 
this emotion’s history and identify some of its changes in social representation by looking at 
how it has appeared over time within different aesthetic and discursive formations. It is from 
the secondary literature of these aesthetic and discursive repertoires how the contemporary 
varieties of awe can be traced through history. 
 
This chapter maps the history of the category awe with particular attention to science 
communication. Once I have laid the framework through which I tell this story, I outline this 
emotion’s history from its first appearance in the English language in the Middle Ages to the 
many themes it displays in the Romantic period. I then describe how this emotion became 
part of the representational repertoire of science communication from descriptions of wonder 
in the works of Boyle, Descartes, and Newton, to its contemporary awe-filled practices. 
Overall, this chapter traces the existence of multiple varieties of awe and their use through 
time in science communication.  
 
 
50 Here I am interested in the history of the category awe rather than the history of the awe experience. The conceptual history of an emotion 
term is part of that history of experience, yet it doesn’t aim to give a complete account of people’s felt experience with this emotion in the 




4.1. A framework to study awe through history 
Perhaps the most important representational convention for the human species is language (S. 
Hall et al., 2013; Lupyan, 2012; Paivio, 1971). People who use the same language share, to 
an extent, a series of social meanings that makes them members of one of the largest possible 
group units: the culture of speakers of a language. For example, English speakers use the 
code of the English language to establish a regularity through symbolic means in the 
signification of a category by providing placeholders (i.e., English words) (Hoemann et al., 
2019; Xu, 2002) for a represented entity. This means that an average literate English speaker 
will recognize the arbitrary set of three symbols printed on this page, ‘a-w-e’, organize these 
into a word, and interpret them using the English language convention (i.e., a social 
meaning), as standing for an emotional category when it is used as a noun (e.g., she was 
overwhelmed by awe), an invocation of that state when it is used as a verb in a sentence (e.g., 
they awed the crowd), or as an adjective related to the state in its compounded forms (e.g., 
awe-inspiring, awe-filled, awe-commanding) among other things. The conventionalization of 
this preferred meaning of the word ‘awe’ in its repeated representation in institutionalized 
practices and products (e.g., dictionaries, stories, recipes) gives it an ecological regularity in-
the-world, from which an average English speaker learns this broad definition in their 
repeated exposure throughout their lives. The relation of the word ‘awe’ to its social meaning 
as an affective experience is somewhat temporarily fixed through those conventions and 
standards, allowing for its communication among individuals within the same cultural unit 
(i.e., the Anglosphere). As a result, most English speakers will share, in the broadest strokes, 
elements of conceptual knowledge about the category ‘awe’ with all the other average 
speakers of this language, thus representing this category with a certain degree of similarity. 
 
However, those meanings are only shared among speakers of the English language up to a 
point. The stereotypical social meanings of any category are always slanting over time, 
continuously mutating, and being produced and reproduced in different ways, as a result of 
people’s experiences and creativity, regularities in linguistic fluctuation, changes in social 
structures, political struggles, and technological change, among other factors driving 
semantic evolution (e.g., Dasher & Traugott, 2002; McConnell-Ginet, 2008). One frequently 
used example for the change in the social meaning of a categories has precisely to do with 
awe. The word awful, whose early uses were akin to those of awe-inspiring today, now refers 




change meaning, ending up assuming a multiplicity of forms and functions, some of which 
run out of fashion, or which co-inhabit the cultural space simultaneously. Dictionaries such as 
the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), as repositories of these social conventions, have 
captured such semantic changes in their job of cataloguing the many usages given to a 
linguistic representation. This process of cataloguing done by the OED, and other such 
dictionaries, is one of the many mechanisms of standardizing social meanings within the 
Anglophone culture and serves as an entry point for investigating their semantic history. In 
that sense, the OED (Oxford University Press, n.d.-c) identifies the following three 
stereotypical meanings for the word ‘awe’ when it is used as a noun: 
1) Immediate and active fear; terror, dread. 
2) From its use in reference to the divine being this passes gradually into: Dread mingled 
with veneration, reverential or respectful fear; the attitude of a mind subdued to 
profound reverence in the presence of supreme authority, moral greatness or 
sublimity, or mysterious sacredness. 
3) The feeling of solemn and reverential wonder, tinged with latent fear, inspired by 
what is terribly sublime and majestic in nature. 
The three senses of awe here described lean towards terror, admiration, and wonder – social 
meanings that appear today in academic descriptions of this emotion (A. M. Gordon et al., 
2017; Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Sundararajan, 2002). These definitions also capture some of the 
situational elements that appear in contemporary descriptions of this emotion category. 
Situations such as being in the presence of God or nature, and themes around solemnity, 
greatness, and mystery are part of these definitions. These limited definitions, however, do 
not mention the many other forms and functions of awe suggested in the literature review. 
The lack of reference to encounters with architecture, music, grand theories, animals, works 
of art, or any of the other situations where this emotion is experienced on the one hand, or to 
the themes of vastness, need for accommodation, curiosity, humility, beauty, transcendence, 
smallness, or any of the many other threads used to represent this emotion on the other, 
indicates the limitations of dictionary definitions in reflecting the complex variations of the 






More importantly, while different meanings of awe coexist in this larger culture, there may 
be more elusive social representations of such category within the many subcultures that 
make up the broader English-language cultural space. In each of these cultural spaces where 
‘awe’ plays some central role, it will take different normative connotations in response to the 
mandates of such subcultural spaces (see chapter three). Today, awe has been identified in a 
variety of subcultures in the English language world including the world of art (e.g., Konečni, 
2011), Christian religious communities (e.g., Krause & Hayward, 2015), the tourism industry 
(e.g., Coghlan et al., 2012), the sports world (e.g., Hodges et al., 2015), the world of magic 
(e.g., Lamont, 2017), the wellness industry (e.g., F. Williams, 2017), environmentalism (e.g., 
McShane, 2018), and humanist psychology (e.g., Schneider, 2009), among other spaces. Awe 
takes a variety of social meanings responding to the mandates of each of these spaces, 
meanings that freely flow from one subculture to the next in a never-ending exchange within 
the larger semantic market of the English language culture. 
 
It is worth keeping in mind that the social meaning of a category does not exist in a linguistic 
vacuum. The ways people use the emotion category ‘awe’ is always within a particular 
narrative and rhetorical relation with the many words surrounding it. As discursive 
psychology reminds us (Edwards, 1999), emotions (and other words) are always described as 
part of larger patterns of social meanings such as stories, scripts, frames, or themes, that tie 
different constituent elements of a situation together into an overarching narrative and offer 
contrast towards potential alternatives of events. These larger patterns of representation that 
give meaning to ‘awe’ can be described as the discourses of ‘awe’51 – taken-for-granted 
repertoires through which people use awe and from which they construct its meaning. The 
discourses of awe provide the semantic scaffold that ties incongruent elements such as words, 
phrases, metaphors, common places, ideas, and other forms of linguistic utterances into a 
coherent network or mapping that people use to make sense of and construct the meanings of 
this emotion category, delineating how it is represented in situations.52  
 
 
51 Lutz and Abu-Lughod’s (1990) distinction between discourses on emotion and emotional discourses is helpful to think about these 
formations Discourses on awe, the way researchers, practitioners, the public, talk about awe are relatively recent and these have been for the 
most part described in the literature review. Emotional discourses of awe, on the other hand, are not referring to this emotion category but 
rather are “commentaries on the practices” (Lutz & Abu Lughod, 1990, p. 19) in which awe is part of the situation. This chapter concerns 
those emotional discourses in which awe participates.  
52 This includes issues about whether it is appropriate or not to experience it, who gets to experience it, where, and when, in relation to what, 




Besides language, there are many other forms of representations associated with an emotion 
category. There is an entire semiotic code through which objects, symbols, images, smells, 
sounds, movements, and other forms of non-linguistic representations function as signifiers to 
an emotion within a grid of semantic associations in social contexts (e.g., Pernau & 
Rajamani, 2016). Facial expressions, body movements, places, food, dances, people, events, 
music, architecture, and many other objects and behaviours signify an emotion category 
through connotation. For example, in part of the English-speaking culture, there is a code in 
which expressions such as the open drop-jawed mouth, the tilted head forward, visible 
inhalations, and the ‘wow’ vocal burst described in various studies (e.g., Campos et al., 2013; 
Cordaro et al., 2018; Shiota et al., 2003), stand for ‘awe’. The same can be said for images, 
such as those of panoramic views of waterfalls, oceans, and deserts (e.g., Prade & Saroglou, 
2016; Saroglou et al., 2008), giant dinosaurs (e.g., Shiota et al., 2007), or views of Earth from 
space (e.g., Yaden et al., 2016), which are also part of the shared code of non-linguistic 
elements through which many English speakers constitute this emotion.  
 
As with discursive repertoires, these non-linguistic (i.e., aesthetic) formations representing 
awe exist within an extensive semantic network of interlaced linguistic and non-linguistic 
associations through which people make sense of this emotion (see Pernau & Rajamani, 
2016). Together, the discursive and aesthetic formations of awe work in tandem to galvanize 
the many social representations that this emotion has in the many contexts where it circulates, 
connecting the various elements that make up its different representations and its many 
themes to the larger social, political, and cultural world. 
 
The variety of social meanings with which awe is represented today reflects how this concept 
has been diversely represented over time. No work, however, has examined the evolution of 
the emotion category ‘awe’ and its many manifestations over different periods. Having said 
that, the outlines of this history can be traced in part by reviewing works that have dealt with 
the discursive and aesthetic repertoires through which people make sense of this emotion: 
‘the sublime’ and ‘the wondrous’.53,54 
 
 
53 I refer to it as a discourse of the wondrous although most of the literature refers to it as a discourse of wonder. I do this to differentiate 
between the formation and the emotion category ‘wonder’.  




There has been considerable academic interest for almost a century in the sublime starting 
with Samuel Monk’s review (Monk, 1960/1935) of its role in the work of various 18th and 
19th century English writers. Since then, multiple works have reviewed the sublime from the 
fields of literary studies (e.g., De Luca, 1991; Nicholson, 1997; Poetzsch, 2006; Weiskel, 
1986), philosophy (e.g., Shaw, 2017), or from a historical perspective (e.g., De Bolla, 1989; 
Nye, 1994). Similarly, the study of the wondrous has caught on over the last few decades 
after many years of neglect from various disciplines (Vasalou, 2015). The historic inaugural 
address on wonder by R.W. Hepburn (1980) marks a starting point for various works on 
wonder appearing in philosophy (e.g., Rubenstein, 2011; Vasalou, 2015), aesthetics (e.g., 
Fisher, 1998), and history (e.g., Daston & Park, 1998). More recently, ecological and feminist 
studies have shined a critical light on much of what has been said about these discursive and 
aesthetic repertoires and their sociocultural roles. This critical attitude to the formations of 
the sublime and the wondrous can be seen in the works of authors such as William Cronon 
(1996), Patricia Yaeger (1989), Barbara Claire Freeman (1995), Christopher Hitt (1999), 
Louise Economides (2016), and Lisa Sideris (2017). Together, this work opens a window for 
tracing the history of the different meanings underlying awe, a history that informs us about 
how these conventions are used in science communication today. 
 
However, as lively and intricate as the discussions about the historical trajectories of the 
sublime and the wondrous are, the many works written on the subject can only explain as 
much about the history of awe. First, most authors in this area have taken a classical view of 
emotions. They describe emotion categories such as awe as having a static and universal 
essence, from which authors in different cultures with different languages and from different 
periods are allegedly describing the same affective overtones55. Only a few authors have 
taken a constructionist view of emotions56. Second, the resources that authors work with, tend 
 
55 For example, studies treat Plato’s thaumazein, Descartes’ etonemment, and Kant’s Bewunderung, as the same emotion category as 
‘wonder’ in the English language (e.g., Fisher, 1998; Hepburn, 1980; Rubenstein, 2011; Vasalou, 2015). Constructionist accounts of 
emotion would have an issue with taking direct translations of emotion words across eras and cultures without explicating the sociocultural 
practices and representations surrounding these (Boddice, 2019; Boddice & M Smith, 2020). Evidence suggests that words translated as 
equivalent from one language to another refer to different social and psychological experiences and expressions (e.g., Hurtado de Mendoza 
et al., 2010; Kayyal & Russell, 2012). This is not to say that the translations circulated in the English language of the works by these authors 
did not impact how people talked about these emotions in the English-speaking world. It is then important to acknowledge the role that 
translations of authors such as Plato, Descartes, and Kant have played in inspiring how different writers in the English-speaking world, from 
Smith to Dawkins, have written about these emotions without taking these to have the same social meaning as the English words. Other 
forms of semantic borrowing from things like geographic proximity (e.g., multilingualism) result in semantic networks for emotion 
categories becoming increasingly related (see Jackson et al., 2019). Yet as similar as emotion categories in different languages can be, awe 
isn’t the same as ikei (Japanese), huşu (Turkish), asombro (Spanish), and any other of the countless translated pairings.  
56 This is the case of Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, who in their work Wonders and the Order of Nature (1998) identified the changes 




to bias their accounts around the social meanings of particular artistic and socioeconomic 
groups. By contrast, the ways by which these emotion words are used by people outside these 
elite groups are seldom presented.  
 
Furthermore, most studies have a tidy narrative structure within somewhat defined 
taxonomies to capture the trajectory of the different formations. Some acknowledge the 
existence of multiple ‘micro-narratives’ that can give a much more diverse and nuanced sense 
of the different meanings appearing within these formations, the interaction between these, 
and their changes through time (e.g., Vasalou, 2015). Every author deals then with an act of 
balancing the parsimony of clear taxonomies with the messiness of having multiple narratives 
that do not coalesce into a single unified picture that can be told within a narrative arc. The 
narrative and taxonomies presented here are a case in point. With various methodological, 
intellectual, resource, and spatial constraints, the outline presented here is only a broad and 
modest overview of a history spanning more than five centuries.  
 
Finally, tracing the history of the meanings of a category through its many representations in 
the historical record is a complicated endeavour because “thought is organic, and every 
thought in every period is in some way conditioned by other thoughts” (Monk, 1960, p. 2). 
There are tomes and methods dedicated to elucidating the evolution of a category through 
time, who try linking different authors, the meanings of what they wrote about, and the 
social, demographic, technological, economic, and political circumstances through which the 
studied categories transpired (see Koselleck, 2002). More importantly, scholars argue 
endlessly about who inspired who, how works should be interpreted, the idiosyncrasies and 
contexts that could lead to such an interpretation, among many disagreements in literature, 
philosophy, history, and other disciplines that trace the historical development of a category. 
For example, there is if little agreement about how the sublime and the wondrous moved 
through place and time, the taxonomies that should be used to interpret these, and the impact 
they have had in the past and today57. The literature review presented in this chapter is an 
 
objects in the world that “cause” an episode of wonder and the descriptions of its psychological experience, or what the authors call the 
“objective order […] [and its] subjective sensibilities” (p. 14). They trace these changes by looking at how these emotions’ representation 
stood next to other emotion and non-emotion words. Their description of changes in the representational maps (i.e., discourses) is somewhat 
similar to some of the changes in the affective tone that Louise Economides (2016) observes in the continuities and changes in the 
discourses of wonder and the sublime from the 17th-century until today.  
57 See, for example, the arguments of Ashfield and de Bolla (1996) against Monk (1960) in the differences between the English and the 




interpretative attempt at localizing the historical sources of some of the elements of situations 
and functions that people use today to talk about the category awe, particularly in science 
communication. I then side with those authors who see the weight of the sublime and the 
wondrous in the constitutions of people’s emotional experiences in the present (e.g., Cronon, 
1996; Economides, 2016; Hitt, 1999), rather than with those who see them as somewhat 
moribund (e.g., Weiskel, 1986). This is my effort at contextualizing the study of the social 
representation of this emotion today which is presented in the following chapters. 
 
4.2. The history of awe 
The next sections look at the historical trajectory of the emotion category ‘awe’, and the 
various social meanings it has picked up over the last few centuries. These, I argue, result 
from socio-political, technological, and cultural changes in the English-speaking world, 
around which different discursive and aesthetic formations appeared, moved, and changed. 
The histories of the formations of the sublime and the wondrous regulated much of the 
production, consumption, and circulation of the representation of awe, all leading to its 
various social meanings in contemporary science communication. My overview of this 
complex history focuses on some of the available analytical and critical reviews of the origins 
and changes in time of the formations of the sublime and the wondrous. This is a literature 
review where I adapt the linear narrative, and main taxonomies for the evolution of these 
formations found in the works of authors such as Monk, Shaw, Daston and Park, Nye, 
Economides, and Vasalou, among others, to the purposes of this work. As a result, the next 
section begins with the origins of the word awe in religious discourse, to then look at its role 
in the different iterations of the sublime before the 19th century – rhetorical, natural, and 
Kantian. Then, the section turns to the origins of the related word ‘wonder’ within the 
discourses of the wondrous. Finally, I look at how these two formations met and intermingled 
with other discourses and aesthetics during the Romantic era, giving rise to many of the 
social meanings that we associate awe with today. In the subsequent section, I will trace the 
development and usage of this emotion category in the communication of science through the 
19th and 20th centuries.  
 
4.2.1. Origins and religious discourse 
The word ‘awe’ can be traced back to the Proto-Germanic word *agiz-, from which the Old 




their meaning (Harper, n.d.-a). By the 14th century, the word was already being used in its 
current spelling to mean both terror and a form of dreadful admiration in “reference to the 
divine being” (Oxford University Press, n.d.-c). This can be observed in Psalm 33 of the first 
complete printed Bible in the English language, the Coverdale Bible of 1535, which includes: 
 
Let all the earth feare the LORDE, and let all them that dwell in the worlde, stode in 
awe of him (Coverdale, 1975/1535).  
 
Awe as a form of terror towards the godhead is a fundamental emotion in some Christian 
religious discourses (Fisher, 1998; Otto, 1923; Vasalou, 2015). Otto (1923) describes it as a 
sense of overpowering, majesty and dread that came in the presence of the divine figure, 
standing as the cornerstone of much of religious devotion. As in the psalm, Otto refers to the 
Bible and other religious text’s descriptions of awe as a fearful encounter that is made 
ambiguous by themes of majesty, reverence, and admiration. Overall, these early descriptions 
of awe are shackled to religious discourses around the encounter with the deity. 
 
The secularization of Europe throughout the Renaissance, however, brought a decline in 
religious authority and its discourses (Monk, 1960). The word ‘awe’ would then take new 
meanings and themes within the many cultural changes Europe experienced, such as the 
appearance of new humanistic values (see Weiskel, 1986). Nonetheless, the meanings and 
themes of awe around a religious discourse of the encounter with the deity have been kept 
alive in the work of thinkers such as Kierkegaard’s and his horror religiosus (Vasalou, 2015), 
Otto’s encounters with the numinous (Otto, 1923), and Woodruff’s most reverent feelings 
towards something transcendent (Woodruff, 2001; Sundararajan, 2002). This religious 
discourse of divine encounters was to heavily influence some of the emotional discourses and 
aesthetics that would become common in Western Europe throughout the 18th and 19th 
centuries, particularly the discourses of the sublime. 
 
4.2.2. New meanings of ‘awe’ in the discourse of the sublime 
Ideas about the sublime reappeared in Europe around the late 17th century, achieving a 
critical status throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries in England (Monk, 1960). The 
secularization and rapid restructuring of social hierarchies, and the twin political and 




to describe the new forms of social relations appearing in this period (Weiskel, 1986). The 
work of an anonymous Roman stoic thinker known as pseudo-Longinus and titled Peri 
Hypsous or On the Sublime (Longinus, 1996), gave English writers a new conceptual trope 
that was ripe to describe the anxieties of the time (Weiskel, 1986). After being unearthed in 
1674 in a translation by Nicolas Boileau, this book gained enormous popularity throughout 
the 18th century in England, making the sublime one of the “informing concepts of the age” 
(De Bolla, 1989, p. 30) and influencing various aspects of the cultural life of the time, 
ranging from people’s aesthetic sensibilities to the role of emergent social institutions. 
 
The idea of the sublime in the scholarship communicates a boundary of reason, whereby 
words fail to express the encounter with an object or thought, when there is a breakdown of 
the usual cognitive apparatus through which experience is assessed, and this indeterminacy is 
evaluated as being part of an order beyond experience (Weiskel, 1986). As a result, the 
concept of the sublime has been related to the understanding of transcendence, of a vision of 
what is beyond ordinary experience, or as sensing of what “lies beyond thought and 
language” (Shaw, 2017, p. 3). This vision of the sublime in relation to a metaphysical order 
in Western thought was influenced by the religious discourse of the encounter with the deity. 
This is why some authors characterize sublimity as essentially a secular version of a religious 
experience under another name (e.g., Cronon, 1996; Fisher, 1998). Other authors, such as 
Economides (2016) and Hitt (1999), see the emphasis of the sublime in its call for mastery 
and control, as a formation that defines the limits of what is and what is not reasonable; the 
sublime allows secular society to define otherness, whether in ‘inhuman nature’, or in 
society, against “‘irrational’ women, non-European peoples, the poor, [and] children” 
(Economides, 2016, p. 19), confirming “the authority and autonomy of a [reasonable] subject 
over and against a threatening other” (Hitt, 1999, p. 603). Moreover, these authors describe 
how the sublime reinforces the “masculinist and humanist agenda critical to the project of 
modernity” (Economides, 2016, p. 19) through its holding the key to our transcendence from 
nature. Considering the differences between literary and critical interpretations of the 
sublime, it is not surprising then that while authors such as Weiskel argue that the concept is 
today in a moribund state (Weiskel, 1986), others argue that it continues to mediate our 
relationship to nature (e.g., Cronon, 1996; Economides, 2016; Hitt, 1999), the relations 
between men and women (e.g., Yaeger, 1989), and people’s relationship with science and 





Since the appearance of the sublime in Europe, it has merged and fused into many other 
formations, taking, and giving categories, metaphors, and other forms of representation to 
and from other discourses and aesthetics. In this giving and taking from various formations, 
the emotion vocabulary of the sublime which includes emotion words such as ‘astonishment’, 
‘elevation’, and ‘admiration’, have come to take new social meanings and themes. ‘Awe’, a 
word with a religious background, becomes entangled into these semantic networks, 
associating and interacting with other words in its introduction into the sublime, and 
acquiring thus a whole new set of ways of being represented. However, this story is not 
straightforward as the sublime came in different varieties. A broad taxonomy of the sublime 
can be seen, one showing that the 18th century had at least three varieties according to the 
themes, objects of focus, and effects. These versions are the rhetorical, natural, and 
Kantian sublime58. These formations of the sublime came to have different forms and degrees 
of impact in the many subcultural spaces where these were utilized. However, by the end of 
the 18th century and early 19th century, during the period identified as the Romanticism, the 
sublime had infected European culture at large and English culture in particular (Weiskel, 
1986). 
 
4.2.2.1. The rhetorical sublime 
Longinus’ Peri Hipsous can be described as the starting point for the rhetorical sublime 
(Crane, 1936; Monk, 1960; Shaw, 2017). This book is mostly concerned with the rhetorical 
styles that cause sublime experiences in an audience (Longinus, 1996). The sublime is both a 
rhetorical strategy in the vein of the grand style, and a quality of the artist or orator’s mind, 
which produces an intense emotional reaction on the audience (Monk, 1960). This last quality 
is beyond the mere oratorical skill, and its sign is on the emotional overtones that can take 
“violent and even enthusiastic degree(s)” (Longinus, 1996, p. 23) on the audience, giving the 
“echo of a noble mind” (Shaw, 2017, p. 15). The sublime for Longinus is a source of 
distinction from which “sensible minds” can recognize the greatness of a person (Crane, 
1936, p. 165), legitimizing and assigning power to the figure of the ‘genius’ and their works 
through which the “quality of their souls shines through” and to which the audience 
 
58 This is, of course, a simplistic taxonomy of the many ways in which the sublime metamorphosed throughout the 18th century. Scholars such 
as Shaw (2017) and Ashfield and de Bolla (1996) describe the many authors who used the sublime and adapted it in many different ways to 




subordinates itself, as “not to admire [the genius] is to confess oneself lacking in taste and 
sensitivity” (Crane, 1936, pp. 165–166). The power that the person receives is then 
manifested in the embodied experience through the emotional reactions of the audience, who 
is taken as if by a ‘thunderbolt’ into a state of submission and in which “a grand conception 
may be instilled in the mind without any bothersome appeal to reason or justice” (Shaw, 
2017, p. 14). This vision of sheer rhetorical power through which the genius brings the 
audience to a state of raised emotions, including elevation, ecstasy, admiration, and awe, is 
the most central theme around the rhetorical sublime (Crane, 1936; Longinus, 1996; Shaw, 
2017). 
 
Many 18th-century authors, such as John Dennis and Thomas Stackhouse, continued this 
tradition of a ‘rhetorical sublime’ whose power lies in language (Ashfield & De Bolla, 1996, 
p. 28)59. Yet a broader version of the sublime, one that went beyond the image of the ‘genius’ 
and their rhetorical skills, also emerged. Quotes from Longinus’ Peri Hipsous were extracted 
and applied to a context in which the natural world was starting to be seen, not as a strange 
and hostile place, but one of beauty and adventure60 (Monk, 1960; Nicholson, 1997; Weiskel, 
1986). Authors in this tradition took Longinus’ pagan vocabulary of thunderous ravaging and 
transport and moulded it to the realities of a Christian worldview increasingly under threat 
from new perspectives of the individual and the universe (De Bolla, 1989; Monk, 1960). In 
this moulding and mixing of categories, ideas, and other forms of representation, the concept 
of ‘awe’ as terror and admiration acquired a new set of social signifiers and associations. 
 
4.2.2.2. The natural sublime 
Longinus’ work on the sublime led to interpretations in which the sublime existed in the 
external world, specifically, as a quality of nature (Monk, 1960; Shaw, 2017). As Monk 
notes, before the sublime entered Europe, there was “little enthusiasm for natural sublimities” 
(Monk, 1960, p. 17). Marjorie Hope Nicholson also writes in her work Mountain Gloom and 
 
59 While the distinction of the ‘rhetorical sublime’ and the ‘natural sublime’ that began with R.S. Crane is still used in texts about the sublime 
(e.g., Shaw, 2017), there has been a long discussion into how true these differences are in the many writers of the XVIII century. For example, 
Weiskel argues that the rhetorical sublime is “structurally cognate” to the natural sublime (Weiskel, 1986, p. 11) while Ashfield and de Bolla 
(1996) recognize not only a Longinian tradition but various other forms of interpretations that mix elements of the natural and the rhetorical 
with many other forms of discourse. 
60 For example, Longinus (1996) writes: “Nature never designed man to be a groveling and ungenerous animal, but brought him into life, and 
placed him in the world, as in a crowded theatre, not to be an idle spectator, but spurred on by an eager thirst of excelling, ardently to contend 
in the pursuit of glory. For this purpose, she implanted in his soul an invincible love of grandeur, and a constant emulation of whatever seems 




Mountain Glory (1997/1963) that before the 18th century, mountains were “warts, blisters, 
imposthumes, when they were not the rubbish of the earth, swept away by the careful 
housewife Nature – waste places of the world with little meaning and less charm” 
(Nicholson, 1997, p. 62). However, the increasing anxieties of modernity creeping from the 
novel, empirically-driven ways of assessing the world resulted in boredom and 
disenchantment. In turn, writers began to seek out intense emotional experience in nature as a 
“homeopathic therapy (…) [and] a cure of uneasiness” (Weiskel, 1986, p. 18) in an effort to 
guide readers out of the daily and the familiar. The vocabulary of the sublime in Longinus, 
with its focus on powerful emotions as a result of images of grandeur, was taken by artists 
and writers of the time and applied to this changing interpretation of the natural world 
(Monk, 1960). Images of new worlds were opening up the imagination and rupturing the 
images of order and beauty that dominated previous eras (Economides, 2016; Vasalou, 2015; 
Weiskel, 1986). Findings in astronomy, geography, and exploration, meant that meanings 
traditionally assigned to the deity, such as vastness and infinity, were soon slipping to denote 
qualities of the natural world (Weiskel, 1986). It is in this new semiotic economy where 
emotional words that would traditionally accompany descriptions of religious encounters 
with the deity (e.g., awe, fear, love) and the experience of the sublime (e.g., astonishment, 
elevation, ecstasy) were transposed to encompass natural objects and phenomena, such as the 
night sky, waterfalls, the ocean, desserts, and mountains, within a secular version of the 
sublime whereby “a sense of the numinous was diffused through all the grander aspects of 
nature” (Weiskel, 1986, p. 14). This movement of the powerful themes and emotional 
vocabulary from the rhetorical sublime to natural objects via religious discourses, is one of 
the most important characteristics of what is today referred to as the natural sublime. 
 
After standing for most of its history as a symbol of fear surrounding encounters with God, 
the word ‘awe’ acquired a new set of social meanings within the discourses of the rhetorical 
and natural sublime. The sublime had created new networks in which the encounter with 
objects deemed sublime, whether those with extraordinary abilities in the rhetorical sublime 
or natural objects in the natural sublime, became associated as the ‘attention foci’ of the 
various emotion categories that prevailed in this economy. In its relation to religious 
discourses, the emotion vocabulary of the discourse of the sublime made ‘awe’ tantamount to 
the emotions in Peri Hypsous of ‘admiration’, ‘elevation’, and ‘astonishment’, words that 




original usage. The social meaning of ‘awe’ began then to slip through the discourse of the 
sublime into a more positive connotation, in relation to the semiotic networks that came to 
dominate the forms of representation in the second half of the 18th century and the early 19th 
century. 
 
As an example of this shift, consider On the Sublime and the Beautiful by the Irish politician, 
philosopher, and essayist Edmund Burke (1990/1757). In this work, the formation of these 
networks of signification can be observed, as the meaning of ‘awe’ slants into new domains 
through the discourse of the sublime, in its contiguity to other emotion and non-emotion 
words, which correspond to the aesthetic sensibilities and social necessities of the time. 
 
For Burke, the original meaning of the word ‘awe’ describes an overwhelming terror that 
“accompanies the idea of power” (Burke, 1990, p. 77). The ultimate source of this awe-
inducing power is seen as derived from God: 
 
In the Scripture, wherever God is represented as appearing or speaking, everything  
terrible in nature is called up to heighten the awe and solemnity of the Divine  
presence. (…) The earth shook, (says the Psalmist,) the heavens also dropped at the  
presence of the Lord (p. 79). 
 
The religious association to the emotion concept sustains the original social meaning of the 
emotion word, which is preserved in the religious discourse of the encounter with the deity. 
However, the meaning of awe as terror begins to slant in the association that ‘awe’ acquires 
with other words in its emotional neighbourhood. This can be seen in the following passage: 
 
In all these cases, if the pain and terror are so modified as not to be actually noxious;  
if the pain is not carried to violence, and the terror is not conversant about the  
present destruction of the person, as these emotions clear the parts, whether fine or  
gross, of a dangerous and troublesome incumbrance, they are capable of producing  
delight; not pleasure, but a sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquillity tinged with  
terror; which, as it belongs to self-preservation, is one of the strongest of all the  
passions. Its object is the sublime. Its highest degree I call astonishment; the  




the words, show from what source they are derived, and how they stand distinguished  
from positive pleasure (Burke, 1990, p. 123). 
 
Here, there is a move from an exclusively negatively valenced emotion, towards a more 
ambiguous experience of ‘delightful horror’ or ‘negative pleasure’ through the sublime. It is 
in moments like this where ‘awe’ acquires a new social meaning away from the traditional 
association with terror and into a new semiotic economy in its relationship with 
astonishment, reverence, and respect, taking, perhaps, a neutral or perhaps positive sense of 
esteem and worship towards that which the ‘awe-inspiring’ signifies. Within these new 
networks of associations, the emotion concepts used by Burke are exchanging meanings; 
reverence, respect, and astonishment come to be associated with the terror in ‘awe’, and 
‘awe’ takes from these the aesthetic, behavioural, and phenomenological elements carried by 
these other emotion words. 
 
More importantly, Burke lists the themes that are to be associated with the sublime and 
catalogues the objects which possess these qualities. Qualities traditionally associated with 
God, such as powerfulness, magnificence, obscurity, silence, and infinity are all now qualities 
that cause emotional reaction that can be thought of as sublime. One of these Burkean 
themes, vastness, was to become central to the contemporary conceptualization of this 
emotion (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Likewise, objects such as “a tower a hundred yards high, or 
a rock or mountain of that altitude”, “the cloudy sky (…) and night”, “the ocean” and many 
such natural objects that possess these qualities are considered sublime and can cause people 
to experience awe (Burke, 1990). These lists of objects and their attributes calling the 
sublime were reasonably common throughout the 18th century, found in the works of Dennis, 
Addison, Akenside, Baille, and many other writers who wrote essays on the topic (Ashfield 
& de Bolla, 1997; Shaw, 2017). However, Burke’s book was to be the most influential work 
on the subject, going through multiple re-prints both in the United Kingdom and the United 
States after its original publishing in 1756 (Nye, 1994). The popularization of this specific set 




sublime promotes might explain the many usages and associations of the word awe that 
contemporary English speakers have inherited61. 
 
There is still in Burke’s work, however, an ambivalence about what the source of the sublime 
is, as he recognizes that God is the ultimate source of the sublime (Burke, 1990; Shaw, 2017). 
It was German philosopher Immanuel Kant who managed to synthesize a century of literature 
on the sublime within his philosophical system, which favours the subjective, rather than the 
religious, point of view. Kant’s writing in this area was widely read in his time and, along 
with Burke’s oeuvre, continues to have a significant hold on the subject’s discussions to this 
day. 
 
4.2.2.3. The Kantian sublime 
For Kant, the sublime resided in a process whereby reason becomes aware of itself and then 
conquers its own limits. The German philosopher spent a large section of the third book in his 
critique series, the Critique of Judgement (Kant, 2000/1790), dedicated to defining the 
characteristics of this process. This new formation displaces attention away from the objects 
towards an understanding of the mental steps that make up the sublime moment. 
 
Kant’s sublime considers its three narrative stages (Hitt, 1999; Weiskel, 1986). The first stage 
is that of calm or stasis before the encounter. The mind is at ease going about its everyday 
life. Then it gets overwhelmed with feelings of incomprehension at the presence of an idea or 
object that cannot be represented as a result of its boundlessness and formlessness that calls 
into question the person’s judgement (Shaw, 2017). This incomprehension can result from an 
encounter with spatial or temporal magnitude, which the philosopher labels the mathematical 
sublime, or from a sense of overbearing power, the dynamic sublime (Kant, 2000/1790). 
Examples of the mathematical sublime can be sequential objects that lead to the idea of 
infinity or omnipresence, while objects that bring in the dynamic sublime are usually in 
nature such as the ocean, mountains, and storms. This second moment of encounter is marked 
through emotion categories such as astonishment, awe, and admiration. However, the mind 
can return from this imbalance as reason triumphs over the object. In this final stage, the 
 
61 Consider how the literature about ‘awe’ in psychology continues citing Burke’s work (e.g., A. M. Gordon et al., 2017; Keltner & Haidt, 
2003; Piff et al., 2015) and how grand natural vistas are the paradigm method to elicit ‘awe’ in lab experiments (e.g., A. M. Gordon et al., 




mind conceives its incapacity to stand against the object’s magnitude yet becomes aware of 
its capacity to represent it (Shaw, 2017). For example, while the concept of infinity is 
inconceivable, reason can hold the concept of infinity together. The Himalayas also look vast 
and insurmountable, but people have ascended its highest peaks through ingenuity. Being 
able to hold infinity conceptually or overcoming our smallness as creatures through reason’s 
powers is a transcendental moment in which it is possible to get in touch with the a 
priori principles that, according to Kant, hold together all experiences (Shaw, 2017). This 
ability to transcend objects that are beyond comprehension frees reason from the bounds of 
nature and the imagination (Kant, 2000; Nye, 1994; Shaw, 2017). In this triumph of the 
human mind over nature, the sublime becomes a discourse of understanding and 
transcendence from human limitations, where reason, rather than God, is the ultimate source 
of the sublime. The products of reason such as mathematical formulas, philosophical ideas, 
and complex concepts enter the semantic network of objects that connote powerful awe-like 
reactions. Similarly, its process is akin to the theme of accommodation; the theme at the 
centre of current scientific definitions of awe (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 2003). 
 
As translations of Kant’s works appeared in English, writers such as Blake (De Luca, 1991), 
Coleridge, and Wordsworth (Shaw, 2017) took the language and narrative structure of the 
discourse of the sublime and appropriated many of its tropes and rhetorical devices. These 
authors did not just borrow from Kant’s sublime, but also many of the general implications of 
his philosophical ideas, for example, his move towards subjectivism, the affirmation of the 
individual, the primacy of the imagination, and the possibilities of art to transcend experience 
(Monk, 1960; Shaw, 2017; Weiskel, 1986). These ideas proved central to much of a new 
artistic movement that emerged through the late 18th and early 19th century; a collection of 
artists and thinkers that today are referred to as the Romantics. 
 
Multiple works about the role of the sublime in Romantic literature and its influence today 
have emerged over the past century (e.g., Monk, 1960). Many of these analyses have looked 
at the sublime’s focus on the grandest of nature as an object of inspiration and the 
glorification of the subject, in what Poetzsch (2006) calls the “mountaintop paradigm of the 
sublime”. For example, works such as the Romantic Sublime (Weiskel, 1986) have focused 
their attention on the “big six” of Romantic literature (i.e., Wordsworth, Blake, Coleridge, 




encounters with expanding vistas, in solitude, and foreign lands. This work created the 
stereotype of the “lone wanderer, usually male, who, exhausted by the grind of the diurnal 
round, seeks solace, refreshment or inspiration in the primeval purity of nature, and there 
discovers some trace of transcendent otherness” (Poetzsch, 2006, p. 9). The idea of vast 
natural objects eliciting intense emotion reactions in the natural sublime, and the way these 
lead to changes in perspective in the Kantian sublime, have been since this period staples of 
the discursive and aesthetic traditions of the English language. Today, the mountaintop 
version of the sublime can be encountered as one of the main stereotypical representations of 
awe; it is even used in psychology experiments to elicit awe under controlled laboratory 
conditions (e.g., Bai et al., 2017; Shiota et al., 2011). 
 
More recently, some scholars have identified a series of other discursive and aesthetic 
formations running parallel to the sublime in the work of Romantic authors. These scholars 
have constructed a much more complex view of the many artists in this movement, their 
varied aesthetic sensibilities, the multiplicity of sources from which they took inspiration, and 
the many representational repertoires leading to new networks of association. Critics have 
unearthed many of the themes that the Romantics mixed with the sublime, such as those 
around the beautiful and the quotidian that contest the traditional narratives of a monolithic 
conception of the sublime in Romantic literature and its influence today (e.g., Economides, 
2016; Poetzsch, 2006). Such images of the pastoral, the beautiful, the quotidian, and most 
importantly, ideas about the wondrous, converged with the sublime throughout this period, 
resulting in new forms of representation and signification for many categories, including the 
emotion ‘awe’. 
 
4.2.3. The discourses on the wondrous 
The emotion word ‘wonder’ has obscure origins. Derived from an unknown Proto-Germanic 
word, the term was already used in the Old English as the noun ‘wundor’ in works such as 
Beowulf to describe a marvellous object, and as an intransitive verb ‘wundrian’ as in, to be 
struck with astonishment or a feeling of surprise (Harper, n.d.-b). By the High Middle Ages, 
the word was already used in its current spelling to describe an emotional state (Oxford 
University Press, n.d.-e)62. Using a constructionist account, Daston and Park (1998) note the 
 
62 Arguing from a classical emotions view, various authors trace the social meaning of wonder to Plato and Aristotle’s works, whereby, 




various changes in the social meaning and themes around wonder, through the Middle Ages 
and to the early Enlightenment period. These authors described multiple formations of the 
wondrous appearing over the course of centuries, including its religious, lay, and scientific 
versions. 
 
The authors trace the origins of the religious discourse of the wondrous to European readings 
of Augustine of Hippo, who argued that there was no distinction between the objects 
described as wondrous and everyday things. As God had created everything, all was a 
reflection of the divine will and power, and hence a potential object of wonder (Daston & 
Park, 1998). This motif about the potentiality of anything to be wonderful was to inspire 
many writers and thinkers throughout the ages (Daston & Park, 1998; Vasalou, 2015). In this 
religious formation of the wondrous, the social meaning of the emotion word ‘wonder’ was 
accompanied by themes around appreciation, humility, and gratitude that stood in relation to 
that wholeness of existence. 
 
The second of these discourses of wonder was more lay in tone and would be related to “both 
sacred and secular marvellous objects that defined the limits of people’s knowledge and 
understanding” (Daston & Park, 1998, p. 16). Through the Medieval period and into the 
Renaissance, collections of marvels63 sprang up through Europe, becoming symbols of 
prestige and reputation for elites who became obsessed with collecting rare specimens and 
artefacts in their Wunderkammers. The emotion of wonder acted as a technology through 
which the practices that signified the power of the elite were embodied in the emotional 
reactions to these rarities (Daston & Park, 1998). Wonder took social meanings and themes 
around the marvel and surprise provoked by the novel and rare object.  
 
However, new forms continued to emerge as a function of Europe’s many cultural shifts 
through the late Renaissance and into the 17th century. ‘Curiosity’, a word that from antiquity 
had had negative connotations as the vice of wanting to know “that which did not concern 
 
of this emotion. For example, the ‘thaumezein’ of the ancient Greeks is taken to mean the same as the current emotion word ‘wonder’ and is 
described as an innate human capacity (e.g., Fisher, 1998; Vasalou, 2015). While elements of the situation in which thaumezein occurred 
might resemble those of current descriptions of wonder, and the writings of these two authors enormously influenced Western thought, it is 
very hard to make a one-to-one correspondence between these two emotion categories from a constructionist framework. 
63 The objects of wonder changed through the ages. So, while “the African pygmies, the mysterious lodestone [and] the glowing carbuncle” 
were all considered objects of wonder, for a relatively long time, other objects, such as the basilisk, comets, and unicorn horns, lost their 




one” (Daston & Park, 1998, p. 305), and which had no relation to wonder, became, in the 
works of early European scientific thinkers such as Hobbes and Descartes, a positive virtue 
and an ally to wonder. This new scientific wonder, surrounded by themes of curiosity and 
learning, was central to much of the early scientific endeavour and, as I argue in a later 
section, to the practices involved in the constitution of early contemporary science 
communication. 
 
Around the 18th century, however, wonders, which had been a sign of distinction for the 
European elite for centuries, became “vulgar” to their eyes, with people from all walks of life 
claiming to possess objects of a similar fashion, and shows travelling around the continent 
displaying curiosities for popular entertainment (Daston & Park, 1998). Moreover, scientific 
wonder lost some of its appeal throughout the 18th century. The objective detachment 
beginning to be expected of natural scientists as a function of their scientific labour, relegated 
descriptions of wonder (which were rife in the work of 16th and 17th century naturalists) to 
autobiographies or introspective commentary about their own research (Daston & Park, 
1998). This coincided with the rising to prominence of the sublime during the Romantic 
period, which would turn wonder into something “almost beyond recognition” subsuming 
much of it into its “natural and moral order” of things (Daston & Park, 1998, p. 362). It is 
during this critical junction that many of the varieties of awe being used today in science 
communication were first established. 
 
4.2.4. Awe in the Romantic period 
During Europe’s Romantic period (which lasted from the late 18th to the early-middle 19th 
centuries) the semantic networks of powerful emotional experiences of the sublime and the 
formations around the wondrous came together (Dalston and Park, 1998). Within this 
blending, the emotion categories awe and wonder became closely associated, being paired up 
in descriptions of sublime and wondrous situations, to the point of becoming almost 
interchangeable terms. It is here, I argue, that the emotion word ‘awe’ acquired a new set of 
social meanings and themes related to wonder, such as the marvellous, the rare, humility, 
appreciation, and curiosity, far removed from the themes of the terrible and dreadful 
reverence on the one hand, and astonished transcendence on the other, related to the sublime. 
More importantly, while the formation of the sublime was at the core of the discourses and 




with the Enlightenment allowed many other formations, such as those around beauty or the 
quotidian, to become entangled in this semiotic economy, thus providing a large variety of 
novel themes to the categories of awe and wonder. All these developments were to permeate 
the work of early contemporary science communicators. 
 
At the centre of the transformation of meanings of awe, was the newfound close association 
between the sublime and the wondrous. To illustrate this pairing, consider the passage below 
from Blake’s poem Milton, published in 1810 (cited in Economides, 2016, p. 8). While still 
circumscribed within the ideas of the sublime, it guides the audience towards new meanings 
and themes for the word ‘awe’: 
 
The Lark sitting upon his earthly bed: just as the morn 
Appears; listens silent; then springing from the waving Corn-field! loud 
He leads the Choir of Day! trill, trill, trill, trill, 
Mounting upon the wings of light into the Great Expanse: 
Reechoing against the lovely blue & shining heavenly Shell: 
His little throat labours with inspiration: every feather 
On throat & breast & wings vibrates with effluence Divine 
All Nature listens silent to him & the awful Sun 
Stands still upon the Mountain looking on this little Bird 
With eyes of soft humility, & wonder love & awe. (Part II: Plate 31: 28–38) (Blake, 2002, p. 
213) 
 
In this part of the poem, Blake describes the image of a delicate lark singing at dusk, where 
the vastness and command of the great expanse and heavenly shell (i.e., the natural sublime), 
is juxtaposed to the smallness, love, and humility characteristic of religious versions of the 
wondrous and other discourses around the beautiful. The images of chirping, wings, and 
feathers, stand in sharp contrast with the ‘awful Sun’ and the ‘Mountain’, highlighting the 
difference between the two formations and affording “new perspectives on natural 
phenomena which might otherwise be perceived as ‘mundane’” (Economides, 2016, p. 11). 
 
More importantly, wonder, a word not found in Burke’s book to describe the sublime, half a 




the adage of distributional semantics models (Andrews et al., 2009; Vigliocco et al., 2009) 
“You shall know a word by the company it keeps” (Firth, 1957, p.11), a quick search in 
Google Books’ n-gram function (figure 4.1) clearly shows the semantic shifts for the word 
awe in the increasing use of the phrases ‘awe and wonder’ and ‘wonder and awe’ in the 
English language between the publishing of Burke’s landmark A Philosophical Enquiry into 
the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful in 1757, and Blake’s writing 
of Milton between 1804 and 1810. As this figure illustrates, the pairing of these two words 
increasingly found a place throughout the second half of the 18th century. However, as the 
Romantic period came into full swing, the paired usage of the two words accelerated, 
reaching its zenith around the time Darwin published his treatise on natural selection, On the 





In this linking between the sublime and the wondrous, awe took on a host of new themes. In 
the same way that an image of the commonplace, as in Blake’s lark in Milton, is depicted as 
sublime, an extract from a 1797 poem by Anna Laetitia Barbauld, titled Washing Day (cited 
 
64 It is worth highlighting that the pairing declined for almost a century until today, where it has reached a similar popularity level as it had 




in Poetzsch, 2006, p. 116) shows some of these new social meanings that awe takes from 
more typical ‘wondrous’ formations: 
 
(…)well remember, when a child, the awe 
 This day struck into me; for then the maids, 
 I scarce knew why, looked cross, and drove me from them: Nor soft caress could I obtain, 
nor hope 
 Usual indulgencies; jelly or creams, 
 Relic of costly suppers, and set by 
 For me their petted one; or buttered toast, 
 When butter was forbid; or thrilling tale 
 Of ghost or witch, or murder-so I went 
 And sheltered me beside the parlour fire(...)(58-67) (Barbauld, 1874, p. 94)  
 
The author associates awe with the child-like sense of wonder in its descriptions of a washing 
day; a situation that has nothing to do with the vast natural landscapes or rhetorical prowess 
of a genius that are characteristic of the sublime. More importantly, in the inclusion of 
emotion categories reserved for powerful encounters with nature within discourses around the 
quotidian, both awe and the familiar domicile space acquire new social meanings, essentially 
grounding the former and elevating the latter (see Poetzsch, 2006). 
 
Coleridge (cited in Economides, 2016, p. 37) also bridges the sublime and the child-like 
sense of wonder in his description of a genius as someone who can: 
 
…carry on the feelings of childhood into the powers of manhood; to combine the  
child’s sense of wonder and novelty with the appearances which every day for  
perhaps forty years had rendered familiar: (…) this is the character and privilege of  
genius, and one of the marks which distinguish genius from talents (Coleridge, 1969, p. 73). 
 
Here, Coleridge merges the wondrous in the image of the child’s ‘sense of wonder’ and the 
themes around novelty, with the figure of the genius from the rhetorical sublime 
(Economides, 2016). Wonder and awe are conceptualized as emotions that can bring about a 




indifference towards the foreground of our cognition, a theme known in art and philosophy as 
defamiliarization (Economides, 2016; Vasalou, 2015). Importantly, defamiliarization 
secularizes the ability in the religious discourse of the wondrous through which a change of 
perspective can make any object wonder-filled through the touch of the divine (see Daston & 
Park 1998). Defining the genius as the type of individual who can carry the “child’s sense of 
wonder” into adulthood – a defamiliarization ability through which they can turn anything 
into something novel and awesome – is yet another instance of the interaction between the 
formations sublime and the wondrous to create new meanings that strongly reverberate into 
today’s discussions (see Sideris, 2017; Vasalou, 2015).  
 
Economides (2016) finds similar amalgamations of the sublime and the wondrous with other 
formations around themes of the beautiful and the pastoral in the work of the Romantic poets. 
Both Burke and Kant describe the beautiful as an aesthetics that is the direct opposite to the 
sublime. While, on the one hand, the sublime is defined in terms of ‘manly’ “fortitude, 
justice, and wisdom” (Burke, 1990, p. 100), beauty is treated as a “quality, where it is 
highest, in the female sex, [and that] almost always carries with it an idea of weakness and 
imperfection” (Burke, 1990, p. 100). Besides the problematic gender dynamics involved in 
their definition of these aesthetics (see Freeman, 1995; Yaeger, 1989), the beautiful was then 
seen as the anti-sublime (Economides, 2016, p. 55). Similarly, the pastoral aesthetic stood in 
contrast to the sublime (e.g., Dekker, 2014; Economides, 2016). The pastoral’s emphasis on 
harmony, greenery, and locality contrasts to the sublime’s value of tension, darkness, and 
remoteness, which Burke explains, “an immense mountain covered with a shining green turf, 
is nothing, in this respect, to one dark and gloomy” (Burke, 1990, p. 75). Some Romantics, 
however, had no difficulty in taking elements of the beautiful, and the pastoral into their 
network of signifiers and signifieds of the sublime and the wondrous. For example, Coleridge 
describes wonder and curiosity towards visions of the beautiful and pastoral in his 
celebrations of nature (Economides, 2016, p. 56). The poet displays in many of his works a 
sense of tranquillity, harmony, and radical openness to the environment characteristic of 
pastoral, beautiful, and wonder-filled aesthetics (Economides, 2016, p. 28). Economides 
(2016) also observes how some of the poetry of authors such as Wordsworth or John Clare, 
through which ‘awe’, ‘wonder’, and other similar emotions, could now be ascribed not just to 
powerful encounters with the sublime but also to the small, the lovely, the harmonic, the 





These are only a few examples of the many ways in which the Romantic period served as a 
melting pot for the combination of many discourses and aesthetic formations through which 
the category ‘awe’ acquired many of the social meanings and themes that we use to talk 
about it today. From the sublime, it would take meanings related to terror, elevation, and 
admiration, and themes of vastness and accommodation. From the wondrous, it would relate 
to categories such as marvel, astonishment, and wonder, as well as take ideas about 
defamiliarization, humility, and curiosity. Similarly, it was also to acquire from other 
formations many other meanings and themes such as modesty, beauty, ordinariness, and 
gratitude, which are present in today’s descriptions of this emotion category (see chapters 
two and seven). Finally, the sublime and the wondrous have contributed to the stereotypical 
representation of the situational menagerie ascribed to awe. Whether encounters with 
outstanding people, natural objects, or the products of reason (e.g., mathematical formulas) 
through the sublime, or rendezvous with marvels and eccentricities from the wondrous, these 
discursive and aesthetic formations demarcated and constituted the situations where awe was 
experienced and expressed. This set of social representations forms the basis of many of the 
varieties of awe that we currently see represented in the English-speaking world.  
 
Throughout its history, however, different subcultural groups of English speakers have taken 
and used these various social meanings in different ways, incorporating them into their 
products and practices in relation to their idiosyncrasies. In fact, some groups give a central 
place to certain versions of this emotion, adapting its meanings to their particular cultural 
mandates; processes of appropriation, circulation, and representation with their own social 
and historical trajectories. For example, whereas specific religious cultural spaces have used 
social meanings for awe and wonder, with a continued emphasis on terror and admiration and 
themes of transcendence, elevation, and humility (e.g., Otto, 1923; Sundararajan, 2002), 
popular practices in the entertainment industry, such as tabloids or the pages of the Guinness 
World Book of Records, still contain versions of the awe as marvel over rarities and oddities, 
reminiscent of the Wunderkammer (Daston & Park, 1998). The many varieties of awe within 
the different subcultures, which have given it a place in their representational repertoire, have 
had their own unique histories. However, they feed one another in the larger and shared 
cultural spaces in which English language speakers participate, while at the same time 




other challenges that come with every epoch. This is also the case for the varieties of awe in 
the contemporary culture of science communication, a culture whose original practices and 
products were heavily influenced by the Romantic movement, and which from its inception 
positioned awe in a central role in its representational repertoire. 
 
4.3. Awe in the culture of science communication  
Varieties of awe, with their many social meanings and themes, have been in use throughout 
the history of contemporary science communication. However, there is no history of this 
emotion category and the different senses it took through time in this cultural space. The 
following sections are my attempt to outline such history. I rely heavily on authors such as 
Daston and Park (1998) and Nye (1994) to trace the outlines of this history, following the 
appearance and usage of this emotion category as part of the formations of the sublime and 
the wondrous; formations which have been central to the ways science is talked about with 
non-expert audiences. 
 
I begin this section by going back to the genesis of Western science and describe how 
wonder, in particular, was part of its vocabulary from its conception. Then I describe the 
appearance of English science communication practices at the beginning of the 19th century 
and how the Romantics heavily influenced early practitioners in their treatment of awe and 
wonder. Next, I describe how novel formations of the sublime and the wondrous, such as the 
technological sublime, the nuclear sublime, and the environmental sense of wonder have 
become part of how science has been communicated over the past two centuries, adding new 
representational repertoires to descriptions of this emotion in this space. 
 
4.3.1. The wondrous and the sublime in Western science before the 19th century 
Discourses of the wondrous have been closely entwined with Western science products and 
practices65 in general, and its English-speaking community in particular, from its early days 
in the 17th century (Daston & Park, 1998). As described earlier, these formations had been 
inherited from the many cultural practices of wonder during the Renaissance, such as 
the Wunderkammer. The curiosities and miscellanea found in these cabinets of 
 
65 I acknowledge the very problematic nature of the construct of Western science as it imposes a narrative that, for example, ignores the 
influences of previous eras and other cultures (see Daston, 2017). Here I use it to refer to the particular knowledge production practices that 





curiosities were so much part of the zeitgeist of the late 16th and early 17th centuries that 
authors such as Francis Bacon included their cultural bearing into their program of methods 
and epistemologies for the new natural philosophy. Works such as the Novum Organum and 
the New Atlantis would have a later influence on the constitution and ethos of the Royal 
Society through their impact on scientific luminaries such as Boyle, Hook, Huygens, and 
Newton (Daston & Park, 1998). 
 
Although the history of the Wunderkammer can be traced back to the relic collections of 
medieval times and through the Schatz- repositories of the Renaissance, the 17th century saw 
an explosion in the popularization of such cabinets (Daston & Park, 1998). Not only royalty 
and the wealthy collected such marvels, but educated elites such as scholars, lawyers, 
physicians, merchants, and institutions (including medical schools, universities, and 
eventually academies), were now bringing together works of craftmanship, exotic objects 
from far-flung places, natural rarities, and classical antiquities to showcase curiosities in 
carefully curated spaces. The function of many of these collections was to display the power 
and wealth of rulers and individuals who used their resources to set up impressive displays 
that would leave admirers ‘dumbstruck’ with marvel (Daston & Park, 1998). People would 
travel across Europe to see the marvels in these collections and experience the emotional 
menagerie these would elicit. A lay discourse of wonder focused on marvellous objects, and 
the intense emotions these collections brought, was at the time very much part of European 
culture. 
 
In this cultural milieu of the 17th century, curiosity and wonder were bound together as a 
“sensibility of inquiry” towards understanding the extraordinary (Daston & Park, 1998, p. 
301). Bacon and others drew inspiration from the practices of the Wunderkammer in their 
conceptualization of the practices of natural philosophy (Daston & Park, 1998). 
The Wunderkammer’s objects demanded a motivational commitment to keep up the sustained 
level of attention that their study demanded. Authors such as Bacon and Hobbes then 
reconceptualized curiosity as a restless desire to understand these objects (Daston & Park, 
1998, p. 307); a motivation that resulted from the wonder and marvel they generated. It was 
in this new association between curiosity and wonder, where wonder acts as an engine of 
encouragement which dissipates once investigation begins, that a new sensibility of enquiry, 




pursuit. The wonders of the Wunderkammer and the new “sensibility of inquiry” in authors 
such as Bacon, had an immense influence on the scientific empiricism that the Royal Society 
promoted in its early decades. The instrumental view of wonder as leading to curiosity drove 
the research ethos of the time, becoming commonplace in the writings of natural philosophers 
such as Hooke and Newton throughout the 17th century.  
 
Other themes around wonder, however, began to percolate into the writings of scientists. 
Authors such as Hooke, for example, described how the act of intense observation, could turn 
the common and domestic into the rare and the marvellous (Hooke, 1969, as cited in Daston 
& Park, 1998). This idea that everything is potentially wonderful, present in religious 
discourses of the wondrous and pursued later by Romantic poets and other artists (i.e., 
through ‘defamiliarization’), characterized wonder as an emotion that dwells on the object; a 
dwelling parallel to the theme of a ‘sense of wonder’ at everything in the world. Wonder and 
curiosity could potentially be sustained, working not as a means to an end, but as an end in 
itself (Vasalou, 2015). These two conceptualizations of the wondrous (instrumental and the 
sense of wonder) were to become competing formations in the communication of science 
(Sideris, 2017). 
 
However, the formations around wonder in science would decline throughout the 17th and 
early 18th centuries. Even though Bacon had made wonder an important part of the scientific 
ethos, he also had cautioned against the dangers of too much wonder, arguing that its 
excesses lead to “broken knowledge” that resembled “vain admiration” (Bacon, 1872, as 
cited in Daston & Park, 1998, p. 317). Similar admonishments appeared in the work of 
Boyle, Descartes, and others, who feared that wonder could lead to a paralyzed stupefaction 
that could freeze rather than encourage enquiry, amongst other issues that could result from 
its excesses. Furthermore, after the disastrous wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, where 
religion had played an essential role in their motivation and sustenance, the intellectual elites 
of Europe in urban centres such as London and Paris, began to view wonder and its role in 
rousing enthusiasm and superstition, as politically dangerous (Daston & Park, 1998). A 
mixture of fear, novelty, and admiration for prodigies, miracles, and marvels, had served as 
the powder keg for revolutionary fervour and pathological fanatism. For the educated elites, 
the wondrous became associated with chaos and social disorder. Marvels and miracles were 




were seen as leading to superstition, enthusiasm, and a general ignorance that could only be 
tamed by reason and the methods provided by objective, ‘emotionally neutral’ science. In 
short, wonder had lost its appeal as a motivator of inquiry and was downgraded to “the level 
of gawk” (Daston & Park, 1998, p. 326). 
 
More importantly, the traditional descriptions of the wondrous were replaced by the up-and-
coming new aesthetic, moral, and metaphysical sensibility of the European elites: the sublime 
(Daston & Park, 1998). A. G. Gross (2018) traces the appearance of the sublime in science to 
the work of Adam Smith, who in his History of Astronomy associates powerful natural events 
of interest to scientists, such as a solar eclipse, to a sense of uncertainty that leads to awe-like 
emotional reactions. Similarly, Smith saw the higher abstractions of mathematics and other 
sciences, in their superior exertion of reason’s power over matter, as sublime. Vast natural 
objects studied by science and the powers of the scientific mind and knowledge entered the 
semiotic economy of the sublime. Authors such as Burke and Kant already recognized these 
objects’ presence in their natural and mathematical descriptions of the sublime. However, it 
was the work of Smith (A. G. Gross, 2018), Davey (Holmes, 2008), and others who 
constituted the scientific sublime, explicitly using the themes of the natural and Kantian 
sublime around vastness, transcendence, and the elevation of reason, in their references of the 
scientific pursuit.  
 
The foregoing works, however, were the last embers of the use of affective language in the 
culture of science. Throughout the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries the communication of science 
was for the most part concerned with reaching all the educated elites of Europe, which is the 
reason why scientific texts were written in personalized and accessible prose (Perrault, 2013). 
The cultural boundaries between science and the rest of society were tepid at best, as science 
was not clearly demarcated from philosophy, theology, ethics, or other knowledge pursuits 
(Perrault, 2013). The profound societal transformations accelerating in the late 18th century, 
with trends such as the increasing specialization of the sciences and its professionalization in 
the universities, academies, and journals, created a growing estrangement between science 
and society (Atkinson, 2004; Bensaude-Vincent, 2001; Hanauska, 2019; Perrault, 2013)66. As 
 
66 It is most important to note that this is a crude oversimplification of the non-trivial process through which western science and contemporary 
science communication became their own separate spaces. As Hanauska notes referring to the period before 19th century “it would be a naïve 




a result, the language of scientific discussion, such as in journals, became more 
depersonalized and cryptic to outsiders, moving away from personal prose and focusing on 
cold descriptions (Perrault, 2013). Emotional discourses slowly but surely dissipated within 
the arcane, depersonalized language of academic journals and scientific societies67 
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, a trend that has continued until today where the 
language of emotion is still considered taboo in much of the culture of science (Dror et al., 
2016). 
 
As universities sub-divided into ever-increasing smaller disciplines, and as demarcation 
appeared between what it meant to be a scientist and a non-scientist, science communication 
moved in to fill in the void left by science’s departure from other cultural spaces (Hanauska, 
2019, Perrault, 2013). This movement can be observed during the first half of the 19th 
century, whereby many of the science communication formats, such as public lectures, 
science biographies, popular science magazines, and the science fiction genre, among other 
things, standardized into forms that are still recognizable today (Hanauska, 2019; Holmes, 
2008). A culture of contemporary science communication began to form around these science 
communication events, where new social meanings were constituted and from which new 
identities, such as the science journalist, the science populariser, and the science 
museumgoer, began to crystalize. In this emerging culture of science communication, the 
emotion category awe through the formations of the sublime and the wondrous found a new 
space to occupy. 
 
4.3.2. Awe in the emerging culture of science communication 
Throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries, scientific work was to have a tremendous 
cultural impact on many artists from the Romantic period. They took inspiration in the 
discoveries and inventions of science to nurture their work with new categories, meanings, 
and metaphors (Holmes, 2008). Poetry interlaced with the vocabulary of science and the 
formations in which awe appears, such as the sublime, can be found in the works of 
Romantics, such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lord Byron, and Percy Shelley. These writers 
took inspiration from the discoveries of science and the advances of technology to spread 
 
as we do today” (2019, p. 586). However, there is some agreement that the appearance of contemporary science communication practices and 
products can be traced back to this period.  




their credo of individualism, emotionality, and authenticity (Holmes, 2008). The influence of 
scientific themes in such works arguably reached its zenith in this period in Mary Shelley’s 
novel Frankenstein. Inspired by researchers such as Italian scientist Luigi Aloisio Galvani, 
Shelley embedded her work both in the latest discussions about the role of electricity in the 
animation of bodies, and sublime imagery, as in the dramatic descriptions of the Swiss Alps, 
to single-handedly create a new fiction genre. Frankenstein remains one of the most enduring 
popular images of the intersection between science and the awe-inspiring (Economides, 
2016; Holmes, 2008). 
 
More importantly, while the culture of science was beginning to embark on its process of 
removing emotional language from its work, images of the sublime and the wondrous were 
very much present in the practices and products of early science communicators, who were 
now producing works about science for the general public. The stories of travels and voyages 
of scientists such as Joseph Banks and Alexander Von Humboldt were deeply steeped in the 
vocabulary of wonder and the sublime (Holmes, 2008; Wulf, 2015). These accounts enlarged 
the repertoire of signifiers associated with the ideas of the wonderous and the sublime in their 
descriptions of new worlds filled with fantastic scenes and objects that captured the 
imagination of the European crowds. The space discoveries of scientists such as William 
Hershel and the popularization of astronomy by people like Adam Walker, whose public 
presentations were deeply steeped in the sublime’s romantic vocabularies, inspired new ways 
of feeling about the universe in an awe-inspired fashion (Golinski, 2017). Some of the first 
science popularization books written exclusively for non-specialist audiences, such as those 
of Mary Somerville, the earliest forms of science journalism and science biographies in the 
work of David Brewster, and the increasingly popular science lectures by people like 
Humphry Davy, were also responding to that cross-fertilization of vocabularies and meanings 
provided by the Romantic milieu (Holmes, 2008). The sublime and the wondrous were very 
much present when many contemporary science communication practices in the English-
speaking world began68. 
 
The next generation of scientists, inventors, and journalists to popularise science, such as 
Charles Darwin and Michael Faraday, grew up deeply immersed in the poetry of Coleridge 
 
68 The foundation of the Royal Institution in the UK at the turn of the century (1799) has been used as a signpost for talking about an important 




and Shelley, the travelogues of Humboldt and Banks, and the lectures of Davy (Holmes, 
2008, Wulf, 2015). They would come to use the language of the wonder of nature, the 
marvellous in the quotidian, and the power of the vast, to communicate science to general 
audiences (Bradley, 2011). Works such as Faraday’s Chemical History of a Candle (part of 
the Royal Institution’s Christmas lecture series) and Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of the 
Species would expertly utilize the wonderous and the sublime formations through which awe-
like emotions were represented to their audiences (Bradley, 2011; Holmes, 2008). 
 
In parallel to these mostly British developments, in the early 19th century United States, 
human-made feats of science and engineering began to enter the sublime’s semiotic economy 
in a formation that has come to be known as the technological sublime (Nye, 1994). The 
technological sublime had its echoes in much of the admiration towards science expressed by 
Romantic writers such as Coleridge and Shelley, on the one hand (Economides, 2016; 
Holmes, 2008), and the metaphorical triumph of reason over nature in Kant’s sublime, on the 
other (Nye, 1994). As familiarity and domination rendered people’s reaction to natural 
objects such as waterfalls, mountains, and oceans obsolete, attention moved to the next vast 
objects characterized as the “literalization of Kant’s sublimity via technology” (Economides, 
2016, p. 77). The railroad, the skyscraper, the dam, and many other forms of massive 
technological accomplishments were proof of reason’s dominance over nature and a form of 
collective transcendence. A sense of awe, akin to admiration and marvel within the 
technological sublime applied to these human-made wonders, drew large crowds and 
constituted affective attachments to these objects. Jaw-dropping feats of engineering, such as 
early skyscrapers and tunnels, turned into sites of peregrination (Nye, 1994). 
 
The technological sublime had other characteristics that separated it from its previous 
European iterations (i.e., rhetorical, natural, and Kantian). First, feelings of awe/admiration 
towards the figure of the ‘genius’ which were usually put in the artist, the scientist, or the 
politician, and that were common in the natural and the rhetorical sublime, were transferred 
to a new group of people who rapidly climbed the 19th century social hierarchy in the United 
States. The people with the practical skills to create these new technological marvels, the 
inventors and engineers, were the new geniuses, a source of all the awe-like admiration 
previously reserved for other people in the elite (Nye, 1994). Moreover, the stereotype of the 




the ocean, or a faraway land, was renovated within the constraints set by the objects of 
sublime appreciation and the characteristics of US society. The sublime became a popular 
and collective experience in which people came together to witness the opening of a bridge or 
the inauguration of a railroad. Pomp and splendour in organized ceremonies became part of 
the sublime moment, whereby public displays of emotionally expressive behaviour were 
common (Nye, 1994). The technological sublime was there for the masses, who celebrated in 
the communal and expressive demonstration of man’s dominion over nature. Another 
characteristic of the technological sublime discourse is its complete divorce from any 
metaphysical source (Nye, 1994). While some tried to tie the new human-made wonders to 
the presence of the divine, reason’s power over nature actualized in the technological feats, 
pushed the sublime toward even more significant forms of secularization that were more and 
more divorced from its original religious frameworks (Nye, 1994). Moreover, familiarity 
rendered the objects of the technological sublime obsolete within the cultural logic of 
capitalism. Reason was to be continuously moving to bring about the next sublime object. 
With a hasty curiosity not dwelling long on one specific object, awe led to people longing for 
the future, where the next-big-thing was about to happen. Finally, this US version of the 
sublime was tagged to ideas about the country’s manifest destiny, through which nationalistic 
ideologies could be represented and reproduced (Kessler, 2012; Nye, 1994; Sage, 2008). The 
move towards technological objects as indicators of the power of reason over nature, the 
changes in social hierarchies, the popularization of sublime objects, the public emotional 
displays, the secularization of the discourse, its focus on the future, and nationhood, changed 
the semiotic economy of the sublime experience in general, and the associations and 
meanings attached to awe. Within the formation of the technological sublime, feelings of awe 
as admiration and marvel brought about by new technological wonders and the genius of 
inventors and engineers, were now to be experienced collectively, openly, commonly, and 
loudly, and felt as an embodied representation of our species’ dominion and mastery over the 
planet’s resources and a hope for a godless future (Nye, 1994). As we shall see, expressions 
of the technological sublime that can be traced back to this romantic period continue to 
inform artistic representations of science and technology today, through other formations 
such as the nuclear sublime, the environmental sublime, and the astronomical sublime (e.g., 





The continued specialization and professionalization of the scientific pursuit throughout the 
19th century, and the appearance of science communication as a distinct cultural space, freed 
the culture of science from carrying emotional formations such as those on the wondrous and 
the sublime, while completely displacing those representations to the products and practices 
aimed at communicating science to non-specialist audiences. In Europe, romantic visions of 
the sublime and the wondrous were tethered to tales of exploration and discovery, whereby 
themes of beauty in nature and quotidian sensibilities around a sense of wonder surrounded 
awe’s manifestations. On the other side of the Atlantic, by contrast, discourses of the sublime 
were put to use in the communication and popularization of new technological achievements, 
such as the railroad, the electric dam, and the skyscraper (Nye, 1994)69. From the first half of 
the 19th century until today, these two emotion discourses – the sublime and wondrous – and 
the many themes derived from their different iterations (e.g., rhetoric, natural, Kantian, 
technologic), have been part and parcel of the culture of science communication, giving 
meaning to how people represent awe within this cultural space, and socializing people into 
the knowledge from where they construct their representation of these emotions. Moreover, 
while the history and genealogy of these emotion discourses within science communication 
have not been written, it is easy to find them as recurring themes in the works of influential 
figures such as Albert Einstein (A. I. Miller, 1992), Harlow Shapley (Palmeri, 2012), Rachel 
Carson (Moore, 2005), Richard Feynman (A. G. Gross, 2018), and Carl Sagan (Helsing, 
2016). In this last section, then, I turn to the few studies that have looked at the representation 
of awe through these discourses in current science communication. 
 
4.3.3. Representations of awe in today’s science communication 
There is anecdotal evidence that representations of awe are common today in the culture of 
science communication (Kirby, 2015). Although a systematic analysis of these types of 
representations is yet to be carried out, they seem to be popular in science photography 
(Kessler, 2012), science television series (Campbell, 2016), general audience science books 
(A. G. Gross, 2018), science journalism (Perrault, 2013), children’s literature (Bell, 2008) 
and stage science (Nadis, 2005). Most of the research that has been carried out on these 
emotions has focused on space sciences (Campbell, 2016; Helsing, 2016; Kessler, 2012), 
though a few studies have looked at their role in other areas, such as biology (e.g., Turney, 
 




2004), ecology (e.g., Moore, 2005; Perrault, 2013) and geology (D. P. Dixon et al., 2012). 
For the most part, these are qualitative studies using a range of literary (e.g., A. G. Gross, 
2018; Turney, 2004) and rhetorical (e.g., Fahnestock, 1986; Perrault, 2013) techniques to 
analyse texts that convey scientific knowledge to non-specialist audiences. Some have 
focused on the formation of the sublime (e.g., A. G. Gross, 2018; Kessler, 2012; Turney, 
2004), while others have looked mainly at the representation of the wondrous (e.g., Helsing, 
2016; Sideris, 2017). Together, this limited empirical body of work shows some evidence of 
the value of awe in science communication, and the variety of forms and functions it takes in 
this cultural space.70 
 
4.3.3.1. The sublime in contemporary science communication  
While the technological sublime celebrated industrial accomplishments (Nye, 1994) and the 
natural sublime focused on natural objects investigated by science (A. G. Gross, 2018), both 
shared an elevation of human reason and its conquering of nature, placing the work of 
scientists and engineers as sources of admiration, marvel, and awe. These expressions of the 
sublime continue to inform artistic representations of science and technology today (e.g., 
Campbell, 2016; Kessler, 2012). However, over the past century, several new versions of this 
formation began to appear in response to the rapidly changing technological, environmental, 
and social conditions through the 20th and early 21st centuries. This is the case, for example, 
of the nuclear, environmental, and astronomic sublime. 
 
The incalculable loss of the effects of two World Wars, the death camps, and the carpet 
bombings of large cities, began a disenchantment with the sense of optimism concealed in the 
technological sublime, transforming the formation’s affective tone and form (Nye, 1994; 
Ray, 2005). Objects and people through which the discourse of the sublime moved under the 
logic of admiration and marvel, were now overshadowed by two technologies from which 
“nature and human existence ceased to be pre-given and became contingent” (Nye, 1994, p. 
228). The combination of the rocket technology perfected by the Nazis, and the atomic bomb 
created from the Manhattan Project, led to the development of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBM) with nuclear warheads, which the United States and the Soviet Union began 
mass-producing from the 1950s as a result of their decades-long détente. From the choices of 
 




a few people, the human species could now go extinct. The possibility of collective uplifting 
and transcendence through technological achievements was undercut by a new emotional 
palette. Under this new structure of feeling (R. Williams, 2009), terror and anxiety prevailed 
as a result of living in a world that could not be taken for granted, or a so-called death-
world71 (Nye, 1994, p. 228). Under these circumstances, a new form of the sublime appeared. 
 
The language of the sublime, with its descriptions of power, vastness, its logic of conquer, its 
narrative of ravishment and transport, and its emotional vocabulary of astonishment, terror, 
and awe, permeated the descriptions written by many of the military, scientific, and civilian 
personnel who witnessed the atomic blasts carried out until the 1960s (Nye, 1994). While a 
few witnesses were transfixed in admiration and celebrated the event as a triumph of humans 
over nature – remnants of the discourse of the technological sublime (C. J. Dekker, 2014) – a 
sense of terror and dread pervaded many of the descriptions of the power of the atomic bomb 
(Nye, 1994, Ray, 2005). This new discourse of the sublime, labelled by various authors as the 
atomic or nuclear sublime (Dekker, 2014; Hales, 1991; Nye, 1994; Wilson, 1991), returned to 
the vocabulary of terror and dread captured by the original religious meaning of the word 
awe. This emotion vocabulary became the primary tool through which the 
incommensurability, transfixion, incomprehension, and quasi-religious experience72 of the 
atomic bomb, could be represented affectively. 
 
Moreover, the nuclear sublime brought an end to the era when technological achievements 
were unquestionably celebrated in the United States. While Luddite movements and visions 
of science-gone-wrong, such as Mary Shelley Frankenstein, were somewhat common in the 
United Kingdom and continental Europe, the United States had kept for the most part a 
general enthusiasm for the developments of science and technology, from the arrival of the 
railroad in the 19th century to the New York World’s Fair in 1939 (Nye, 1994). With the 
atomic bomb, however, the feeling of security, the sense of collective achievement, and the 
esteem towards scientists, inventors, and engineers, that characterised the technological 
sublime, began to erode. An oscillation and ambivalence appear in which the public moved 
between admiration of scientific success in events such as the triumphs of space exploration, 
 
71 Gene Ray (2005) described this death-world as follows: “After Hiroshima, we inhabit a world immeasurably more threatening, a world 
threatened in fact to the very extreme and in this sense worthy of deep dread and even deeper denial” (p. 92). 
72 The semi-apocryphal story of the head of the Manhattan project citing the famous passage of the Bhagavad Gitta: “I am become death, the 




and the existential fear and terror that science and technology wrought (Nye, 1994, p. 255). 
And while the atomic bomb represents the ultimate existential threat, representations of 
global biohazard risks, dangerous artificial intelligence, nanorobots grey-gooing the planet, 
particle experiments gone-wrong, and other potentially cataclysmic examples of dangerous 
technoscience, all contain elements of the nuclear sublime’s affective tones and its other 
semiotic characteristics.  
 
The nuclear sublime’s negative affective language and its focus on the excesses of science 
are passed on to yet another iteration of the sublime, the so-called ecological or 
environmental sublime (Economides, 2016; Hitt, 1999; Rozelle, 2006). As humans have 
become aware of the enormity of the ecologic disaster that they have unleashed on the planet, 
the sublime’s vocabulary for humanity’s achievements in the technological sublime and 
pristine mountains and oceans in Burkean descriptions of the natural sublime has receded. 
The representation of showers of acid rain, climate change enhanced hurricanes, towering 
wastelands, massive fires consuming everything in their path, collapsing natural habitats, 
islands of non-biodegradable plastic, and ongoing mass extinction, signalled our lack of 
control over the forces that we had unleashed on our planet through the use of those same 
technologies we previously marvelled over. As with the nuclear sublime, awe’s social 
meanings turn towards the horror and dread for humanity’s destructive capacity 
(Economides, 2016; Rozelle, 2006). However, while the signifiers of emotions in the nuclear 
sublime focused on specific technologies made for destruction, where blame could be rightly 
directed at specific governments or individuals, the source of the environmental sublime 
cannot be so obviously linked to any one particular object or actor. Everyone (some more 
than others) is a participant in the new sublime objects (Economides, 2016)73. 
 
73 Some authors such as Rozelle and Hitt have argued that the environmental sublime can bring about increased awareness of the environment 
(Rozelle, 2006) or a certain humility towards nature (Hitt, 1999) that could engage people and generate momentum towards political action. 
However, according to Cronon (1989), Economides (2016) and others, the discourse of the sublime as a possible way of political action for 
addressing our environmental crisis is problematic. For these authors, the environmental sublime both displaces blame and reinforces our 
beliefs in the power of reason. As a result, massive feats of engineering invoking the technological sublime that are business-as-usual, are 
seen by many as the only way to tackle the current environmental crisis (Economides, 2016). The Romantic authors used the aesthetic of the 
sublime to ignore many of the political and social difficulties of the late 18th and early 19th centuries (Weiskel, 1986). Similarly, representations 
of the current environmental problems as sublime can displace the blame as something beyond the individual’s control, leading to apathy or 
denial. Apathy and denial arise from the sense of disconnectedness that the sublime brings to representations of the current environmental 
crisis, opening up the political and economic space for solutions that depend on vast technological responses. These engineering solutions to 
the environmental crisis are the ultimate form of a technological sublime in which nature is thoroughly subjugated to human necessity 
(Economides, 2016). Awe-as-terror for the current environmental catastrophe works within the discourse of the sublime as an instrument for 
moving people away from a reflection that would point directly into their own behaviours as the source of sublimity. The emotions represented 
within the discourse of the environmental sublime close the road for political action as they move people away from confronting its source in 
themselves while advocating for a correspondingly enormous technological fix within a technological sublime that could lead to several 





In an analysis of the environmental sublime, Economides (2016) describes a new emotional 
focus that seems to be forming around it, which can potentially be changing the social 
meanings of awe within this formation. The environmental catastrophe represents the ‘death 
of nature’, the loss of that ‘other’ that needs to be conquered for the transcendent moment of 
the original sublime to occur (Economides, 2016, p. 119). The environmental sublime finds 
itself at odds with the reality of loss from which mourning arises in the form of sadness and 
melancholy that permeates the discursive formation. Sadness and melancholy paralyse rather 
than drive action, and in this semiotic economy, awe arrives, potentially, at a new gloomy 
social meaning. An example of the kind of paralysis found in the discourse of the 
environmental sublime, and one charged with melancholic affect, is Economides’s (2016) 
analysis of people’s relation to the ocean. Once a source of admiration and fear for sailors 
and artists alike, events such as the death of coralline environments, the collapse of animal 
colonies, and floating country-size gyres of garbage, makes the sea a signifier of humanity’s 
recklessness and destruction, evoking a common emotional reaction of combined dread, 
culpability, and sadness. Within these semantic networks, awe is suffused with anxiety and 
hopelessness akin to the dread in the terror of the nuclear sublime, but with a general sense of 
sorrow that makes people look away instead of confronting the reality of the environmental 
catastrophe. 
 
The discourses and aesthetics of the nuclear and the environmental sublime represent only a 
small portion of the formations used in the communication of science today. More common 
uses rehash romantic notions of the natural sublime; with the most popular being those 
associated with space science, in what has been called the astronomical sublime (Kessler, 
2012). Looking at the different aesthetic choices made by creators of different astronomy 
television programmes, Campbell (2016) identified how stylistic choices, such as the usage 
of ‘candy apple neon’ colour pallets for the shows, the magisterial gaze (the “Olympian 
perspective”; see Sage, 2008), and the usage of a ‘grand tour’ narrative, all reference the 
natural sublime through their intertextual associations. These strategies by science 
documentary filmmakers, Campbell argues, are aimed not only at communicating knowledge, 
but instrumentalized to work “as vehicles for the representation of science as sublime” 






Similarly, Kessler (2012) argues that the way public images of the Hubble Space Telescope 
are created reflects a long tradition of representations in astronomy tracing back to the 
sublime aesthetics of the Romantic period. The use of “saturated colour, high contrast, and 
rich detail as well as majestic compositions” (Kessler, 2012, p. 4) in space images are 
reminiscent of late 19th and early 20th century landscape images of the North American West. 
In both cases, the treatment of shape, colour, size, and scale is meant to elicit a sense of awe 
and wonder. The goal of these aesthetic choices “lulls the viewer into believing human senses 
can perceive the cosmos” (Kessler, 2012, p. 67) and signify the power of science to capture 
nature. 
 
Astronomers, photographers, and documentary film producers are attaching new forms of 
representation through the sublime to an already pre-established emotional script. Whereas 
the Romantics ascribed this ability to mountains, oceans, and waterfalls, astronomy 
communicators, through their Hubble images and space documentaries, enlarge the 
representational repertoire, introducing images of distant galaxies, nebulae, and grand tours 
of the cosmos. In that sense, the astronomic sublime can perhaps best be conceptualized as an 
extension or continuation of Romantic versions of the sublime (Kessler, 2012). 
 
The astronomical sublime also serves as a reinforcement of belief systems that are more 
centred in contemporary representations of science. Notably, the sublime aims to reaffirm the 
power of science over nature (Campbell, 2016; Kessler, 2012; Sideris, 2017)74, beliefs that in 
their more extreme version amount to forms of scientism (Owen, 2020). Kessler (2012) also 
suggests how the aesthetics of the astronomic sublime have been associated with the ideology 
of manifest destiny very much present in the US’s frontier politics. According to Sage 
(2008), the astronomical images such as those of the moon landings conjure the sublime 
landscapes of the frontier images that have been so important in the articulation of US 
national identity. The emotions that these evoke, according to the author, are then central to 
the constitution of how people from the United States view themselves and their role in the 
world. The motifs, techniques, and codes used in astronomical images that allude to the 
 




sublime are instrumentalising their emotional content to perpetuate worldviews, such as 
scientism and nationalism, that are localised in contemporary realities. 
 
Scholars and critics have identified yet further contemporary awe-based formations that 
allude to sublime aesthetics and discourses in the communication of science. These include 
Turney’s (2004) abstract sublime, Mosco’s (2005) digital sublime, or the many other 
scientific sublimes described by A. G. Gross (2018) (e.g., biophilic sublime, polymath 
sublime, etc.). Although a thorough discussion of each such iteration is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, it is important to recognise the importance that the sublime continues to exert in 
science communication, with each formation adding new sets of social representations to 
emotion categories such as awe. With that in mind, I turn my attention to the appearance of 
formations related to the wondrous, a lens through which awe is often used in contemporary 
science communication. 
 
4.3.3.2. The wonderous in contemporary science communication 
At least two versions of the discursive and aesthetic formations around the wondrous have 
continued to manifest differently throughout the 19th and 20th centuries in the communication 
of science. The first of these refers to a motivation towards investigation and exploration, 
which should be extinguished through these practices, while the second discourse focuses on 
the contemplation, appreciation, and the continued sustenance of its affective characteristics 
(Rubenstein, 2011; Vasalou, 2015). In contrast to the themes of vastness and transcendence 
in the sublime, the wondrous manifests in forms of attention and engagement towards the 
world that can generate curiosity on the one hand or the defamiliarization of any objects in its 
line of sight on the other. The former views awe as an instrument for observation and 
enquiry, while the latter works as a general “sense of wonder”, whereby themes around the 
quotidian, the beautiful, the small, and the pastoral allow everyday objects to potentially 
become awe-inspiring. While these different formations of the wonderous have been 
described through the literary works of authors such as Henry James and James Joyce 
(Abrams, 1971; Vasalou, 2015) and philosophical works by Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and 
Merleau-Ponty (see Economides, 2016), they also appear in the works of popular science 
communicators, such as Richard Dawkins, Rachel Carson, and Carl Sagan (e.g., Helsing, 





While recognizing the many ways in which wonder has been used in the communication of 
science, Sideris (2017, p. 16) contrasts what she calls “inappropriate forms of wonder” with 
its “wholesome varieties”. The author identifies the former variety in the work of authors 
such as Richard Dawkins, who describes wonder as a source of curiosity that leads towards 
scientific investigation: an engine that motivates the intellect towards dispelling the mysteries 
of the world and displaces one’s affective engagement towards a novel source. This version 
of wonder is reminiscent of the previously described instrumental wonder of Bacon and 
Descartes that works as a ‘sensibility of enquiry’ (Daston & Park, 1998; Vasalou, 2015). 
However, while previous writers were uncertain of wonder, afraid of its excesses and always 
aimed at dispelling it, Dawkins and others have argued for a continued revelling in this 
emotion through scientific knowledge (Sideris, 2017). Within this formation, scientific 
knowledge and scientists become the ultimate purveyors of awe, setting the basis for 
elaborating scientific cosmologies that consecrate science into a new global myth in the 
works of authors such as E. O. Wilson. Other authors have observed this tendency of 
discourses around wonder to reference “the amazing powers and secrets of nature or of the 
breakthroughs and accomplishments of the scientists themselves” (Fahnestock, 1986, p. 279) 
and boost science’s image as a ‘glorious’ endeavour – an image that potentially harms 
science, both raising the publics’ expectations and conferring authority to pseudo-scientists75 
(Perrault, 2013, p. 55-56). 
 
Another exponent of the wonderous, Rachel Carson’s work is seen as embodying the ideas 
around a ‘sense of wonder’ that can defamiliarize the quotidian, and revel in the beautiful and 
the mysterious (Moore, 2005; Sideris, 2017). By contrast to the overall awed childlike 
response towards objects big and small in previous iterations of the wondrous formation, 
Carson’s ‘sense of wonder’ is something to cultivate by closing the “distance between ‘this is 
wonderful’ and ‘this must remain’” (Moore, 2005, p. 30). This evolves into an ethics of 
caring and compassion towards the non-human world that contrast with the logic of 
domination and exploitation present in other formations in which awe participates, such as 
the natural and technological sublime. The connection to the natural world, motivation to 
protect it, appreciation for the mystery of life, and other such environmental themes give new 
colouration to the emotion category ‘awe’ within this wondrous formation. 
 





Overall, this taxonomy of the contemporary formations around the sublime and the wondrous 
in science communication is but a very limited attempt at describing the complex ways in 
which emotion categories such as awe appear in this cultural space, masking how these have 
been intertwined, experimented over, and utilized by the many practitioners who have 
represented these categories in their work. One case in point is the work of Carl Sagan, 
whose quasi-theological view of science as the ultimate source of awe and wonder, as well as 
his frequent use of vastness and scale as rhetorical tools (particularly in his Cosmos television 
series) reflect both the instrumental use of wonder and themes related to the sublime to 
highlight the power of science and human reason over nature (Lessl, 1985; Sideris, 2017). 
However, Sagan’s aesthetic sensibilities around the beautiful, his ethical commitments to 
denounce nuclear armaments, and his defence for humility in the face of human hubris, 
present different themes around the wondrous (Helsing, 2016; Sagan, 1997) that contrast with 
the approach of other popular science communicators such as Dawkins. Just as with artists in 
the Romantic era, science communicators are now taking from different discursive 
formations to create new vocabularies, expressing different forms of affective experiences 
around awe and wonder, and giving these emotions whole new sets of forms and functions. 
Whether this emotion is conveyed through images of large objects such as the Apollo 
program (Nye, 1994), galaxies (Kessler, 2012), the Large Hadron Collider (A. G. Gross, 
2018), or the small, beautiful, and picturesque, such as flowers or the sky (Moore, 2005), or 
whether it functions to captivate audiences (Fahnestock, 1986), generate escapism (Jeffries, 
2003), frame the sciences as sublime (Campbell, 2016), communicate ethical and aesthetic 
concerns (Helsing, 2016), reframe people’s relation to the natural world (Moore, 2005), make 
it into a quasi-religion (Sideris, 2017), or reinforce national identity (Nye, 1994; Sage, 2008), 
the awe represented in contemporary science communication is continuously mixing and 
giving these categories new social meanings, all of which are historically contingent and 
culturally situated in the products and practices of their specific place and time.76 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
The variety of social meanings through which the emotion category awe is represented results 
from an assortment of historical circumstances and cultural formations, tying this emotion to 
the shared meanings that constitute the culture of English speakers who use this word. In this 
 




chapter, I have identified some of those social meanings by outlining a tentative history of 
this emotion category, through the formations of the sublime and the wonderous. The original 
meaning of awe as terror was first complemented by ideas about admiration, and later by 
those of marvel and wonder in the interaction of these formations. Associations of this 
emotion to natural objects, quotidian and familiar spaces, human-made inventions, or the 
abilities of individuals, are also the result of historical contingencies that displaced 
descriptions of emotional reactions initially reserved for the figure of the godhead. Themes 
for awe such as elevation, curiosity, humility, gratitude, transcendence, terror, and beauty, 
have all hinged on haphazard factors inscribed in the social, political, cultural, economic, and 
technological developments of the English language culture through and over large stretches 
of time. I have attempted to trace a few of those developments through the discourses and 
aesthetics of the sublime and the wondrous, briefly focusing my attention to the Romantic 
period as a semiotic “laboratory”, in which awe acquired many of the meanings still 
associated with it today and from where much of English-speaking early science 
communicators drew inspiration. 
 
I have also outlined the complex sociocultural processes by which the foregoing linguistic 
conventions became part of science communication, a culture in which people talk about 
science to non-specialist audiences. I have argued that, although Western science has had its 
associations with wonder since its inception as a feeling conducive to scientific investigation, 
it was in its encounter with the sublime and the appearance of contemporary science 
communication in the Romantic era that much of the senses and connotations now related 
with this emotion became consolidated in this cultural space. Moreover, I looked beyond the 
Romantic era and showed how some of the more recent iterations of this emotion category 
have been inscribed in contemporary versions of the sublime and the wondrous, such as the 
technological sublime, the nuclear sublime, and the environmental sense of wonder.  
 
This literature review is only a tentative effort to develop a historical and taxonomic 
framework to think of the varieties of social meanings that this emotion category has today in 
the communication of science, with all its limitations and defects. Contextualizing some of 
the varieties of awe in time and place, however, allows me to shed any pretence of 
universality and describe how contemporary both mental and social representations of this 




studies in the following chapters. Nonetheless, future studies can use this modest history of 
the category awe to explore the different histories that these representational varieties have 
taken and explore other contexts outside the United States and the United Kingdom which 





Chapter five - The social representation of awe in picture book biographies of scientists  
 
5. Introduction 
Cultures promote the emotions they value through their various products and practices 
(Mesquita et al., 2017). More importantly, an emotion category will take a variety of forms 
and functions across cultures and within them (Barrett et al., 2014). The content of an 
emotion category will be a function of a culture’s values, beliefs, norms, goals, and 
worldviews, which have developed over time as a result of their many historical 
contingencies (see Boddice, 2018, 2019). 
 
As mentioned, previous studies have described the historical presence of social 
representations of awe in different cultural artefacts from the culture of science 
communication. This emotion shows up in contemporary popular science media such as non-
fiction books, TV documentaries, and science photography (e.g., Campbell, 2016; A.G. 
Gross, 2018; Kessler, 2012; Sideris, 2017). Such work suggests that the emotion category of 
awe is valued in this cultural space and thus is represented with a higher incidence in its 
practices and products, an abundance that some scholars have pointed out (Kirby, 2015). No 
study, however, has tested empirically whether this is the case. 
 
Moreover, the few works that observe the presence of awe in the communication of science 
describe a variety of types in the forms and functions that this emotion takes (e.g., Nye, 1994; 
Sideris, 2017). For example, awe is represented in relation to a variety of different objects 
(e.g., galaxies, the Large Hadron Collider, experiences in nature) and settings (e.g., 
planetariums, museums, outdoors, science documentaries) (e.g., Kessler, 2012; Moore, 
2005). Moreover, this emotion has been described as having a myriad of functions in science 
communication (see chapters 3 and 4), including charming different publics (Fahnestock, 
1986), producing a distraction (Jeffries, 2003), framing science as sublime (Campbell, 2016), 
constructing identities in relation to the natural world (Moore, 2005), consecrating science 
(Sideris, 2017), and reinforcing pride in one’s nation (Nye, 1994)77. Research in this area 
suggests a multiplicity of awe types in this cultural space standing for the various mandates 
 




that circulate within it. None of these studies, however, has singled out the emotion category 
awe and catalogued the variety of forms and functions it assumes. 
 
In this chapter, I present the results of three studies that evaluate through content analysis the 
incidence and content of representations of awe in one type of cultural artefact: picture books. 
Picture books in general are an excellent tool to evaluate the value and quality of an emotion 
in a culture. These have widespread usage in industrialized settings as artefacts through 
which parents and educators promote the child’s cognitive development and socialization into 
a culture (e.g., Kümmerling-Meibauer & Meibauer, 2013, 2015; Nikolajeva & Scott, 2013). 
Most importantly, picture books both mediate the development and socialization of emotions 
(e.g., Garner & Parker, 2018; S. L. Gordon, 1989; Tsai et al., 2007) and are one of a child’s 
earliest points of contact with science (e.g., Brunner, 2019; Dagher & Ford, 2005; Kelly, 
2018; Schroeder et al., 2009). 
 
Multiple studies have compared the prevalence and content of emotion across cultures using 
picture books (e.g., Boiger et al., 2013; Garner & Parker, 2018; Tsai et al., 2007; Vander 
Wege et al., 2014). There are also many studies that have looked at how different objects and 
people are represented in science picture books (e.g., Brunner & Abd-El-Khalick, 2017; 
Dagher & Ford, 2005; Kelly, 2018; Owens, 2009). However, no study has looked into how 
emotions are represented in science picture books. Considering the importance of picture 
books in the acculturation of a child and the socialization of their emotions, such artefacts 
have significant potential as an empirical tool for assessing the representation of particular 
emotions in cultural context. This study is the first to examine how awe occurs in the cultural 
space of science communication, using science picture books as a real-world gauge of its 
depiction. 
 
I begin this chapter with a brief methodological overview of content analysis and a literature 
review which summarizes some of the relevant literature on emotions and picture books. 
Then I outline the preparation stage for the three studies, introducing the object of study, 
describing the sampling processes, and discussing ethical issues. The next three sections 
sequentially describe each of the studies to then conclude with an overall discussion of the 
findings, limitations, and possible future directions. Following my conceptualization of awe 




commonly represented in the science picture books, as they are artefacts of the culture of 
science communication. Moreover, I anticipated finding different types of awe represented in 
the science picture books; representations that are qualitatively different from those in the 
picture books produced outside this culture. 
 
5.1. Methodological overview 
Content analysis is a series of “research techniques for making replicable and valid inferences 
from texts to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18), and which were originally 
developed in the early 20th century to analyse messages in both newspapers and political 
propaganda. Broadly speaking there are two types of content analysis: quantitative and 
qualitative content analysis. Quantitative content analysis is, for the most part, concerned 
with capturing the incidence of keywords or content using a dictionary or standard against 
which counts can be made. These coding schemes are usually theory derived and are 
prepared before the coding. As such, the various versions of quantitative content analysis 
emphasize solving issues of reliability and validity, with practices such as creating mutually 
exclusive categories and bringing in second coders to assess intercoder agreement 
(Krippendorff, 2004; Neuendorf, 2017). By contrast, qualitative content analysis (QCA) 
focuses on confirming or providing new insights on social phenomena (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005; Schreier, 2012) by combining both top-down and bottom-up categories to 
systematically describe materials using a coding frame. While QCA also regards issues of 
validity and reliability, its focus is on trustworthiness, which refers to issues such as 
rigorously proceeding through the different research phases and accurately reporting these 
(Elo et al., 2014; Schreier, 2012). 
 
A special kind of quantitative content analysis is textual content analysis. While this was 
traditionally done manually by coders, over the last couple of decades it has been 
increasingly performed by computers, with an ever-increasing degree of sophistication 
(Neuendorf, 2017). As a result, such an approach has evolved into a vast array of computer-
assisted techniques to evaluate written texts, including word embeddings, sentiment analysis, 
and big data. Together, these various fields have converged into one unified discipline called 






5.2. Literature review 
Various studies have used quantitative content analysis to compare how often emotions are 
represented in different types of picture books. Tsai et al. (2007) coded emotional 
expressions, smiles, and arousal levels in 20 US and Taiwanese picture books to compare the 
representation of ideal affect. Similarly, Vander Wege et al. (2014), used a code for distinct 
emotions, intensity of expression, and social context on 10 US, 10 Romanian, and 10 Turkish 
picture books searching for differences in valence, intensity, and frequency in emotion 
representations. Finally, Boiger et al. (2013) coded for instances of anger and shame in 19 
Belgian and 19 US picture books, comparing how these emotions were represented in 
artefacts from these two cultures. Other studies have used quantitative content analysis to 
study emotions in picture books, focusing on, for example, differences in the representations 
of emotion in different genders (e.g., Tepper & Cassidy, 1999), how emotions are portrayed 
in picture books overall (e.g., Garner & Parker, 2018), and how different emotions are 
portrayed in European-American vs Mexican-American books in the United States (Sanders 
et al., 2018). Overall, these studies have consistently observed differences in the 
representation of emotions across cultures.  
 
Moreover, content analysis has been used to look at how science is communicated in picture 
books. All these studies have been done in the field of science education and have focused on 
representations of science and scientists. Dagher and Ford (2005) studied the portrayal of 
scientists in twelve picture book biographies. Similarly, Rawson and McCool (2014), and 
more recently Farland-Smith et al. (2017), coded representations of scientists using the Draw-
A-Scientist Test Checklist (DAST-C), assessing stereotypical elements of their portrayal. 
Another important study coded for different elements of the Nature of Science (NOS) in a 
sample of 44 picture books (Ford, 2006). Similar studies coding for elements of the NOS in 
picture books have been done more recently (e.g., Brunner & Abd-El-Khalick, 2017; Kelly, 
2018). These studies have detailed how many science picture books in the market today 
represent science using stereotypes that don’t correspond to the realities of how it is done 
(e.g., Brunner & Abd-El-Khalick, 2017) and scientists using clichéd tropes such as that of the 





While all these studies have used different forms of content analysis to examine aspects of 
picture books in relation to the depictions of emotions, science and scientists, no study to date 
has explored how emotions are represented in picture books aimed to communicate science. 
 
5.3. Preparation stage  
In this section, I present the preparation phase shared by the three studies. This includes the 
definition of the object of study, the sampling, and a brief discussion of ethical issues that 
arose during these studies.  
 
5.3.1. Definition of the object of study 
Although there is no agreed upon definition of a picture book, most characterizations concur 
that these cultural artefacts are a form of multimodal texts in which visual and verbal 
elements interact to convey meaning (e.g., Darigan et al., 2002; Nikolajeva & Scott, 2013; 
Nodelman, 1988). Although broad, this definition covers the many perspectives from which 
picture books are used and studied. Whether treated as an educational tool (e.g., 
Kümmerling-Meibauer & Meibauer, 2015), an art form (e.g., Nikolajeva & Scott, 2013), an 
ideological artefact (e.g., Stephens, 1992), or a book layout (e.g., Darigan et al., 2002), there 
is an important tradition of studying culture through the lens of these cultural artefacts. 
 
Picture books in which the informational content refers to a “specialized way of talking about 
the world” (Lemke, 1990, p. xi, cited in Donovan & Smolkin 2002, p. 503) identified as 
“science” can be thought of as science picture books. There are different ways of classifying 
science picture books. For example, Kelly (2018) groups these in relation to their scientific 
field: earth and space sciences, engineering, technology, and applications of science, and 
physical sciences. These are also classified by their genre78. Using genre as a category, 
Donovan and Smolkin (2002) classified science picture books as storybooks, narrative 
informational texts, non-narrative informational texts, or dual-purpose texts79. Other 
 
78 By genres, I am referring to the social semiotic tradition which identifies ways of organizing texts using certain rules with specific goals 
within a social and cultural space (Donovan & Smolkin, 2002). 
79 Donovan and Smolkin (2002) define storybooks as those in which characters move through time in a sequence of events (i.e., plot) within 
a structure (i.e., story grammar) and include basic elements, such as a setting, an initiating conflict, and a resolution of this. The narrative-
informational texts also include a series of events set so as to make factual claims. These usually refer to those science picture books that 
describe processes of nature such as life cycles. Non-narrative informational texts are those where the unifying characteristic is not 
sequentiality but rather an exercise in co-classification around a topic. These are perhaps the most common type of science picture books 
and include concept books, picture encyclopaedias, and how-to books. Finally, dual-purpose texts refer to texts that combine elements of 




classification schemes based on genre collapse the category of dual texts and narrative 
informational books into one category usually labelled as hybrid (Pappas, 2006) or 
combination (Schroeder et al., 2009) texts. Many science picture books exist somewhere 
along a continuum of hybridity with purely informational books on one end, and purely 
narrative books on the other (e.g., Ford, 2006; Pappas, 2006; Schroeder et al., 2009).  
 
A particular genre of hybrid picture books are picture book biographies. In its most basic 
conceptualization, biographies represent the life and times of one or multiple individuals, 
many times told from cradle to grave (Hendrick, 1998; Muurlink & McAllister, 2015). 
Adapting this definition to the purpose of this study, I define science picture book 
biographies as books that represent through both written text and visual information the life 
of one person or many people related to science. Picture book biographies are hybrid texts 
that include powerful stories and images aimed at captivating and inspiring children (Darigan 
et al., 2002). As Bader (2013, p. 18) points out, picture book biographies “at their best” can 
“rivet attention, convey emotion, [and] imprint a moment”. As hybrid texts, the chance of 
encountering representations of affective categories in picture book biographies is much 
higher than in the dry descriptions of informational texts. Importantly, evidence suggests that 
books that have narratives are preferred both by children and adults when choosing picture 
books (Bergman Deitcher et al., 2019; Wagner, 2017). Because all picture book biographies 
include some sort of narratives and these convey emotions, I chose this kind of book as the 
object of my study. 
 
Science picture book biographies have been recognized as an important resource for 
educators (Kelly, 2018), helping students to develop a comprehensive view of science and 
scientists (Sharkawy, 2009, 2012). However, research on this particular kind of book is 
scarce, with the few studies in this area showing that these present a rather limited and 
stereotypical view of science in general (Dagher & Ford, 2005) and fail to convey inclusive 





However, these books usually make use of features such as captions, boxes, and diagrams on the margins and the author’s note, foreword, 





While some studies on picture and science trade books for children have used a random 
selection of books from libraries (Ford, 2006), I followed the lead of previous authors who 
have used convenience sampling (e.g., Abd-El-Khalick, 2002; Kelly, 2018; Owens, 2009).80 
Some of these investigators chose their samples from lists of award-winning trade books for 
children. The rationale for selecting picture books from such lists has been three-fold. First, 
these awards are given based on excellence by highly recognized professional organizations 
such as the National Science Teachers’ Association81 (NSTA) and the American Library 
Association (ALA)82, meaning that the books on these lists represent the most preeminent 
books of their kind and are used by educators and librarians to support academic excellence 
(Crowther et al., 2005). I assume that award-winning picture books have the finest 
representations of the cultural milieu in which these are produced. Second, book awards in 
the United States function as market signals that increase the consumption of a product 
(Dekker & de Jong, 2017). In the case of children’s books, parents, schools, and libraries 
guide their consumption decisions on the information provided by these awards (e.g., Bang-
Jensen, 2010; Wagner, 2017). Publishers stick big labels to the front cover of the books 
announcing the awards these have received, while websites such as Amazon highlight in their 
book descriptions the importance of these honours. And although there are no precise data 
comparing sales numbers of award-winning and non-award-winning picture books, a small 
report that looked at library holdings in the Worldcat index found that books that received the 
Outstanding Science Trade Books for Children award were the most widely available in 
libraries around the world (Owens, 2009). Thus, it is a reasonable assumption to surmise that 
award-winning picture books are bought more by parents, libraries, and schools, than are 
those that do not win such awards. Third, because these are some of the most popular books, 
the process of finding and acquiring them in Aotearoa New Zealand was considerably easier. 
 
80 Accurate publishing figures on picture books in general, science picture books in particular, and picture book biographies of scientists are 
very hard to come by. In the 1990s, around 5,000 picture books were being published every year in the US alone (Darigan et al., 2002). 
While there is no database containing the total population of science picture book biographies, a study that took a sample of science picture 
books from the winners of the Outstanding Science Trade Books (OSTB) given by the National Science Teachers’ Association observed 
that science biographies made up about 14% of the total of the sample (Kelly, 2018). Whether this is an accurate representation of the 
proportion of science picture book biographies in the market is unclear, however. 
81 Founded in 1944 the National Science Teachers’ Association is the largest and most recognized science teacher group in the United States 
with more than 57,000 members (National Science Teachers’ Association, 2020). 
82 The American Library Association is the oldest library association in the world, promoting libraries and library education since 1876. 





The recognition of their excellence, their widespread consumption, and the ease of acquiring 
them were the main reasons I chose award-winning picture books.  
 
I then chose a sample of picture books from the lists of perhaps the two most prestigious 
awards given yearly to the best trade books for children in the United States. These are the 
Notable Children’s Books (NCB)83 and the Outstanding Science Trade Book for Children 
(OSTB)84. These are both bulk awards given every year to dozens of books that target the 
same audience – children K-12 (Association for Library Service to Children, 2020; National 
Science Teachers’ Association, 2020). Being bulk awards of children’s literature means that 
they capture a large cross-section of the many books produced each year in various formats 
and genres. This includes many picture book biographies, the final target of the sampling 
process. The similar quantity of books selected every year and the same age target makes 
these samples comparable. Moreover, previous studies looking at different forms of 
representations in children’s literature have used both the NCB (e.g., Gooden & Gooden, 
2001) and the OSTB (e.g., Kelly, 2018) for sampling purposes. Finally, it is important to 
highlight that the NSTA is only given to books that “reflect current scientific knowledge” and 
“when appropriate, advances the Nature of Science (NOS), scientific thinking, and has 
general compatibility with book content and the Next Generation Science Standards (NGSS)” 
(National Science Teachers’ Association, 2020). These selection benchmarks show a high-
quality standard for the winners in relation to the science content of the books. To sum up, as 
a result of the similarities in size, target audience, reputation, their use in previous research, 
and the scientific criteria used to judge NSTA books, I selected these two lists of award-
winning trade books for children as the starting point in my sampling process. 
 
The timeframe for selecting the books was between 2000 and 2018. Considering that I am 
narrowing down the total number of books by focusing on one particular book genre (i.e., 
picture book biographies), I wanted to have a large cross-section of books in the initial 
selection so that there would be enough books in the final sample. Given that around 50 
 
83 The NCB is awarded by the Association for Library Services to Children (ALSC) which is a subdivision of the ALA. This bulk award has 
been given every year since 1940 to over 70 books a year, including the winners of the Belpré, Caldecott, and Newbery medals (Association 
for Library Service to Children, 2020). The list includes books written for children ages K-12 in various formats (e.g., chapter books, 
graphic novels, picture books), and genres (fiction, non-fiction, expository).  
84 The OSTB is given yearly to over 40 books since 1973 by the American National Science Teachers’ Association (NSTA), in association 
with the Children’s Book Council (National Science Teachers’ Association, 2020). This bulk award highlights the best trade science 




books receive these awards every year, I found that a starting selection of about 1,800 books 
was appropriate for this research.  
 
Having defined the source of the books and timeframe, I created a spreadsheet that included 
all the winners of the OSTB and the NCB of the previous two decades (2000-2018) using the 
websites of the National Science Teachers Association (National Science Teachers’ 
Association, 2020) and the American Library Association (Association for Library Service to 
Children, 2020). However, both lists include all sorts of formats and genres of books for 
children. I then narrowed the sample only to picture book biographies. This left me with 139 
NCB and 71 OSTB winners. Many of the biographies, however, were of multiple individuals 
that ranged from 25 people (i.e., 25 Women Who Thought of it First) to two individuals (e.g., 
The Inventors Secret: What Thomas Edison told Henry Ford). I removed these books from 
the selection. Moreover, some of the winners of the NCB represented scientists, engineers or 
people very much involved in science (e.g., Gregor Mendel: The Friar who Grew Peas; On a 
Beam of light: A Story of Albert Einstein), yet these were not in the OSTB list. These were 
counted as science picture book biographies. The remaining selection included 69 picture 
book biographies of scientists and 110 picture book biographies of non-scientists.  
 
I acquired the picture books from the library of the University of Otago using the interlibrary 
loan service from other libraries in Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia. However, nine (9) 
of the picture book biographies of scientists were not found in these two countries. As a 
result, my final sample was comprised of 60 picture book biographies of scientists. Because I 
wanted both samples to be the same size, I randomly chose 60 picture book biographies of 
non-scientists. The final sample of 120 picture books will be referred to hereafter as the 
‘sample’. This sample is larger than similar studies on trade and picture books, which have 
tended to use sample sizes of fifty books or less (e.g., Boiger et al., 2013; Brunner & Abd-El-
Khalick, 2017; Kelly, 2018; Sanders et al., 2018; Tsai, 2007; Vander Wege et al., 2014)  
 
Most books were hardcover copies, and the majority came with their dust jackets. After the 
books arrived, these were digitized into PDF files for analysis. I then returned all the books to 
the respective libraries. The digitized copies of the books were dutifully kept in secure places 





Appendix A shows all the picture book biographies of scientists and non-science in the 
sample, with their year of publication, and the name of the authors, illustrators, and main 
characters. I further collected some publicly available demographic information about the 
book’s authors, illustrators (table 5.1) and main characters (table 5.2).  
 
Table 5.1 
Demographics of Authors and Illustrators1 
Author's gender1,2 Science (n=60) Non-science (n=60) Total (n=120) 
Female 43 (69.35%) 36 (58.06%) 79 (63.71%) 
Male 19 (30.65%) 26 (41.94%) 45 (36.29%) 
Author's ethnicity1,2       
White 60 (96.77%) 39 (62.90%) 99 (79.84%) 
African American, or Black 2 (3.23%) 15 (24.19%) 17 (13.71%) 
Latin American, Latino/a/x, or Hispanic American 0 (0.00%) 5 (8.06%) 5 (4.03%) 
American Indian, or Native American 0 (0.00%) 2 (3.23%) 2 (1.61%) 
East or Southeast Asian 0 (0.00%) 1 (1.61%) 1 (0.81%) 
Illustrator's gender3       
Female 28 (50.00%) 16 (27.59%) 44 (38.60%) 
Male 28 (50.00%) 42 (72.41%) 70 (61.40%) 
Illustrator's ethnicity3       
Caucasian/White 45 (80.36%) 25 (43.10%) 70 (61.40%) 
African American or Black 3 (5.36%) 25 (43.10%) 28 (24.56%) 
Latin American, Latin/a/x, or Hispanic American 4 (7.14%) 6 (10.34%) 10 (8.77%) 
American Indian, or Native American 0 (0.00%) 1 (1.72%) 1 (0.88%) 
East or Southeast Asian 4 (7.14%) 1 (1.72%) 5 (4.39%) 
1These are based on my own perception of their gender and ethnicity based on their names, pictures, and biographies. They do not 
necessarily represent how the authors and illustrators identify themselves.  
2Some books had more than one author 
3Some books used stock images as illustrations 
 
5.3.3. Ethical considerations 
Because content analysis usually deals with physical objects, only a few ethical issues from 
the use of this method of data collection and analysis are worth noting. First is the issue of 
honesty throughout the process. Following the work of Neuendorf (2017), Schreier (2012), 
and others, I committed to the ethical standards in the collection, analysis, safekeeping, and 
reporting of data. Moreover, I am aware of the few ethical issues that may arise with human 
coders. One has to do with potential negative content in the texts studied. In particular, some 
of the picture book biographies highlight issues of discrimination against women and ethnic 
groups that might be sensitive to some coders. The second coder was informed about the 
appearance of these issues during the training sessions and debriefed after the coding. 
Because the picture books are written for children between the ages of 4 and 12, the 





Demographics of Main Character 
Gender3 Science (n=60) Non-science (n=60) Total (n=120) 
Female 25 (41.67%) 20 (33.33%) 45 (37.50%) 
Male 35 (58.33%) 40 (66.67%) 75 (62.50%) 
Ethnicity3       
White 51 (85.00%) 21 (35.00%) 72 (60.00%) 
African American or Black 8 (13.33%) 26 (43.33%) 34 (28.33%) 
Latin American, Latino/a/x, Hispanic American 0 (0.00%) 5 (8.33%) 5 (4.17%) 
American Indian, or Native American 0 (0.00%) 3 (5.00%) 3 (2.50%) 
East or Southeast Asian 1 (1.67%) 2 (3.33%) 3 (2.50%) 
Other 0 (0.00%) 3 (5.00%) 3 (2.50%) 
Current status1       
Historical figure 47 (78.33%) 53 (88.33%) 100 (83.33%) 
Alive 13 (21.67%) 7 (11.67%) 20 (16.67%) 
Country of birth2       
United States 32 (53.33%) 36 (60.00%) 68 (56.67%) 
United Kingdom 11 (18.33%) 1 (1.67%) 12 (10.00%) 
France 4 (6.67%) 2 (3.33%) 6 (5.00%) 
Germany 3 (5.00%) 1 (1.67%) 4 (3.33%) 
Mexico 0 (0.00%) 3 (5.00%) 3 (2.50%) 
Other 10 (16.67%) 15 (25.00%) 25 (20.83%) 
1At the time of coding (November 2020) 
2Some characters were born in countries that currently don't exist or which changed as a result of war and colonization. 
3These are based on my own perception of their gender and ethnicity based on their names, pictures, and biographies. They do 
not necessarily represent how these people identified themselves in real life.  
 
5.4. Study 1 - Facial expressions of awe in picture book biographies 
Previous studies have tried to capture the representation of emotion by using quantitative 
content analysis of the facial expressions in picture books (e.g., Sanders et al., 2018; Tsai, 
2007; Vander Wege et al., 2014). These have catalogued the faces using systems such as the 
Facial Action Coding Scheme (FACS) (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) to capture the cues that the 
characters of the books produce and catalogue their emotions accordingly. The 
constructionist view sees the faces represented in systems such as the FACS (e.g., smile for 
happy, scowl for angry) as cultural stereotypes which correspond to what people believe an 
emotion should look like (Barrett et al., 2019; Robinson & Clore, 2002). In the same way that 
people pose these stereotypical faces when asked to make them, I argue that an illustrators’ 
representation of an emotion in a character’s facial expression will tend towards the cultural 
stereotype, constructed using their beliefs about what an emotion category should look like.  
 
However, there are various complications from coding facial expressions from picture books 




picture books have a high degree of ambiguity because of the variety of techniques and styles 
used by illustrators that make facial expression many times difficult to outline (e.g., Vander 
Wege et al., 2014). As a result, it is necessary to test for the reliability of the coding by 
inviting a second coder. 
 
With this in mind, the study compared the prevalence in the representation of stereotypical 
facial expressions of awe in picture book biographies of scientists and non-scientists. 
Following the aforementioned literature on the higher importance of a valued emotion 
category in a cultural space (Mesquita et al., 2017) my hypothesis in this study was that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Stereotypical representations of awe in the facial expressions of characters in 
picture book biographies of scientists are more frequent than those in picture book 
biographies of non-scientists. 
 
5.4.1. Procedure 
In this study, I followed an adapted version of the standard procedures of quantitative content 
analysis (e.g., Neuendorf, 2017; White & Marsh, 2006). After sampling and determining the 
units of coding (i.e., a human face) and analysis (i.e., the picture book), I developed a simple 
theory-based codebook (appendix B) with two questions and tested it on a subset of the 
sample. I segmented all the images in the picture book into units of context (i.e., the page). 
After reviewing the codebook, I coded the entire sample. Then I brought in a second coder to 
test for reliability. To statistically compare the differences between the two types of picture 
book biographies, I used simulation-based difference of means tests that account for the 
relatively low sample size and their non-parametric distribution. These tests were conducted 
in R (Core team, 2013) using the ‘infer’ package (Bray et al., 2018). After analysing the data, 
I proceeded to write up the results.  
 
5.4.2. Materials - The coding frame 
The stereotypical representation of an awe facial expression has been described as having a 
raised inner eyebrow, widened eyes, and an open drop-jawed mouth (Shiota et al., 2003). 
In this study, we evaluated every human face (unit of coding) appearing in the picture book 
biographies as following this description of awe. The codebook asks two simple questions: 




expression of awe on this page? The codebook also included the description of this 
expression and notes on how to proceed with the coding.  
 
5.4.3. Coding 
First, I counted the total number of units of coding (i.e., human faces). The faces had to 
include at least eyes and mouth. When there were more than five faces in an image (e.g., 
depictions of a crowd) only the five most prominent faces were acknowledged. All 
illustrations and photographs were counted; this included the images in the covers and 
peritextual material (Martinez et al., 2016). In total, the 120 books had 6,234 faces (M = 
51.95, SD =29.8), in 5,540 pages (M = 46.17, SD = 9.4) for an average of 1.1 faces per page. 
I then coded for the number of faces of awe on each page. Some books presented a challenge 
for coding, as many of the faces were very small or unclear as a result of the illustrator’s 
approach and technique. For example, many artists represent their characters using a 
minimalistic style (Painter et al., 2013), in which faces are portrayed with very few features. 
As such, many faces did not include eyebrows or their mouths were only lines (for examples, 
see figure 5.1). Moreover, other stereotypical facial expressions also include widened eyes or 
open mouths (e.g., fear, surprise, singing) (see figure 5.2) compounding the high level of 
ambiguity in many illustration’s faces resulting from stylistic differences. I allowed, 
therefore, a certain degree of flexibility in the coding. In circumstances where the illustrator 
overall drew no eyebrows, drew every eye as simple dots, or made all mouths closed, at least 
one of the other conditions that make a stereotypical awe face had to be satisfied. Any such 
ambiguous situations were discussed and resolved in conversation with the second coder.  
 
Figure 5.1 
Examples of Minimalist Style Illustrations in Picture Book Sample 
    
*The first image is taken from Mae Among the Stars by Roda Ahmed. The second image is from Me, Jane by 
Patrick McDonnell (see Appendix A).  






Examples of Awe-like Expressions with Different Meanings in Picture Book Sample 
    
*The first image is taken from Handel by M. T. Anderson. The second image is taken from Helen’s Big 
World by Doreen Rappaport (see Appendix A).  
**Image usage is covered under fair dealing/use principles for educational and research purposes.  
 
5.4.4. Intercoder reliability 
A second coder was introduced to the codebook and given an hour-long training session, in 
which the coding procedure was practised on picture books that were not part of the sample. 
The second coder was blind to the hypothesis. After the session, the coder received 20% of 
the sample (i.e., 24 books) to code. Following their coding, I met the second coder once again 
for a debrief session in which disagreements were resolved through consensus. After the 
session, the coder was thanked and received 100NZD for their work. The intercoder 
reliability measure for the total number of faces (Cohen’s k = 0.871) suggests an almost 
perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). Using this same benchmark, the reliability for 
stereotypical awe facial expressions per page was substantial (Cohen’s k = 0.695). 
 
5.4.5. Results 
In total, 259 faces were coded as having a stereotypical representation of awe (M = 2.15; SD 
= 3.28; table 5.3). For the sixty picture book biographies of scientists, the total number of 
awe expressions was 184 (M = 3.07; SD = 3.96). By contrast, the sixty picture book 
biographies of non-scientists included a total of 75 awe expressions (M = 1.25; SD = 2.07). 
Hypothesis testing using 5,000 permutations to create a null distribution indicated that the 
difference in means between both types of picture books was significant (p < 0.001).  
 
Table 5.3 
Descriptive Statistics of Frequency of Faces with Stereotypical Awe Expressions in Picture Book Biographies 
  Mean  SD  Range N 
Science  3.07 3.96 [0, 16] 184 





Likewise, the proportion of faces (table 5.4) with stereotypical awe expressions in picture 
book biographies of scientists (M = 0.07; SD = 0.1) was higher than in picture book 
biographies of non-scientists (M = 0.03; SD = 0.04), and this difference was also statistically 
significant (p < 0.001). Overall, the science picture book biographies in the sample contained 
a higher proportion of faces with stereotypical awe expressions85. 
 
Table 5.4 
Descriptive Statistics of Proportion of Faces with Stereotypical Awe Expressions in Picture Book Biographies 
  Mean  SD  Range Median 
Science 0.07 0.1 [0, 0.44] 0.05 
Non-science 0.03 0.04 [0, 0.16] 0 
 
5.4.6. Discussion 
Images depicting facial expressions of awe were much more common in picture book 
biographies of scientists than in those featuring non-scientists. In fact, over half of the former 
(42 out of 60) included such stereotyped displays of this emotion, whereas significantly fewer 
such books included such images in the sample of the latter type (25 out of 60). Some science 
picture books contained multiple faces that fit the mould of the drop jaw mouth and wide-
eyed expression stereotypical of this emotion. For example, the picture books of scientists 
such as Barnum’s Bones, Small Wonders, and The Man who Made Time Travel contained 
more than a dozen such representations each (figure 5.3). Such differences between the two 
types of books were apparent both for the raw frequency and the overall proportion of such 
images. These findings suggest that visual characterizations of awe are indeed more common 
in science picture books than they are in similar books from other areas of society.  
 
That said, various affordances of the picture books, such as artistic styles, presented 
challenges for coding. Ambiguities in the illustrations frequently made interpretations 
difficult (see also Vander Wege et al., 2014). For example, due to the lack of specificity of 
facial features (e.g., no eyebrows), many expressions did not fully correspond to the 
stereotypical representation of a facial expression for awe (Shiota et al., 2003). Others 
seemed to show mixed stereotypical emotions, approximating surprise, fear, or even joy (see 
 
85 Traditional non-parametric tests shows that the difference was statistically significant for raw frequency (W = 1,210; p < 0.001) and 




Du et al., 2014). There were also depictions of characters talking, singing, or with a wide-
eyed and open-jawed expression, which made the task of identifying awe facial expressions 
difficult. Moreover, there were instances whereby this emotion was represented in the 
illustrations through other conventional signifiers of awe, such as settings (e.g., on top of a 
mountain), events (e.g., stargazing), and actions (e.g., freezing), that were not captured by the 
coding scheme. In some cases, this emotion was also represented in the text accompanying 
such images. To corroborate this initial study of awe-based content in children’s picture 
books, therefore, in the next study I analysed the written text, similarly expecting to find 
more awe-related words in the science books than in the non-science books.  
 
Figure 5.3 
Examples of Stereotypical Facial Expression of Awe in Picture Book Biographies of Scientists 
     
 
*The first image is taken from Barnum’s Bones by Tracey E. Fern. The second image is taken from Small 
Wonders by Matthew Clark Smith. The third image is taken from The Man who Made Time Travel by 
Kathryn Lasky (see Appendix A).  
**Image usage is covered under fair dealing/use principles for educational and research purposes.  
 
5.5. Study 2 - Text data mining of representation of awe in picture book biographies 
The representational content of a category, such as an emotion, is enmeshed in rich networks 
of associations anchored in their words and grounded in perception, action, and situations 
(e.g., Barsalou et al., 2008). There are various ways to approximate the content of these rich 
networks that represent the content of a category. On the one hand, word associations, 
property generation, and other production tasks shed some light on the content and structure 
of people’s conceptual knowledge of a category (e.g., De Deyne et al., 2019). On the other 
hand, language models capture how words are represented within networks in-the-world by 
looking at vast corpora and determining the relationships between words (e.g., Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997). The resulting word incidences, co-occurrences, distributions, and distances 
from these tasks and models, point towards the stereotypical linguistic content that constitutes 





Early work using dictionaries to identify emotion content in written texts focused on explicit 
emotion categories (Ortony et al., 1988). Content analysis studies about emotions in the text 
of picture books have also focused on emotion categories (Boiger et al., 2013). More 
sophisticated studies of emotions in text have used TDM techniques, such as sentiment 
analysis, creating increasingly advanced dictionaries of measures of the valence of words 
(Baccianella et al., 2010) and specifically connoted emotion categories (Strapparava & 
Valitutti, 2004). While methods that use dictionaries have been criticized for their lack of 
nuance into the details of emotion situations, they are still widely used, following trends in 
algorithmic sophistication in TDM (see Mäntylä et al., 2018). 
 
In this study, I use simple TDM techniques to compare the frequency of the representation of 
words that compose the stereotypical linguistic structure of the category ‘awe’ in picture 
book biographies of scientists versus those of non-scientists. However, measures of raw 
frequency do not fully capture the importance of a word in a document (Anandarajan et al., 
2019). As a result, different weighting schemes have been devised to take different aspects of 
a document and the body of documents it comprises into account. One such weighting 
strategy is called ‘Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency’ (TFIDF), which combines 
both the frequency of each word in a document and the amount of information each term 
carries in relation to the corpus (Aizawa, 2003). 
 
In line with arguments about the value of the representation of this emotion in the culture of 
science communication (see chapter 3), I sought to test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Representations of awe in the written text of picture book biographies of 
scientists are more frequent and central than those in picture book biographies of non-
scientists 
 
To compensate for some of the criticism towards dictionary-based studies, I used five 
different dictionaries of awe-related words derived from previous research. 
 
5.5.1. Procedure 
The main texts of the 120 picture books were manually transcribed with the help of Adobe’s 




tokenizing each text, I calculated the TFIDF score for every word in every text. Following 
this, I calculated the frequencies of the words in the picture books for each of the five 
dictionaries of awe-related words and weighted these by the total number of words in each 
book. I also calculated a measure of the thematic weight of awe-related words in each book 
as the sum of TFIDF for each of the dictionaries. This measure captures the centrality (i.e., 
thematic weight) of a category (i.e., awe) within a document. Finally, I compared these 
different measures at the document level using both simulation-based difference of means 
test with 5,000 permutations and traditional non-parametric measures, with picture book 
biography type as the one factor with two levels (scientists/non-scientists). Most processing 
and analysis was done using the ‘stats’ (R Core Team, 2013), ‘tidytext’ (Silge & Robinson, 
2016), and ‘infer’ (Bray et al., 2019) packages. 
 
5.5.2. Materials  
I used five different dictionaries of awe-related words to capture the frequency of 
representation of awe in picture books. The first is a reference dictionary of the words ‘awe’ 
and ‘wonder’ and their derivates (e.g., ‘awe-inspiring’, ‘awesome’, ‘wonderful’) taken from 
the Oxford English Dictionary (Simpson et al., 1989). The next three dictionaries were taken 
from results of previously published research that has used production tasks, such as the 
traditional taxonomy of relations between emotion words (Storm & Storm, 1987), the South 
Florida University word association norms (Nelson et al., 2004) and the recently compiled 
Small World of Words English norms (SWOW-EN) (De Deyne et al., 2019). I also included 




The first dictionary (appendix C) includes the word ‘awe’ and all its derivate forms. I 
included then the verb, participle, and adjective among the various derivates of the words 
taken from the Oxford English Dictionary (Simpson et al., 1989). Because the word ‘awe’ 
and its derivatives were not very frequent (i.e., only eight tokens), I also included the word 








Storm and Storm (1987) created a taxonomy of the relations of synonymy of emotion words. 
By contrast to other taxonomies of emotion (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989), these 
authors did not assume the existence of a referent from which the emotion word acquires its 
meaning, but rather explored the lexical domain of relationships between these words through 
a combination of sorting and free listing activities with children, regular adults, and experts, 
to hierarchically classify 525 emotion-related words in the English language. The result was a 
series of 61 clusters that reflect certain synonymy relationships between emotion words in the 
English language. Words in each cluster can then be recognized by speakers of the English 
language, within the cultural setting of the study, as having, to a certain extent, a relationship 
of synonymy with each other. The resulting fourteen emotion words that clustered together 
with ‘awe’ (appendix D) gravitate around the idea of violation of expectations.  
 
 
The University of South Florida Word Association Norms (USF-WA) (Nelson et al., 2004) 
are perhaps the most cited word association norms in the literature, with over 1,000 papers. It 
contains the discrete free word associations (i.e., only one response per cue) for more than 
5,000 English words produced by over 6,000 participants. The dictionary is composed of all 
the non-idiosyncratic responses to the cue word ‘awe’ in the USF-WA norms. Non-
idiosyncratic responses are those given by more than two participants. This 20-word 
dictionary (appendix E) includes many of the same words as the other dictionaries. I did not 
include the derivate forms of these words, but rather only the word ‘awe’. 
 
 
Similar to the South Florida University project, the Small World of Words is currently the 
largest word association norms in the English Language, having collected word associations 
of more than 12,000 English words from over 90,000 participants. By contrast to the former, 
it uses a continued word association task whereby the participants produced three responses 
to a cue (De Deyne et al., 2019). The dictionary (appendix F) includes both non-idiosyncratic 
out and in responses for the word awe. This means that it includes all the responses that 
participants made when cued with the word ‘awe’, and the cue words that generated the 
response ‘awe’ or ‘awed’. This dictionary is larger and more diverse than all previous ones 






The Global Vectors for Word Representation algorithm (Glove) (Pennington et al., 2014) is a 
word vectoring model invented in 2015 by a Stanford team to extract the meaning of words 
from context using pre-existing corpora. The model was trained on the largest of the corpora 
provided by the team: The Common Crawl corpus. This commonly used corpus contains 840 
billion tokens for 2.2 million types. I calculated the fifty most similar words to ‘awe’ using 
Euclidean distances. I also included the word ‘awe’ for a total of 51 words (appendix G). 
This was done in Python using the ‘scipy’ library (Virtanen et al., 2020). 
 
 
Because picture books are usually written for children, many include little text and simple 
narratives, both of which increase in complexity with the age of the target audience 
(Nikolajeva & Scott, 2013). Nonetheless, picture books have a more diverse vocabulary than 
regular speech in conversation (Montag et al., 2015). The main texts of the 120 picture book 
biographies included 218,334 total words (i.e., tokens) (M = 1,819.5, SD = 1,440.8) and 
16,273 unique words (i.e., types). Numbers such as years, quantities, and time were included 
in the counts. 
 
 
To weight each word, I used the TFIDF. Weighting schemas are used in text analytics to 
compensate for the differences in the total number of words and the abundance of a word in a 
corpus. The TFIDF is one of the most commonly combinatorial weighting schemes, as it 
counterbalances the frequency of a word in a document and how often it appears across all 
documents in a corpus (Anandarajan et al., 2019). It is the result of multiplying the number of 
times a term shows up in a document divided by the sum of all words (i.e., Term Frequency 
or TF) and the logarithm of the total number of documents divided by the number of 
documents that include such words (Inverse Document Frequency or IDF). It is usually given 
by the formula: TFIDF = TF * IDF. I chose this weighting scheme to compensate for the 
differences in the word counts of individual picture books, on the one hand, and to favour the 
centrality of the words in their context, on the other. Thus, words such as ‘some’ and ‘like’, 
which appear in several of the dictionaries and provide very little information about the value 




‘astonishment’ or ‘amazing’. The value of TFIDF scores from the words in the dictionaries is 
then added for each picture book to capture the ‘thematic weight’ of awe-related words in the 
book. This method is commonly used in text analytics to capture the relevance of a sentence 
in an article (see Zechner, 1996).  
 
5.5.3. Results 
Table 5.5 shows the raw word frequency using the five dictionaries in the two kinds of books.  
Mann-Whitney and simulated difference of means tests of weighted word frequency between 
science and non-science picture books (Table 5.6) revealed a significant (p < 0.05) difference 
between both types of books for dictionaries 1 and 5. The Mann-Whitney test for dictionary 2 
showed a marginally significant effect (p < 0.1) while the simulation results suggested a 
significant p-value (p = 0.03). For dictionaries 3 and 4, however, the differences were not 
significant; likely the result of these dictionaries coming from word association tasks which 
include some very common words such as ‘some’ and ‘like’ and which do not provide much 
insight into the content of the emotion category ‘awe’. Effect sizes using Cliff’s d were small 
for dictionaries 1 and 2, and medium for dictionary 5.  
 
As frequencies alone do not necessarily reflect the full informational content of a word in the 
context of a corpus, we considered the thematic weight of the category awe (i.e., the sum of 
TFIDF values) to be a better indicator of the centrality of this emotion in the text. This value 
was again greater for science than for non-science picture books, across all of the dictionaries 
for the simulation test (Table 5.7). Similarly, the result of the Mann-Whitney tests were 
significant for four of the dictionaries. Overall, these results suggest that the thematic weight 
of the category awe is higher (i.e., is more central) in picture book-biographies of scientists 
than in those of non-scientists.  
 
Table 5.5 
Overall Raw Frequencies of Awe Related Words in Picture Book Biographies  
  Dictionary 1 Dictionary 2 Dictionary 3 Dictionary 4 Dictionary 5 
Science 79 35 388 738 180 








Table 5.6  
Mann Whitney U and Difference in Means Tests of Weighted Frequencies of Awe-related Words between Picture Book 
Biographies 
 
  Science - Mean (SD)  
Non-science - Mean 
(SD)  
Mann 





Dictionary 1 0.00104 (0.00167) 0.000381 (0.000540) 1371 0.017** -0.24 0.002*** 
Dictionary 2 0.0005 (0.0008) 0.0002 (0.0004) 1499 0.073* -0.17 0.03** 
Dictionary 3 0.00471 (0.00331) 0.00447 (0.00330) 1674 0.51 -0.07 0.685 
Dictionary 4 0.00808 (0.00462) 0.00686 (0.00287) 1522 0.15 -0.15 0.074* 
Dictionary 5 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 1192 0.001*** -0.34 0.003*** 
*p<0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
Effect sizes based on Vargha and Delaney (2000): 0.11–< 0.28, small; 0.28–< 0.43, medium; ≥ 0.43, large 
 
 
Table 5.7  
Mann Whitney U and Difference in Means Tests of Sum of TFIDF Values of Awe-related Words between Picture Book 
Biographies 
 
  Science - Mean (SD) Non-science - Mean (SD) 
Mann 





Dictionary 1 0.002(0.003) 0.0007(0.0009) 1378 0.02** -0.23 <0.001*** 
Dictionary 2 0.001(0.002) 0.0004(0.0008) 1480 0.057* -0.18 0.009*** 
Dictionary 3 0.004(0.003) 0.003(0.003) 1406 0.39 -0.22 0.041** 
Dictionary 4 0.01(0.008) 0.007(0.004) 1499 0.066* -0.20 0.014** 
Dictionary 5 0.005(0.004) 0.003(0.003) 1224 0.002*** -0.32 0.008*** 
*p<0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  





The findings from this study suggest that awe-related words are more frequent, and more 
central, to picture book biographies of scientists than those of non-scientists. For three of the 
five dictionaries, weighted frequencies comparisons revealed that awe-related words were 
overrepresented in the scientist book type. The two dictionaries for which this was not the 
case were derived from word-association norms and included common auxiliary terms such 
as a ‘some’ and ‘like’, which have little to do with the stereotypical conceptualization of awe. 
Moreover, the sum of TFIDF values on picture book biographies of scientists was for the 
most part, higher than in those of non-scientists, indicating that, in books about science, awe 
had a greater centrality in these books. 
 
Given that it is derived from applying the Glove algorithm to the Common Crawl corpus 
(Pennington et al., 2014), the last dictionary is perhaps the most robust of the five, capturing 
the words most commonly associated with awe in the same medium as the picture books: 




two tests lends credence to the overall findings on the incidence of this emotion’s 
representation in science picture books.  
 
In general, the results from Study 2 applied to the range of dictionaries used, which are the 
products of expert consultation, production tasks, and corpus-based methods. As with the 
previous study focusing on facial expressions of awe, the pattern of text data for the present 
study suggests that this emotion is especially valued in life stories centring on science. The 
larger implications of these findings will be explored in the general discussion section. 
 
5.6. Study 3 - Representation of awe situations in picture book biographies of children 
Representations of awe are important to a variety of domains outside science communication, 
such as tourism (Coghlan et al., 2012), religion (e.g., Krause & Hayward, 2015), and the 
world of art (e.g., Konečni, 2008). Social representations in these domains assume the forms 
and functions in relation to the different mandates of these cultural spaces (e.g., Mesquita et 
al., 2017). The situations where awe is represented in science communication and the roles 
this emotion assumes in these social representations will reflect this culture’s beliefs, values, 
norms, goals, and worldviews.  
 
Previous work on the content of social representations of emotion in picture books has 
focused on elements of an emotion situation, such as valence, arousal, and the social 
situations of the agents displaying the emotion (Sanders et al., 2018; Tsai et al., 2007; Vander 
Wege et al., 2014). Function has also been investigated by these researchers, although for the 
most part they have assumed a one-to-one correspondence between an emotion category 
(e.g., anger) and its alleged function (e.g., disengaging) (Sanders et al., 2018; Vander Wege 
et al., 2014). Moreover, these studies have looked at characteristics of the character 
experiencing the emotion such as gender (e.g., Sanders et al., 2018). Such work has observed 
differences in the way emotions are represented in picture books across different cultures, 
comparing, for example, Taiwan and the US (Tsai, 2007), Belgium and the US (Boiger et al., 
2013) and Hispanic and European American picture books in the US (Sanders et al., 2018).  
 
I used QCA to expand on the foregoing work and to look at the different elements of awe 
situations represented in picture books, as well as the characteristics of the characters who are 




from within the culture of science communication, and from outside this cultural space.  
 
To address these issues, I used the results from the first study to identify the illustrations in 
which awe is represented (i.e., those including a stereotypical awe face). I then coded for the 
elements co-occurring with these depictions of awe, to answer the following questions: 
 
Question 1: What are the elements of an awe situation represented in picture book 
biographies of scientists and non-scientists? 
 
Question 2: Who is represented as experiencing awe in picture book biographies of scientists 
and non-scientists? 
 
Question 3: How are the representations of awe in picture book biographies of scientists 
different from the representations of awe in other picture book biographies? 
 
This was, therefore, a descriptive study that aimed to document the representation of this 
emotion. Following the constructionist framework, I expected to find considerable variation 
in how awe is represented in the picture books of scientists. I also envisaged possible 
differences in the elements of the emotion, as well as the people shown as experiencing awe, 
between the biographies of scientists and those of non-scientists.  
 
5.6.1. Procedure 
I used an adapted version of QCA (Schreier, 2012) on the picture books split into two stages. 
The first stage takes as the unit of coding and analysis the visual unit, which is comprised of 
the illustration that includes a stereotypical awe facial expression and its accompanying text. 
Because in some illustrations there was more than one character represented as experiencing 
this emotion, I utilized a second stage, in which the unit of coding and analysis was the 
individual represented as having the emotion rather than the whole illustration. The steps in 
the procedure were as follows: 
1) First segmentation. Following a thematic criterion (Schreier, 2012), I segmented all 
the picture books into the illustrations that represented awe situations. The thematic 




1). The illustration and its accompanying text were therefore the unit of coding and 
will be referred to as the visual unit.  
2) Construction of preliminary main categories. Following the analytical framework in 
chapter three, I created 12 top-down main categories. 
3) Pilot. I tested the preliminary main categories on 10% of the visual units. I identified 
various categories that did not appear or could not be inferred in most picture books, 
reducing the number of main categories to five situational elements.  
4) Abstraction and synthesis. I coded another 10% of visual units. The coded units were 
abstracted and synthesized to generic subcategories based on both top-down 
typologies from previous research and bottom-up induction.  
5) Main coding. I coded all references into the subcategories.  
6) Reliability assessment. I brought in a second coder to assess the coding frame. The 
second coder was trained in an hour-long session. This person coded 20% of the 
visual units with the main categories. I then performed a reliability test based on the 
frame using Cohen’s kappa.  
7) Second segmentation. Next, I segmented the visual units following the thematic 
criterion of the individuals represented as experiencing this emotion.  
8) Construction of preliminary categories. Following the dimensions about the 
individual used in previous research (e.g., Vander Wege et al., 2014), and adding 
further demographic dimensions, I created a new coding frame that included four 
categories about the person represented as experiencing the emotion. I also included a 
category for the action being performed by the individual as an important element of a 
situation from the analytical framework.  
9) Pilot. I pilot-tested the code on 10% of the sample, which allowed me to refine the 
categories. I identified that actions had to be disaggregated into three different 
dimensions to capture different aspects of movement. I created the subcategories for 
each of these dimensions based on previous research.  
10) Coding for main categories. I coded the whole sample using the refined coding frame. 
Because the seven categories had all been clearly defined, there was no need for 
abstraction and synthesis. 
11) Reliability assessment. A second coder was again brought to code for 17% of the 
sample. I performed a reliability test using Cohen’s kappa and disagreements were 




12) Reporting the results. I created frequency tables and matrixes to present the data and 
wrote the results. 
The segmentation, coding, and analysis were done using NVivo 12 for Mac (QSR 
International, 1999). 
 
5.6.2. Segmentation  
I went through the results of the first study to segment the picture book biographies into the 
visual units that include stereotypical representations of facial expressions of awe. I only 
accounted for representations of facial expressions of awe from the main text of the books, as 
representations in other sections, such as the peritext or the covers, were sometimes 
repetitions from those in the main text and these did not include textual references to the 
action being represented. The sample of representations of awe amounted to 154 visual units 
(109 science, 45 non-science). 
 
Following this, I segmented the visual units into all the individuals represented as having this 
emotion in each visual unit. For cases in which there were more than five representations, I 
only accounted five of these to avoid skewing the sample86. In total, there were 242 
individuals represented as experiencing awe (170 science, 72 non-science).  
 
5.6.3. Materials - The coding frame 
The two coding frames include five categories representing aspects of the situation and seven 
categories about the actions and characteristics of the individual depicted as experiencing 
awe.  
1) Attention foci: Agent, object, or action, that is the focus of attention. The five 
subcategories were taken from categories highlighted in previous awe research (e.g., 
Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Shiota et al., 2007; Yaden et al., 2019). 
a. Accomplishment 
b. Human-made artefact 
c. Natural object 
d. Non-human living organism 
 




e. Person  
2) Social context: Number of people present in the awe situation. I adapted Keltner’s and 




c. Small group 
d. Crowd 
3) Setting: The physical place where the awe situation occurs. Studies of picture books 
have used typologies of the environment to describe the setting where an action takes 
place (Babb et al., 2018; Williams Jr. et al., 2012). I adapted these by dividing the 
setting into five groupings.  
a. Natural (wilderness area, no human presence) 
b. Modified (natural area that has been transformed such as rural farmland or 
gardens) 
c. Built outdoors (outside settings that have been completely built such as cities 
and suburbs) 
d. Built indoors (indoor settings that have been completely built such as rooms 
and halls) 
e. Unclear (non-descript settings) 
4) Event: Background event in which the awe situation occurs. I adapted the typology of 
events devised by Getz (2008) to include six subcategories.  
a. Arts, culture, and entertainment 
b. Business and trade 
c. Private events 
d. Public and political 
e. Scientific and educational  
f. Sports and recreation 
5) Outcomes: Results of the awe situation. There is no typology in the literature on the 
different functions awe can accomplish. The literature, however, mentions a few 
outcomes of this emotion such as curiosity and learning (e.g., Valdesolo et al., 2017). 
I constructed the six subcategories for this element using some of these previous 










6) Action - Direction of gaze. What is the direction of the gaze of the individual 
experiencing awe? Semiotic work on picture books (e.g., Painter et al., 2013) suggests 
the importance of the direction of gaze at identifying the relationship between an 
individual and the rest of the scene being represented.  
a. Looking up 
b. Looking straight 
c. Looking down 
7) Action - Relationship to the object of focus. What is the direction of the movement of 
the individual in relation to the object/person of focus?  
a. Engaging with the object/person 
b. Not moving 
c. Moving away from object/person 
8) Action - Communication. What communicative action is the individual performing? 
a. Clapping 
b. Communicating verbally 
c. Covering mouth 
d. Pointing 
e. Writing 
9) Age. In what age group is the individual? Baby/Child/Adult 
10) Gender. What is the apparent gender of the individual experiencing awe? 
Male/Female/Other 
11) Ethnicity. What is the apparent ethnicity of the individual experience awe?  
a. African American or Black 
b. American Indian, or Native American 
c. East or Southeast Asian 
d. Hispanic/Latinx 






12) Protagonist. Is the individual experiencing awe the main character of the picture 
book? Yes/No 
5.6.4. Intercoder reliability 
A second coder was brought in to test the reliability of the coding frame. They partook in a 
one-hour training session after which they received two codebooks (appendix H and I) and 
spreadsheets for the visual units and the individuals. They also received scanned versions of 
thirty (n = 30) visual units where awe is occurring (20% of the visual unit sample) and forty 
(n = 40) images of individuals with the stereotypical facial expression of awe (17% of the 
sample of individuals expressing awe), which they were asked to code alone and were blind 
to the purpose of the coding. We later met for a debriefing session after which they were 
thanked and paid 100NZD for their work. Disagreements were discussed and resolved during 
this debriefing session. 
 
Table 5.8 
Intercoder Reliability for Visual Units 
Item Cohen's k (n = 30) 
Attention foci 0.79 






Intercoder Reliability for Individuals 
Item Cohen's k (n = 40) 
Action 
 
  Looking direction 0.77 
  Direction of movement 0.71 
  Communicative expression 0.72 
Individual's characteristics 
 
  Age 0.91 
  Gender 0.69 
  Ethnicity 1 
  Main protagonist 0.9 
 
Results from the intercoder reliability assessment are presented in tables 5.8 and 5.9. These 




almost perfect agreement between both coders such as ethnicity, age, and social context. 
Some others showed less of an agreement such as outcome and gender, though these were all 




Table 5.10 shows that, overall, there was a diversity of objects, agents, and actions 
represented as being the centre of attention in the illustrations. From bubbles and the Ferris 
Wheel, to the tricks from a horse and seeing a dancing performance, awe is represented in 
picture books as being caused by myriad objects, agents, and actions, with ostensibly little in 
common. Moreover, there were differences between the attention foci for this emotion in 
science and non-science picture books. Living organisms and natural objects are commonly 
represented as the main source of this emotional reaction in science picture books, whereas 
accomplishments and people constitute most of the awe elicitors in picture books outside of 
this cultural space.  
 
Table 5.10 
Frequency of Representations of Attention Foci 
Agent, object, action Science (n=109) Non-Science (n =45) Total (n =154) 
Accomplishments 7 (6.42%) 5 (11.11%) 12 (7.79%) 
Human-made artefact 42 (38.53%) 14 (31.11%) 56 (36.36%) 
Living organisms 27 (24.77%) 4 (8.89%) 31 (20.13%) 
Natural object 23 (21.1%) 2 (4.44%) 25 (16.23%) 
Person 10 (9.17%) 20 (44.44%) 30 (19.48%) 
 
 
As table 5.11 reveals, the representation of awe occurs in all sorts of social situations. 
Overall, non-science picture books represent awe situations as being most frequent in a 
crowd, while science picture books tend to depict situations in which the individual is alone 
more often.  
 
Table 5.11 
Frequency of Representation of Social Circumstance 
Social circumstance Science (n=109) Non-Science (n=45) Total (n=154) 
Alone 39 (35.78%) 5 (11.11%) 44 (28.57%) 
Dyad 26 (23.85%) 6 (13.33%) 32 (20.78%) 
Small group 23 (21.1%) 8 (17.78%) 31 (20.13%) 






Globally, representations of awe in picture book biographies occur in a variety of 
environments but mostly in built indoor environments (table 5.12). However, there were 
slight differences between the two groups, with awe being represented in natural and 
modified environments more frequently in science picture books than in their non-science 
counterparts. These included gardens, parks, forests, deserts, and other outdoor spaces.  
 
Table 5.12 
Frequency of Representations of Setting 
Setting Science (n=109) Non-Science (n=45) Total (n=154) 
Built indoors 51 (46.79%) 27 (60%) 78 (50.65%) 
Built outdoors 19 (17.43%) 8 (17.78%) 27 (17.53%) 
Modified 16 (14.68%) 3 (6.67%) 19 (12.34%) 
Natural 16 (14.68%) 3 (6.67%) 29 (12.34%) 
Unclear 7 (6.42%) 4 (8.89%) 11 (7.14%) 
 
 
Table 5.13 indicates that awe occurs in a wide range of events, including pottery making, 
presidential visits, watching television, or just having dinner. It is not surprising that the 
majority of awe represented in picture book biographies of scientists occurs during scientific 
and educational events. This included exploring nature, working at a lab, and attending a 
rocket launch. By contrast, a good proportion of representations in non-science picture book 
biographies occurred in events related to the entertainment industry. This included concerts, 
dance shows, and visits to art museums.  
 
Table 5.13 
Frequency of Representations of Event 
Event Science (n=109) Non-Science (n=45) Total (n=154) 
Arts, culture, and entertainment 8 (7.34%) 21 (45.67%) 29 (18.83%) 
Business and trade 2 (1.83%) 3 (6.67%) 5 (3.25%) 
Private 19 (17.43%) 7 (15.56%) 26 (16.88%) 
Public and Political 5 (4.59%) 9 (20%) 14 (9.09%) 
Scientific and Educational 64 (58.72%) 3 (6.67%) 67 (43.51%) 
Sports and Recreation 11 (10.09%) 2 (4.44%) 13 (8.44%) 
 
 
As table 5.14 suggests, there are a wide-ranging set of outcomes that accompany an awe 
situation, represented in both picture book biographies of scientists and non-scientists. 




foci. Whether a person (e.g., a dancer, a scientist), an object (e.g., a light bulb, a painting), or 
the natural world (e.g., the ocean, birds) the most frequent social function represented across 
all picture books was that of assigning value to that source of attention through its recognition 
and praise. Nonetheless, a few differences appeared between both samples. For example, 
picture book biographies of scientists sometimes represented experiences of awe as inspiring 
an individual to become a person of science. This function was mostly not present in 
representations of awe in non-science biographies. Picture book biographies of scientists also 
showed individuals as learning something from awe experiences more often than in non-
science picture books. By contrast, situations where awe was represented in picture book 
biographies of non-scientists showed people experiencing such emotion commonly being 
entertained through it. Nonetheless, both types of picture books show a wide range of 
functions for this emotion.  
 
Table 5.14 
Frequency of Representations of Outcome  
Outcome Science (n=109) Non-Science (n=45) Total (n=154) 
Admiration 45 (41.28%)  22 (48.89%) 67 (43.51%) 
Entertainment 0 (0%) 11 (24.44%) 11 (7.14%) 
Inspiration 18 (16.51%) 1 (2.22%) 19 (12.34%) 
Learning  20 (18.35%) 3 (6.67%) 23 (14.94%) 
Motivation 22 (20.18%) 5 (11.11%) 27 (17.53%) 
Shock 4 (3.67%) 3 (6.67%) 7 (4.55%) 
 
 
As table 5.15 shows, individuals illustrated as experiencing awe were represented doing a 
variety of actions. First, they were illustrated as looking in different directions. A greater 
proportion of individuals are both looking up or down rather than across in picture book 
biographies of scientists. This contrasts with most of the individuals looking across in non-
science picture books. Second, the movement directed towards the object or agent of focus in 
the representation shows the majority of individuals as standing still. However, in some 
picture book biographies of scientists, the individual is shown as approaching and engaging 
with the object or person by contrast to biographies of non-scientists in which this behaviour 
is represented less often. Lastly, besides the stereotypical facial expression (i.e., jaw-dropped 
mouth or raised eyebrows), there was not much additional communication (e.g., gestures, 
actions, or verbal communication), represented in awe situations. The lack of other 




to determine which illustrations to analyse. Nonetheless, there were a variety of other 
communicative signs, such as clapping, pointing, or covering the mouth represented, 
suggesting that awe is communicated bodily, and thus represented in ways beyond just the 
stereotypical facial display.  
 
Table 5.15 
Action of the Individual Experiencing Awe 
Looking direction Science (n=170) Non-Science (n=72) Total (n=242) 
Across 48 (28.24%) 38 (52.78%) 86 (35.54%) 
Down 52 (30.59%) 8 (11.11%) 60 (24.79%) 
Up 70 (41.18%) 26 (36.11%) 96 (39.67%) 
Direction of movement       
Moving towards the object 40 (23.53%) 7 (9.72%) 47 (19.42%) 
Not moving 125 (73.53%) 63 (87.5%) 188 (77.69%) 
Moving away 5 (2.94%) 2 (2.78%) 7 (2.89%) 
Communicative expression       
Clapping 1 (0.59%) 2 (2.78%) 3 (1.24%) 
Communicating it verbally 5 (2.94%) 1 (1.39%) 6 (2.48%) 
Covering mouth 7 (4.12%) 1 (1.39%) 98(3.31%) 
None 144 (84.71%) 61 (84.72%) 205 (84.71%) 
Pointing 10 (5.88%) 7 (9.72%) 17 (7.02%) 
Writing 3 (1.76%) 0 (0.00%) 3 (1.24%) 
 
 
Table 5.16 shows the variety of characteristics of the individual represented as experiencing 
awe. Age-wise, most picture books showed adults experiencing this emotion. There were, 
however, quite a few representations of children having this emotion, particularly in the 
science picture books. When it comes to gender, however, there was a considerable 
difference between female and male representations in the frequency of awe in picture book 
biographies; 71% of the characters represented as having this emotion were men. This is 
despite the fact that 40% of the biographies of scientists were of women. Moreover, almost 
four out of five illustrations of people with the facial expressions of awe were of white 
people. Finally, it is worth noting that in picture book biographies of scientists, two of five 
illustrations were of the main protagonists experiencing this emotion. A larger proportion of 
the representations of this expression in picture book biographies of non-scientists were made 







Characteristics of the Individual Experiencing Awe 
Age Science (n=170) Non-Science (n=72) Total (n=242) 
Adult 108 (68.06%) 49 (68.06%) 157 (64.88%) 
Baby 5 (2.94%) 2 (2.78%) 7 (2.89%) 
Child 57 (33.53%) 21 (29.17%) 78 (32.23%) 
Gender       
Female 43 (25.29%) 28 (38.89%) 71 (29.34%) 
Male 127 (74.71%) 44 (61.11%) 171(70.66%) 
Ethnicity       
Arab or Middle Eastern 0 (0.00%) 1 (1.39%) 1 (0.41%) 
East or Southeast Asian 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
African American or Black 22 (12.94%) 15 (20.83%) 37 (15.29%) 
Hispanic or Latin/a/o/x 0 (0.00%) 3 (4.17%) 3 (1.24%) 
Native American 0 (0.00%) 7 (9.72%) 7 (2.89%) 
White 148 (87.06%) 46 (63.89%) 194 (80.17%) 
Main protagonist       
No 106 (62.35%) 60 (83.33%) 166 (68.6%) 
Yes 64 (37.65%) 12 (16.67%) 76 (31.4%) 
 
5.6.6. Discussion 
The results showed a large variety of elements accompanying the situations whereby a 
stereotypical awe facial expression is illustrated, in both picture book biographies of 
scientists and non-scientists. Consistent with the constructionist view on emotion, there was 
no one consistent element of form that accompanied all the representations of this emotion, 
despite the selection criterion for analysis being based on a stereotype (i.e., a facial 
expression). The elicitors, settings, events, social circumstances, actions, or any other element 
of a situation that accompanies awe, varied greatly across instances of the emotion. The 
results highlight the variety of ways in which this emotion is represented.  
 
The same can be said for the function of the awe situation represented. Again, the 
constructionist view argues that there is no one-to-one correspondence between an emotion 
category and a specific function. The results here suggest that this emotion serves a variety of 
functions, including those which have been mentioned in the previous literature, such as 
making people curious (Anderson et al., 2020), a personal realization (Schneider, 2017), or 
learning (Valdesolo et al., 2017). As all other emotions, awe is represented to serve the needs 
of a particular situation; considering the diversity of situations in which it occurs, it is only to 





More importantly for the purpose of this research, there were several differences in the 
representation of form, function, and characteristics of the individual experiencing awe 
between science and non-science picture books. For example, biographies of scientists 
illustrated a large proportion of individuals experiencing awe as a result of encounters with 
natural organisms (e.g., mushrooms, birds) and objects (e.g., the moon, mountains). The same 
can be said about the type of setting, events, and social context, whereby science picture 
books showed a predilection of representing awe in natural environments and research-
related contexts in which the individual was alone. The stereotype of the solitary scientist 
doing research alone outdoors and being in awe with nature matches long-held romantic 
notions of scientific exploration and adventure embodied in the life of Humboldt, Darwin, 
and other such explorers (see Holmes, 2008; Wulf, 2015). 
 
There were also some differences in how movement was represented, whereby biographies of 
scientists showed individuals looking both up and down, rather than across, more frequently. 
Semiotic studies of picture books suggest that the directionality of eyesight indicates the 
power relationship between the individual and the object or person they are looking towards 
(Painter et al., 2013). Individuals in picture book biographies of scientists are often shown 
either looking up, whether it is at the sky (e.g., Carl Sagan) or at the scientists (e.g., Nikola 
Tesla), or staring down, at an experiment (e.g., Marie Curie) or at nature (e.g., Jean Henri 
Fabre) (figure 5.4). This implies both a position of submission towards the genius of an 
individual or smallness towards the cosmos, or a relation of dominance over nature. By 
contrast, the line of sight for most images of awe in picture book biographies of non-
scientists is across, connoting an equal status relation between the awed and the object of awe 
(figure 5.5). Moreover, some picture book biographies of scientists show a movement 
towards the object or person that caused the awe situation, suggesting a function of active 
engagement, whether through control, investigation, or use. By contrast, most agents assume 
a passive role in the depictions of awe in the biographies of non-scientists, suggesting a 
different kind of stereotypical function for this emotion in spaces outside of science 
communication. The differences in outcomes, in which curiosity and learning were more 
frequent in science picture books, suggest that this interpretation of the different 
functionalities for this emotion category inside and outside the culture of science 





Examples of Illustrations of Characters Looking Up and Down when Experiencing Awe 
  
   
*The first image is taken from Star Stuff by Stephanie Roth Sisson. The second image is taken from Electric Wizard by Elizabeth Rusch. 
The third image is taken from Marie Curie by Demi. The fourth image is from Small Wonders by Matthew Clark Smith (see Appendix 
A).  
**Image usage is covered under fair dealing/use principles for educational and research purposes.  
 
Figure 5.5 
Examples of Illustrations of Characters Looking Across when Experiencing Awe 
 
   
*The first image is taken from Emmanuel’s dream by Laurie Ann Thompson and Sean Qualls. The second image is taken from 
Hiawatha and the Peacemaker by Robbie Robertson. The third image is taken from Josephine by Patricia Hruby Powell (see Appendix 
A). 
**Image usage is covered under fair dealing/use principles for educational and research purposes.  
 
Picture book biographies of scientists also often showed the protagonist to be the person 
experiencing awe. The importance of the scientists, and not a bystander, as being the person 
who experiences awe suggests the centrality of this emotion within the representational 
aesthetics of this cultural space. Importantly, a frequent trope was that of the main character 
having an encounter with awe as a child, an event that inspired the individual to pursue their 
career as a scientist. Whether it was an early encounter with nature that drove them to 
become a biologist (e.g., Rachel Carson), an experience with computers that made them 
become an analyst (e.g., Margaret Hamilton), or a sudden awareness of the night sky 
inspiring them to become an astronomer (e.g., Carl Sagan, Neil de Grasse Tyson), this 
stereotype of an inspiring discrete awe-related incident from childhood suggests the centrality 
of this emotion in the organization of people’s affective relationships to science. This is in 
line with one of the main goals of science communication: persuading future generations on 
the “value of careers in science” (Trench & Junker, 2001, p. 3). Providing a narrative arc in 
which a strong emotive situation leads to a professional choice in STEM activities falls 




Finally, it is worth highlighting how the gender and race of the person experiencing awe are 
unevenly represented in the depiction of this emotion. The great majority of illustrations of 
people experiencing awe were of white men. While there were exceptions that showed both 
non-white characters (e.g., Neil de Grasse Tyson), and women (e.g., Rachel Carson) as 
experiencing awe, for the most part, the images of people in these books conformed to this 
exclusionary stereotype. This is despite a good proportion of picture books being about 
women (37%) and non-white people (40%). This finding suggests the continuation of 
discourses of awe based on the sublime aesthetic, which reflect a powerful gender and 
Eurocentric bias (Freeman, 1995; A. K. Mellor, 1993; Yaeger, 1989). While the gendered and 
racialized coding of this emotion has been noted by scholars of the sublime, no study prior to 
the present work into the representation of awe has documented this stereotype empirically. 
This is particularly important for science communication, a field in which creating 
participatory spaces where people from any background can affectively relate with science is 
a necessary condition for engaging with communities “feeling left out” (Humm et al., 2020, 
p. 164) from this cultural space.  
 
Research into the content of the representations of awe in picture book biographies both of 
scientists and non-scientists show a large variety of forms, functions, and individuals 
experiencing this emotion. The results from the present study suggest that, for the culture of 
science communication, there are different varieties of awe. Furthermore, these varieties are 
distinct from those apparent in other cultural spaces. These findings are both in line with the 
constructionist view of emotion and the overall argument of this thesis.  
 
5.7. General discussion 
I have argued that awe is a valued emotion in the culture of science communication. Hence, I 
hypothesized that this emotion should be represented at a higher frequency and centrality 
through the artefacts produced in this cultural space. In studying the facial expressions and 
written texts in picture book biographies of scientists, comparing such content to that of 
picture book biographies of non-scientists, these general predictions were supported.  
 
Moreover, I observed a variety of forms and functions tagged to the representation of this 
emotion in these artefacts. The forms and functions of an emotion in a culture are products of 




functions observed in the present analysis suggest the variety of norms, values, beliefs, and 
other mandates within this culture. More importantly, there were noticeable contrasts 
between the representation of this emotion within and outside of science communication. 
This suggests that, despite the varieties of awe in science communication, there are some 
normative set of beliefs, values, identities, and goals that constitute the representational 
repertoire for this emotion in this cultural space.  
 
Finally, noting the prevalence of this emotion in children’s picture books establishes a 
mechanism through which children begin to acquire the conceptual knowledge to construct 
this emotion. While commonly used emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness, disgust) are learned 
by an infant from their caregivers, emotion categories such as awe, marvel, and astonishment 
rarely appear in natural language during interactions between parents and children ages zero 
to seven87. Picture books, by contrast, include a much larger variety of words than regular 
child-directed speech, hence parents and educators who read these are supporting the learning 
of categories that have low frequency use in the English language (Montag et al., 2015). 
Other cultural spaces where awe is valued such as churches (e.g., Krause & Hayward, 2014) 
or tourism experiences (Coghlan et al., 2012) may also be spaces where children encounter 
awe-related language and expressions early. However, considering the importance of picture 
books in the cognitive development of children (Kümmerling-Meibauer & Meibauer, 2013, 
2015), and how these books socialize children into the emotions of a particular cultural space 
(Garner & Parker, 2018; Tsai et al., 2007), the results of this study suggest that picture books 
are a starting point for the development of the emotional knowledge of awe, one through 
which they can later construct their own emotional experiences of this emotion. If this is the 
case, the higher frequency and centrality of this emotion in picture books from the culture of 
science communication would mean that children socialized into this space would be getting 
a head start in their affective learning of awe.  
 
5.8. Limitations  
Nevertheless, several limitations of the present work are worth noting. In general, results 
from convenience samples are difficult to generalize to the entirety of the population. 
 
87 This is true especially of vocabulary that is not used in daily conversation. Awe is not a word that parents commonly use when talking to 
their children. A quick search on ChildFreq (Bååth, 2010) - a tool that searches 5,000 transcriptions of conversations with children ages six 
months to seven years from the CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000) that includes 3,500,000 words - shows no entries for ‘awe’. By 




Although this study used a good sample size and included some highly consumed picture 
book biographies, as suggested by the fact that they were all award-winning books, it is 
problematic to conclude that the findings could be applied to all science picture books, or 
even that they apply to picture book biographies. It is worth remembering that picture book 
biographies of scientists are different in many ways from the informational books that are 
very popular as science books for children. Moreover, while the sample was chosen from 
award-winning biographies from the United States and these books are sold around the world 
through the strength and size of this country’s publishing industry, any generalization to other 
English-speaking contexts such as those in Aotearoa New Zealand is cautioned. Finally, 
creating better dictionaries of words that constitute the representational content of an 
emotion, and devising nuanced typologies with which to code the elements of a situation, 
could potentially help in better establishing the frequency, centrality, form, and function of 
emotions in this kind of studies. The newness of this kind of research makes this study only a 
first step towards exploring the incidence and diversity of emotion representations in cultural 
artefacts.  
 
5.9. Conclusion and future directions 
As far as I am aware, this exploratory study is the first of its kind to show differences in the 
social representation of one emotion (i.e., awe) in one type of artefact (i.e., children’s picture 
book biographies) of the culture of science communication. Future studies might examine 
other cultural artefacts (e.g., science documentaries, comic books) to explore how awe and 
other emotions (e.g., sadness, anger, joy) are represented within this cultural space, in English 
and other languages. Such investigations can also look for differences in how awe, and other 
emotions, are represented across cultural artefacts from different disciplines (e.g., biology vs., 
astronomy), countries (e.g., Aotearoa New Zealand vs. the United Kingdom) and time 
periods (e.g., 20th vs 21st centuries), among the many subcultural comparisons that can be 
done, as ways into picking the diversity and change of the representation of this emotion 
through space and time. At the same time, such work can compare these representations to 
those in other types of artefacts derived from different cultural spaces where this emotion is 
common (e.g., religious communities, art, tourism). Lastly, establishing the way in which 
science picture books are consumed (e.g., who consumes them; where are these read; how do 
children, parents, and educators relate to these), and how these relate to the consumption of 




understanding of how people are socialized into this cultural space, as well as the role of 






Chapter six - Assessing the mental representation of awe in science communication 
through the word association paradigm 
 
6. Introduction  
Different degrees of conceptual skill manifest as a variety of features. First, people with 
increasing levels of skill show different degrees of information-processing abilities, which 
allow them to perform a task with growing expertise (e.g., Biederman & Shiffrar, 1987; Holt 
& Beilock, 2006). Similarly, people with a higher degree of conceptual skill show different 
forms of knowledge about the subject area in which they have said skills. Experts show 
specialized knowledge in particular domains that manifests in the diversity, sophistication, 
and specificity of the content of knowledge in those domains (e.g., K. E. Johnson & Mervis, 
1997; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). Finally, people with growing degrees of skill show increasing 
levels of structural differentiation and organization in their conceptual knowledge (e.g., 
Crowe & Prescott, 2003). These features distinguish the conceptual skills of people with 
rising levels of experience with any category, including the mental representation of emotions 
(Hoemann Nielson et al., 2020).  
 
As I showed in the previous chapter, awe appears to be represented with a higher frequency 
and centrality in the products of this cultural space, and people who navigate it (e.g., going to 
science museums, reading science magazines, attending science festivals) find themselves in 
more situations that involve this emotion category. Being valued in this cultural space, people 
are more likely to interact with the category ‘awe’ and have experiences of (i.e., practice) this 
emotion. Hence, repeated experience with awe should make them more skilled in the 
conceptualizations of this category; expertise which should manifest in divergent processing 
abilities, differentiated content, and a specialized structure of knowledge.  
 
The five studies presented in this chapter assess the differences in conceptual skills between 
those who engage with science communication and those who don’t. As skill differences 
manifest in a variety of phenomena, three questions guide this chapter: Are there differences 
in the processing abilities of the emotion category ‘awe’ in those who participate in the 
culture of science communication? Are there differences in the content of these 
representations of awe between those who participate in this culture and those who do not? 




and those disengaged with this cultural space? Studies 1 and 2 evaluate people’s processing 
of ‘awe’ comparing the activation of different representational systems during a word 
association task. Study 3 evaluates the content of the responses in the domain of science 
communication by comparing their production of natural kind responses. In study 4, I 
segment the sample to compare the perceptual strength in different modalities and 
concreteness of the word association norms produced by the engaged, interested, and 
disengaged from science communication. Finally, study 5 analyses the structure of these 
responses using cluster analysis.  
 
Following the language and situated simulation theory of the representation of concepts 
(LASS; Barsalou et al., 2008), the constructionist view of emotions (Barrett, 2017a) and its 
take on expertise (Hoemann Nielson et al., 2020) (see chapter three), I argue that participants’ 
conceptualization of awe, communicated in the responses to a word association task, should 
differ for the different levels of engagement with the culture of science communication. The 
differences in processing abilities should manifest in a differentiated activation of the 
linguistic and simulations systems during the task. Moreover, I also argue that the content of 
the representations from people who engage with the culture of science communication and 
those who don’t will also differ, as the content of those who do engage should reflect some of 
this culture’s mandates (Mesquita et al., 2017). Finally, I expect to see differences in the 
structure of the responses to the cue ‘awe’ among the engaged and the disengaged. The 
responses of participants with a higher level of experience with this emotion should then 
show a higher degree of order and thematic coherence. 
 
I begin this chapter by presenting a brief overview of the word association production 
paradigm. Then I provide a short literature review of studies using production paradigms to 
test differences in the mental representation of a category. Following this, I describe the set-
up of each of the five studies including their methods and results. I conclude with a general 
discussion of the results of the studies, noting their limitations, and considering future 








6.1. Methodological overview  
The basic setup of the word association task88 consists of giving a single word cue to a person 
and then asking them to produce one or a set of associates as they come to mind. The main 
assumption of this task is that the associations produced give a somewhat unfiltered 
approximation to people’s representational processes, such as conceptualization, linguistic 
association, the interaction between lexical and conceptual knowledge, conceptual 
combination, and so on (e.g., De Deyne et al., 2019; De Deyne & Storms, 2008a, 2008b; de 
Groot, 1989; Deese, 1965; Nelson et al., 2004; Santos et al., 2011). The paradigm belongs to 
a family of production tasks that includes feature listing89 (e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005; McRae et al., 2005; Rosch & Mervis, 1975), whereby people are asked to 
produce as many features as possible of an object, and category fluency tasks90 (e.g., Crowe 
& Prescott, 2003; Storm & Storm, 1987), whereby people are asked to name all the objects 
about a category under a certain time frame.  
 
It is worth highlighting that word association norms, as with all data collection strategies, 
provide only a partial view of the content and structure of knowledge (e.g., Barsalou & 
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Cramer, 1968; De Deyne & Storms, 2015; Deese, 1965; Fitzpatrick 
et al., 2013). For example, comparisons of the data from word association tasks and large 
corpus-based methods show various qualitative differences in their content, showing that 
different forms of data collection strategies tap into various aspects of how people’s 
knowledge is organized (e.g., De Deyne et al., 2016; Mollin, 2009). Moreover, these 
paradigms also suffer from a lack of consistency between studies, deficiencies in the 
assessment of the validity of some of the instruments used, and various other methodological 
issues (Canessa et al., 2020; Fitzpatrick et al., 2013). Most importantly, assuming that the 
construction of mental representations is ad hoc and situated means that the setting in which 
the task takes place constrains the type of responses that become available, due to the 
activation of particular situated knowledge (e.g., sitting in front of a computer to get some 
money). These observations reveal the need for cementing research on robust theories of 
language and mental representation (in this case, LASS). They also highlight the importance 
 
88 While various reviews of the literature on word associations were written in the sixties and seventies (e.g., Cramer, 1968; Deese, 1965), 
the multiplicity of fields that use word associations as a source of information today is currently so large, that a complete review of all of its 
forms is beyond the scope of this research (for a recent review in the field of linguistics, see Thwaites, 2018).  
89 Also known as property generation (e.g., Santos et al., 2011).  




of using measures, procedures, and analytical tools validated in previous research, providing 
detailed and transparent descriptions of all the steps taken during the methodology, and trying 
to replicate the studies. I try to tackle these issues throughout the rest of this chapter.  
 
6.2. Literature Review 
Production tasks such as word association have been used in previous studies to assess the 
processing, content, and structure of knowledge of people from different backgrounds. First, 
a limited number of studies have observed different forms of conceptual processing in people 
with different degrees of skill. A study by Roversi et al. (2013) showed that people from 
different professional backgrounds and degrees of experience (i.e., students, law graduates, 
law professionals, researchers) produce different combinations of linguistic and simulated 
responses to abstract and concrete categories in a property generation task. A similar study by 
Borghi et al. (2016), using a definition task91, found that participants with different kinds of 
expertise in a particular domain (i.e., safety and security at the workplace) responded with 
different degrees of introspective and situational (i.e., simulation) and taxonomic (i.e., 
linguistic) content. These studies suggest the differentiated activation of conceptual systems 
(linguistic or simulated) when processing a categories by people with different levels of skill 
in a specific domain.  
 
Other studies have used word associations to compare the content of knowledge by people 
with different levels of expertise. Language researchers have used cue-response pair 
classifications such as grammatical type (e.g., Deese, 1965), syntagmatic vs paradigmatic 
responses (e.g., Jenkins, 1954), or developed new coding schemes to capture qualitative 
differences in the way that people with different levels of language expertise make word 
associations (e.g., Fitzpatrick, 2006; Zareva, 2007). Other studies have assessed the 
performance of participants with different degrees of expertise to categories such as ‘health’ 
and ‘living cell’ using continued word association tasks (e.g., Colgan & McGuinness, 1998; 
Kostova, 2008). These studies have used measures of frequency, such as response availability 
and idiosyncratic responses, to capture the different degrees of proficiency and content that 
each of the different levels of expertise confers in a particular domain.  
 
 
91 Definition tasks ask participants to define a term, responses which are then content analysed for differences in domains. These are a kind of 




Studies in this area have also compared the structure of knowledge in participants with 
different backgrounds. For example, Crowe and Prescott (2003) observed differences in the 
structure of knowledge in children from different age groups using clustering techniques. 
More recently, a series of studies by Mazzuca, Majid et al., (2020) and Mazzuca, Borghi et 
al., (2020) used similar techniques to compare the responses of different groups in a property 
generation task. In their first study, the authors observed several qualitative differences in 
responses to the word ‘gender’ by normative and non-normative individuals (Mazzuca, Majid 
et al., 2020). The second study observed differences in the production norms to the same 
word from individuals coming from three countries: Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK 
(Mazzuca, Borghi et al., 2020). These structural differences were ascribed to differences in 
both personal and cultural experiences.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that a few studies have investigated the representation of emotion 
words using production paradigms such as word associations. Altarriba et al. (1999) 
compared the results of a word association task between emotion, concrete, and abstract 
words. These authors observed that emotion words received overall more association types. 
Word association tasks have also been used to explore the content of the mental 
representation emotion-laden words such as ‘aesthetic’ (Jacobsen et al., 2004) and emotion 
words such as ‘Ergriffenheit’ (Kuehnast et al., 2014) in German and ‘xoshbaxti’ in Persian 
(Sharifian & Bagheri, 2019). These studies provide evidence of the richness of the knowledge 
content for specific emotion words across individuals. Finally, Boiger et al. (2013) observed 
cross-cultural differences in the content of word associations done in the United States and 
Belgium for words related to anger and shame. Their results show that while both people in 
the United States and Belgium associate anger with aggression, Belgians also associated it to 
a larger extent with containment. Similarly, Belgians associated shame with both suppression 
and closeness to a larger extent than people in the United States, who mostly associated it 
with avoiding this negative experience. This last study is, to my knowledge, the only one that 
has shown differences in conceptual knowledge of emotion across cultural settings using 
production norms from word associations.  
 
Together, these studies suggest the potential of using word association tasks to assess 
people’s conceptualization of emotion categories (e.g., Kuehnast et al., 2014), and to 




Boiger et al., 2013) and degrees of skill with such categories (e.g., Borghi et al., 2016). 
Whether it is looking at the processing of a representation (e.g., Roversi et al., 2013), the 
content of such representations (e.g., Kuehnast et al., 2014), or the structure of those 
representations (e.g., Mazzuca, Borghi et al., 2020; Mazzuca, Majid et al., 2020; see also, 
Mazzuca, 2020), production tasks such as word association can be utilized to capture 
different features of people’s conceptual knowledge of a category – in this case, the emotion 
category ‘awe’. The studies in this chapter are the first to attempt to capture differences in 
conceptual skill with this emotion category in people with different levels of engagement 
with the culture of science communication.  
 
6.3. Study 1 - Simulated vs linguistic responses in word association (60 seconds) 
When people read or hear the word ‘awe’, a distributed network of lexical forms and a partial 
multimodal simulation of conceptual knowledge activate (Barsalou et al., 2008; Santos et al., 
2011; Vigliocco et al., 2009). The former forms a quick and relatively shallow linguistic 
representation of associated words while the latter is a slower multimodal simulation of the 
category. First, the lexical form spreads through a linguistic network activating other lexical 
content that serves as cues, pointers, or shortcuts, and contribute to conceptual processing 
(Connell, 2019). In parallel to this process, the simulation system aggregates previously 
stored-in-memory multimodal knowledge and integrates the different situational elements 
(i.e., external and internal), in relation to the demands of the current situation to support 
action (Barsalou, 2009, 2016; Lebois et al., 2015). The lexical and simulation systems 
dynamically constitute a mental representation of awe (i.e., an awe concept) as a function of a 
person’s past experiences with the emotion category and the affordances of the context where 
the activation takes place (Barrett et al., 2014).  
 
The ability to construct the concept awe is in part based on the experience a person has had 
with this emotion through their lifespan. People who experience this emotion recurrently 
should be able to construct a deep multimodal representation of the category more easily 
(Hoemann, Nielson et al., 2020). Their simulation system should activate with greater 
efficiency, constructing the perceptual, affective, motor, mental, motivational, and the rest of 
the situational components that constitute the core content of a mental representation 
(Barsalou et al., 2008, 2018). I argue that responses to a production task such as word 




representation and produce more words for features such as the external objects, introspective 
properties, and actions. Similarly, responses derived from the simulation system should also 
be more distinctive, as these represent the idiosyncratic experience of the individual. By 
contrast, I argue that people who do not conceptualize awe often will rather rely on quick 
language-based heuristics which carry statistically recurrent content (i.e., stereotypical). 
Hence, the production norms of people with different levels of expertise with this emotion 
should differ in the way in which the simulation and linguistic systems are activated, with 
experts processing a category using a multimodal simulation more readily and non-experts 
relying more on linguistic cues.  
 
Evidence suggests that people closer to the culture of science communication experience this 
emotion more frequently (Gottlieb et al., 2018). I argue this is the result of the acculturation 
received from this emotion being valued in the culture of science communication. People 
who participate in this cultural space have more experiences with this emotion category than 
people who do not. The knowledge acquired through these experiences should manifest in 
their processing ability to represent this category using a multimodal simulation rather than 
using linguistic heuristics. Using a continued word association task as a means of capturing 
the activation of people’s representational systems, I test the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The more people engage with the culture of science communication, the fewer 
responses they will produce derived from the linguistic system to the cue word ‘awe’. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The more people engage with the culture of science communication, the more 
responses they will produce derived from the simulation system to the cue word ‘awe’.  
 
I use two sets of measurements to stand for the activation of simulated and linguistic systems. 
First, are measures of stereotypy and idiosyncrasy derived from the production norms, 
whereby the former stands for linguistic and the latter for simulated. The second set of 
measures are derived from a content analysis of response type categorization in which each 
cue-response pair is coded as either linguistic or simulated.  
 
I expect to find that the more people engage with this cultural space, the more responses 




Guided by the principle of transparency (see Fitzpatrick et al., 2013), in the next sections I 
describe in detail the design, participants, and processing of the data they produced.  
 
6.3.1. Procedure 
To test these hypotheses, I used a continued free association task formalized by Noble (1952) 
and used by de Groot (1989) and more recently by Kenett et al. (2011). This simple task 
consists of giving participants one minute after receiving a cue word to produce as many 
word associations as possible. Studies using word associations have shown the differentiated 
activation of the linguistic and simulation systems during the task (De Deyne & Storm, 
2008a; Wu & Barsalou, 2009). 
 
Participants were contacted through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). They were told 
they would participate in a word association and survey study. On reading the information 
sheet and completing the informed consent form (appendix J), participants received the 
instructions (appendix K) for the free association task. These instructions were adapted from 
Kenett et al. (2014) and Fitzpatrick (2013). Participants saw the cue word in the centre of the 
screen highlighted in boldface and empty spaces where they could write the associates as 
they came to mind. On writing a response and pressing enter, the cursor jumped to the next 
blank space where they could write a new association. Participants had 60 seconds to 
complete the task for each cue word. Every participant completed the task on two practice 
words, the target word ‘awe’, and a filler word. After completing the task, participants were 
thanked and then instructed to complete the questionnaires.  
 
Two questionnaires captured their engagement with science communication. First, they 
responded to the 10-item instrument developed by Füchslin et al. (2018) to capture their 
overall perceptions of science (appendix L). Then they responded to the consumption of 
science communication scale (appendix M)92. I also included two one-question religiosity 
and spirituality items (appendix N). Lastly, I included six questions about the participants’ 
sociodemographic characteristics, such as gender, age, ethnicity, and political persuasion, all 
of which are common in survey research (appendix O). After completing the questionnaires, 
the participants responded to an honesty question about whether they were paying attention 
 




and answered the questionnaire truthfully or not (Rouse, 2015). They were then thanked, 
debriefed, and received the code through which they requested their payment. The task and 
survey were prepared using Qualtrics (2019) and posted through Turkprime/Cloudresearch 
(Litman et al., 2017) to MTurk.  
 
The data produced were pre-processed in two steps: exclusions and standardization. Then I 
processed it in two stages: response type classification and measure construction. I classified 
cue-responses for the target word using a modified version of the taxonomic coding scheme 
used to separate between lexical and simulated content in previous work (De Deyne & 
Storms, 2008a; Santos et al., 2011; Wu & Barsalou, 2009). Then I tallied up idiosyncratic, 
stereotypical, simulated, and linguistic responses for each participant. After processing the 
information, I tested the hypothesis using regressions analysis. 
 
6.3.2. Sample 
A convenience sample (N = 306) were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service 
in exchange for 1.50USD compensation. All participants were based in the United States, 
over 18 years of age, and native English speakers. Evidence suggests that participants 
recruited through this service are more representative of the United States population than 
other internet and student samples (Buhrmester et al., 2016).  
 
I identify four a priori criteria to manually exclude participants from the sample (n = 47). 
Some of these criteria follow the benchmarks used by de Deyne et al. (2019) and the best 
practices for post-hoc identification of meaningless or poor-quality data offered by Dunn et 
al. (2018). The criteria were: 
 
1) Participants who replied affirmatively or with spam to an honesty question (9 exclusions).  
2) Participants who failed to follow the word association instructions. This included those 
who did not produce any word associations for the target word, wrote the same words 
over and over, wrote sentences, or replied nonsense (15 exclusions)  
3) Careless responses: Dunn et al. (2018) recently proposed an easy to use and simple 
statistical method to catch careless responses called the intra-individual response 
variability index for strings (IRV). Low IRV indicate that people are responding with 




IRV scores for the consumption questionnaire (below 5 percentile) were removed (19 
exclusions).  
4) Extreme response outliers: Participants who produced more than 20 responses (3*IQR of 
total responses) (4 exclusions).  
 
Two hundred and fifty-nine participants remained after the exclusion criteria were applied. 
Table 6.1 shows the demographic characteristics of the final sample.  
 
Table 6.1 
Demographic Characteristics of Participants (n=259) 
Baseline characteristic n %  
Gender    
  female 117 45.2  
  male 140 54.1  
  other 2 0.8  
Education Attainment    
  High school diploma or equivalent 36 13.9  
  Some college 88 34  
  Bachelor's degree or equivalent 111 42.9  
  Master's degree or equivalent 18 6.95  
  Doctoral or professional degree 6 2.32  
Ethnicity    
  African American or black 30 11.6  
  Hispanic, Latin American or Latinx 11 4.25  
  White or European American 205 79.2  
  Other 13 4.95  
 
6.3.3. Ethical considerations 
The study received category B approval from the Human Ethics Committee of the University 
of Otago #D19/374 (appendix R).  
 
6.3.4. Materials  
The study includes the free word association task, a 10-item questionnaire on public 
perceptions of science, the science communication consumption scale, spirituality and 
religious measures, and a sociodemographic questionnaire.  
 
 
For this study, each participant performed a continued free word association task on two 




task to guarantee that the participants understood the instructions and become familiar with 
the task. I included a filler word as a distraction from the purpose of the study.  
 
The critical word ‘awe’ is the emotion category at the centre of this investigation. The word 
is for the most part used as a noun, as in the sentence ‘She filled the audience with awe’. This 
word appears relatively infrequently in the English language, scoring a 2.63 out of 100 in the 
contextual diversity measure (SUBTLwd) and ranked 9,846 in Brysbaert and New’s (2009) 
American English Frequency norms93. It also received a mean score of 1.89 in a ranking of 1 
(not concrete) to 5 (concrete) in Brysbaert et al. (2014), making it a highly abstract category.  
 
The two practice words scored high on concreteness and the filler scored low on this metric. 
The three words were matched for frequency, between the 8,000 and 10,000 most frequent 
words (Brysbaert & New, 2009). Most importantly the three words were chosen as they 
scored very low on similarity ratings to the word ‘awe’94. Similarity ratings were calculated 
using the Python tool Spacy (Honnibal & Montani, 2017) which has a function that calculates 
a similarity rating from 1 million-word vectors. The three chosen words for this task were 
‘ferry’, ‘toaster’, and ‘rebound’.  
 
Table 6.2 
Words in Word Association Task 
Words SUBTLwd Frequency rank Concreteness Relatedness to awe  
‘ferry’ 5.35 8162 4.59 0.03 
‘toaster’ 3.88 8607 4.37 0.09 
‘rebound’ 2.78 9111 2.41 0.08 
‘awe’ 2.63 9846 1.89   
 
 
Schäfer et al. (2018) collected data of perceptions of science in the Science Barometer 
Switzerland using a 30-item survey. Their questions were taken from a comprehensive 
literature review of previous studies on attitudes towards science, trust in science, science 
literacy, belief in science, and science media consumption (e.g., BBVA Foundation, 2011; 
Tsfati et al., 2010). Füchslin et al. (2018) narrowed this extensive questionnaire to create a 
 
93 The norms include more than 60,000 English Lemmas taken from the subtitles of 8,388 television shows and movies. The authors found 
the score of contextual diversity (SUBTLcd) to be the best measure of frequency in their analysis, hence words were ranked according to this 
measure.  
94 The score goes from 1 (the same word) to 0 (completely dissimilar).  








Participants responded to the consumption of science communication scale that I developed 
and validated (appendix P and Q), and which includes eleven questions about their 
engagement with products or situations where they encounter science communication.  
 
 
I included two one-item self-report questions about people’s religiosity and spirituality taken 
from Saslow et al., (2013). This was a response to studies suggesting a connection between 




Lastly, I included six demographic questions to control for certain factors that might 
influence people’s representation of any category. This included measures for age, gender, 




Words were standardized by hand using various steps taking inspiration from other studies 
(e.g., De Deyne et al., 2019; De Deyne & Storms, 2008b; Fitzpatrick et al., 2013; Kenett et 
al., 2014) and following these steps: 
1) All words were turned into lowercase.  
2) The last responses a person produced where the meaning was impossible to deduce 
(e.g., rec, in, e, i) were removed (13 words).  
3) The last response a person produced where the meaning could be determined was 
completed (e.g., skateboar à ‘skateboard’, creativit à ‘creativity’, univer à 
universe) (12 words).  
4) I corrected the spelling when there were typos. We used US spelling based on the 
Merriam Webster Dictionary (e.g., amasement à ‘amazement’, awarness à 




5) Numbers were turned into word form (e.g., 7 wonders à ‘seven wonders’) (2 words).  
6) Indefinite and definite articles were removed (e.g., the universe – ‘universe’) (2 
words).  
7) Prepositions ‘in’ and ‘of’ were removed (e.g., in love, look of) (5 words).  
8) Commas, periods, and other punctuation marks (except for hyphens were removed) (1 
word).  
9) I separated long strings (e.g., sound for something à ‘sound’ / ‘something’) (3 
words), adjective-noun pairs (heartfelt performance à ‘heartfelt’ / ‘performance’, 
new baby à ‘new’/ ‘baby’) (8 words) and strings joined by coordinating conjunctions 
(or, and) (good or bad à ‘good’/ ‘bad’, life and death à ‘life’/ ‘death’) (3 words). 
10) Space and hyphens96 were turned into underscores (e.g., mind-blown à mind_blown, 
jaw-dropping à jaw_dropping).  
11) The strings ‘seeing something new’ and ‘seeing something unexpected’, made by one 
participant were turned into four words ‘seeing’ / ‘something’ / ‘new’ / ‘unexpected’.  
12) Finally, when the same word was produced more than once, the second one was 
removed (5 words).  
After standardizations, there were 2015 tokens and 653 types.  
 
 
Cue-responses pairs were coded using a simplified and adapted version of the taxonomy 
developed in Cree and McRae (2003) and used by De Deyne and Storm (2008a), Wu and 
Barsalou (2009), and others. This kind of taxonomy allows for the categorization of items in 
relation to the activation of either the linguistic or simulation systems (e.g., Santos et al., 
2011). The version used here consists of six categories: lexical, taxonomic, entity, external 
situational, introspective, and miscellanea. 
 
 
I constructed four count measures for the analysis of the word association data based on 
previous work.  
 




1) Stereotypy score (stereotypical): Stereotypical responses were defined as the 
dominant responses in the production norms that resulted from this task (de Groot, 
1989; Fitzpatrick et al., 2013). A stereotypy norms list was constructed out of the 
responses produced by at least 5 per cent of all participants (i.e., 13 responses). Then 
the participants received a point for every stereotypical word they produced. This 
measure of stereotypy captures the activation of the linguistic system in conceptual 
processing.  
2) Idiosyncratic responses (idiosyncratic): The total number of unique types per cue 
produced. These idiosyncratic responses, also called hapax legonomena (De Deyne et 
al., 2019), have been used in previous work as measures of heterogeneity of the 
content of people’s knowledge (e.g., Cramer, 1968). I argue that this measure of 
idiosyncrasy captures the construction of a simulation in conceptual processing.  
3) Total number of linguistic responses (linguistic): The sum of the total number of 
taxonomic and lexical associates that a person produced corresponding to the 
activation of the language representational system. Research shows that early 
responses in word associations are usually of this kind (De Deyne & Storms, 2008a) 
and that people produce more linguistic responses in word associations than in 
property generation and imageability tasks (Wu & Barsalou, 2009).  
4) Total number of simulated responses (simulated): The sum of the entities, external 
situational, and introspective features produced by each participant corresponding to 
the activation of a simulation. Previous findings indicate that these are the most 
common response types produced by participants after a few rounds (De Deyne & 
Storms, 2008a), and that imageability and property generation tasks get people to 
produce more of these (Wu & Barsalou, 2009).  
 
The main independent variable is the mean value of responses to the items of the 
consumption of science communication scale (consumption). This measure captures 
people’s engagement with science communication by measuring their consumption behaviour 
around this cultural space.  
 
 
Age (age), level of educational attainment (education), and spirituality (spirituality) were 




documented in the literature (e.g., Cremer et al., 2010; Hirsh & Tree, 2001; Rosenzweig, 
1964). Spirituality was included to capture other cultural values that might be associated with 
awe (e.g., Krause & Hayward, 2015; Sundararajan, 2002; Van Cappellen & Saroglou, 2012). 
Religiosity was not included as it is correlated highly with spirituality (ρ = 0.64, p < 0.01). 
Despite being ordinal factors, level of educational attainment and level of spirituality were 
treated as continuous variables to simplify interpretation. This is common practice in social 
science research and can be justified statistically in many situations, particularly when there 
are no major differences between the model with factors and the model with a continuous 
variable (Pasta, 2009). Other demographic factors such as gender, ethnicity, and political 
orientation were not included, to streamline the analysis. Table 6.3 presents the descriptive 
statistics and correlations of all variables. As expected, simulation and idiosyncratic 
responses, as well as linguistic and stereotypical show a high level of correlation.  
 
Table 6.3 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations with Confidence Intervals of Variables (n = 259) 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. stereotypical 2.96 1.51               
2. idiosyncratic 1.58 1.86 -0.09             
      [-.21, .03]             
3. linguistic 3.23 1.8 .68** -0.07           
      [.61, .74] [-.19, .05]           
4. simulated 4.53 3.39 0.03 .67** -.28**         
      [-.09, .15] [.60, .73] [-.39, -.16]         
5. consumption 2.81 0.8 -0.11 0.04 -0.13 0.08       
      [-.23, .02] [-.09, .16] [-.25, -.01] [-.05, .20]       
6. age 38.35 12.16 0.02 0.07 -0.14 0.17 -0.01     
      [-.10, .14] [-.05, .19] [-.26, -.02] [.04, .28] [-.13, .11]     
7. education 2.5 0.9 -0.07 0.12 -0.06 0.03 .29** .15*   
      [-.19, .06] [-.00, .24] [-.18, .06] [-.09, .15] [.17, .40] [.03, .27]   
8. spirituality 2.81 1.54 -0.1 0.03 -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 .25** -0.01  
    [-.22, .02] [-.09, .15] [-.24, .00] [-.18, .06] [-.13, .11] [.14, .36] [-.13, .11] 
Pearson’s correlations with p values adjusted for multiple comparisons using Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979).  
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
 
6.3.6. Intercoder reliability 
A second coder and I went through all the cue-response pairs, classifying them using the 
coding scheme. The coder attended a two-hour-long training session where we went through 
each of the categories and practised using various examples. The coder then received an excel 
spreadsheet with all unique responses to the word ‘awe’ and the instructions of how-to code 
for these (appendix S). The coder was instructed to only use one code for each category. 




during coding. Intercoder reliability assessment for the response type categorization was 
substantial (Cohen’s k = 0.62) (Landis & Koch, 1977). Diverging codes were resolved 
through consensus during a final debriefing session.  
 
6.3.7. Results and discussion 
To test the proposed hypotheses, where people with different levels of consumption of 
science communication exhibit different levels of production of responses from the language 
and simulation systems, I performed regression analysis for count data (positive integer, 
positively skewed distributions, and relatively infrequent discrete events) using the ‘stats’ 
package in R (R Core Team, 2013). The analysis of count data is usually done using the 
family of regressions that assume Poisson or negative binomial distributions (Coxe et al., 
2009). Poisson regression is used when the mean and variance are assumed equal or close to 
equal. In cases when this assumption did not hold, I used a negative binomial regression.  
 
Table 6.4 shows the results of regressions on the four measures. Stereotypical, idiosyncratic, 
and simulated responses were not significantly related to the consumption of science 
communication (b = -0.6, SE = .05, p = 0.205), (b = 0.0005, SE = .09, p = 0.99), (b = 0.08, SE 
= .06, p = 0.21) respectively, although the direction of the coefficients is consistent with my 
prediction.  
 
The model for linguistic responses suggests a small yet significant effect on this variable by 
people who consume science communication, who overall produced fewer linguistic 
responses (b = -0.09, SE = .05, p = 0.044). This result suggests that those who consume more 
science communication rely less on their language system to conceptualize awe.  
 
The consumption variable only shows significant effects in the model for linguistic 
responses. The incidence rate ratio for this model predicts that a unit increase in the 
consumption of science communication scale produces a 9% decrease in the number of 
linguistic responses. Keeping everything else constant, the model predicts that a person with 
the highest possible score in the consumption of science communication scale (i.e., cons = 5) 
produces 1.52 fewer linguistic responses than a person who does not engage with science 




activation of the representational systems when conceptualizing ‘awe’ by people with 
different degrees of engagement with science communication.  
 
Table 6.4 
Results of Multiple Regression Analysis (n=259)  
Stereotypical Responses - Poisson 
Predictor Estimate SE Exp(b) 95% CI, Exp(b) 
Intercept 1.34** 0.19 3.81 2.65 – 5.48 
consumption -0.06 0.05 0.94 0.86 – 1.03 
age 0 0 1 1.00 – 1.01 
education -0.03 0.04 0.97 0.89 – 1.06 
spirituality -0.04 0.02 0.96 0.92 – 1.01 
Idiosyncratic Responses - Negative binomial 
Intercept -0.15 0.36 0.87 0.44 – 1.71 
consumption 0 0.09 1 0.84 – 1.19 
age 0 0.01 1 0.99 – 1.02 
education 0.14 0.08 1.15 0.99 – 1.35 
spirituality 0.01 0.05 1.01 0.92 – 1.11 
Linguistic Responses - Poisson 
Intercept 1.74** 0.18 5.68 4.01 – 8.05 
consumption -0.09* 0.05 0.91 0.84 – 1.00 
age -0.01 0 0.99 0.99 – 1.00 
education 0 0.04 1 0.92 – 1.08 
spirituality -0.03 0.02 0.97 0.92 – 1.01 
Simulated responses - Negative binomial 
Intercept 1.01 0.25 2.76 1.70 – 4.47 
consumption 0.08 0.06 1.08 0.96 – 1.22 
age 0.01** 0 1.01 1.00 – 1.02 
education -0.01 0.06 0.99 0.88 – 1.10 
spirituality -0.06 0.03 0.94 0.88 – 1.00 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
Importantly, the LASS (Barsalou et al., 2008) suggests that in the first few seconds of 
activity, people use the language system to produce a quick heuristic response to a word 
association. After a few seconds (~7.5s), the simulation activates, and people begin to 
represent entity, external, and introspective features of a category. As figure 6.1 shows, the 
first two associates produced by most participants were linguistic responses. The 
aforementioned results suggest that those who consume more science communication and 
produce less linguistic responses are activating their simulation system earlier than those who 





However, from the third response onward, most participants produced more simulated than 
linguistic responses. Considering that, on average, participants took 7.8 seconds to write a 
word, by around the 15-second mark, most participants were already producing associates 
using a simulation of awe. The long generations period (i.e., 60 seconds) gave all participants 
enough time to produce all sorts of responses irrespective of their relationship to science 
communication. That most participants produced both stereotypical and idiosyncratic 
responses is indicative of the prevalence of the word ‘awe’ in the broader culture and people 
generally having had some personal experience with this emotional category. To tackle these 
issues, study 2 repeats this study but with a shorter time frame (i.e., 15 seconds).  
Figure 0.1 
 
6.4. Study 2 - Simulated vs linguistic responses in word association (15 seconds) 
Study 2 repeats the first study using the same procedure but giving participants a shorter time 
frame to produce word associations (15 seconds). A different and larger convenience sample 
was drawn from MTurk, and the same two hypotheses were tested. My goal was again to test 
whether people’s processing abilities in the conceptualization of awe are a function of their 
level of engagement with science communication.  
 
6.4.1. Procedure 
The procedure was identical to study 1, with the one difference that participants had fifteen 







A new sample of five hundred and eight (N = 508) participants was recruited in the month of 
May 2020 through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in exchange for 0.75USD compensation. All 
participants were based in the United States, over 18 years of age, and native English 
speakers. I used the same four a priori criteria to exclude 115 participants from the final 
sample for analysis.  
 
1)Participants who failed the honesty question (25 exclusions) 
2)Participants who did not follow instructions (72 exclusions)  
3)Participants who produced careless responses to the consumption of science 
communication scale (below 5 percentile IRV scores) (18 responses) 
4)Extreme response outliers: No participants were excluded as extreme outliers (3*IQR for 
total responses).  
 
Three hundred and ninety-three participants remained after the exclusions were applied. 
Table 6.5 shows the demographic characteristics of the final sample.  
 
Table 6.5 
Demographic Characteristics of Participants (n=393) 
Baseline characteristic n % 
Gender   
  female 184 46.8 
  male 208 52.9 
  other 1 0.3 
Education Attainment   
  Some high school  3 0.8 
  High school diploma or equivalent 34 8.65 
  Some college 93 23.7 
  Bachelor’s degree or equivalent 184 46.8 
  Master’s degree or equivalent 65 16.5 
  Doctoral or professional degree 14 3.56 
Ethnicity   
  African American or black 43 10.9 
  Hispanic, Latin American or Latinx 34 8.65 
  White or European American 274 69.7 







6.4.3. Ethical considerations 
This study was approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Otago 
#D20/152 (appendix T). 
 
6.4.4. Materials 
Participants performed the continued word association task with the same practice (‘ferry’, 
‘toaster’), target (‘awe’), and filler (‘rebound’) words for 15 seconds for each word. They 
then responded to the 10-item survey on public perceptions of science (Füchslin et al., 2018), 
the consumption of science communication scale, the spirituality and religiosity test, and the 




All words were again manually standardized following the same procedure as in the previous 
study97. After processing there were a total of 1434 tokens and 418 types. 
 
 
Of the 418 types produced as responses to the word ‘awe’ in this new study, 190 were 
different from those in the previous study. I coded these new cue-pair responses following the 
simplified version of the taxonomy used in the previous section. Given that more than half of 
the types (228) had already been coded in the previous section, a second coder was not 
required to perform intercoder reliability checks.  
 
 
I tested the hypothesis with the same four independent variables stereotypical 
(stereotypical), idiosyncratic (idiosyncratic), linguistic (linguistic), and simulated 
(simulated) responses. The main dependent variable was again the score from the 
consumption of science communication scale (consumption) and the covariates were age 
 
97 All words were turned into lowercase. Then all the last responses a person produced where the meaning was impossible to deduce were 
removed (51 words). A person’s last response where the meaning could be determined was completed (34 words). Spelling was corrected 
when the word was obvious following American spelling based on the Merriam Webster Dictionary (38 words). Numbers were turned into 
word form (1 word). Indefinite or definite articles were removed (1 word). Prepositions ‘of’ and ‘in’ was removed (2 words). Adjective noun 
strings were separated (2 words). Strings joined by a coordinating conjunction (and, but, or) were separated (1 word). Spaces and hyphens 




(age), level of education (education), and spirituality (spirituality). Table 6.6 shows the 
descriptive and correlations of the dependent, independent, and covariates variables.  
 
Table 6.6 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations with Confidence Intervals of Variables (n = 393) 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. stereotypical 1.48 1.12               
2. idiosyncratic 0.69 0.94 -.29**             
      [-.38, -.20]             
3. linguistic 2.06 1.33 .74** -.18**           
      [.70, .78] [-.27, -.08]           
4. simulated 1.57 1.5 -.13 .57** -.31**         
      [-.23, -.04] [.50, .63] [-.40, -.22]         
5. consumption 2.93 0.87 -0.12 0.06 -0.14 0.03       
      [-.22, -.02] [-.04, .15] [-.24, -.04] [-.07, .13]       
6. age 36.6 11.65 -.14 -0.06 -.20** -0.04 -0.08     
      [-.23, -.04] [-.15, .04] [-.29, -.10] [-.14, .06] [-.18, .01]     
7. education 3.8 0.96 0.06 -0.01 0 0.04 0.26** 0.09   
      [-.04, .15] [-.11, .09] [-.10, .10] [-.05, .14] [.16, .35] [-.01, .19]   
8. spirituality 2.83 1.44 -.20** 0 -.21** -0.03 0.12 0.14 0.03 
     [-.29, -.10] [-.10, .09] [-.30, -.11] [-.13, .07] [.02, .22] [.05, .24] [-.07, .13] 
Pearson’s correlations with p values adjusted for multiple comparisons using Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979). 
 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
 
6.4.6. Results and discussion 
I tested the same hypotheses as in the first study of this chapter using regression analysis for 
count variables using the ‘stats’ package in R (R Core Team, 2013). Table 6.7 shows the 
result of the regressions for stereotypical, idiosyncratic, linguistic, and simulated responses. 
The results show that people who engage more with science communication produced overall 
fewer stereotypical (b = -0.12, SE = .05, p = 0.015) and linguistic (b = -0.12, SE =.04, p = 
0.007) responses for the word ‘awe’. Figure 6.2 shows the decrease in linguistic responses as 
a function of an increase in the consumption of science communication scale. As in the 
previous study, these small but significant effects suggest a differentiated activation of the 
linguistic system for the different levels of engagement with science communication, with 
those who engage more with this cultural space using this system less to construct a mental 









Results of Multiple Regression Analysis (n=393)  
Stereotypical Responses - Poisson 
Predictor Estimate SE Exp(b) 95% CI, Exp(b) 
Intercept 0.98** 0.24 2.66 1.67 – 4.25 
consumption -0.12* 0.05 0.88 0.80 – 0.98 
age -0.01* 0 0.99 0.98 – 1.00 
education 0.09 0.04 1.09 1.00 – 1.19 
spirituality -0.09** 0.03 0.92 0.87 – 0.97 
Idiosyncratic Responses - Negative binomial 
Intercept -0.29 0.39 0.75 0.34 – 1.61 
consumption 0.09 0.08 1.1 0.94 – 1.29 
age -0.01 0.01 0.99 0.98 – 1.01 
education -0.03 0.07 0.97 0.84 – 1.12 
spirituality -0.01 0.05 0.99 0.90 – 1.09 
Linguistic Responses - Poisson 
Intercept 1.5** 0.2 4.5 3.03 – 6.68 
consumption -0.12** 0.04 0.89 0.82 – 0.97 
age -0.01** 0 0.99 0.98 – 0.99 
education 0.04 0.04 1.04 0.97 – 1.13 
spirituality -0.07** 0.03 0.93 0.89 – 0.98 
Simulated responses - Negative binomial 
Intercept 0.38 0.28 1.46 0.84 – 2.51 
consumption 0.02 0.06 1.02 0.91 – 1.14 
age 0 0 1 0.99 – 1.01 
education 0.05 0.05 1.05 0.94 – 1.16 





However, as in the previous study, there was no relation between simulated and idiosyncratic 




were able to generate simulated (and idiosyncratic) responses in this shorter time frame. 
Considering that word association privilege the activation of the linguistic system (e.g., Wu 
& Barsalou, 2009), the 15-second time frame might have not been long enough to allow 
many participants to generate a full simulation and write down the words related to this 
representational system. In contrast to the previous study where the long response time gave 
all participants enough time to activate their simulation systems, this study didn’t give 
participants enough time to generate responses using this representational system. This might 
explain why despite the differentiated activation of the linguistic system for the different 
levels of consumption of science communication there were no differences in the activation 
of the simulation to represent ‘awe’.  
 Figure 0.3 
 
  
The results of the first two studies show important differences in the conceptual processing 
by people with different degrees of engagement with science communication. The data from 
both studies offers evidence that people who participate in this cultural space use their 
linguistic representational system less in their conceptualization of awe. Importantly, the 
effects for linguistic responses in the second study were more robust than those in the first 
study. Considering that the word association task privileges early linguistic responses over 
simulated (Wu & Barsalou, 2009) and that linguistic processing is done faster than the 
simulation (Santos et al., 2011), these results indicate that those who participate in the culture 
of science communication were jumping the early stages of processing using these shallow 
representations and engaging directly with the simulation. Assuming that the responses from 




heuristics for a deeper and richer conceptualization through the simulation system (Barsalou 
et al., 2008), the differences in activation suggest that those who engage with science 
communication have developed the conceptual skill to represent this emotion category by not 
relying on the linguistic system. I argue that these differences are the result of having 
encountered this emotion category more often while navigating the culture of science 
communication; a cultural space where this emotion is valued and often represented (see the 
previous chapter).  
 
6.5. Study 3 - Natural kind responses 
Conceptual skills should also manifest in specialized content knowledge tailored to the 
experiences in the specific domain where these occur (e.g., K. E. Johnson & Mervis, 1997). 
Because some types of awe represented in science communication are tied to the cultural 
mandates of naturalism and environmentalism (see Pigliucci, 2006, Sideris, 2017), the 
content of people’s representation of this emotion in this space should reflect that interest in 
the natural world. Hence in this study, I test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: People who engage more with the culture of science communication will 
produce more natural kind responses to the cue word ‘awe’.  
 
6.5.1. Sample 
The study uses the word association norms from studies 1 (n = 259) and 2 (n = 393).  
 
6.5.2. Materials - Natural kind categorization 
All responses to the cue ‘awe’ were coded through content analysis using a dichotomous 
classification based on whether these words referred to natural kinds (1) or not (0). I use a 
traditional definition of natural kinds which makes the distinction between natural occurring 
objects and human-made artefacts (Gelman, 1988). This definition includes both living 
agents and non-living objects such as rabbits, roots, mountains, and rainbows.  
 
6.5.3. Intercoder reliability 
A second coder went through all the 653 types produced by participants in study 1 and 
classified them as either natural kind or not using the instructions (appendix U). Intercoder 




Disagreements were resolved through consensus during the debrief session. The 190 unique 
types of study 2 were coded only by me.  
 
6.5.4. Procedure 
Every natural kind response made by every participant was summed up as a score (natural) 
which was then used as the dependent variable in count data regression analyses. The score 
from the consumption of science communication scale was the main independent variable, 
while age, education, and spirituality, were included as covariates. Table 6.8 and table 6.9 
show the descriptive statistics for natural kind responses and its correlation to the other 
variables for both datasets respectively.  
 
Table 6.8 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations with Confidence Intervals of Variable Nature (n = 259) 
Variable M SD cons age edu spi 
natural 1.04 2.09 0.09 0.13 -0.01 0.03 
   [-.03, .21] [.01, .25] [-.13, .11] [-.09, .16] 
Pearson’s correlations with p values adjusted for multiple comparisons using Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979).  
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
 
Table 6.9 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations with Confidence Intervals of Variable Nature (n = 393) 
Variable M SD cons age edu spi 
natural 0.33 0.8 -0.02 0.02 0.03 -.14* 
   [-.12, .08] [-.08, .12] [-.07, .13] [-.24, -.04] 
Pearson’s correlations with p values adjusted for multiple comparisons using Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979).  
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
 
In both studies, most participants did not produce any natural kind responses (figures 6.4 and 
6.5). In situations when there are excess zeros in count data, two-part models such as the 
hurdle model are recommended (Mullahy, 1986). Hurdle models assume that there are two 
processes in people’s behaviour: one modelling zeros and another modelling non-zero counts. 
The former frequently uses a binomial logistic distribution while the latter typically follows a 
Poisson or a negative binomial distribution to model the positive counts (Loeys et al., 2012). 
I chose the hurdle model because all participants have the potential of producing non-zero 
counts, meaning that there are no structural zeros. Moreover, I assumed that there are two 
independent processes occurring during the task. First, there is a process through which a 
person represents ‘awe’ by activating a situated simulation that includes a natural kind. After 
constructing this particular awe situation (i.e., passing the hurdle), the construction of related 




Barsalou et al., 2008). Thus, the first step captures the ability to conceptualize ‘awe’ using 
natural kinds and the second suggests the intensity and depth of the process. These two, I 
assume, are a function of the number of experiences that a person has had with such objects 
in situations. I will use the same main independent variable (i.e., consumption) and covariates 











6.5.5. Results and discussion 
Table 6.10 and table 6.11 show the results for the negative binomial hurdle model for natural 
kind responses. The results from the zero-hurdle model indicate that consumption of science 
communication doesn’t increase the odds of producing a natural kind response. One thing 
worth noticing at this point is that a few participants read the word awe as its homophone, the 
interjection ‘aw’.98 This word has a very different connotation as it is used to express feelings 
of sympathy, cuteness, and disappointment (Oxford University Press, n.d.-b). As a result, a 
few participants produced associates such as ‘puppy’, ‘cat’, and other natural kind responses 
which are not stereotypically related to the emotion ‘awe’, but which are associated with this 
homophone. Because some of these participants read the word both as ‘awe’ and ‘aw’ it was 
unreasonable to remove them from the sample. However, keeping all the participants who 
read ‘awe’ as ‘aw’ might have created the situation where people who do not consume 
science communication still produce natural kind responses without necessarily representing 
the targeted emotion category.  
 
Table 6.10 
Results of Regression Analysis for Variable Nature (n=259) 
Natural kind responses - Negative binomial hurdle modelab 
Zero-hurdle model 
Predictor Estimate SE Exp(b) 95% CI, Exp(b) 
Intercept -0.62 0.66 0.54 0.15 – 1.97 
consumption -0.03 0.17 0.97 0.69 – 1.35 
age 0.01 0.01 1.01 0.99 – 1.04 
education -0.01 0.15 0.99 0.73 – 1.33 
spirituality -0.12 0.09 0.89 0.75 – 1.06 
Count model 
Intercept -1.74 0.96 0.18 0.03 – 1.16 
consumption 0.5* 0.21 1.65 1.10 – 2.46 
age 0.02 0.01 1.02 0.99 – 1.05 
education -0.2 0.17 0.82 0.59 – 1.14 
spirituality 0.06 0.11 1.06 0.85 – 1.31 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
a Comparison of predicted zeros of Poisson regression 124 against the actual zeros 162 suggests zero inflation. 




98 It is hard to tell how many participants read ‘awe’ as ‘aw’. For example, 17 participants from the first study produced the association ‘cute’, 
a word stereotypically related to the conjunction ‘aw’. However, most of these participants who produced associates such as ‘cute’, ‘baby’, or 
‘puppy’ also produced words such as ‘amazement’, ‘wonder’, ‘some’, and ‘struck’, suggesting that many of these interpreted ‘awe’ both as 





Results of Regression Analysis for Variable Nature (n=393) 
Natural kind responses - Poisson hurdle modelab 
Zero-hurdle model 
Predictor Estimate SE Exp(b) 95% CI, Exp(b) 
Intercept -0.78 0.74 0.46 0.11 – 1.95 
consumption -0.26 0.16 0.77 0.56 – 1.06 
age 0.01 0.01 1.01 0.98 – 1.03 
education 0.16 0.14 1.17 0.89 – 1.54 
spirituality -0.27** 0.1 0.76 0.63 – 0.92 
Count model 
Intercept -1 0.76 0.37 0.08 – 1.62 
consumption 0.4* 0.17 1.48 1.07 – 2.05 
age 0.01 0.01 1.01 0.99 – 1.03 
education -0.06 0.14 0.94 0.71 – 1.25 
spirituality -0.1 0.1 0.91 0.75 – 1.10 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
a Comparison of predicted zeros of Poisson regression 286 against the actual zeros 317 suggests zero inflation. 
b Likelihood ratio test comparing Poisson and negative binomial hurdle models (χ2 (1) = 0.833, p = 0.361). 
 
Nonetheless, among those who produced natural kind responses, consuming science 
communication increased their chances of producing yet more natural kind responses in both 
studies. As the results from the count model in both studies show, the intensity of the 
representations of awe through natural kind responses is a function of the participants’ 
engagement with science communication. For example, one participant with a high level of 
consumption of science communication produced the following associates one after the other 
‘black hole’, ‘neutron star’, ‘uy scuti’99, ‘space’, and ‘universe’; natural kind responses 
related to space. I can safely assume that this person was simulating one situation (e.g., sitting 
in a planetarium, going to a science museum, watching a science documentary) where these 
objects are contextually correlated, meaning that the content of his representation with this 
emotion was mediated by his experiences in this cultural space. While trivial, these results 
indicate that people who participate in the culture of science communication construct richer 
representations of awe using natural kinds.  
 
Such representations are tied to the cultural mandates of naturalism and environmentalism at 
the centre of much of this cultural space (e.g., Sideris, 2017). As experts show specialized 
knowledge of the domains in which they participate (e.g., Tanaka & Taylor, 1991) these 
results suggest that those with more exposure to science communication are more skilled at 
 




conceptualizing ‘awe’ using this specific type of content knowledge. I argue that this has 
been learned in this cultural space.  
 
In the following two studies, I investigate this dataset further, looking for both quantitative 
and qualitative differences in the production norms from participants with different levels of 
engagement with science communication.  
 
6.6. Study 4 - Concreteness and perceptual strength of responses  
Concreteness ratings were developed in the 1960s (Paivio et al., 1968) to capture the degree 
to which a word refers to an object which can be perceived through the traditional 
exteroceptive senses (i.e., sight, sound, taste, smell, and touch). These are usually generated 
by group norming procedures whereby participants are asked to rate on Likert-style scales 
batteries of words (e.g., Brysbaert et al., 2014). These are commonly used in the grounded 
cognition literature where conceptual processes are understood to be partially grounded in 
perception (e.g., Connell & Lynott, 2012; Harpaintner et al., 2018).  
 
Concreteness measures have also been used in studies using word association tasks. Many of 
these studies compare the effects of cue concreteness on response production. For example, 
de Groot (1989) observed how concrete cues elicited quicker association, produced more 
total responses, and these were more homogenous. Fewer studies, however, have looked at 
the concreteness of responses. Van Rensberger et al. (2015) observed a correlation between 
the concreteness of a word and the concreteness of the responses. Recently, Mazzuca, Majid 
et al. (2020) compared concreteness ratings of the responses in a free listing task between 
different groups of people (e.g., men/women, normative/non-normative) to the cue ‘gender’.  
 
Concreteness measures, however, have been criticised for their lack of specificity. For 
example, Connell and Lynott (2012) observed how popular concreteness measures related 
positively to olfactory, visual, and haptic ratings, but negatively to auditory and gustatory 
ratings. Consequently, these authors recently compiled their own modality-specific ratings of 
perceptual strength for a large vocabulary of English words (Lynott et al., 2020). Their norms 
not only include the typical five exteroceptive modalities but also incorporate a sixth rating 





Considering how conceptual knowledge is in part grounded in the perceptual modalities 
(Barsalou, 1999), I use the available concreteness and perceptual strength ratings in the 
English language to compare the responses to the cue ‘awe’ made by those who engage and 
those who are disengaged from science communication. As this is only exploratory analysis, 
however, I did not have clear predictions about the directionality and strength of the 
differences in the ratings for the responses.  
 
6.6.1. Sample  
The sample from the first study (n=259) was segmented using Latent Class Analysis (LCA) 
into three segments – the engaged, the interested and the disengaged (appendix V). Table 
6.12 shows the results of the LCA and the attitudinal and demographic differences for the 
three-segment solution. While age shows no difference between groups, there is a wide 
gender and education gap between those who are very engaged with science communication 
and those who do not participate in this cultural space. The engaged are mostly men and 
people with college degrees, while women and people without college degrees make up most 
of the disengaged – characteristics that other studies have documented (e.g., Runge et al., 
2018; Schäfer et al., 2018). Importantly, attitudinal measures towards science were higher, as 
expected, for the engaged than for the other two groups.  
 
Table 6.12 
Totals, Demographic, and Attitudinal Characteristics of Three Segments of Engagement with Science Communication (n=259) 







disengaged 72 528 243 37.1 52.8 36.1 3.8 3.4 2.9 
interested 127 1055 372 39.3 49.6 52 4.3 4.3 3.2 
engaged 60 432 226 37.8 26.7 71.7 4.4 4.7 3.7 
aResponse to the question 'How much do you trust science in general?' (1 = not at all, 5 = a great deal) 
bResponse to the question 'How interested are you in science?' (1 = not at all, 5 = a great deal) 
cResponse to the question 'How much do you agree with the following statement? “Science can sort out any problem.”' (1 = strongly disagree, 
5 = strongly agree) 
 
6.6.2. Materials 
Concreteness and perceptual scores were taken from two of the most extensive norms in the 
English language. First, I used the Brysbaert et al. (2014) concreteness norms for 40,000 
known English lemmas, which were generated in a group norming procedure from more than 
4,000 participants. Second, I used the recently compiled Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms 
(Lynott et al., 2020) collected for six perceptual modalities and five actions. In this section, I 






After grouping the sample into three segments, all the responses produced by the participants 
were tokenized and lemmatized (Anandarajan et al., 2019) using the R packages ‘tidytext’ 
(Silge & Robinson, 2016) and ‘textstem’ (Rinker, 2018). Then I merged the tokens with their 
individual concreteness and perceptual modality ratings taken from the aforementioned 
concreteness and perceptual rating norms (Brysbaert et al., 2014; Lynott et al., 2020). Of the 
2015 tokens in the sample, 52 tokens for 40 types, had no corresponding words in the norms 
list. This included proper nouns (e.g., ‘Jordan’, ‘Jesus’, ‘Grand Canyon’), phrases (‘never 
seen before’, ‘caught off guard’, ‘blown away’, ‘taken aback’), and some words that weren’t 
in the databases (e.g., ‘agape’, ‘ewe’, ‘gobsmacked’). These words were removed from the 
sample. I then used non-parametric analysis100 (i.e., Kruskal Wallis) to compare the mean 
ranks across groups for the concreteness score and the six perceptual modality ratings 
(auditory, gustatory, haptic, interoceptive, olfactory, and visual) for the words produced by 
the three segments. This was done using the ‘stats’ package from R (R Core Team, 2013).  
 
6.6.4. Results and discussion 
The results of the Kruskal Wallis tests are presented in table 6.13. These show differences in 
the mean ranks of the haptic, interoceptive, visual, and concreteness scores of all the 
responses to the word ‘awe’ produced by at least one pair of segments. Post hoc pairwise 
comparisons using Wilcoxon rank sum test with Bonferroni correction were carried out for 
the four pairs of segments. Of particular interest were those which indicate differences 
between the engaged and the disengaged for interoceptive (p = 0.02) and visual scores (p = 
0.006)101.  
 
As the boxplots in figures 6.6 and 6.7 show, the engaged produced words with lower 
interoceptive scores and higher visual scores than the other groups. These results are 
consistent with the results observed in the previous studies. People who engage the most with 
science communication responded with less linguistic associates. Synonyms of awe (e.g., 
wonder, astonishment, amazement), superordinate (e.g., feeling, emotion), and coordinate 
 
100 QQ-plot analysis showed a substantial deviation from a normal distribution for all seven datasets.  
101 Other significant pairwise comparisons include those between the interested and the engaged for haptic ratings (p = 0.02) and concreteness 




(e.g., fear, happiness, joy) categories represent some of the most common responses. All such 
words related to emotion have some of the highest interoceptive scores in the Lancaster 
norms. The results show that people engaged with science communication produced fewer 
words related to emotion, as for the most part, these derive from the language system as word 
associations for ‘awe’. The most engaged participants rather produced words that have on 
average a higher rating for visual scores. This again is consistent with the previous findings 
in which participants with higher levels of consumption produced more natural kind 
responses (e.g., moon, sun, mountain, dog); words that score at the top of the visual ratings of 
the Lancaster norms.  
 
Table 6.13 
Kruskal Wallis Test for Scores of Concreteness and Six Perceptual Variables for Awe Norms Across Groups 
(N=1962) 
Score df χ2 p 
Auditory 2 1.69 0.429 
Gustatory 2 2.66 0.264 
Haptic 2 8.10 0.017* 
Interoceptive 2 14.902 <0.001** 
Olfactory 2 2.99 0.224 
Visual 2 9.42 0.009** 
Concreteness 2 7.48 0.024* 










Another interpretation of these results may also involve different foci of attention in the 
representation of awe by people with different levels of relationship to science 
communication. Whereas people who aren’t experts in this emotion represent the experiences 
interoceptively, where things like affect, arousal, and other internal sensations are at the 
centre of attentiveness, the emotion experience by those who engage in science 
communication is driven by visual cues, focusing on the shapes, contours, colours, and other 
visual characteristics of the objects and agents present in the awe situation. This overall 
suggests that people with different levels of skill have their attention in different modalities 
during an emotion episode. The importance of the visual system in the representation of awe 
suggests a potential mechanism through which affective relations with particular objects and 
agents related to science are established.  
 
6.7. Study 5 - Psychological proximity analysis 
One characteristic of knowledge is that it is organized in a relatively stable structure in long 
term memory (for reviews see Murphy, 2004; E. E. Smith & Medin, 1981). The structure of 
people’s conceptual knowledge can be studied by looking at the order and frequency of 
responses in production tasks. For example, stereotypical and linguistic responses tend to be 
produced early during the task and cluster together, while the opposite occurs for 




psychological proximity of a response in production tasks have been developed based on 
their proximity to other words made by a participant and their global frequency (Crowe & 
Prescott, 2003). These measures can then be used to organize the relationships between 
responses and represent the structure of knowledge of a particular category.  
 
Looking not only at the processing ability and content of people’s mental representation of 
awe but also at the thematic structure of the knowledge surrounding this emotion category 
could reveal something about how other categories are related to it. More importantly, 
comparing the structure of knowledge of different groups could reveal other distinguishing 
features of people with different degrees of experience. In this last study, I cluster the 
measures of psychological proximity of the responses to the word association task for the 
word ‘awe’ to evaluate the structure of stereotypical knowledge for this emotion and compare 




The sample came from the participants from the first study (n = 259) segmented in the 
previous section as the disengaged (n = 72) and the engaged (n = 60) using Latent Class 
Analysis (LCA).102 
 
6.7.2. Materials  
The inter-item similarity metric was developed by Crowe and Prescott (2003) to measure the 
psychological distance between words in a production task. This measure is composed of two 
components a and ßw, where a is the proximity score inside the list and ßw is a measure of its 
frequency across lists. The final similarity score is defined as abw and was calculated in R 
using the script from Mazzuca Majid et al. (2020).  
 
6.7.3. Procedure 
As in the previous study, the production norms were lemmatized (Anandarajan et al., 2019) 
using the R package ‘textstem’ (Rinker, 2018). Then I followed the procedure used by 
Mazzuca (2020) and Mazzuca, Majid et al. (2020), which was inspired by Crowe and 
 





Prescott (2003), to produce word clusters for two datasets: one production norms from the 
disengaged and the other for the engaged. I began by calculating the inter-item similarity 
metric for each word in the two datasets. I then tested the clusterability of the datasets using 
Hopkins’ statistic. A score over 0.5 suggests that the dataset can be clustered (Banerjee & 
Dave, 2004). After making sure the data could be grouped, I calculated four indices (C, 
Dunn, McClain and Silhouette) to determine the best number of clusters for each database. 
Finally, I employed hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) on the data using Ward’s 
agglomerative method (Murtagh & Legendre, 2014) results of which were visualized in 
dendrograms. For these procedures, I used the R packages ‘factorextra’ (Kassambara & 
Mundt, 2017), ‘NBClust’ (Charrad et al., 2014), and ‘dendextend’ (Galili, 2015) and the 
scripts from Mazzuca, Majid et al. (2020).  
 
6.7.4. Results and discussion 
Hopkins’ statistic for the similarity ratings for the word associations produced by at least 5% 
of engaged and disengaged participants indicate the clusterability of both datasets (H = 
0.563) and (H = 0.542) respectively. The Dunn and McClain indices for both clusters indicate 
a two-cluster solution while C and Silhouette suggest a six-cluster solution. I chose the two-
cluster solution as it was more parsimonious. Figure 6.8 shows results in dendrograms with 
the clusters in different colours for both engaged and disengaged participants.  
 
Contrasting these two visualizations qualitatively, two things are worth noting. First, the 
number of responses for both segments had different counts (33 words engaged, 29 words 
disengaged) and both lists only share 16 words in common. Most of the differences in the 
norms produced by the engaged and the disengaged refer to external objects. The disengaged 
produced five words that stand for external objects (‘god’, ‘baby’, ‘nature’, ‘firework’, and 
‘sunset’), categories which correspond to prototypical objects said to elicit ‘awe’ in a variety 
of different domains (e.g., religious, familial, environmental). By contrast, the engaged 
produced ten words that stand for external objects, most of which can be directly associated 
with the culture of science communication (‘planet’, ‘star’, ‘mountain’, ‘life’, ‘animal’, 
‘universe’, ‘ocean’, ‘nature’). These differences in content highlight the differences in the 








Most importantly, the results of the clustering indicate that the structure of knowledge of awe 
is different for both groups. The clusters of the disengaged don’t cohere thematically. By 
contrast, the engaged seem to have a differentiated structure for a particular type of awe 
around situations connected to science communication. This is most evidenced in the second 
cluster (red) which includes all the external objects related to this cultural space. Importantly 
these words are accompanied by the most frequent word produced by all participants (i.e., 
‘wonder’). This organization of all the external objects around the word ‘wonder’ in one 
particular cluster shows the weight given to the knowledge related to the culture of science 
communication in their overall structure for the emotion category awe.  
 
The content and structure of knowledge observed in the engaged point towards a 
differentiated degree of experience with this emotion (Hoemann, Nielson et al., 2020): first, 
they have a more differentiated knowledge structure; second, their categories are efficiently 
organized around a particular domain where this emotion is experienced; and third, there is a 
level of specific domain knowledge corresponding to the objects encountered in the culture of 
science communication. By contrast, the structure of the knowledge for the disengaged is 
rather disorganized, with stereotypical responses reflecting a degree of general knowledge 
Figure 6.8 






received from participating in the broad culture of English speakers, but not specific to any 
particular subcultural space. These differences in the structure of the associations produced to 
the cue ‘awe’ support the overall thesis of this chapter, where the engaged have a higher 
degree of conceptual skill with this emotion category.  
 
6.8. General discussion  
Through the word association paradigm, I tested whether there are differences in the 
processing, content, and structure of knowledge of the emotion category awe in people with 
different degrees of engagement with the culture of science communication. First, I found 
some differences in the activation of the different representational systems. Studies 1 and 2 
produced evidence that people who engage with this cultural space rely less on their 
linguistic system for the representation of this emotion category. I also presented some 
evidence in studies 3 and 5 that the engaged produce more content pertaining to the specific 
domain of science communication. Importantly this content (i.e., natural kind responses) is in 
line with the cultural mandates of naturalism and environmentalism present in this cultural 
space. There was some weaker evidence that higher engagement with science communication 
produces more responses with a higher measure for visual and less interoceptive strength 
(study 4). This result suggests there might be a differentiated foci of attention related to the 
visual system in the kind of experiences of awe that people encounter in this cultural space. 
Finally, in study 5, I found qualitative differences in the structure of knowledge around awe, 
whereby the disengaged produced broad and disorganized stereotypical responses while 
engaged participants organized their emotion knowledge around the domain of science 
communication.  
 
Overall, these studies provide some credence to the idea that people who engage with science 
communication are more skilled in conceptualizing awe. These differences in the activation 
of the representational system, content knowledge, and structure indicate that people who 
participate through consumption activities in this cultural space may be learning increasingly 
sophisticated ways of conceptualizing this emotion. In going to science museums, watching 
science documentaries, reading about science online, and many other forms of interaction 
with this culture, people increasingly experience situations where this emotion category is 
present; acquiring the content knowledge through which they can constitute the mental 




language-driven heuristic to represent this emotion, get better at simulating it, associate it 
more with distinct cultural mandates, and organize its representation in relation to the 
domains in which it is encountered. Together, these findings suggest that people are learning 
knowledge of this emotion in their engagement with science communication, and they get 
better at its conceptualization with repeated interaction.  
 
6.9. Limitations 
The studies reported here suffer from multiple limitations. First, they do not allow for 
comparisons to be made between awe and other categories. Other factors that explain the 
differences observed might have been occluded as a result. This same design shortcoming 
makes it a correlational report, weakening any causal claims. The results can also be 
interpreted as saying that people who use their linguistic system less, or who structure their 
knowledge of awe better, are more interested in science. The classical views of this emotion 
could potentially claim this sort of directionality (e.g., Gottlieb et al., 2018). My 
interpretation here, however, is based on the theoretical framework to which I subscribe and 
the increasing evidence that supports this view (Barrett, 2017a). Future work should use 
strategies adhering to controlled experimental designs to test causal hypotheses that lie at the 
heart of this analysis.  
 
A second issue arises as a result of the context where the task took place and the task itself. 
The MTurk contributors who participated in this study were all sitting in front of a screen 
typing words on a keyboard. Moreover, the demands of the word association task are very 
specific and contrived. These environmental and task constraints put a lot of limitations as to 
the potential to best capture differences in conceptual knowledge and skill. The situated 
conceptualization view assumes that concepts take functional forms related to the context and 
task at hand (e.g., Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). More importantly, experts are better at 
creating mental representations that suit the functional needs of a situation (Hoemann, 
Nielson et al., 2020). This means that there is potentially an opposite effect of expertise in 
this kind of task, whereby experts would be better at simulating responses that conform to the 
simplicity of the task requirements and setting. It is then somewhat surprising that I found 
some effects in the expected direction for the differences in engagement. More importantly, 




effect of expertise on conceptualization. Disentangling the sources of these effects is a task 
for future study designs.  
 
A third issue arises from the sampling of the participants and controls used. While MTurk 
samples have shown some reliability (Buhrmester et al., 2016), there are growing concerns 
about the data quality produced through these platforms (e.g., Newman et al., 2021). Despite 
various screening criteria used the results might have been muddled by inattentive and 
careless responses. More importantly, the sample was taken exclusively from the United 
States. Generalizations to another English speaking context such as Aotearoa New Zealand 
should be prudent. Similarly, the study only controlled for age, education, and spirituality. A 
larger sample would have allowed us to control for other cultural factors such as ethnicity, 
religion, and socioeconomic status, which could also have some influence on how people 
represent ‘awe’. While the results presented in this chapter suggest that the consumption of 
science communication influences someone’s ability to conceptualize ‘awe’, many other 
cultural factors could be at play.  
 
Importantly for the area of science communication, this study did not look at the many 
nuances in the conceptualization of awe considering the diversity of subcultural spaces within 
this domain and their many mandates. People engaged with science communication have 
different interests and consume different media. For example, someone interested in 
astronomy and museum exhibits will interact with different varieties of awe from someone 
who cares mostly about conservation and watches nature documentaries; spaces where they 
will encounter different awe types in accord with the cultural mandates within the various 
subdisciplines and media formats (see chapters 3 and 4). Coding the responses for specific 
aspects of science (e.g., astronomical objects, lab equipment, animals) or getting a more 
detailed sense of consumption preferences might have contributed to disentangling the 
diversity of people’s experiences in science communication. Unfortunately, the sample sizes 
and questionnaires used did not allow for this level of detail.  
 
6.10. Conclusion and future directions 
Although exploratory, the results of these studies suggest that those engaged with the culture 
of science communication are more skilled in representing awe. Future studies can prepare 




future work can also take advantage of techniques such as virtual reality (Chirico et al., 2018) 
and experience sampling methods (Conner & Mehl, 2015) to assess the representation of 
emotion in a variety of settings. Additionally, future work can take advantage of the many 
instruments that capture people’s relationship to science and science communication (e.g., 
Jones et al., 2020; Nadelson et al., 2014) to get a more nuanced description of the degrees and 
forms in which people engage with this cultural space.  
 
Moreover, increased skill with emotion categories also brings advantages such as knowing 
more about the situational information that correlates with the presence of the category, 
constructing instantiations of this emotion that better fit the functional needs of a situation, 
and deliberate practice that involves novel opportunities, among other things (Hoemann, 
Nielson et al., 2020). Future work could also potentially test these other manifestations of 
increased skill of awe for the different levels of engagement with science communication. All 
these proposals can be done by comparing the representation of this emotion within the many 
subcultural spaces that exist within and outside science communication. For example, the 
ability to conceptualize awe can be compared for individuals who participate in other cultural 
domains such as tourism (e.g., Coghlan et al., 2012), religious communities (e.g., Krause & 
Hayward, 2015), and the world of art (e.g., Silvia et al., 2015), where this emotion is also 
often represented. Similarly, this kind of test could be replicated in different countries (e.g., 
Aotearoa New Zealand) to trial both the generalizability of the results and capture the many 
subcultural nuances that might arise from people having divergent experiences within these 
national communities. This kind of study can enrich our knowledge both about the existing 
types of awe and the importance of this emotion across different cultural domains. Finally, 
these methods could be further used to study the different emotion types and forms of 
expertise for other emotion categories (e.g., anger, joy, love) in people who participate in 
different cultural spaces (e.g., people from different nationalities, ethnic backgrounds, 
genders, professions, systems of beliefs). These studies could potentially enrich our 
understanding of emotion, moving us further away from natural kind universalist conceptions 





Chapter seven - How do science communicators represent awe? Qualitative analysis of 
interviews with science communicators 
 
7. Introduction 
University engagement officers, NGO researchers, government bureaucrats, multinational PR 
representatives, doctors talking to their patients, journalists writing pieces for magazines and 
newspapers, designers creating infographics to be displayed on billboards, enthusiasts 
organizing citizen science events, people retweeting scientists, and a host of different agents 
communicate science using a diverse set of organizational affiliations, interests, values, 
beliefs, and identities. Nonetheless, with the increasing professionalization of the field, the 
development of communities around different science communication practices, and 
increasing organizational commitments towards science engagement, among other 
developments, many have begun to organize and identify as science communicators (Baram-
Tsabari & Lewenstein, 2017; Davies & Horst, 2016; F. Mellor, 2013). These science 
communicators have a central role in the ecosystem of the culture of science communication 
(Davies & Horst, 2016), producing the social representations that put into motion the 
circulation of shared meanings constituting this cultural space. Such representations encode a 
series of collective meanings that not only include the manifest, on-the-surface, patent 
meanings (e.g., the word ‘planet’ refers to a celestial body of a certain kind), but also the 
values, beliefs, norms, goals, and other forms of latent cultural expressions that lurk beneath 
the surface in discourses, aesthetics, narratives, and other forms of arrangements of 
knowledge (S. Hall et al., 2013).  
 
Of particular importance in how science communicators produce these social representations 
are their histories of participation in the cultures of science communication, science 
education, and all other spaces where they have encountered science and its communication. 
While there has been little research conducted on who the science communicators are, we 
know that they tend to have backgrounds in science and display elevated levels of interest in 
the topic (e.g., Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 2010; Metcalfe & Gascoigne, 2004). Science 
communicators have engaged more than your average person with science and science 
communication throughout their lives, and hence possess enhanced cultural knowledge of 
this space. Such cultural knowledge can be thought of as science communication capital (see 




meanings from their cultural experiences as consumers of science at school, academia, and 
the media, among the many different spaces where they have encountered science and 
science communication. In short, science communicators are experts in the representation of 
the shared meanings that constitute the culture of science communication.  
 
As argued throughout this thesis, the emotion category awe is valued in science 
communication. Little is known, however, about how science communicators contribute to 
the construction and circulation of the representations of this emotion through their 
experiences, beliefs, and practices. The present study responds to this empirical gap by 
investigating how a diverse group of science communicators represent awe in their lives and 
work, specifically by looking into how such individuals talk about this emotion.  
 
Because research on awe has been concerned primarily with questions of universality 
(Cordaro et al., 2018), and has focused on a very narrow sliver of the experience of emotion 
such as appraisals, elicitors, and outcomes (e.g., Shiota et al., 2007; Yaden et al., 2019), most 
work in this area has reduced the richness of this emotion and disregarded many elements of 
the historical and cultural contexts where these are represented – a pattern repeated across 
much of emotion-based research (see Boddice, 2018, 2020a; D. M. Gross & Preston, 2020). 
Our very limited understanding of the contexts in which awe occurs has not given us the 
language to talk about the diversity of forms and functions that this emotion might have in 
relation to these contexts. The poverty of the descriptions of the emotional experience has 
also given us a stunted language that disregards the variety of settings, behaviours, and 
phenomenologies that accompany this emotion, and the relations of these to people’s values, 
goals, beliefs, goals, identities, and the many other aspects of their lives in culture.  
 
Moreover, with a few exceptions (e.g., Bonner & Friedman, 2011; Dobson, 2015), a 
considerable proportion of the work on awe has been done from the quantitative paradigm 
(e.g., A. M. Gordon et al., 2017; Piff et al., 2015). In rejecting the naïve realism of the 
classical view of emotions, and embracing a rather critical ontology, I believe the 
constructionist view of emotion (e.g., Barrett, 2017a; Wilson-Mendenhall, 2017) opens the 
space to new methods that go beyond the correlational (e.g., Gottlieb et al., 2018; e.g., Shiota 
et al., 2007) or the experimental (Danvers & Shiota, 2017; Valdesolo & Graham, 2014). 




considers situational aspects, is aware of the researchers’ own subjective and interpretative 
vantage point, and doesn’t shy away from rich or ‘thick descriptions’ of the phenomena being 
explored (Braun & Clarke, 2013; Geertz, 1973). 
 
Nonetheless, the constructionist view of emotions takes ontological and epistemological 
positions that make it incompatible with some qualitative methodologies, such as discourse 
analysis or grounded methods (for descriptions of these and other methods, see Braun & 
Clarke, 2013), which come preloaded with considerable philosophical baggage. As such, in 
this chapter I utilize two qualitative methods: qualitative content analysis (QCA) and 
reflexive thematic analysis (RTA) (Braun & Clarke, 2019; Schreier, 2012), neither of which 
make strong commitments to any particular view of the world and are quite flexible in 
accommodating diverse ontological and epistemological perspectives.  
 
The purpose of this study is then to explore how science communicators talk about awe using 
two distinct qualitative methods. I conducted one-on-one semi-structured interviews with a 
diverse group of self-identified science communicators, where I asked them a series of 
questions about their experiences, overall beliefs, and uses of this emotion in their work as 
science communicators.  
 
In the QCA section, I focus on the manifest content of the interviews, using for the most part 
top-down categories derived from the literature review in chapter two (e.g., Keltner and 
Haidt, 2003), the situated conceptualization analytical framework presented in chapter three 
(Barsalou et al., 2018) and the history of awe presented in chapter four (e.g., Burke, 1990). 
Whereas for the most part, this is a deductive, concept-driven approach like in quantitative 
content analysis, QCA opens up the codes in an inductive fashion to potential new levels 
within the categories (Graneheim et al., 2017; Schreier, 2012).  
 
In the second section, I approach the data using RTA to construct larger themes that connect 
the ideas between the different categories in the data. Here I take a rather data-driven 
approach of looking at the data with ‘fresh eyes’ and ‘detach’ myself as much as possible 
from the knowledge that I have acquired throughout my research journey. As I recognize that 
there is no such thing as a purely data-driven approach and that the construction of themes is 




sociocultural reality (Braun & Clarke, 2013), RTA also assumes (although indirectly), a top-
down approach.  
 
This chapter is therefore divided into five sections. First, I present a brief methodological 
overview of both QCA and RTA. I then introduce the preparation stage shared by both 
studies. This includes a reflexive positioning of my experience in the study, the selection and 
sampling of participants, a description of the interview process, and the familiarization with 
the data through transcribing, re-listening, and copious note-taking. The third and fourth 
sections focus on the QCA and RTA parts of the analysis respectively. These sections include 
the research questions, procedures, materials, and results of the analysis. In the last section, I 
briefly discuss the results of the two methods, acknowledge some of the limitations of this 
study, and suggest some future research directions work in this area might take.  
 
7.1. Methodological overview 
The interviews were evaluated using Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) and Reflexive 
Thematic Analysis (RTA). QCA and RTA are similar qualitative methods that are commonly 
used to analyse interview data. These two methods focus on describing social phenomena and 
chunking them into smaller units, whether categories or themes, for analysis (Vaismoradi & 
Snelgrove, 2019). There is enough overlap between these two methods in that they can be 
used sequentially yet are different enough to allow for distinctive levels of interpretation from 
the same data (Vaismoradi & Snelgrove, 2019). QCA is more suited for analysing manifest 
categories that lend themselves to quantitative quality checks, such as reliability controls, 
while RTA is better positioned for exploration, play, and creative construction of latent 
themes from the data in a systematic, rigorous, and thorough process (Braun & Clarke, 2019; 
Schreier, 2012).  
 
QCA is a research method derived from quantitative content analysis and is used to 
systematically describe materials by interpreting, classifying, and reducing its parts using 
categories in a coding frame (Schreier, 2012). Multiple versions of qualitative content 
analysis exist which blur the lines with quantitate methods and thematic analysis (e.g., Elo et 
al., 2014; Schreier, 2012; Schreier et al., 2019; Vaismoradi & Snelgrove, 2019). Here, I 
highlight the distinction drawn out by Vaismoradi and Snelgrove (2019), whereby QCA is 




opposed to themes), focused on manifest content, and open to quantification. As there is no 
single way of doing QCA, I use an adapted version of the most common QCA strategies 
(e.g., Assarroudi et al., 2018; Elo et al., 2014; Schreier, 2012), one that focuses on issues of 
validity and reliability, on the one hand (Schreier, 2012), and trustworthiness, on the other 
(Elo et al. 2014). Overall, these issues are confronted by giving detailed descriptions of the 
QCA process (validity, trustworthiness) and by bringing in a second coder to code and assess 
the main categories (reliability).  
 
By contrast, RTA is a method used to summarize and organize qualitative data into themes103 
(Braun & Clarke, 2013, 2019). It contrasts with other forms of thematic analysis such as 
Codebook Thematic Analysis, and Coding Reliability Thematic Analysis, which are closer to 
QCA in their focus on top-down categories and coding agreement methods (Terry et al., 
2017). I chose RTA as it allows me to detach myself briefly and only partially from the 
somewhat rigid analytical constructs that guide this research, to explore how the 
representation of awe is confined to larger patterns of cultural meaning.  
 
I make a strong distinction, then, between looking for manifest categories using QCA and 
latent themes using RTA. This is done with the awareness of the ongoing debate in the 
methods community that the words ‘categories’ and ‘themes’ mean different things to 
different researchers, are sometimes used interchangeably, blur into one another, and that 
both methods can be used to discover these two forms of organizing knowledge (Graneheim 
et al., 2017; Schreier, 2012; Terry et al., 2017; Vaismoradi & Snelgrove, 2019). Furthermore, 
I acknowledge that both themes and categories can have different levels of abstraction and 
that these lay rather on a continuum of meaning (Graneheim et al., 2017). However, 
consigning the construction of manifest categories to QCA and latent themes to RTA helps 
heuristically to approach and scrutinize the data from distinct analytical locations (i.e., top-
down/bottom-up, manifest/latent, categories/themes).  
 
7.2. Preparation 
The preparation phase for this study is shared by both QCA and RTA. This includes the 
reflexivity, sampling, interviewing, transcribing, and familiarization phases through which I 
 
103 Themes have been described as “patterns of shared meaning, united by a central concept or idea” (Braun & Clarke, 2020, p. 4), which in 




become immersed with the data. Then I proceeded independently and sequentially with the 
analysis, beginning with QCA, and following up with RTA.  
 
7.2.1.  Reflexivity  
A central issue in qualitative research in general, and one that appears in QCA and RTA 
manuals, is reflexivity (Braun & Clarke, 2013, 2019; Schreier, 2012). Considering that ‘I’ – 
my sociocultural position, my idiosyncrasies, my personal history, my knowledge – am 
constitutive of the practices and products that make up this research, and that the 
communicative practices that I engage in contribute to how others construct their own 
realities, it is important that I recognize this subjective ‘first person’ point-of-view and 
acknowledge the ways in which it influences my research.  
 
My relation to science communication comes from a deep affective attachment to science that 
began as a middle-class boy in Colombia in the eighties watching the television show 
Cosmos. Obsessed with stars, planets, and galaxies, my parents took me multiple times to the 
planetarium in Medellin where I accumulated the scientific, cultural, and affective capital that 
would later guide the many decisions I made on my way to do a PhD in science 
communication. It was also in those early experiences where the seed of materialism and 
naturalism as my core metaphysical beliefs formed. Unfortunately, the conditions both at 
home and in my country quickly deteriorated throughout the nineties. The war in Colombia 
took a precipitous turn, as drug cartels, guerrillas, paramilitary armies, and a weak state 
fought with great violence for legitimacy, influence, and power. The madness of the country 
particularly bled into my family and school where violence took the form of beatings and 
bullying that marked me for life. Growing up surrounded by injustices, inequality, and 
violence, but at the same time being fortunate enough to have had teachers, friends, the love 
of a mother, and a modicum of economic wealth that allowed me to get a good education, 
resulted in a combination of anger, anxiety, pessimism, gratefulness, charity, tolerance, sense 
of justice, and humanism, that has informed my life and work so far. My ontological and 
philosophical commitments were further refined with the discovery of Secular Buddhism as a 
pragmatic and ethical framework to engage with the world. In particular, its ideas of anātta 
and anicca, roughly translated to ‘no self’ and ‘impermanence’, respectively, have been 
central to my further development. It gave me the language to contest ideas about the self and 




of bourgeois, cisgender, heterosexual, mestizo, bilingual, Latin American, male, able-bodied, 
cosmopolitan, middle-class, and have lived with the many biases, social privileges, and 
disadvantages that the performance of these identities have granted me, I can also describe 
instances in which those signifiers of identity and theories about my ‘self’ have been much 
more fluid and localized in the many situations that I have found myself in. It is in that rather 
more spontaneous mix and remix of cultures and experiences that acts and adapts statistically 
to the particular contexts that I navigate, that I encountered the theories of constructed 
emotions and ad hoc situated conceptualization as frameworks to evaluate social phenomena. 
These are theories that I believe can incorporate hard scientific descriptions of the nature of 
the mind into interpretivist and critical ideas in social science, and whose exponents urge 
people to integrate these theoretical perspectives into larger sociocultural discussions of 
diversity and justice. My rejection of the naïve reductionism and universalisms of the 
classical view of emotions is then not just tied to my evaluation of the overwhelming 
evidence against its tenets, but also stems from a life of experiences that have led me to 
conclude that one of the noblest goals in life is, as anthropologist Ruth Benedict apocryphally 
said about her discipline, to try to “make the world safe for human difference” (Haviland, 
2005, p.133). 
 
7.2.2. Sampling and participants 
Purposive samples are common in qualitative research (Palinkas et al., 2015). I issued a call 
for interviewees through an advert in the PSCI-COM mailing list (appendix W) – a forum 
based in the UK but with more than 4,000 science communicators from around the world 
(JiscMail, 2020, n.d.) – to be interviewed for an hour online in exchange for the opportunity 
to enter a raffle for a 150EUR gift card. The original goal was to have fifteen participants, but 
considering the overwhelming response that the ad received, the final sample included 
twenty-two (n = 22) self-identified practising science communicators who used English in 
their daily activities. This number is above the suggested rule-of-thumb margin of 15-20 
interviews for a PhD in which the qualitative section is only part of a larger project (Terry et 
al., 2017). After responding to the ad, participants were contacted individually via email, 
where they received a link to a Qualtrics (2019) form that allowed them to read the 
information sheet about the study and give informed consent (appendix X). They then 




concluding with a form about their preferred times on a calendar. After filling these out they 
received a Zoom link indicating the time for the interview.  
 
Table 7.1 
Demographic Characteristics of the Participants (n=22) 
Baseline characteristic Frequency (Percentages) 
Gender  
  female 11 (50.0) 
  male 10 (45.5) 
  other 1 (4.5) 
First Language  
  English 14 (63.6) 
  Other 8 (36.4) 
Education  
  Bachelor's degree or equivalent 1 (4.5) 
  Master's degree or equivalent 11 (50.0) 
  Doctoral or professional degree 10 (45.5) 
Political Orientation  
  1 - Very Liberal 4 (18.2) 
  2 9 (40.9) 
  3 6 (27.3) 
  4 - Centre 3 (13.6) 
  5 0 (0) 
  6 0 (0) 
  7 - Very Conservative 0 (0) 
Religious affiliation  
  Atheism 12 (54.5) 
  Agnosticism 3 (13.6) 
  Christian Catholicism 2 (9.1) 
  Christian Protestantism 1 (4.5) 
  Hinduism 1 (4.5) 
  Other 3 (13.6) 
Baseline characteristic Mean (SD) 
Age 36.9 (9.8) 
 
In selecting the final twenty-two participants, I took into consideration a homogeneity and a 
heterogeneity criterion. On the one hand, all participants had to be science communicators 
who used the English language at work (homogeneity criterion). On the other, I took into 
consideration a diversity principle that included gender, organizational affiliation, and branch 
of science (heterogeneity criterion). Table 7.1 presents the overall demographic characteristic 
of the sample while table 7.2 presents their professional characteristics. Both tables suggest a 
heterogeneous mix of participants in the selected criteria with participants who identified as 




communication practices. There was some degree of heterogeneity as to participants place of 
provenance, with at least eight participants not being English primary speakers, and some 
diversity in their religious affiliation. There was, however, homogeneity in terms of 
educational background, with almost all participants having graduate degrees, and a liberal or 
moderate political affiliation. No participant was excluded from the sample.  
 
Each interviewee received a number (e.g., Int1, Int2, Int3) depending on the order in which 
they were interviewed. I will be using these identifiers to quote them throughout this chapter. 
 
Table 7.2 
Professional Characteristics of the Participants (n=22) 
Baseline characteristic Frequency (Percentage) 
Practising Scientists  
  Yes 2 (9.1) 
  No 20 (90.9) 
Organizational Affiliation*  
  Freelance 5 (22.7) 
  University/Research Centre 10 (45.5) 
  Charity/Non-Profit 2 (9.1) 
  Science Museum/Centre 5 (22.7) 
  Government Organization 2 (9.1) 
  Science Festival and Events 2 (9.1) 
  Private Firm 2 (9.1) 
Branch of Science  
  Biological Sciences 4 (18.2) 
  Engineering and Technology 3 (13.6) 
  Physical and Chemical Sciences 5 (22.7) 
  Medical and Health Sciences 4 (18.2) 
  Environmental Sciences 1 (4.5) 
  Formal Sciences 2 (9.1) 
  Social Sciences 2 (9.1) 
  Other 1 (4.5) 
* Various participant reported more than one organizational affiliation. 
 
7.2.3. The interviews 
All the online interviews were conducted throughout the month of June 2020 using Zoom. 
The interviews were video recorded using this software’s recording tool. The interviews 
lasted on average 48 minutes with a range between 28 and 70 minutes. All interviews 
followed a semi-structured schedule (appendix Z) with all interviewees receiving, for the 
most part, the same 14 questions. The semi-structured format, however, allowed me to ask 




of their responses. The rationale for the interview structure was first to get participants to 
activate their identities as science communicators and their beliefs about emotions. Then I 
delved into the topic of awe by focusing on particular personal experiences with this emotion, 
the respondents’ beliefs about it, and their use of awe in their work. This approach tapped 
into different aspects of their knowledge of emotion, with their beliefs being more 
stereotypical and their personal experiences more idiosyncratic (Robinson & Clore, 2003).104 
The interview schedule was reviewed by an expert science communicator and tested on two 
local science communicators whose feedback was used to improve the questionnaire.  
 
All twenty-two interviewees were very cordial and kind in their responses and with their 
time. There were no major hiccups outside of standard connection problems (which were 
easily resolved) and several participants needing to reschedule their interview sessions. It is 
important to note that all participants were experiencing some degree of issues in their 
personal and professional lives because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the many restrictions 
imposed by governments in response. As a result, many of their answers were punctuated by 
this context.  
 
7.2.4. Ethical considerations 
Ethical issues were dealt with the utmost respect for the interviewees and the information 
they provided. Efforts were in place to guarantee the confidentiality, anonymity, and 
safeguard of their data following commonly used standards in qualitative research (Kvale & 
Brinkman, 2009). No serious ethical issues were raised in the processes. Following the ethics 
standards set by the University of Otago, I filled out an ethics committee application form 
Category B, which received approval on May 26, 2020, by the University’s Human Ethics 
Committee under project number D20/151 (appendix AA). 
 
7.2.5. Familiarization 
Qualitative analysis begins with a familiarization or deep immersion into the material (Braun 
& Clarke, 2013). In the present case, this included transcribing, relistening to the interviews, 
and taking notes throughout the process.  
 
 
104 It is somewhat akin to the difference between asking a person how does a happy face look and looking at how people actually move their 




To get closer to the material, I transcribed all interviews throughout the month of July 2020 
(Braun & Clarke, 2013, 2019). From the start, I acknowledged that transcriptions are an 
interpretative process, in which the transcriber makes multiple decisions such as the level of 
detail that is included in the transcriptions and how punctuation is used throughout (Bailey, 
2008; Braun & Clarke, 2013). I ignored most of the visual data, as elements of what the 
interviewee was wearing, the setting, or hand movement were deemed unimportant for the 
purpose of the research. Only when the participants made specific facial or vocal expressions 
related to an emotional experience and performed these as visual cues, were visual data 
included in the transcripts in parenthesis. Moreover, I transcribed elements of the way 
participants spoke following standard practices (Bailey, 2008; Braun & Clarke, 2013). Verbal 
tics and other fillers (e.g., ‘er’, ‘um’, ‘like’, etc.) and repetitions were extensively removed 
and corrected to maintain an appropriate flow of the text (Arksey & Knight, 1999). Besides 
these changes, transcriptions were kept as verbatim as possible and included some of the 
social chatter after the formal interview had ended, whenever this was related to the topics of 
emotions or awe. After transcribing the interviews (for an excerpt see appendix AB), I 
relistened to all of them in full at least once, both for editing purposes and for further 
familiarization. 
 
I took notes during and after the interviews. I also took notes during the transcription process 
and after a second and third re-listen. Notes went from very broad and about the attitude of 
the participant (e.g., “participant seems tired”, “participant’s responses are very short”) to the 
very detailed (e.g., “participant takes the rather postmodern view of facts as context-
dependent and not universal or absolute”). These notes helped to organize my thoughts and 
alerted me of places in the interviews where there might be something of interest for later in 
the coding process.  
 
7.3. Study 1 - Qualitative content analysis of interviews with science communicators 
Throughout the interviews, the participants described a variety of situations in which they 
had personally experienced awe, believed others had experienced awe, and created contexts 
in which they tried to elicit this emotion in others. These situations were populated by a 
variety of elements which together constituted the representation of the emotion. Such 




conceptualization framework in chapter three, which include aspects such as the agents, 
objects, setting, events, actions, evaluations, and outcomes (Barsalou et al., 2018).  
 
Very few qualitative studies on awe have disaggregated the situational elements present in 
the conceptualization of this emotion. Dobson (2015) used a method similar to qualitative 
content analysis105 to describe the experiences of awe from 18 interviews. The author found a 
variety of elicitors, outcomes, affective states, and physical sensations which were later 
organized into categories such as physical, cognitive, and social elicitors, or cognitive, 
emotional, and physical outcomes. Similarly, Cuzzolino (2019) described a variety of 
elicitors, appraisals, affective responses, and outcomes of awe situations from interviews with 
scientists and students. These two studies observed a variety of situational elements from 
which they expanded on the traditional definition of this emotion.  
 
Aligned with the main research question of this chapter (How do science communicators talk 
about awe?), in this section I focus my attention on the specific elements of the awe situation 
to arrive at the following sub-question.  
 
Question 1: What elements of a situation do science communicators represent when they talk 
about awe?  
 
With this question, I go through the interviews using QCA to look at the different aspects of 
the elements of the situation mentioned by the participants. The situated conceptualization 
view allows me to look at the content in a systematized way, separating the various elements 
of the awe experience within a taxonomy of situational elements.  
 
7.3.1. Procedure 
In this study, I combined elements of different procedural QCA manuals (e.g., Schreier, 
2012) to develop the coding frame, review it, test it, and use it to analyse the interviews. The 
following were the steps carried out.  
1) Preliminary main categories. I started with preliminary main categories using the 
analytical framework devised in chapter three.  
 




2) Segmentation. Using a thematic criterion, I segmented the interviews into individual 
elements of a situation (unit of coding). This included only fragments of the 
interviews that alluded to the specific elements of a situation in relation to an 
experience, belief, or practice of awe.  
3) Pilot. I tested the preliminary categories on two interviews. The results helped me to 
polish the definitions of the categories and narrow the initial categories to twelve.  
4) Coding of main categories. I coded all the references using the codebook developed 
for the main categories.  
5) Reliability assessment. I brought in a second coder to test the main categories. This 
person coded 20% of the segments with the main categories, with which I tested the 
reliability of the frame using Cohen’s kappa.  
6) Simplification, abstraction, and synthesis. The final coded references were abstracted 
and synthesized to generic subcategories based on similarities and on previous work 
on these topics to simplify the reporting of the findings. These subcategories were the 
result of combining a theoretically driven and bottom-up inductive approach.  
7) Reporting the results. A large matrix was created to present the data and this section 
was written down.  
7.3.2. Materials - The coding frame 
The codebook was developed sequentially and with different iterations resulting from testing 
it on portions of the sample. The final categories were refined a few times to make them as 
clear and exclusive as possible. The results were twelve (12) main categories to code for the 
different elements in an emotion situation. These included: 
1) Attention foci. The agent, object, or action that is the focus of attention during the awe 
situation.  
2) Social context. Other human agents present during the awe situation.  
3) Setting. The physical place where the awe situation occurs.  
4) Event. Background event or actions in which the awe situation occurs. 
5) Appraisal/evaluation. The evaluation of the agent, object, action, or situation where 
awe is represented.  
6) Valence. Whether an awe situation is described as positive or negative. 
7) Arousal. Whether an awe situation is described as exciting or calming. 




9) Motivations. Motivations accompanying the awe situation.  
10) Bodily sensations. Bodily sensations used to describe awe.  
11) Action. Behaviour or expressions performed during an awe situation.  
12) Outcomes. Results of the awe situation. 
7.3.3. Coding the main categories 
It is worth pointing out some of the issues occurring during the coding process. First, each 
participant made references to many elements in the same category. However, there was a 
wide range of references made by the participants for the different elements of a situation. 
For example, Int11 made twenty-seven (27) references to appraisals/evaluations of an awe 
situation, while Int20 made only two (2). Also, while many references were manifest and had 
a straightforward interpretation, some of them required a degree of construal for their coding 
(i.e., they were more latent). This resulted in some segments being coded for multiple 
categories, once for its manifest content and others for more latent understanding. For 
example, the segment “I was just on YouTube, just watching things” (Int15) was coded as an 
event (online surfing), setting (in front of a screen), and social context (alone). Many of these 
decisions were discussed with the second coder but in the end were made based on the 
primary coder’s best judgement. Lastly, it is worth pointing out that some segments were 
discarded when the participant made the same reference to an element of an emotion situation 
multiple times. For example, segments in which one participant referred to feeling ‘excited’ 
or ‘positive’ in an awe situation more than once were discarded. Overall, the indeterminacy 
of language and the open-endedness of the interview format makes this kind of coding a 
highly subjective practice characterised by certain imprecisions. Potential objections to the 
interpretative nature of the coding are countered through the methodological transparency 
here presented, which includes the step-by-step description of the research process and clarity 
in my goals and limitations (Thyme et al., 2013). Most of the coding was carried out using 
NVivo 12 for Mac (QSR International, 1999).  
 
7.3.4. Simplification, abstraction, and synthesis  
After coding all the segments into the main categories, I simplified, synthesized, and 
abstracted most of the references into subcategories to streamline the results. I began by 
simplifying through paraphrasing and summarizing the references to more generic categories. 
For example, the segment in the main category “two hundred sand tiger sharks” (Int2) was 




“the contrast between white and blue” (Int11) was simplified to the code ‘contrast’. This 
simplification was accompanied by a process of synthesizing similar references together in 
one code. For example, the segments with the appraisal/evaluations “pretty”, “stunning”, and 
“beautiful”, were combined as the code ‘beauty’.  
 
Considering that at the end of this process there were still too many codes for some of the 
main categories, I decided to create new subcategories into which I could incorporate the 
various codes. Here, I took both a top-down and bottom-up approach to create the 
subcategories to summarize the findings. For some of the main categories this was an easy 
process, as in the literature there is enough agreement as to what are the dimensions of this 
aspect of an emotion. This was the case for valence and arousal, which most literature defines 
as being within a continuum of positive/negative and exciting/calm, respectively (e.g., 
Russell & Barrett, 1999). For other categories where there is less agreement in the literature 
(e.g., appraisal/evaluation, motivations). Therefore, I developed my own classification 
scheme based on my experience, my reading of the awe literature, and my theoretical interest 
in science communication. This was a recursive process with no one theoretical or analytical 
framework guiding this level of categorization. Overall, the process of simplification, 
synthesis and abstraction was aimed at abridging the presentation of the results by reducing 
the data into a manageable number of subcategories for description. The construction of these 
subcategories is described in the results section.  
 
7.3.5. Intercoder reliability 
Reliability in QCA can be reached through intercoder testing of the coding frame (Schreier, 
2012). I brought in a second coder to code the segmented references in the main stage of 
coding. The second coder was trained in an hour-long session after which they received a 
codebook (appendix AC) and a spreadsheet containing 220 of the 1,103 segments (20%), 
which is within the range of 10%~25% of the sample recommended by Krippendorff (2004). 
After the coding, the second coder attended a debrief session where some disagreements were 
discussed and resolved. Intercoder reliability showed a substantial level of agreement 








The results of the QCA can be observed in table 7.3106. There were 1,103 references to 
elements of awe situations in the 22 interviews. For nine out of the twelve elements of a 
situation investigated, all participants reported at least one reference. Valence, arousal, and 
motivations were not described by all participants. In the next sections, I describe the 
findings for each of the main categories. 
 
 Table 7.3 
 Results from QCA 
    
Name Quote Interviewees References Examples 




Accomplishment "I hear their cancer story and hear that 
they are now doing really well or they 
achieved something amazing" (Int 7) 
6 9 a child learning quickly, an 
Olympic accomplishment 
Living organism "We were snorkelling at the time and we 
came across a school of squid, and it 
was just like insane" (Int 15) 
14 23 a school of squid., mosquito 
larvae, sharks 
Natural object "I was amazed by the grandeur of the 
planet." (Int 16) 
17 48 blackholes, sunsets 
Non-science related 
artefact, practice, or 
idea 




"People with marginalized identities that 
advocate bravely and proudly for 
themselves against all adversity. I feel 
like they are doing something important, 
so I feel in awe of them." (Int 22) 




artefact, practice, or 
idea 
"the CERN particle accelerator and stuff 
(.) well they fill me with awe" (Int 3) 
20 61 a new technology, robots, 
the Galileo project 
Science-related 
person 
"I was almost in awe of my doctors" (Int 
7) 
4 6 doctors, science 
communicators, themselves 
2. Social context   22 32   
Alone "I read it over the internet" (Int 20) 9 10 
 
Dyad "And it was, you know, pitch black, 
dead of night, strong wind and just the 
two of us there" (Int 5) 
6 8 with one friend, one-on-one  
Small Group "there were a couple of friends over" 
(Int 13) 
8 9 close family, in a team 
Large Group "everybody was really worked up at that 
point because they wanted to see" (Int 6) 
4 5 as member of an audience, 
in a class 
3. Setting   22 75   
Natural "have these little moments of wonder in 
the everyday nature" (Int 4) 
11 16 a cave, beach, desert 
Non-science-related 
built  
"in our room where we had all been 
living for the last few weeks on top of 
each other" (Int 1) 
22 42 auditorium, bar, theatre 
Science related built  "it would ruin the awe of the experience 
of walking into the aquarium the first 
time" (Int 2) 
14 17 aquarium, natural history 
museum, observatory 
 4. Event   22 71   
Arts, culture, and 
entertainment 
"I was there at a museum" (Int 18) 11 19 at an arts festival, watching 
a film 
 




Business and trade "I have a mentoring role" (Int 12) 6 8 mentoring, researching 




"I was conducting a workshop and it 
was about robots" (Int 13) 
15 22 doing astrophotography, 
science conference, 
Sports and recreation "we’d had a couple of beers and we 
were just chatting" (Int 9) 
10 12 diving, going for a run, on a 
walk 
5. Appraisal - 
Evaluation 
  22 309   
Aesthetic of merit "There are so many different people 
who have such different academic 
qualifications, such different 
professional backgrounds that come 
together to do science communication, 
that is something that is really 
impressive" (Int 14) 
12 22 ability, diversity, 
importance, virtue 
Aesthetic of the 
Burkean sublime 
"If as if I could physically experience 
the empty separation between myself 
and the sun. And it was immense. And it 
was immense in a way that I couldn’t 
comprehend but I could feel" (Int 11) 
19 83 complexity, confusion, 
rarity, vastness 
Aesthetic of the 
marvellous 
"I think it is just so, crazy to even just 
think about them, and I mean, they can 
be very kind of stimulating in a sensory 
way, like the images of the cosmos are. 
Insane!" (Int 15) 
22 102 anticipation, catchiness, 
coolness, unexpectedness, 
uniqueness, weirdness 
Aesthetic of beauty "it was like these very small scale, hands 
on, tactile things, but they were very 
much focused on getting people to 
observe and notice things that they may 
have not noticed before" (Int 1) 




Aesthetic of the 
supernatural 
"there is something transcendental about 
it I suppose, (.) and (..) it is probably the 
nearest thing I guess that non-religious 
people get to something akin to the 
feeling that people have in (.) sort of 
ecstatic religious experiences" (Int 3) 





Other aesthetics "I thought it was a really cool way of 
making something really funny, really 
memorable" (Int 17) 
8 12 animated, funny, futuristic, 
identification, participation 
6. Valence   16 16   
Positive "I think it’s a positive emotion" (Int 20) 10 10 
 
Positive and negative "it could be a negative thing." (Int 2) 6 6 
 
7. Arousal   14 15   
Both exciting and 
calm 
"it’s exciting, but there is also a kind of 
peacefulness" (Int 2) 
2 3 
 




Excited "I was very excited." (Int 19) 10 10 
 




"I think there are ways in which awe can 
be sad" (Int 5) 





"I think it’s a positive emotion so I don’t 
know if I would go so far to say 
happiness, but (..) it is a sort of a joyful 
feeling. Maybe some aspect of joy (…). 
Happiness" (Int 21) 
22 106 amazement, ecstasy, 
empathy, gratitude, 
happiness, inspiration, joy, 
love, pride, wonder 
9. Motivation   17 58   
to act "maybe also feeling the power of 







to create "it makes me want to create something 
myself" (Int 18) 
2 2 
 
to explore "I kind of wanted to engage with it in 
more depth somehow, yet at the same 
time knowing that it probably was 
impossible" (Int 3) 
1 2 
 
to learn "it is like motivating, in a way. To be 
able to find something new" (Int 10) 
11 32 
 
to share "I wanted to tell people about it" (Int 10) 6 8 
 




to transcend "this strong push I feel inside me to be 
one" (Int 22) 
1 1 
 
to work "encourages you to keep doing what you 





20 70   
Behaviour "frozen quite still for a moment." (Int 2) 13 21 clapping, engage with the 
object, freezing, grab nose, 
move away from object 
Communicated to 
others 
"I shouted. (laughs) “It is happening”" 
(Int 1) 
7 9 communicate online, verbal 
communication 
Expression "when you can see someone else’s eyes 
go wide" (Int 9) 
18 40 crying, saying 'wow', 
smiling 
11. Bodily sensations   18 56   
Full body sensations "I shiver, I got a little bit of a shiver" 
(Int 5) 
16 31 buzz, dizziness, lightness 
Localized sensations "I couldn’t breathe. The thing is you 
can't breathe when you are watching it" 
(Int 11) 
8 11 choking, different heartbeat, 
heavy breathing 
Mental sensations "and very present in the moment of (.) 
kind of watching this unfold for me it’s 
watching, watching this experience 
unfold and (.) seeing how(.) I think there 
is also this intense focus" (Int 21) 
7 14 autopilot, euphoria, focus, 
out of body experience 
12. Outcomes   22 106   
General outcomes  "It might not be in a lab. It might not be 
an academic setting, but it feels as 
though you have achieved something 
really great." (Int 14) 
20 63 assign value to a person, 




"I mean the absolute ideal the one that I 
aim for and don’t always achieve is 
wonder, when people eyes go (open 
eyes) 'waaa' and even if they are not 
saying, in their head, you know that they 
are going 'oh my god that is so cool', 
because again, that’s building that 
relationship with science." (Int 9) 
19 43 build a relationship with 
science, connect science 
with daily lives, create an 
expectation about a 
technology, learn science, 
loose trust in science 
Total   22 1103   
 
 
All participants referred to at least one agent, object, or action that was the focus of attention 
during the awe situation. The resulting 182 references (M = 8.27; SD = 3.25) were subdivided 
into seven subcategories. Considering the topic of science communication framed the 
interviews, it is not surprising that the most common representations were of scientific 
artefacts, practice, or ideas. This category included various technologies and scientific 




alluded to detailed instances in science communication such as “getting the right metaphor, 
for example, heavier than this many elephants” (Int3), or a specific science demonstration 
with “liquid nitrogen or fake blood” (Int17), that incited awe in an audience.  
 
This category is followed by the most commonly cited source of awe: natural objects (Shiota 
et al., 2007; Yaden et al., 2019). This includes mostly large objects such as mountains, the 
Grand Canyon, and the whole planet. This, contrasted with the category living organisms, 
many of which were small such as flowers, moss, courgettes, birds of paradise, and a fox. A 
variety of non-scientific positive and negative artefacts or ideas were also named as 
appearing in awe situations, including the New York cityscape, God, and rioting. The last 
three categories were accomplishments (e.g., Olympic achievements), non-science-related 
people (e.g., community workers), and science-related people (e.g., a science communicator). 
There was an incredible variety of objects large and small, scientific, and non-scientific, 
common and rare, that were described as awe-inspiring, and these were represented across 
the board by all participants.  
 
 
Participants describe a multiplicity of natural and built settings where awe is experienced by 
them and others. The most common overall place where people reported experiencing awe 
was in front of a screen (11 participants). In settings related to science, participants described 
awe while at science centres (5 participants) and museums (5 participants) as places where 
people experience awe the most. This might be related to the fact that most of the participants 
work or have worked in some capacity in projects related to such institutions. Aquariums, 
science festival stands, and natural history museums were also locations where participants 
reported experiencing or seeing others experience awe.  
 
 
The typology for events was adapted from the tourism literature (Getz, 2008) to include five 
subcategories. Again, interviewees reported experiencing awe during all sorts of activities 
that included sports and recreation (e.g., while running, while snorkelling), private activities 
(e.g., driving home, having beers with friends), and activities related to arts, culture, and 




common occurrences of awe were during science shows and demonstrations, on the one 
hand, and during visits to science centres, museums, and aquariums, on the other.  
 
 
While the literature on awe traditionally focuses on two (or seven) appraisals (Keltner & 
Haidt, 2003) people use all sorts of adjectives, adverbs, and other modifiers to describe the 
objects that induce awe. Here, I constructed sixty-two (62) different categories to organize 
the many appraisals and evaluations made by the participants of the situations where they or 
others experienced awe. I further organized these around five “aesthetics” corresponding to 
some of the discourses described in chapter four. The aesthetic of the Burkean sublime takes 
from Burke’s list of elements that make something sublime (Burke, 1990), while the aesthetic 
of merit is similar to the themes of admiration and virtue described by contemporary 
researchers (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Similarly, the aesthetic of beauty was constructed 
around the themes of the wondrous and the beautiful (e.g., Economides, 2016; Moore, 2005), 
and the aesthetic of the marvellous around the discourses of wonder related to the marvels of 
the Wunderkammer (e.g., Daston & Park, 1998). Finally, the subcategory of the supernatural 
was related to some of the religious and spiritual themes around awe described in previous 
chapters (e.g., Otto, 1923; Van Cappellen & Saroglou, 2012).  
 
The most common overall appraisals were vastness (14 participants), coolness (12 
participants), ability (11 participants), novelty (11 participants) beauty (11 participants), 
incredibleness (10 participants), and connectedness (9 participants). While these match some 
of the stereotypical appraisals described in the literature for awe (Yaden et al., 2019), others 
do not. Moreover, not all participants expressed such stereotypical evaluations. Many 
expressed appraisals that do not appear anywhere in the literature on awe. These include 
fragility, funniness, futuristic-ness, diversity, and cuteness. Some of these ‘atypical’ 
appraisals didn’t fit the mould of the five subcategories created and therefore were coded as 
being in the ‘other appraisals’ category.  
 
 
Many participants described awe situations as positive (10 participants). However, some of 
them (6 participants) acknowledged the possibility of awe being a negative emotion. For 




Int12 described that this emotion “gives you some pleasure and some pain at the same time”. 
Similarly, while most participants spoke about excitement as a component of the awe 
situation (10 participants), two participants described situations of awe as calming, and two 
others described these as both. Int8 described awe as making them “very relaxed”, while Int2 
described it as “it’s exciting, but there is also a kind of peacefulness”. The ambivalent nature 
of the valence and arousal descriptions of awe is what has led some researchers to label it as a 
complex emotion (A. M. Gordon et al., 2017; Shiota et al., 2011).  
 
 
The participants used various other emotion categories to describe their experiences with 
awe. Emotion categories stereotypically described as positive such as joy (6 participants), 
happiness (12 participants), surprise (12 participants), inspiration (7 participants), amazement 
(7 participants), and wonder (8 participants), were the most used by participants. Other 
positive emotions words such as love, empathy, trust, and contentment also accompanied 
such descriptions. The most common negative emotion was fear, described by three 
participants. Other emotions with negative connotations such as sadness, loneliness, disgust, 
and jealousy were also concurrently used to describe awe situations.  
 
 
Most interviewees described people, including themselves, as feeling an urge to do 
something accompanying awe situations. Various participants (11) described some version of 
wanting to “seek out more information” (Int1), wanting “to know more” (Int18), or becoming 
“hungry for the answer” (Int22). Six more participants used the category curiosity in relation 
to an awe episode. This motif of wanting to learn more fits with the ‘need for 
accommodation’ premise that accompanies many descriptions of awe in the literature 
(Keltner & Haidt, 2003). However, other motivations such as wanting “to tell other people” 
(Int7), “to create something” (Int18), and “to stay within that moment” (Int3) were also 
described. Besides the work that has argued for the information-seeking potential for awe as a 
so-called ‘epistemic emotion’ (Valdesolo et al., 2017), the motivational elements that attend 








Bodily sensations are part of the affective component of the situated conceptualizations 
framework. I divided these bodily sensations into three categories in relation to whether these 
referred to the full-body, localized in a particular place in the body, or whether there was 
some reference to a mental construct or state of mind. Although these are all leaky categories, 
with no clear definitions in the literature, they served as effective heuristics that enabled me 
to simplify classification. The interviewees used words such as overwhelm (5 participants), 
lightness (4 participants), shock (4 participants), smallness (3 participants), and shivering (2 
participants), to describe how their bodies felt during the awe situations. Of these, only 
smallness and shivering appear in the literature of awe as constructs (e.g., Piff et al., 2015; 
Schurtz et al., 2012). Localized sensations such as feeling choked (2 participants), different 
heartbeat (2 participants), and heavy breathing (2 participants) were also mentioned by the 
interviewees. Complex mental constructs such as euphoria (2 participants), focus (3 
participants), and being mind-blown (4 participants) refer to conceptualizations that are 
heavily in the body yet also reflect states of mind. The description and exploration of many of 
these motifs requires further investigation.  
 
 
I divided the descriptions of actions during awe situations into three categories: behaviours 
focusing on the body, expressions on the face, and communications with the use of spoken 
and written words. I recognize that these categories are somewhat arbitrary, as all actions 
communicate something (Mehrabian, 1970) and that the separation of expressions between 
the face and body is rather tenuous (Van den Stock et al., 2007).  
 
Expressions that are stereotypically associated with the emotion ‘awe’ (Cordaro et al., 2016; 
Shiota et al., 2003) such as the expression ‘wow’ (12 participants), wide eyes (2 participants), 
deep inhalations (2 participants), and open mouth (1 participant) were brought up by some of 
the interviewees. However, they described many other actions, such as smiling (4 
participants), crying (2 participants), reaching out online (2 participants), saying something to 
someone (6 participants), and clapping (1 participant). These are only but a small subsample 
of the potential diversity of actions that people do when in awe. Also, while some describe 
engaging or approaching behaviour, some participants described freezing or staying in place 




entirely” (Int9) during an awe episode as a result of it being “too crazy” (Int9) for them. 
Again, this goes to show that while stereotypical expressions and behaviours exist, a 
potentially unlimited range of actions can accompany an awe situation.  
 
 
In the category outcomes, I returned to organizing situations as to whether they were in the 
context of science communication or not. This proved difficult, as some referred to general 
outcomes that could occur within this context, but at the moment when the interviewee was 
describing this, they were not making exact reference to a science communication situation. 
For example, various participants talked about caring about something (4 participants) as a 
result of an awe experience. In some cases, they were referring to nature - “to appreciate what 
that ecology is” (Int1), – or more broadly about the idea that awe can get people to “care 
about something” (Int3). Similarly, a few participants described realizations as a common 
outcome from an awe experience. Participants described realizing how lucky they were, or 
how they gained new insight, as a result of an experience with awe. They also reported 
receiving a reward (6 participants) or a sort of reinforcement (4 participants). While not 
necessarily directed towards science, these general outcomes could potentially be tied to this 
subject.  
 
When it comes to outcomes strictly related to science and science communication, the most 
common responses described by the participants were learning some new science (8 
participants), capturing someone’s attention with science (6 participants), building a 
relationship with science (5 participants), and influencing people’s career paths (4 
participants). Not all these outcomes were positive, as some reported things like preventing 
children from learning, making people lose trust in science, making science less accessible, 
and making people fatigued about science. The implications of these results will be discussed 
in the next section.  
 
7.3.7. Discussion 
Three overall conclusions can be described from the QCA regarding how science 
communicators represent awe. First, the overall stereotypical features of awe presented in the 
literature as an emotion caused by objects in nature described as vast, that generate arousal 




Valdesolo et al., 2017), are somewhat frequent in science communication. At least half of the 
participants described elements of awe using this ordinary cultural type. Importantly, some of 
these representations also included the negative stereotypical connotation. From objects 
stereotypically described as negative causing people to experience awe, to descriptions of 
negative affect and emotions, various participants expressed in different forms situations that 
were of an undesirable kind, some of which were connected to the communication of science. 
These are in line with descriptions of a negative variant of awe in the literature (e.g., A. M. 
Gordon et al., 2017) 
 
However, participants’ descriptions using these frequent stereotypes were also accompanied 
by a wide-ranging variety of other elements. The second conclusion of this QCA is that there 
is a wide range of elements of experience that do not conform to the stereotypical features of 
awe described in most of the literature. From descriptions of awe as fragile or funny, to 
associations with disgust and love, variability of awe experiences was the norm (see Barrett, 
2017a).  
 
Many of these representations, however, weren’t random. There were common patterns in the 
participants’ descriptions of awe in relation to science communication. For example, science 
museums and science centres were identified by multiple interviewees (10 participants) as a 
place where awe is experienced. Similarly, half of the sample (11 participants) associated 
awe with a motivation to learn or curiosity. Importantly, several participants consistently 
mentioned certain goals for this emotion such as capturing attention (6 participants) and 
building a relationship with science (5 participants) indicating the functional similarity of 
many of its uses in this cultural space. The consistency in participants’ responses around 
certain forms and outcomes of awe is derived from the many cultural themes or scripts107 for 
this emotion that circulate in science communication and beyond this cultural space. The 
participants integrate the elements of a situation into a cohesive framework using these 
scripts giving coherence and social meaning to their awe beliefs, experiences, and practices. 
 
107 These are a form of larger patterns of social meanings which could also be described as narratives, schemas, frames, discourses, or themes 
(see next section). I use here the term script as it is referenced by Boddice (2019, p. 50) who quotes the following passage by historian Robert 
A. Kaster (2005, p. 8) “emotion properly understood…is the whole process and all of its constituent elements, the little narrative or dramatic 
scripts that is acted out from the evaluative perception at its beginning to the various possible responses at the end. Subtract any elements of 
the scripts, and the experience is fundamentally altered, without a response”. Boddice (2019) then goes on support this view of emotions as 





It is through these practices where these scripts are constructed and reproduced in the culture 
of science communication. 
 
More important, these scripts are co-constitutive of the various and sometimes conflicting 
mandates that circulate within science communication. Many seem to include elements that 
give awe a positive connotation while supporting many of the goals implicit in deficit-style 
norms of science communication including promoting science careers, teaching science 
outside the classroom, and ensuring public support for scientific activities (e.g., Metcalfe, 
2019; Stocklmayer, 2012). Nonetheless, some of the forms and outcomes described by the 
participants deviate from these norms and their accompanying beliefs, identities, and 
worldviews. For example, descriptions of awe that ‘makes people distrust science’ or 
‘prevent people from learning’ suggest the presence of divergent cultural scripts around awe 
based on contrasting mandates. However, the disaggregation of the awe situation into its 
constitutive elements performed in this QCA doesn’t permit further elaboration into the 
nature of these larger patterns of meaning. To understand the frameworks that tie together the 
elements of the awe situation in the culture of science communication and relate these to the 
various mandates in this space, I now turn to the second study of this chapter, in which I use 
RTA on the same dataset and construct themes that thread these elements together.  
 
7.4. Study 2 - Reflexive thematic analysis of interviews with science communicators 
As participants answer questions about their personal experiences with awe, their beliefs 
about this emotion, and their practices around these, they are not only activating, partially 
simulating, and communicating their conceptual knowledge of this emotion category through 
its individual elements, but they are also tying these together in larger and underlying patterns 
of social meaning. These could be described as cultural scripts, motifs, discourses, narratives 
or, for the purpose of this study, themes. These themes give structure to the elements of an 
emotion situation described in the previous study and organize how people construct the 
representation of an emotion within a cultural context. 
 
Importantly, the different themes through which people represent awe in science 
communication are deeply entwined with the various cultural mandates in this space. By 
contrast to QCA’s focus on more manifest content, RTA allows the deeper latent work 




construction of the studied emotion category. Moreover, this type of interpretative exercise 
acknowledges the two-way constitutive manner through which the emotion type is not only a 
function of the mandates but through which these mandates are imbued with affective 
content. Themes then, serve as an overarching framework of meanings within which people’s 
beliefs, values, norms, goals, and identities are tethered, co-constructing affect and emotions 
on the one hand, and the rest of the elements of experience on the other. 
 
Previous qualitative work has tried to look for larger themes of awe within the narratives 
presented in interviews. Bonner and Friedman (2011) discovered some 10 themes around 
different appraisals for the awe experience. However, the source of their material has been 
criticized by other studies (e.g., Dobson, 2015). Dobson (2015) identified some themes such 
as detached observation, active re-evaluation, and sense of connection. Hicks and Stewart 
(2020) described the different meaning-making and learning outcomes from awe experiences 
involving wildlife. In a similar vein, Cuzzolino (2019) identified three major themes around 
awe in the way scientists talk about their experiences with this emotion, including: 1) its 
relationship with the process of discovery; 2) awe as positioned to prior experience; 3) and 
awe as highly variable and elusive. These studies have contributed by giving more nuance 
and richness to our understanding of this emotion in different contexts (e.g., wildlife 
experiences, scientific culture, etc.). 
 
In this section, I explore some of the larger patterns of meaning through which science 
communicators construct their beliefs, experiences, and practices of awe, and ascertain how 
these constitute the culture of science communication. Therefore, the research question 
guiding this investigation can be stated as follows:  
 
Question 2: What are the themes around which science communicators construct their 
representations of awe? 
 
Uncovering those patterns of meaning can help us understand not only the structures that 
hold together the different forms of representation of this emotion in this cultural space but 
also uncover some of the mandates at the core of our science communication practices 





7.4.1. Procedure  
After having completed the QCA, I re-read the interviews, engaging in a systematic coding of 
the data focused on identifying the larger patterns of meaning in relation to the research 
question. In this stage, I coded 407 passages with very broad paraphrasing to capture both 
their manifest and latent content (phase 2). I then proceeded to construct narrower themes 
around certain cultural mandates underpinning the representation of awe within this cultural 
space (phase 3). Here I used my interpretive abilities to look beyond what was being stated 
by the practitioners, taking their representations as situated, partial, and combinatory 
reconstructions of a lifetime of experiences steeped in multiple cultures with contrasting and 
sometimes contradicting types of this emotion. I then reviewed the themes multiple times 
(phase 4) and polished their names (phase 5). Throughout these sections, I was aided by 
NVivo 12 for Mac (QSR International, 1999). Finally, I wrote the results and discussion 
sections (phase 6).  
 
7.4.2. Results 
My interpretation of the data is closely tied to my reading of the history of awe and 
understanding of science communication presented in chapters two, three, and four of this 
thesis, whereby I described the varieties of awe and subcultures of science communication as 
organized around differing, and sometimes conflicting, values, beliefs, norms, and goals (i.e., 
cultural mandates). While individual science communicators showed a preference for one or 
two themes, for the most part, their answers showed a mixture of many influences. Some 
respondents were even aware of the tensions between mandates and were critical of certain 
types of awe and/or of the emotion category awe altogether. I composed six main themes 
(entertainment, curiosity, admiration, revelation, connection, humility), each with a central 
organizing sociocultural function that threaded together the different forms this emotion took 
and the cultural mandates it co-constructed. A variety of representations that did not fit any of 
the main themes were put in a seventh theme (other). Lastly, I created an eighth theme 
(diversity) around the critical voices of this emotion who advocated bringing an increasing 








One of the most common images of awe in science communication was that of the science 
communicator, usually a science demonstrator at a museum, using a big explosion to grab the 
attention of a crowd: 
 
“so, people go for those big bangs, those big kind of ‘here is a demo (rocket sounds)’ like 
trying to make some kind of emotion, which is like the kind of ‘wow’, wonder” (Int3) 
 
These flashy and electrifying hooks often come with the presentation of a novel or unique 
object and are used at the beginning of a communication event to shock and marvel the 
audience, tickling their “interest” (Int20) and creating an “excitement about science” (Int19). 
Besides explosions and experiments at science demonstrations, there are a host of techniques 
used by science communicators to create these forms of marvellous awe. These include 
journalists appealing to “clickbait” (Int13), documentary filmmakers using images of pristine 
nature (Int1), writers creating lists of extraordinary facts (Int2), and the general use of 
enthusiasm in science presentations (Int17), all of which aim at entertaining the audience and 
gaining their attention (Davies, 2021; Jeffries, 2003). One interviewee described these 
practices as being on one end of a spectrum:  
 
“on one hand you’ve got, the science communicator who is the container of all knowledge (.) 
trickling information down in a very sterile and cold way (.) and on the other end of the 
spectrum, you’ve got science communication done just for fun, just for its entertainment 
value. And you’ve got emotions in both areas. On the first hand is probably going to be 
boredom and the other one is probably going to be just (.) surprise, just awe, just wonder.” 
(Int6) 
 
This version of awe-as-entertainment is tied to its long history of popular objects of marvel 
from the European Wunderkammers (“cabinets of curiosities”), to the Barnum-type circus 
acts, magic shows, and contemporary forms of public spectacle, this emotion has long been 
used for entertainment (Daston & Park, 1998). Rather than a private matter, this type of awe 
is to be experienced and expressed collectively, openly, commonly, and loudly (Nye, 1994). 




for fun’, several popular forms of this emotion have been historically looked down upon as 
inauthentic and ‘vulgar’ (Daston & Park, 1998; Nye, 1994); this judgmental, sometimes 
elitist, attitude pervades much academic work in this area and dismisses certain experiences 
as not being “true” awe (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 2003).  
 
Other interviewees voiced parallel concerns about this type of awe-as-entertainment. They 
argued that these kinds of showy displays were being “overused” (Int11), that they were used 
in a “lazy way” (Int13), and that they made people fatigued (Int9). Another critique was the 
charge that this kind of awe can prevent people from learning, as the participants are too 
transfixed by the excitement brought about by the ‘awesome’ object, and that as a result they 
would be distracted away from the actual scientific information being conveyed (Int2).  
 
Despite the many criticisms, this form of awe was utilized by many of the interviewees. 
Some interviewees acknowledged that, as the result of the competitive pressures from the 
attention economy in the broader capitalist consumerist society (see Crogan & Kinsley, 
2012), where everything “is very flashy” (Int6), it becomes increasingly hard to get people to 
pay attention to science. As a result, this ends up becoming the default form of science 
communication. As one participant put it: 
 
“As science communicator, you have your audience for a small time and you need to try to 
hook their brains, you need to find a hook somewhere. So, going for that sense of awe I think 
is a very traditional thing to do in science communication.” (Int4) 
 
More importantly, some also saw the possibility that this could lead to science being 
oversold, and people losing trust in science when it did not deliver (Int13). Perrault (2013) 
argued something similar about certain kind of science popularisers who use things like 
wonder to hype science. While hype can be used as a positive practice in certain 
circumstances (Roberson, 2020) many science communicators seem to find themselves 
walking a tightrope between their beliefs about hype on the one hand, and the increasing 







Curiosity has established itself as a cardinal value in many science discourses (Ball, 2013; 
Daston & Park, 1998; Harrison, 2001) and as something to be promoted in science 
communication activities (e.g., Davies, 2019; Onion, 2016). Motivated to know more, the 
scientifically minded individual investigates, probes, examines, and tests, dedicating time and 
energy towards satiating that curiosity. At the end of this curiosity-driven journey is an 
intense emotional response described as ‘awesome’. The reward is so powerful that the 
individual seeks more, entering a feedback loop of curiosity and awe, which one participant 
described as an addiction.  
 
“You know, I would say it’s enticing. It’s a rush. It’s a weird mixture between satisfying but 
also unsatisfying because it entices you to more (.) it’s almost like an addiction (...) Addiction 
sounds bad, but I think it shares a lot of things with addiction in the way that is both 
satisfying because it feels so nice, but it is also, you need more, that’s why I keep doing it” 
(Int9).  
 
By contrast to the previous version of awe which usually came at the beginning of the science 
communication event, this version of awe requires a build-up, through a narrative (Int9), a 
long and measured activity (Int1), creating a safe space for an audience (Int13), or any other 
strategy that requires exploration and discovery and that takes time to build up into a 
climactic emotional experience. This conception of the slow-burning and curiosity-driven 
science communication event mirrors ideas about the research journey and wonder of 
discovery at the centre of much of the scientific ethos (see for example, Dawkins, 1998; 
Henderson, 2017). Awe is thus described as an affective prize for hard work, discipline, and 
patience.  
 
Whereas the use of awe as entertainment was sneered by several respondents and seen as an 
inauthentic, gimmicky, or lazy practice, its association with curiosity was, for many science 
communicators, seen as virtuous and central to their identity within this cultural space. The 
interviewees mentioned how awe motivates the public to “go home and talk about what they 
saw” (Int17), getting them to want to “find out more” (Int10), “inspiring them” (Int7) to 




processes that build a “relationship with science” (and science communication) (Int9). 
Analogously, some participants recognized these experiences of awe as a professional 
motivation to work as science communicators, where their biggest reward at work was to 
“infect someone else with awe” (Int9). Some practitioners even saw themselves as experts in 
this emotion.  
 
“I think that I experience [awe] probably, at a higher frequency to most people […] I think 
that it is because I tend to be quite kind of open to new experiences and to (.) if I experience 
something, I try to experience it fully. Whereas some people you know, will only initially 
engage partly with something and they have to be brought out of their shell.” (Int9)  
 
“conveying a feeling of awe is only possible if you have it in the first place (.) so if I didn’t 
feel it every day, I wouldn’t be able to convey it in the same way that I do (.) because it 
wouldn’t be authentic” (Int22) 
 
When describing awe and its role in inspiring curiosity, values such as openness to 
experience, the ability to be present in the moment, sharing, and authenticity, featured 
prominently. For some respondents, Carl Sagan was the paragon of science communication, 
not only because of his scientific knowledge and talent as a skilled communicator, but also 
because of his ability to experience this type of awe himself and to invoke it in others.  
 
Carl Sagan [was] one of the greatest science communicators of the century. Why was he so 
good? Because his words made you feel like he was also constantly marvelled at the 
universe. Constantly! Every day that he woke up. He was in awe. (Int22) 
 
As part of a motivational, affective, and narrative reward loop with curiosity-driven problem 
solving, awe was viewed by some respondents as being central to the science communication 
ethos. Such individuals tended to see themselves as awe experts, experiencing this emotion 
more frequently than the average person and readily being able to infect others with it. This 
version of awe appears to be an organizing pillar of much of the culture of science 
communication, constituting the affective nexus between a specific set of value-driven social 
practices (e.g., the science narrative), mandates (e.g., authenticity, openness to experience, 





Somewhere between the last two themes appears a smaller theme in which scientific 
discoveries, technical inventions, and explorations in the name of science are represented as 
inherently ‘awesome’. Whether it is space rocket launches (Int1), the power of modern 
computers and phones (Int16), exploring the deep oceans (Int4), the Voyager probes (Int3) or 
a machine that can clean plastic from the ocean (Int19), most interviewees reserved a kind of 
awe experience that accompanied their admiration and esteem for the pursuit of science and 
its resulting ideas, objects, and practices.  
 
As historians, anthropologists, and cultural critics have noted, it is through affective 
experiences that we assign value and constitute our relationships with other things in-the-
world (Ahmed, 2004; Boddice, 2019; Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990). Scientific knowledge and 
technological artefacts aren’t inherently awesome but rather, we make them awe-inspiring 
through our affective discourses and practices. The ways in which we speak about scientific 
endeavours and outputs help to fuel this sense of admiration. These discourses of awe-as-
admiration in science communication can turn “even a worm” (Int3) into something 
awesome. Arguably, the affective power of these expressions of awe through science is 
essential to the construction of much of science’s value in our societies; by cultivating a 
reverence for its progress and abilities, this emotion serves to maintain science’s status and 
reproduce its embedded social hierarchies.  
 
For example, much of this admiration is reserved for objects at the frontier of scientific 
inquiry. This results in a hierarchy of sorts where astrophysics, genetics, robotics, artificial 
intelligence (Int13, Int10) and other fields that appear to be the vanguard of science are 
described as the bigger source of awe, while practices such as social and health sciences are 
described using other emotion categories such as interest, anger, and sadness (Int15, Int19). 
Hence lies the enormous power of this cultural discourse of admirative awe, whereby 
language can turn our attention towards certain objects and disciplines, turning them into 
‘marvels’ worthy of reverence.  
 
Science oozing reverential awe is reminiscent of Nye’s (1994) technological sublime. 




science and technology) the cathartic characteristics of the natural sublime (see chapter four). 
This type of awe of science is oftentimes displaced towards the figurehead of the engineer or 
the scientists, who becomes a source of awe in their own right. In this way, some 
interviewees expressed their awe towards scientists they have met or heard things about (Int9, 
Int15, Int20). The transfer of awe, however, does not stop at scientists, but continues by 
association to make science communicators themselves the source of awe. One particular 
example of this transfer is the case of Int7 who works as a scientist but does science 
communication activities on the side. This person expressed their desire to inspire awe in 
other people.  
 
“I don’t know if it comes across as arrogant to say, I want to inspire awe. I want to be awe-
inspiring in people.” (Int7) 
 
The science communicator in their closeness to science, the ultimate source of awe, receives 
some of that awe-inspiring aura becoming themselves a source of admiration. The scientist 
who is also a science communicator is a greater source of awe than the person who is 
exclusively a science communicator, again, reproducing a hierarchical structure that this 
veneration confers.  
 
In its conference of status, this particular kind of awe is instrumentalized in the maintenance 
of various practices that aim at ensuring the general support for science. One such practice is 
building a future workforce of scientists. Science communication organizations and national 
bodies understand the importance of promoting science for future national competitiveness 
(e.g., Bodmer, 1986) and exert their influence on science communication activities. As one 
participant told me: 
 
“the commissioners that we work with from, for example, zoos, or for example, the science 
museum here, they try to say […] keep in mind we have to create a positive message about 
science in general […] to also show how amazing science is and to sort of recruit the 
scientists of the future. So, the result of that in exhibitions, is mostly that they should evoke 





Rather than an end in itself, evoking amazement, wonder, awe, and all other such emotions at 
a science communication event are tools for the advancement of particular social and political 
agendas through which science gets the human capital needed for its sustenance. Awe as 
admiration at science is then one of the tools through which science acquires the various 
forms of capital from which its status is established and reproduced in our societies.  
 
By contrast to the previous themes where the source of awe was a surprising yet 
manufactured event at the beginning of a science show, or a carefully crafted narrative that 
led to awe, here science itself is represented as the ultimate source of awe. Much of the value 
that we assign to science in our societies is cloaked in the affective discourses of awe as 
admiration and reverence that we deploy as science communicators. Certain objects, by their 
association with science, become sources of this powerful emotion, facilitating and 
legitimizing various aspects of science’s own hierarchies (e.g., the ‘hard’ sciences being more 
venerated than the ‘soft’ sciences) ensuring the continuation of its public support, and overall 
contributing to the sustenance of science’s status in our societies. More importantly, in its 
instrumentalization it legitimizes many of the social practices to advance particular political 




While the technological sublime appears in the previous theme, the Burkean natural sublime, 
with its repertoire of over-the-top appraisals and strong religious undertones around beliefs of 
transcendence and revelation, continues to have an influential presence in the communication 
of science.  
 
During the interviews, some participants described people’s emotional experiences as being 
on a pyramid. At the bottom there is surprise and excitement and as you move up this “ladder 
of emotions” (Int17) you arrive at wonder. At the pinnacle of this emotion order lies ‘true’ 
awe, an experience that signifies a breakdown of normalcy and the trespass into other states 





“It’s sort of like the limits of emotion. It’s the limit of the capacity of the emotions to 
experience. Awe takes you to the edge of your emotional capacity to experience I think that’s 
maybe where I would get with awe. To a point that goes beyond (.) it is certainly, the 
emotions are so expanded, they go beyond their own nature to something transcendental” 
(Int11) 
 
In this representation of awe, its aesthetic is defined in terms of a long list of themes related 
to Burke’s discourses of the natural sublime. These include complexity (6 participants), 
contrast (4 participants), dissonance (5 participants), powerlessness (4 participants), and 
vastness (14 participants). These are accompanied by descriptions of ineffability, 
incomprehension, and the numinous, religious motifs which pervade descriptions of this 
representation. 
 
Examples of revelatory awe are common in biographies of scientists, especially when 
signalling biographical turning points that inspired the person to embark on a scientific 
career. One participant, for instance, described a young Leonardo Da Vinci “finding whale 
bones embedded in the wall” (Int4) as a life-changing moment, with his revelatory discovery 
being infused with awe. As with other aspects of scientific rhetoric, the language used to talk 
about such unique experiences connotes secularized versions of traditional expressions of 
religious experiences (see Lessl, 1989). As two participants noted: 
 
“it is probably the nearest thing I guess that non-religious people get to something akin to 
the feeling that people have in sort of ecstatic religious experiences” (Int3).  
 
“So, to me, awe is (.) getting close to God if you wanted a spiritual aspect (.) it’s that which 
is beyond ourselves (.) beyond our ordinary thing.” (Int11) 
 
Descriptions of extraordinary emotional experiences of transcendence and ecstasy in nature 
mark the road of conversions and transformation into a life of scientific interest – narratives 
of inspiration that strongly mirror many traditional Christian myths of revelation. The 
Burkean sublime, a deeply religious aesthetic (see also, Cronon, 1996), is then a scaffold 
used in science communication through which religious elements are introduced to scientific 




might still hold religious temperaments and who wish to consecrate science into a new form 
of religion (Sideris, 2017).  
 
From a practical perspective, practitioners cannot easily elicit revelatory awe from their 
audience, as its source lies mostly in nature. It can be facilitated, however, with tools from 
science and technology that reveal nature’s extraordinary power and scale (e.g., images of 
space from the Hubble telescope, or microbes under the microscope). As such, this version of 
awe tends to be reserved for the very large (e.g., black holes, supernovas, exoplanets) or the 
very small (e.g., mosquito larvae, neutrinos). This fact may reinforce the higher status of 
certain sciences that deal with such extraordinary matters (e.g., physics, astronomy, 
microbiology) (A. G. Gross, 2018; Kessler, 2012). Science communicators are then conduits 
for enabling people to experience these lofty emotions by giving their audiences access to 
nature in all its glory. Yet this is often something that only those with the most resources can 
provide, such as Brian Cox with scenes from “mountains or cliff tops on a helicopter” (Int8). 
 
Notably, various participants raised some issues with this type of representation. Some 
mentioned how this version of awe can have negative effects on people. One participant 
suggested that the dissonance and disbelief of an all-too-powerful awe experience could 
potentially be too much for some and get them to “disengage entirely” (Int9) from a situation. 
Another participant talked about not using this kind of awe in their work as they felt it made 
people feel small and “kind of dismissible”, tending to dehumanize science and making it less 
“relatable” (Int5). More troubling was the mention by one participant that awe in science 
communication was many times represented to reach out exclusively to men (Int4). This 
comment appears to highlight some of the historically gendered attributes of Burkean 
aesthetics, which often excluded women from participating in these powerful experiences 
(see A.K. Mellor, 1993). The recognition of these issues by the participants suggests that 
some practitioners are moving away from such off-putting aesthetics. 
 
 
Another theme in the representation of awe by science communicators is that of connection. 
A story that multiple participants reported was that as a result of the lockdowns in relation to 




flora (Int10), looking at the sky (Int11), or a family tradition (Int22). Others reported 
reconnecting through awe experiences with their inner child (Int6), or a particular ecosystem 
(Int21). Implied in these narratives is the impression that humans have lost connection with 
certain aspects of their existence, and that encounters with awe make them aware of this 
absence and serve to reconnect them with the world.  
 
For most of the participants who described this type of awe, the point of (re)connection was 
to nature. According to these narratives, our urban lifestyles, our increasing screen times, our 
focus on work, have drawn us away from a natural world, and awe towards a certain kind of 
nature works as a balm to the many contemporary ills that this has brought. A couple of 
participants (Int1, Int16) specifically mentioned the biophilia hypothesis - the idea that 
humans are universally inclined towards nature and that reconnecting with it will improve 
their health (Kellert & Wilson, 1993). Awe researchers have been fond of this suggestion and 
have been devising awe-based interventions to treat people with depression, anxiety, and 
other mental health problems (e.g., Anderson et al., 2018).  
 
The natural world, however, is not described using the appraisals derived from the Burkean 
sublime (i.e., vastness, power), but rather with evaluations related to the discourse of the 
wondrous (see chapter four). These include descriptions of beauty (11 participants), 
smallness (7 participants), familiarity (4 participants) and silence (3 participants), among 
other descriptions highlighted in the previous section. Situations that are at a human scale, 
approachable, comforting, and rather ordinary were favoured. These situations make people 
really “look closely at what’s around” (Int4) and develop an “intense focus” (Int21) from 
which “even familiar things” (Int1) can become objects of awe; scripts of defamiliarization 
described by many commentators (see Economides, 2016; Vasalou, 2015). 
 
The job of the science communicator is seen as fostering situations through which this new 
perspective towards the familiar can be cultivated. Describing a workshop at a science centre, 
one participant explained how they tried to encourage feelings of awe and wonder at a small-
scale event: 
 
“we did a workshop where it was looking at planting native species, or potting moss and it 




getting people to observe and notice things that they may have not noticed before, like moss 
[…], and I think you can still have those moments of awe and wonder at looking at something 
that you might have overlooked before as well.” (Int1) 
 
Such experiences cultivate a sense of wonder in “everyday nature” (int4), from which new 
relationships around care and protection can develop (Int10) and reconnect people in a way 
that “makes you feel whole again.” (Int16). This theme resonates with those ecological 
discourses that deliberately use such emotions to foster beliefs and identities around an 
environmental consciousness (e.g., Economides, 2016; Moore, 2005).  
 
This form of representing awe, nevertheless, is in tension with other ways of representing 
nature in science communication. On the one hand, entertainment forms of awe that portray 
pristine nature can particularly dull down forms of environmental and political action around 
the engagement with ecologies “under threat because of some human action or political 
situation” (Int1). On the other, representations of nature through the Burkean awe variety can 
contribute to the disconnection and alienation that disengages people, not just from nature, 
but from science altogether (Int5, Int9). Beautiful, familiar, pastoral, and quotidian aesthetics 
that engender feelings of awe and wonder, and which focus our attention on the present 
moment and reconnect us to our immediate surroundings, can serve, perhaps, as a counter to 
the diverting and disaffecting effects of some of these other discourses and aesthetics of the 
sublime variety (Economides, 2016; Moore, 2005; Sideris, 2017).  
 
 
In 1994, Carl Sagan gave a speech about the Pale Blue Dot picture taken by the Voyager 1 
space probe. The main theme around that speech was that as human beings have learned 
more about our unimportant role in the large scale of the universe, this process of gradual 
decentring leads to a new form of humility (for an elaborated discussion, see Sagan, 1997).  
 
A few interviewees described appraisals during awe experiences accompanied by a sense of 
thinking of “a bigger picture” (Int4) or “of the world and the universe” (Int5) that gives them 
a sense of “feeling very small, that your problems, your existence seems very small” (Int3). 




the movement of the individual’s frame of reference away from the centre. As one participant 
described: 
 
“I feel a common example for people would be like thinking about space […] But that quite 
often uses awe, and it is the idea that like we are just this tiny little spec, so that’s, like in the 
whole universe and I feel that is like a change in someone perspective.” (Int10)  
 
By contrast to space imagery that aims at transcendent experiences with sublime aesthetics 
(e.g., Kessler, 2012), the Pale Blue Dot perspective comes in the form of rather more humane 
realizations such as those about the limits of human knowledge (Int7), that you play a small 
part of a larger scheme (Int5), that you are lucky to be in your current position (Int15, Int22), 
and that there is a lot of work left to do (Int20). This newfound humility nonetheless gives 
meaning to the individual, motivating them to contribute to the enormity of the human task 
and at the same time constructs their identity around a “shared human experience” (Int3)108; 
universalist and communitarian values found in much of the science and science 
communication ethos (see Medvecky & Leach, 2019).  
 
 
Several respondents referred to awe in ways that did not readily match the foregoing themes. 
Although not as frequent as those already described, two particular representations are worth 
noting, what might be called imagination, and national pride.  
 
A couple of participants described awe in terms of imagined worlds, for example when 
observing the Manhattan cityscape (e.g., “very sort of Blade Runner”, Int3), or mentioning 
science fiction films as being a source of this emotion (“many possibilities out there that are 
way beyond our imagination”, Int13). There are various aesthetics in science fiction that tend 
towards “wonder, awe, and religious or quasi-religious attitudes towards the universe” (Russ, 
1975, p. 116). Although these might match functions similar to those given by sublime 
visions of awe, the repertoire that accompanies such representations is not of actual nature, 
 
108 Religious discourses of wonder around humility and gratitude as a result of a sense of smallness have existed through the ages (see Daston 
& Park, 1998). Considering the religious character of much of Sagan’s rhetoric (Lessl, 1985) it wouldn’t be surprising that Sagan’s speech 




but of fictionalized ‘what if’ representations. The relation of these fictionalized worlds to 
science and science communication, and their use of awe, is a promising area to explore.  
 
Moreover, one participant associated awe with national pride (Int20). This individual saw 
their efforts of communicating the science of researchers from their country as a nationalistic 
endeavour, designed to generate awe and, as a result, boost patriotism. This contrasts with the 
universalist and cosmopolitan values attached to some of the previous themes, and which are 
themselves connected to traditional scientific norms (e.g., Mertonian norms). Nonetheless, 
this theme has been previously noted by Nye (1994), who observed the use of sublime 
aesthetics in how the United States represents scientific pursuits and this nation’s explicit 
beliefs in manifest destiny (see also, Kessler, 2012).  
 
There were yet further, idiosyncratic representations of awe, oftentimes coloured with other 
emotions. For example, one participant expressed a sort of melancholic awe at graveyards 
(Int5), while another described a mixture of disgust and awe for creepy crawlers (Int 4). The 
study of these smaller ancillary themes around awe, and how these relate to the 
communication of science, is a task for future research.  
 
 
Many participants described awe and other emotions as if these were natural kinds in line 
with the classical view of emotions. Such description involved, for example, scientific ideas: 
 
“But you know overall everyone would feel a sense of awe, to a great or a lesser extent when 




“It is easy to feel in awe with the environment because it is awe-inspiring. I don’t know why. 
I think it just is. I can’t explain it.” (Int15) 
 
Whether explicitly or implicitly, many participants described awe as an innate emotion that 





Nonetheless, a few participants had a more flexible and open understanding of this and other 
emotions. Besides some of the previously noted criticisms that some participants levied 
against specific forms of awe in science communication, some interviewees highlighted, for 
example, how the representations of this emotion were not going to appeal to everyone (Int4), 
that people are going to experience it in relation to their personal interests (Int10), and that 
there is not “a certain template associated with awe” (Int14). As one participant pointed out 
when describing the reaction of another person:  
 
“so maybe she wasn’t prepared for that, to have awe herself, I think it does impact people 
differently and in different times of their lives and their life experience.” (Int21) 
 
The belief that people markedly differ in their ability to experience awe as a function of their 
previous experiences is central to the constructionist view of emotions. Aware of the relative 
nature of emotional experience, another participant described how the focus on awe in 
science communication has “squeezed out” other affective possibilities from this cultural 
space.  
 
“everyone’s got the full range of emotions, and I think, maybe that’s been squeezed out in 
science communication, everyone is focused on the wonder and awe, and squeezed out the 
rest.” (Int4).  
 
While still using awe and wonder in their work, this participant tried to incorporate “loads of 
different emotions” (Int4) as a means of engaging everyone rather than a narrow subset of the 
audience. Similarly, a few participants described how they stayed away from awe altogether 
in their work (Int5, Int19). These participants described appealing to other emotions instead, 
such as happiness, fear, anger, joy, and sadness; emotions that can humanize science and 
make them more relatable to people’s affairs (Int4, Int5, Int19). These expressions suggest a 
general concern with diversity, wherein the emotional content of science communication is 
tailored not just for one kind of person (e.g., middle-upper class, straight, male, white) (Int2, 
Int4, Int5, Int19), but meant to appeal to the many individual lifetimes of experiences that 






7.4.3.  Discussion  
The participants described a variety of converging representations of awe in science 
communication. I organized these representations under the headings of entertainment, 
curiosity, admiration, revelation, connection, and humility. Versions of some of these themes 
are already found in the literature on awe and somewhat correspond to some of the 
descriptions of awe as discussed in chapters two and four. For example, the theme of 
connection has received increasing attention in recent years (Goldy & Piff, 2020). The theme 
of admiration here also somewhat resembles both themes of ‘virtue’ and ‘admiration’ 
explored by Keltner and Haidt (2003). The theme of revelation is similar to those descriptions 
in much of the literature connecting the role of awe and spirituality (e.g., Van Cappellen & 
Saroglou, 2012) while there has been a recent exploration of the relation between humility 
and awe (e.g., Stellar et al., 2018).  
 
The classical view of emotions presents each of these themes as being aspects of a unified 
and universal emotional experience. According to this view, descriptions of awe at a moss 
workshop that develops into a sense of connection with the environment (Int1) are somewhat 
analogous to experiences of awe from pondering the scale of a black hole (Int8) and the 
accompanying beliefs on human transcendence. By contrast, I argue that there are enough 
differences between themes in the situations where each of these varieties get represented 
(i.e., form) and the things that these emotions do in the world (i.e., function) to be considered 
descriptions of different sociocultural phenomena altogether. For example, the situations 
where awe becomes active produced by a science demonstrator at a science museum (e.g., 
show with liquid nitrogen) (Int17) and tied to the goals of entertainment, have nothing in 
common with the quality and scope of the decentring of the human experience constituted 
through the ‘awe-some’ cosmic scales of the Pale Blue Dot speech (Int4, Int10). Each of 
these themes, I argue, stands for a different variety of awe.  
 
The limited number of themes observed, however, is indicative of the degree of stability and 
consistency in the social representation of this emotion, something that applies to all social 





“We stabilize representations of ourselves and of things in concert with others, with a shared 
pool of categorical perceptions, symbols, and conventionalized and habitual behaviour 
patterns” (p. 169) 
 
The aforementioned varieties of awe are conventionalized frameworks (e.g., scripts, 
narratives, schemas) through which we make meaning out of this emotion category in this 
shared space. These local conventions of awe are historically contingent (see chapter four), 
and their use is tied to the individual’s experiences and the cultural mandates operating 
during the situations where these emotions are represented. While individual experiences are 
for the most part idiosyncratic, the category’s symbolic representation through language (i.e., 
the use of the word ‘awe’) and the various congruities in their social representation present a 
degree of contextual regularity, from which people acquire a certain degree of similar 
emotion knowledge that allows “good enough” (Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015, p. 544; Ferreira 
et al., 2012) communication to occur. Social representations establish a limit on the possible 
number of varieties that occur in one space.  
 
The varieties of awe described in this section, however, were constructed in reference to the 
particular context within which the interviews took place (i.e., the culture of English-
speaking science communication). While versions of awe around the themes of 
entertainment, curiosity, admiration, revelation, connection, and humility certainly exist in 
other cultural and subcultural spaces such as the world of art (e.g., Konečni, 2011), Christian 
religious communities (e.g., Krause & Hayward, 2015), or the tourism industry (e.g., 
Coghlan et al., 2012), the descriptions presented here have their own flavour in their 
localization within the particularities of science communication. For example, versions of 
awe as entertainment in science communication are very much tied up to the expectations of 
explanation at a science show or demonstration. This is different from other spaces where 
entertainment forms of awe occur (e.g., magic shows, circuses) (e.g., Lamont, 2017) where 
there is no elucidation of the objects in question. These particular ways of representing awe 
in science communication are in ways unique to this space as a result of these being tied up to 
its specific mandates (i.e., the norm and value of explanation).  
 
The multiplicity of ways I observed this emotion to be represented is then a testament to the 




these themes can be associated with the subcultural spaces around the Public Appreciation of 
Science and Technology (PAST) and Critical Understanding of Science in Public (CUSP) 
dichotomy (Perrault, 2013). For example, the theme of admiration is committed to the 
reproduction of a black-box view of science as a superior kind of knowledge that should be 
unquestioningly revered. Similarly, the revelation view of awe is suggestive of the goal of 
finding a secular replacement of religious authority with science (Sideris, 2017). Beliefs of 
scientism and ideals of technocracy, reminiscent of hierarchical mandates of the PAST, 
permeate descriptions of reverent and transcendent awe. Awe, within those types of social 
representations, contributes to the constitution of the axiomatic power science receives within 
those worldviews. By contrast, descriptions of participatory activities that foster a sense of 
connection through awe-like emotions or the promotion of critical attitudes towards human 
activities through awe-imbued pleas for epistemic humility, can be described as in line with 
the cultural mandates of democracy and scepticism associated with the CUSP.  
 
From this perspective, reverential and transcendent awe would appear to be more in line with 
hierarchical deficit-style mandates such as the promotion of careers in science (through the 
status awe emotion confers to science) or changing public attitudes of science (through a 
devotion to its products and practices), while the connection and humility varieties could be 
identified with calls for dialogue and participation. Similar one-to-one correspondences 
between other cultural mandates and varieties of awe could be drawn out. For example, the 
themes around humility could be tied to the universalist or organized scepticism of Mertonian 
norms or a sense of connection to environmental beliefs such as the Gaia principle109. As I 
described in chapter three, however, this simple dichotomy doesn’t fully capture the nuance 
and complexity of the many interacting, contrasting, and competing mandates active at any 
point during a science communication situation.  
 
As Priest (2013, 2018), Davies (2021), and others have pointed out (e.g., Kappel & Holmen, 
2019), an instance of a communicative practice can have multiple mandates such as strategic, 
economic, democratic, or entertainment goals all layered up within the same activity. A 
science communication situation is assembled in the interaction between the many 
affordances provided by the products and practices produced in part by the science 
 




communicator, the variety of individuals who bring a diversity of lifeworld cultures to a 
science communication event, and the many particularities of the day (see Davies, 2018, 
2019). A science communicator who presents an image of the Hubble space telescope to get 
people to experience awe can have strategic goals (e.g., get more funding for space 
exploration), entertainment goals (e.g., give people a positive experience), and democratic 
goals (e.g., get more people to humbly understand their place in the universe) all wrapped up 
within the same communicative activity. Similarly, the audience member who conceptualizes 
awe in such situation can conceptualize this emotion using any of the cultural scripts (e.g., 
transcendence, connection, admiration) and their various accompanying values, beliefs, 
norms, ideals, and worldviews (e.g., scientism, democratic participation) available to them at 
the moment. The construction of the dominant or preferred set of social meanings for awe by 
the audience isn’t guaranteed, with an individual’s response very much a function of both 
their distance to that particular set of meanings (i.e., their lifeworld culture) and the many 
idiosyncrasies of the moment. Many cultural mandates are then present at the moment when 
the emotion awe is represented in the culture of science communication. These interact in 
multiple and unforeseen ways, sometimes complementing each other, sometimes competing 
for dominance, all of which is situated in the sociocultural realities of the moment when and 
where they are constituted. 
 
It is also worth highlighting that “the stability” and continuity of the social representation of 
awe “is precarious” at best (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999; p. 169). On the one hand, the borders 
of a culture are always fuzzy, always in flux, continuously permeated and penetrated by new 
forms of meaning from the broader culture. For example, some of the themes constructed 
from the present interviews did not seem to correspond to those explored in most of the 
reviewed literature on awe. This was particularly true for some of the minor repertoires of 
awe related to futurism and national pride, which have only been hinted at in literature from 
disciplines outside of psychology (e.g., Nye, 1994, Russ, 1975). These repertoires, with their 
own history and idiosyncrasies, may be moving into the science communication space 
enriching the available representational resources through which science communicators can 
produce novel versions of awe. As such, the varieties of awe presented here can only be 
considered a snapshot in time (i.e., the early 21st century) as these will continue to evolve 





On the other hand, part of this process of change in the content of social representations is the 
result of the creative ways through which concepts are combined to create novel 
representations that add to awe’s repertoire. This creative ability can be observed in the ways 
participants mixed the different types of awe, in many cases synthesizing strands from 
various themes. For example, one participant was able to amalgamate multiple themes when 
describing the weather extremes in the planets of the solar system: 
 
“You can do it in a different way, you can do it by eliciting feeling one, by eliciting awe, by 
eliciting curiosity, which will then increase your involvement and participation.” (Int22) 
 
The themes of revelation and curiosity are wrapped into mandates of participation, all 
sequentially fused into one statement that constitutes a novel representation. The combination 
of elements from different representational repertoires to create original permutations is the 
normal state of affairs for the human conceptual system (i.e., conceptual combination) (see 
Barsalou, 2012; Hoemann et al., 2021). Again, the operation of multiple mandates 
(metaphysical beliefs, value of having an inquisitive mind, goals of involvement) indicates 
the complex ways through which these can operate at the same time. The porosity of the 
borders of the science communication space and the potential to construct an infinite 
amalgam of representations out of the existing representational repertoire highlights the non-
existences of stable prototypes or unique representations but rather captures the vast diversity 
of combinatorial possibilities that an emotion such as awe can take in cultural context, 
particularly in an increasingly diverse cultural space such as science communication. It is 
important then to not take the descriptions of varieties of awe in this taxonomy at face value 
but think of them in terms of broad social conventions (i.e., stereotypes) which are widely 
used today.  
 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that one main criticism participants had about the use of awe 
in science communication is encapsulated by the theme of diversity. This theme recognized 
that people bring a variety of interests, experiences, and emotional lives to the science 
communication event, and that science communicators should be more attuned to this range. 
This criticism underscored that the kind of goals that science communicators bring to their 
communicative activities (e.g., fostering curiosity, promoting careers in science, changing 




wonder, and other such emotion categories are conceptualized as ‘tools’ to achieving such 
goals (see also Davies, 2019). The value placed on this particular brand of affect may limit 
the science communicator’s ability to achieve their communicative goals as a result of these 
representational types already being preloaded with, and embedded within, distinct mandates. 
For example, the alienating effects of transcendental representations of awe described by 
some participants (Int5, Int9), could have been the result of the contrast between the product 
(e.g., images of the vast cosmos) and its cultural goals (e.g., realize metaphysical aspirations), 
and the immediate intended communicative goals of the communicator (e.g., fostering a 
sense of community, presenting a relatable image of science). In such situations, the 
interpretative frameworks that people bring to construct awe might be at odds with the 
intentions of the science communicator.  
 
A skilful science communicator might be attuned to choosing the variety of awe that aligns 
with their specific communicative goals and the emotion knowledge brought by the 
participants. Defaulting to the varieties of awe, however, might not be the best way to 
achieve such goals as there is only so much that such stereotypes can do. There is a very large 
spectrum of other emotions (e.g., fear, love, anger, joy, nostalgia, camaraderie), and their 
many varieties, that do many different things within our cultures. Their functional range is 
above and beyond what awe, wonder, marvel, and other such emotions can do. The 
communicative goals in a particular situation might be better aligned with the functions 
provided by another emotion category. This might be particularly true for goals of making 
science communication more inclusive and diverse (see Canfield et al., 2020). People bring 
the full gamut of emotions to the science communication event, and these don’t necessarily 
correspond to the stereotypical representations of awe presented in this chapter. Rather than 
expecting participants to experience knee-jerk awe reactions at the science communication 
event, products and practices that aim at fostering participatory spaces where people are not 
feeling ‘left out’ (Humm et al., 2020) can engage with people’s emotion experiences and 
work with the wealth of knowledge that these bring.  
 
7.5. General Discussion 
My QCA analysis identified how science communicators ascribed a large variety of elements 
of experience to awe situations. By contrast to the classical view of awe, which argues for a 




vastness and the motivational construct of need for accommodation (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 
2003), I found that many awe descriptions in science communication deviated widely from 
the norm. Take, for example, the experience of one interviewee who experienced awe mixed 
with pride at eating a courgette they had grown (Int22) and contrast it with the description of 
ineffable awe felt by another participant experienced when viewing a sunset and 
contemplating “the empty separation between myself and the sun” (Int11). These two 
situations could not have been more different, yet the referent used by both was the word 
‘awe’ to describe them. The classical view would either dismiss one of them as not real awe 
(Keltner, 2009) or rather argue that one or both were making a metaphorical construal of 
vastness and need for accommodation (Graziosi & Yaden, 2019). Representational diversity 
of awe forms in science communication appears to be the norm, and with this vast contextual 
range comes a diversity of functions, including the use of this emotion to capture attention, 
for learning, building a relationship with science, constituting an autobiographical memory, 
or one of the many other goals described by the interviewees.  
 
In the RTA analysis, however, I have reported certain common patterns in the stories told by 
participants surrounding their personal experiences, beliefs, and intentional use of awe’s 
many instantiations to invoke an audience response. These common themes highlight how the 
emotional experiences of people are not just random but rather operate within the 
conventionalized social representations that are valued in the cultural milieu in which these 
are represented. That most participants referred to the themes of curiosity (21 participants) 
and entertainment (18 participants) suggests a broad culture of science communication in 
which some social representations of awe remain relatively consistent. However, the 
appearance of at least six other awe-based themes speak to the diversity of mandate-based 
subcultural spaces within science communication, each with different, often interacting, 
sometimes competing values, beliefs, norms, goals, and worldviews.  
 
These findings resonate with the research on the constructed nature of emotions in relation to 
their cultural environments (e.g., Boiger et al., 2013), but also studies examining the different 
mandates that organize a culture of science communication (e.g., Davies, 2021; Perrault, 
2013). Whether it is entertainment, revelation, or admiration towards science, these social 




of mandates. The implication of such strategies, in terms of their effectiveness and their 
political and ethical considerations, is a topic for future exploration.  
 
7.6. Limitations 
The present qualitative studies are limited by the use of a small convenience sample of 
interviews with science communicators. Although I applied criteria of diversity (e.g., gender, 
scientific discipline of interest) in the selection of the final participants, this still does not 
fully capture the diversity of experiences of those who practice science communication in the 
English language. For example, while it included one person from Australia, the United 
States, and two other people outside Europe, for the most part, participants were in Europe 
and particularly the UK. Therefore, the sample at hand did not allow me to compare different 
groups of participants and make inferences about the different forms of representations across 
different sociocultural dimensions and the intersections of these. Moreover, disentangling 
beliefs of emotion, and autobiographical experiences in self-reported descriptions of an 
emotion situation is methodologically fraught (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Respondents’ 
retelling of their experiences with awe were, in-the-moment, utilizing conceptual knowledge 
in ways related to the situation they were in when answering my questions. Many responses 
were therefore linked to the expectations generated by the situation (i.e., Zoom interviews 
with an ‘expert’ in science communication), perhaps moving interviewees towards expressing 
stereotypical representations around their beliefs, rather than reconstructions of events. 
Finally, guided by the research question (i.e., how do science communicators talk about 
awe?) the questionnaire had little exploration about what science communication meant to 
the participants and what values they held in relation to this cultural space. This could have 
allowed for a deeper contrast between people’s construction of the cultural mandates and 
their representation of this emotion category. Although this lack may have limited my ability 
to study the larger formations and worldviews in which the various scripts of awe operate, 
there is no guarantee that asking participants point-blank about their beliefs or values would 
have not devolved into commonplaces and platitudes generated by the expectations of the 
interview setting.  
 
7.7. Conclusion and future directions 
In this chapter, I observed that science communicators both hold a large variety of knowledge 




these findings raise multiple questions about the overall social representations of awe in 
science communication and more broadly about the conceptualization of this emotion in the 
literature. Future research on the representation of awe by science communicators could 
include participants with contrasting backgrounds to compare their differences in 
representational repertoires. Moreover, better distinctions can be made in the questionnaires 
to disentangle their personal experience with the emotion, their beliefs about awe, and their 
communicative practices to elicit the emotion in audiences. Importantly, future work can also 
try to work with groups that were not captured in the sampling. For example, purposefully 
incorporating conservative practitioners or people with different educational backgrounds can 
perhaps capture a larger swath of representational repertoires beyond those presented in this 
chapter. This is especially important for practitioners from other English speaking 
nationalities such as Aotearoa New Zealand who might have idiosyncratic ways of 
representing this emotion that are tied to their various local mandates such as integrating 
science with traditional forms of knowledge or communicating to bicultural audiences. 
Lastly, future research can focus on the larger cultural mandates around science 
communication that permeate the science communicator’s representation of awe, by asking 
direct and indirect questions regarding their understanding of this cultural space and their 
various beliefs, values, and identities surrounding their practices. This last can also help us 





Chapter eight - Conclusion  
 
8. General results 
At the beginning of this project, I set up to answer the question: what is the nature of awe in 
the culture of science communication? Over its course, I have described this emotion’s 
history, the value of its representation in this space, and its cultural specificity. I have also 
observed how people who participate in this culture develop awe as a skill and the variety of 
ways in which this emotion is represented. Based on the collective findings reported here, ten 
points can be made about the present thesis’ contributions to our understanding of awe in 
science communication.  
 
First, chapter five showed that awe is frequently represented in children’s picture books 
aimed at communicating science. This prevalence indicates that awe is a valued emotion in 
this cultural space. As a valued emotion, people who participate in the culture of science 
communication will encounter awe often and seek out situations where they can practice this 
emotion.  
 
Second, this means that in their repeated encounter with awe, people who participate in this 
cultural space become more skilled in its representation. The results in chapter six, where I 
evaluated people’s ability to represent awe through a word association task, suggest that 
people who engage with science communication – going to science museums, watching 
science documentaries, listening to science podcasts – are cultivating this emotion in their 
consumption of these cultural products. This could also mean, and this in line with the results 
reported in chapter five, that children exposed to science picture books could be getting a 
head start learning this emotion. While this is not the only cultural space where this emotion 
is valued and where people can learn and practice it, science communication spaces may be 
enculturating and acculturating people in the representation of this emotion. 
 
Nonetheless, and this is my third point, the representation of this emotion in science 
communication differs from that outside this cultural space. I observed qualitative differences 
in the content of both the social (chapter five) and mental (chapter six) representations of this 
emotion relative to a person or artefact’s closeness to this cultural space. For example, awe 




trees, mountains, galaxies) or in situations where the person is alone. These differences 
highlight the distinctiveness of the shared meanings that make up what I call the culture of 
science communication110.  
 
Fourth, I observed a variety of awe types in science communication. The studies in chapters 
five and seven, where I analysed the features of awe situations in picture books and 
interviews with science communicators respectively, suggest that there is no one 
stereotypical description of this emotion in this space, but rather that this emotion takes a 
multiplicity of forms and functions. For example, although awe was frequently represented in 
relation to large and imposing astronomical objects (e.g., planets, galaxies), it was also often 
presented in situations that were quotidian and familiar (e.g., looking at flowers). These 
studies also showed a diversity of settings (e.g., nature, built), events (e.g., entertainment, 
private), affective characteristics (e.g., positive or negative valence), and actions (e.g., 
approaching an object, moving away from the object) that relate to this emotion. Similarly, 
awe showed a variety of functions such as assigning value to scientific objects, motivating 
curiosity, inspiring careers in science, creating expectations around a technology, and 
integrating people’s identities. Such a variety of forms and functions for awe is indicative of 
the diversity of beliefs, values, goals, and other cultural mandates that people hold around 
science communication. Although describing science communication as a culture, I would 
argue, is a good heuristic to describe a series of broad shared cultural meanings, these results 
highlight the mosaic of cultural and subcultural spaces around divergent mandates that make 
up this domain.  
 
However, and this is the fifth point, while there was a degree of diversity in the many 
mandates associated with awe, there was also some degree of convergence around a limited 
number of representational types in science communication. The most common of these 
varieties of awe described in chapter seven, circled around the themes of curiosity, 
entertainment, admiration, revelation, connection, and humility, each of which is co-
constitutive of different cultural mandates. For example, the admiration and revelation 
themes of awe could be said to reflect some uncritical and hierarchical views of science (e.g., 
naïve realism, technocracy, scientism) such as those of the Public Appreciation of Science 
 




and Technology (PAST) movement (Perrault, 2013). Similarly, the themes of connection and 
humility could be described as co-constructing participatory and critical views of science. It 
is worth noting, however, that these varieties of awe are idealized types (i.e., stereotypes) and 
don’t capture the full extent of the myriad ways in which different cultural mandates interact, 
complement, and compete in a science communication situation.  
 
Sixth, I argued in chapter four that these varieties of awe in science communication each 
have their historical trajectories that tie them up with the larger sociocultural contexts in 
which science communication occurs. Of particular importance are the aesthetics and 
discourses of the ‘sublime’ and the ‘wondrous’. These formations have had a long and 
complex history of involvement in the constitution of awe in science communication in the 
English-speaking world. For example, discourses of the technological sublime and 
environmental wonder demarcate and constitute many of the contemporary ways we talk 
about technology as worthy of our awe-inspired admiration and the environment as a wonder-
filled place to reconnect. These historical conventions delimit the conceptual space through 
which practitioners of science communication produce their awe-filled products and 
practices. The consumption of these social representations constitutes the knowledge through 
which those who engage in this cultural space can then construct their emotional experiences. 
Notably, some of the conventions of awe derived from the sublime and the wondrous 
observed in chapters five and seven, such as those representations of the white male solitary 
explorer as the sort who embodies this emotion, the use of this emotion to hype up science, or 
in ways that sugarcoat the environmental impacts of our science on the planet, continue to 
have a voice in this cultural space. These rather detrimental representations are in part the by-
product of the sociocultural and historical baggage that some of these discourses (e.g., the 
natural sublime, the Kantian sublime) carry within them. The compatibility of some of these 
hierarchical and exclusionary representations with deficit-style science communication 
views, could be undermining the many important goals of those who hold democratic and 
participatory views of science communication, such as inclusion, equity, and environmental 
awareness (Canfield et al., 2020; Perrault, 2013; Polk & Diver, 2020; Sideris, 2017).  
 
The seventh point I want to make is that if cultivating awe is a choice, there are a variety of 
ways of representing it, and each of the varieties co-constructs a different set of beliefs, 




Experiencing transcendent awe for Einstein’s ideas or reverential wonder for Elon Musk’s 
engineering projects are not knee-jerk reactions to evaluating something as vast but rather the 
result of having learned the scripts through which a situation of encountering those objects is 
interpreted as ‘awe-some’. Versions of reverential and revelatory representations of awe may 
co-construct uncritical views of science which have a variety of social consequences through 
the accompanying beliefs, values, and norms that these promote. This includes issues such as 
generating improper expectations by hyping science (Perrault, 2013), describing those with 
differing beliefs as problematic and in need of a fix (Blue, 2018), and extending undeserved 
scientific claims to normative domains in policy-making activities (Welsh & Wynne, 2013) 
among many other things. Similarly, versions of awe that foster a sense of connection or 
epistemic humility can have a different set of social consequences such as helping us address 
some of our current environmental and social injustices (Sideris, 2017). Promoting and 
cultivating the affective scaffold for different mandates and worldviews with diverging 
political, economic, and social consequences makes the choice of a variety of awe over 
another a profoundly ethical one.  
 
Eight, the results presented in this thesis also contribute to our understanding of awe more 
broadly. The variety of elements of a situation observed throughout the studies indicates that 
while there are cultural conventions that resemble many of the descriptions of this emotion in 
the classical view, these are only a proportion of the totality of repertoires available for its 
social and mental representation. For example, an evaluation of vastness and the outcome of 
accommodation were observed across the board in the three studies. However, these were not 
the only appraisals or goals observed in the representation of awe found in the studied picture 
books, word association norms, and interviews with science communicators. Throughout the 
studies, I also observed elements of awe situations that have fleetingly appeared in the extant 
awe literature, such as beauty (Keltner & Haidt, 2003) and uncertainty (A. M. Gordon et al., 
2017). More importantly, I observed elements such as evaluations of ugliness, funniness, and 
fragility, and descriptions of awe while alone, in a dyad, or in groups, which have not been 
discussed much in previous studies. A variety of functions were also observed for this 
emotion besides the stereotypical need for accommodation and the motivational structure 
around exploration and curiosity that it entails (Valdesolo et al., 2017). My thesis revealed 




realizations or epiphanies, and generating national pride, that have not been deeply explored 
in the reviewed literature.  
 
Nine, it is worth pointing out how the studies presented here move away from the narrow 
conceptualization of culture as part of the individualist/collectivism construct present in much 
of the emotion literature, including both the classical and constructionist views (e.g., Boiger 
et al., 2013; Matsumoto et al., 1998). Rather, in this thesis, I have focused on differences in 
the representation of emotion within subcultural spaces that are part of a larger linguistic 
culture, an approach that other psychology and cognitive science researchers are slowly 
adopting (e.g., Kraus et al., 2010). Overall, throughout this body of work, I have assumed a 
broad view of awe, one which embraces the diversity of forms and functions that this 
emotion takes in the different cultural and subcultural spaces in which it is represented (see 
chapter 3). 
 
Finally, and to bracket the previous points, I want to reiterate the non-universal and 
contextual nature of the claims I’ve made throughout this thesis. The word ‘awe’ is an 
emotion category exclusive to the English language. While emotion categories such as 
‘asombro’ in Spanish, ‘huşu’ in Turkish, or ‘Ehrfurcht’ in German, have come to take some 
of the meanings of awe through cross-cultural dynamics such as translation, migration, and 
trade, these words have their own distinct histories and local semantic realities. The results 
presented in this thesis apply then only to the Anglosphere. More importantly, the results 
presented here have focused on the particular experience of the United Kingdom and the 
United States. On the one hand, the samples of picture books and individuals in the three 
studies came mostly from these two countries. On the other, the experience of these two 
countries anchors both the theoretical and analytical descriptions of the cultural mandates that 
constitute the various subcultures within the culture science communication. While the from 
‘deficit to dialogue and participation’ narrative arc doesn’t necessarily match the historical 
trajectory of science communication in many countries (see Gascoigne et al., 2020), I utilize 
this framework in many of my descriptions of the cultural mandates that constitute the 
different subcultures within the larger English-speaking mosaic. However, there are many 
other local subcultural mandates operating at the country level that fall outside the purview of 
those discussed throughout this thesis and which are based on the British-US experience. As 




This is particularly important for a country such as Aotearoa New Zealand where the broad 
cultural mandates discussed throughout this thesis cohabit, compete, and mix with localized 
values, beliefs, goals, and worldviews (Fleming et al., 2020). For example, projects such as 
‘A Nation of Curious Minds’ sponsored by the New Zealand Government, contains goals 
such as the promotion of “STEM-related career pathways” and a more “scientifically and 
technologically engaged public” (Ministry of Business, Innovation, & Employment, 2014, p. 
7) that are in-line with some of the deficit- and dialogue-style mandates discussed throughout 
this thesis. However, these mandates are intersected in this project by other outcomes such as 
the promotion of traditional Māori knowledge (i.e., Mātauranga) and fostering bicultural 
identities and values; goals that are unique to the histories and experiences of this particular 
local context. Whether the varieties of awe described throughout this thesis apply to the local 
sociocultural realities of Aotearoa New Zealand or any other circumscribed national context, 
remains an open question for future studies. Similar more focused studies on awe can take 
into account the intersectionality between cultural mandates within other sociocultural 
domains such as those demarcated by religious beliefs, political affiliation, gender, 
occupation, and class.  
  
Together, the findings emerging from the foregoing studies indicate the value of awe in 
science communication, its cultural uniqueness and historicity, its enculturation and 
acculturation, and the variety of forms and functions this emotion takes within this cultural 
space; all factors that are in line with the constructionist view of emotions. Although 
exploratory, these findings advocate for a broader conceptualization of awe (and other 
emotions) that takes into account the sociocultural realities of the many contexts where this 
emotion is represented. In the following section, therefore, I discuss some reflections and 
speculations on the constructionist view of emotions and the predictive paradigm it is based 
on (see Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019) for the study of awe, the field of science 
communication, and the research on emotions in this field.  
 
8.1. Implications for the literature on awe 
Since Keltner and Haidt’s (2003) seminal article, awe has become a subject of scientific 
inquiry in and of itself, with dozens of papers committed to a definition imposed by a very 
culturally specific representation of this emotion’s meaning (i.e., an emotion caused by 




knowledge). These authors defined this emotion on a culturally situated reading111 of a sparse 
literature review that didn’t look into people’s actual lived experience or empirical data112. 
Rather than considering the many usages, histories, and conventions that this emotion has, 
most of the program of enquiry that their article launched has become unremittingly 
committed to these authors’ narrow definition.  
 
As Danziger (1997) argued about categories such as ‘attitudes’ and ‘intelligence’, “the 
naming of psychological categories is really quite arbitrary” (Danziger, 1997, p.6). From the 
findings described throughout the literature review, the historical contexts where this emotion 
has been represented, and the many descriptions it received throughout this thesis, there 
appears to be no one set of characteristics, neither of form nor of functions, which are 
common to all experiences of this emotion. For example, take the various descriptions of its 
affective character. Both descriptions of positive and negative valenced experiences have 
been described for this emotion. These match those in the literature, where previous studies 
have reported participants having both positive and negative feelings during awe inductions 
(e.g., A. M. Gordon et al., 2017) and which broadly correspond to historical descriptions of 
awe as both negative or mixed (Burke, 1990/1757) and positive (McDougall, 2015/1908). 
Similarly, this emotion was described both as positive and negative by the science 
communicators interviewed in chapter seven. Likewise, they described awe situations as 
mostly exciting but sometimes calming. Such affective dissonance linked to the same term 
also parallels results showing both sympathetic activation and withdrawal as part of this 
emotion’s profile (e.g., Chirico et al., 2017; Shiota et al., 2011). Such apparent contradictions 
for the same emotional category have largely been brushed aside by researchers, for example 
dismissing awe as simply having a “novel and complex” profile (Shiota et al., 2014, p. 365), 
describing it as part of an altered state of consciousness (Yaden et al., 2017), presuming it to 
have both positive and threat-based variants (e.g. A. M. Gordon et al., 2017), or suggesting 
that some instantiations are not authentic awe (see Keltner, 2009). Certainly, descriptions of 
vastness and need for accommodation (Keltner & Haidt, 2003) correspond to one of the many 
scripts of awe that circulate in our culture. In my view, however, the field of awe studies 
should proceed in the same way as Barrett (2009) argues the field of psychology should, by 
 
111 There is no reference to positionality in any of their work on awe. This is intriguing considering how much attention, for example, 
Jonathan Haidt’s has placed on issues of identity, ideology, and their effect on the production of knowledge (e.g., Haidt, 2012).  
112 I sometimes wonder whether the historical trajectory taken by the word ‘awful’ from having a somewhat positive to a very negative 




beginning to “reconsider its vocabulary of categories” (Barrett, 2009, p.327) moving away 
from the view of awe as a ‘natural kind’ (Barrett, 2006a) and that arbitrary and narrow 
definition by Keltner and Haidt (2003). 
 
Again, this is not to say that awe is not real or meaningful as an object of investigation113. 
Awe is real in the same way all “emotions are real” (Barrett, 2012, p. 413), as the result of the 
collective agreement of individuals that give it form and function within situations in culture. 
Reconsidering the vocabulary around awe would mean moving away from its reductionist 
conceptualization and treating it instead as a complex and holistic phenomenon (Barrett, 
2013). For example, it can be treated as the result of contextually situated primitive 
psychological processes (e.g., categorization of elements of situations), in concert with social 
(e.g., acculturation of awe), cultural (e.g., discourses of awe) and historical (e.g., histories of 
awe) contingencies, that situate the biological body within the larger contexts in which it 
develops (see Boddice, 2018; Boddice & M. Smith, 2020). 
 
More importantly, the work that treats this emotion category as explanans to a variety of 
phenomena such as prosociality (Piff et al., 2015), autonomic physiology (Shiota et al., 
2011), memory (Danvers & Shiota, 2017), and information processing (Valdesolo & Graham, 
2014), can be re-evaluated in terms of situated domain-general processes. Re-evaluating awe 
as explanans, however, does not entail discarding it altogether as a useful category for 
analysis in the social sciences. As a result of the highly complex and dynamic interactions of 
domain-general processes within a social and cultural setting, awe has emergent 
characteristics that cannot be reduced to just those domain-general processes (Barrett, 2013). 
Awe could be a useful category in relation to the level of explanation, analytical approach, 
and methods used to describe its components and emergent properties. The possibility of 
using awe as a category to explain phenomena, nonetheless, hinges on the ability to skilfully 
situate this emotion in context through ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973) of the social-
cultural practices, historical contexts, and specific situations in which the described processes 
occur. Taking the narrow view of awe characterised by the classical view as one of many 
scripts and moving towards a theoretical stance that places context front and centre will help 
 




to build much-needed bridges between psychology, sociology, anthropology, and history (see 
Boddice 2020a). 
 
One final implication of sticking to the narrow conceptualization of awe presented by Haidt 
and Keltner (2003) is that it perpetuates hegemonic discursive and aesthetic formations of 
emotion that have deep, and often harmful, social effects. The imposition of a definition of 
authentic awe as requiring vastness and need for accommodation (Keltner, 2009; Keltner & 
Haidt, 2003) performs boundary work in its invalidation of people’s experiences if they do 
not conform to such normative characterizations (see Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990). 
Experiences of awe described in terms of the small, the picturesque, the mundane, the 
familiar, and the beautiful, all of which are common in literature outside affective science 
(e.g., Economides, 2016; Sideris, 2017; Vasalou, 2015), and which were also observed 
throughout this thesis, do not conform to Haidt and Keltner’s (2003) model. It is worth 
highlighting that these authors’ characterization of awe is mostly based on a Burkean and 
Kantian sublime, which have been thoroughly criticized as sexist, ethnocentric, and detached 
from environmental concerns (e.g., Freeman, 1995; A. K. Mellor, 1993; Yaeger, 1989). The 
gender and racial differences in the representation of this emotion in children’s picture books, 
as well as some of the interviewees’ descriptions of awe, indicate the enduring prevalence of 
such stereotypes. These negative stereotypes, however, are being further emboldened by their 
implicit validation in highly cited scientific discourse114. 
 
Similarly, the classical view’s narrow characterization of awe is thoroughly within the 
positive psychology discourse on emotions (Shiota et al., 2017), a hegemonic discourse well 
inscribed into injurious neoliberal narratives of the self, work, and life (e.g., Cabanas, 2018; 
Cabanas & Illouz, 2019). Despite the well-intentioned nature of much of the positive 
psychology work on emotions such as happiness, it has brought a host of increasingly 
documented adverse effects on people and society, such as anxiety, narcissism, and the 
reproduction of consumerist fantasies that are a driving part of environmental calamity we are 
now living in (e.g., Adams et al., 2019; Cederström & Spicer, 2015). For example, the 
promotion of awe as a cure for psychological ills (Anderson et al., 2018), and the ways in 
which the wellness industry has embraced it (e.g., F. Williams, 2017), puts the onus of ‘being 
 
114 Unfortunately, the research program on awe based on Keltner and Haidt’s definition (2003) seems hell-bent on reviving the Burkean 




well’ and self-improvement on the individual rather than on social and political structures 
driving inequality, poverty, and social breakdown, diverting attention away from the 
deprivations stemming from our sociopolitical institutions (for discussions of this issue in the 
context of mindfulness, see Hari, 2019; Purser, 2019). In short, embracing the classical 
definition of awe within larger, hegemonic, individualistic, and consumer-driven discourses 
of the self has consequences well beyond academia. 
 
I believe it is imperative that scholars continue to interrogate essentialist claims about the 
‘true’ nature of awe, remembering that such claims are based on specific cultural histories, 
such as the Burkean and Kantian sublime and the positive psychology movement. I 
encourage a broader approach that lends itself to a more comprehensive, and arguably more 
scientific, understanding of the many phenomena described in much awe-research, one 
grounded in domain-general processes within a predictive paradigm of psychology 
(Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019) situated in sociocultural and historical realities (Boddice, 
2018). Such an approach injects emergentist, contextualism, and critical ideas to document 
not only individual, but also the broader societal effects of awe in the different situations in 
which it is represented. 
 
8.2. Implications for science communication 
Despite every attempt to redress its failures, the standard “deficit model” remains the 
dominant approach to science communication practices (Simis et al., 2016). Deficit forms of 
science communication are associated with naïve views of science, in which scientific 
knowledge is seen both as objective and detached (Perrault, 2013). Emotions in these models 
are mostly seen as tools that science communicators can use to achieve their narrow 
communicative goals (see Chapman et al., 2017) yet are not constitutive of the scientific 
knowledge conveyed. The classical view of emotion, with its separation between cognitive 
and affective mental phenomena (e.g., Ekman, 1992, 2003; Tracy & Randles, 2011), implies 
that knowledge can be disentangled from its affective mooring. Such an approach is 
reminiscent of the old Platonic distinction between reason and passion, emotion and thought, 
hearts and minds (Lutz, 1986, see Barrett, 2020). The deficit model view of knowledge is 





However, as philosophers and anthropologists have decried, and the constructionist view of 
emotion has validated, “all psychological events exist in affective space” (Hutchinson & 
Barrett, 2019, p. 287) (i.e., knowledge is affectively laden). Affect is a manifestation of 
allostatic regulation and serves as a domain-general process used in all cognitive processes 
(Barrett, 2017c; Barrett et al., 2014; Barrett & Simmons, 2015). Affect focuses our attention 
on the allostatically relevant objects in the environment and motivates action towards 
engaging with such objects, among other things (Gendron et al., 2020). More importantly, it 
is an aspect of every situation, grounding all knowledge in the body (Barsalou et al., 2018), 
ephemerally and inescapably working as “a feature of all concepts” (Gendron et al., 2020, p. 
208). Work that shows the prevalence of interoceptive representation in all categories (Lynott 
et al., 2020) and the presence of micro-valences in even the most mundane objects (Lebrecht 
et al., 2012), are only a few examples showing that the boundary between cognitive 
‘knowledge’ processes (e.g., memory, thinking, mentalizing) and affective manifestations 
such as emotion, is a cultural stereotype that has no basis in the actual functioning of the 
brain (Barrett, 2009; Danziger, 1997; Lutz, 1986). Deficit model approaches, then, are not 
just flawed in that they are ineffective at facilitating people’s understanding of science (see 
Logan, 2001; Simis et al., 2016). They are also based on ontological assumptions about the 
nature of the mind and knowledge that are presently hotly contested in the psychological 
sciences. Including these latest developments is both warranted and timely for science 
communication endeavours. 
 
Any training delivered to science communicators that is based on overly simplistic, weakly 
supported versions of the human mind, such as those in which cognition and emotion are 
seen as independent phenomena, is problematic (see Barrett, 2020). This is particularly the 
case as we continue to put expectations of public engagement on scientists and science 
communicators who endorse outdated rationalistic understandings of the mind, such as those 
peddling 19th century utilitarian economics (Simis et al., 2016). Courses for future science 
communicators should include modules on the latest understanding of the human mind, those 
that break with the popular ‘faculty psychology’ and rational choice frameworks which have 
dominated the cultural practices of the Western, industrialized worlds for so long (Barrett, 





In addition, there are concrete implications of the prediction paradigm of psychological 
sciences, in which the constructionist view is inscribed (Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019), for 
science communication practices, particularly in relation to the current research on awe. 
Some of the most common types of awe in the literature (e.g., Valdesolo et al., 2017) and the 
studies in this thesis relate this emotion to categories such as excitement, surprise, wonder, 
curiosity, and learning – outcomes that are seen by many as desirable in science 
communication activities (e.g., Besley et al., 2016; Brown & Scholl, 2014; Davies, 2019; 
Metcalfe, 2019; Treise & Weigold, 2002). The uncertainty, arousal, and acquisition of new 
knowledge implicit in these categories have all been associated with prediction error – the 
updating of the brain’s model of the world from unanticipated information (Barrett, 2017c; 
Theriault et al., 2020). Considering that much of the stated goals of science communication 
practices, particularly those of deficit model approaches, are related to giving new 
information and adjusting people’s attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge (Bucchi, 2008; 
Metcalfe, 2019), much of the culture of science communication is dedicated to the promotion 
of situations where people’s expectations are violated, requiring their brains to be constantly 
updating their internal model (i.e., prediction error). Many of the practices around some of 
the awe-types in science communication observed throughout this thesis are promoting these 
prediction error-related outcomes, which are at the centre of many, if not most, science 
communication practices. 
 
However, prediction error in general, and that implied in these awe-types, is metabolically 
costly, and as such, the brain tries to avoid it in many situations (Theriault et al., 2020). The 
brain is continuously trying to balance its energetic resources and needs in its enactment of its 
internal model (Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019). As such, it is continuously trying to anticipate 
(i.e., predicting) its energy needs before they arise (i.e., allostasis), something that is efficient 
both in the short and long term (Barrett, 2017c; Sterling, 2012). Prediction error is part of the 
brain’s normal functioning having a crucial evolutionary function of updating the brain’s 
model in the encoding of new conceptual knowledge in memory to improve the accuracy of 
future predictions and anticipate energy requirements (see Barrett, 2017c; Spratling, 2017). 
However, updating the internal model from a mismatch between the input and the prediction 
uses considerable resources (e.g., glucose, water, ATP) taxing the nervous system in different 
ways as a result of the energy imbalance this mismatch generates, ultimately motivating 





Awe-based science communication activities that are continually requiring participants’ 
brains to update their internal models (i.e., generate prediction error) may then be overtaxing 
people’s nervous systems. I believe then that the continuous imposition of situations with 
prediction error might be deleterious to getting more people to engage with science 
communication. If every engagement with science communication results in surprise, 
novelty, learning, or whatever other conceptualization in which prediction error is its 
outcome, including many of the awe-types observed in this thesis, many people’s brains are 
going to associate this space with those metabolic costs incurred. As the brain predicts those 
losses before they arise, science communication spaces will be avoided by many. This, I 
believe, lies in many people’s conceptualization of science as boring, difficult, or alienating, 
and their general lack of engagement with science communication. You could think of this 
hypothesis as the physiological and metabolic antecedents of “eww science”. 
 
If true, this hypothesis might have serious implications in the way science is communicated. 
Activities designed with science knowledge learning goals in mind and that use excitement, 
novelty, awe, and other tools to achieve such outcomes, may be repellent to people whose 
brains do not want to tax their physiological budget with a barrage of prediction error. The 
poor, the overworked, the stressed out, minorities, those who do not sleep well, the 
depressed, immigrants, people dealing with trauma, and all those who have an already 
strained nervous system (Barrett, 2017a; Fridman et al., 2019; Gendron et al., 2020) will find 
it even harder to engage with these spaces, thereby perpetuating many of the inequities in 
access already so present in the culture of science communication (Canfield et al., 2020). A 
science communication culture conducive to engaging as many people as possible should aim 
then to strike a balance between excitement, newness, hype, and learning on the one hand, 
and products and practices that are familiar, common, ordinary, safe, and monotonous, which 
do not ask too much of the many audiences, on the other. Awe-types that do not promote 
constant prediction error could be used to make people feel at ease in a science 
communication space. Of course, this needs to be contextually situated as the meanings of 
excitement, new, ordinary, safe, familiar, and awe change from place to place for the many 





One such audience-based difference is age group. People have varying capacities to deal with 
prediction error at different points in life, and these align with developmental changes (see 
Hoemann et al., 2019). Whereas early infants have prediction error as their default setting, 
and children can take in a higher load of the energy mismatch generated by prediction error 
(Atzil et al., 2018), adults will increasingly avoid arousing situations that tax their energy 
budgets (Theriault et al., 2020). This would mean that engaging people with exciting and 
novel science and science-based activities will become more challenging as they grow older. 
Moreover, acculturation processes whereby people have to learn the conceptual knowledge 
through which they can participate in a cultural space (Gendron et al., 2020) become harder 
with age. This speaks to the importance of enculturating children early into social practices 
within this cultural space, thus normalizing the expectation of prediction error and 
incorporating these into the calculation of the energy expenditures required for interaction 
with this cultural space. Such a consideration reveals why science communicators must be 
cognizant of how the age group of their audience influences their capacity for engagement. 
Thus, it can help to create spaces that ‘soften the landing’, getting people’s brains to 
smoothly update the model and feel welcomed and comfortable in these spaces. Perhaps 
science communication practices could find ways of easing the energetic load and cognitive 
stress that comes with having to learn the conceptual knowledge with which to engage with a 
novel cultural space, by establishing points of familiarity and common ground, while slowly 
moving to the point where prediction error can occur. Essentially, science communicators’ 
willingness to adopt an energetically-aware appreciation of the old adage “know your 
audience” will be central for engaging many historically disengaged communities. 
 
Many of the awe-types in science communication observed throughout this thesis are used as 
tools to teach new scientific knowledge, generate excitement for science, and maintain a 
stable workforce of scientists (i.e., deficit-style goals). Moreover, some of the types of awe 
described carry with them hierarchical and exclusionary mandates resultant from historical 
legacies. The combination of deficit-style goals, the hierarchical and exclusionary mandates 
surrounding certain varieties of this emotion, and the prevalence of its representations that 
impose high metabolic costs on people, might be contributing to many people ‘feeling left 
out’ (Humm et al., 2020) from participating in this cultural space. Moving away from a 
representational repertoire that perpetuates exclusionary mandates and establishes high 




practitioners with a democratic bent who want to ‘preach’ to those beyond the already 
converted.  
 
8.3. Implications for the study of emotions in science communication 
Finally, the constructionist view can contribute to the study of emotions in science 
communication. As previously highlighted, most of the work on the role of emotions in 
science communication defines these using mechanistic stimulus-response-output schemes 
derived from the classical view of emotions (see Chapman et al., 2017). Whether these are 
studies looking at the role of emotions in risk processing (e.g., Witte & Allen, 2000), the 
formation and change of beliefs (e.g., O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009), or behaviours (e.g., 
Yeo et al., 2018), these studies represent most of the work in the field of science 
communication. As I have highlighted throughout this thesis, the evidence for the theoretical 
and epistemological frameworks used in these studies is dubious at best. For example, guilt 
or fear shouldn’t be interpreted as causing increased support for climate change proposals or 
creating motivations to engage with the topic (e.g., Bilandzic et al., 2017; Lu & Schuldt, 
2015). Instead, some people will construct certain cultural scripts for these emotion 
categories in relation to their life experience and the laboratory situations in which the studies 
were set, through which they co-constructed the pro-environmental motivations, beliefs, and 
attitudes presented in the results. In other words, emotion categories are dynamically 
constituted in culturally-laden scripts to tackle a particular matter in a situation within a 
socio-cultural and historical context. Some versions of fear and some versions of hope might 
engender such responses, but ‘whose fear and hope is this?’ and ‘where are these emotion 
conceptualizations happening?’ are perhaps better questions to be asking. In this sense, I 
suggest moving away from the idealized laboratory paradigms used in many of these studies 
in which participants are primed in ways that supposedly elicit a discrete emotional response, 
with experimenters then measuring how this affective state influences their response to a 
questionnaire or a task (e.g., Bilandzic et al., 2017; Yeo et al., 2018). Future research can use 
ecological and ideographic approaches that consider the range of forms and functions that 
emotions assume within individuals and across the diverse set of contexts navigated by 
people in the real world (e.g., Conner & Mehl, 2015). More importantly, the study of these 
emotions could be accompanied by thick descriptions of the particular histories of the 
emotion types expressed by participants and the lives of those who construct them through 





Addressing questions about people’s feelings about a particular science policy, the affective 
value they assign to particular beliefs and motivations around science, or how to evaluate 
different emotion framings for a science-related campaign, requires a broader and more 
complex view of emotions than what is currently applied to these important issues. Ideally, 
this is one that does not treat emotions as “simple levers” or tools (Chapman et al., 2017, p. 
850) to be pulled indiscriminately on an audience to generate axiomatic engagement 
responses or that assigns one-to-one functionalities to emotion categories, but instead puts 
context front and centre with the research agenda. Only then will the study of emotions in 
science communication be able to answer questions about how people relate affectively to 
scientific topics. 
 
8.4. Final words 
This thesis had an overarching research objective, which was to investigate the nature of awe 
in the communication of science. However, this topic also opened a space for me to learn 
about the study of emotions, awe, and science communication more generally. What I found 
at first was both dismal and encouraging. On the one hand, I found a field in turmoil, much of 
it unaware of its own cultural biases, and siloed in one academic subdiscipline. On the other 
hand, I found the excitement of a group of scientists standing at the cusp of a paradigm shift 
in our understanding of the human mind and its place in culture and society. This thesis has 
resulted from my humble attempt to catch the wave of this paradigm shift and begin to 
explore what it means to think of emotions as constructions and science communication as a 
cultural space. Leaving behind the many constraints and limitations of the classical view of 
emotions and its take on awe, freed me to observe and assess the special place this emotion 
has in science communication, the diversity of forms and functions it takes, its unique 
histories, and the contextual and situational nature of its varieties. It is my hope that future 
researchers adopt some of the ideas presented in this thesis and expound on them further, 
working together to develop a more detailed understanding of how people relate affectively 







Abd-El-Khalick, F. (2002). Images of nature of science in middle grade science trade books. 
New Advocate, 15(2), 121–127. 
Abrams, M. H. (1971). Natural supernaturalism. Norton. 
Abu-Lughod, L. (1988). Veiled sentiments: Honor and poetry in a Bedouin society. 
University of California Press. 
Adams, G., Estrada-Villalta, S., Sullivan, D., & Markus, H. R. (2019). The psychology of 
neoliberalism and the neoliberalism of psychology: Neoliberalism of psychology. 
Journal of Social Issues, 75(1), 189–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12305 
Adobe. (2020). Adobe Acrobat Pro DC [Computer software]. 
https://acrobat.adobe.com/nz/en/acrobat/acrobat-pro.html 
Ahmed, S. (2004) The cultural politics of emotion. Routledge. 
Aikenhead, G. S. (1996). Science education: Border crossing into the subculture of science. 
Studies in Science Education, 27(1), 1–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057269608560077 
Aikenhead, G. S. (2001). Science communication with the public: A cross-cultural event. In 
S. M. Stocklmayer, M. M. Gore, & C. Bryant (Eds.), Science communication in theory 
and practice (pp. 23–45). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978- 94-010-0620-0_2 
Aikenhead, G. S. (2006). Science education for everyday life: Evidence-based practice. 
Teachers College Press. 
Aizawa, A. (2003). An information-theoretic perspective of tf–idf measures. Information 
Processing & Management, 39(1), 45–65. 
Alioto, A. M. (1993). A history of Western science. Prentice-Hall. 
Allport, F. H. (1924). Social psychology. Houghton Mifflin. 
Altarriba, J., Bauer, L. M., & Benvenuto, C. (1999). Concreteness, context availability, and 
imageability ratings and word associations for abstract, concrete, and emotion words. 
Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 31(4), 578–602. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03200738 
Anandarajan, M., Hill, C., & Nolan, T. (2019). Practical text analytics: Maximizing the value 
of text data. Springer. 
Anderson, C. L., Dixson, D. D., Monroy, M., & Keltner, D. (2020). Are awe‐prone people 
more curious? The relationship between dispositional awe, curiosity, and academic 




Anderson, C. L., Monroy, M., & Keltner, D. (2018). Awe in nature heals: Evidence from 
military veterans, at-risk youth, and college students. Emotion, 18(8), 1195–1202. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000442 
Andrews, M., Vigliocco, G., & Vinson, D. (2009). Integrating experiential and distributional 
data to learn semantic representations. Psychological Review, 116(3), 463–498. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016261 
Arcangeli, M., Sperduti, M., Jacquot, A., Piolino, P., & Dokic, J. (2020). Awe and the 
Experience of the Sublime: A Complex Relationship. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 
1340. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01340 
Archer, L., Dawson, E., DeWitt, J., Seakins, A., & Wong, B. (2015). “Science capital”: A 
conceptual, methodological, and empirical argument for extending bourdieusian 
notions of capital beyond the arts. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 52(7), 
922–948. https://doi.org/10.1002/tea.21227 
Arksey, H., & Knight, P. T. (1999). Interviewing for social scientists. Sage.  
Arnold, M. B. (1960). Emotion and personality. Columbia University Press. 
Ashfield, A., & De Bolla, P. (1996). The sublime: A reader in British eighteenth-century 
aesthetic theory. Cambridge University Press. 
Aslin, R. N. (2017). Statistical learning: A powerful mechanism that operates by mere 
exposure. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 8(1–2), e1373. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1373 
Assarroudi, A., Heshmati Nabavi, F., Armat, M. R., Ebadi, A., & Vaismoradi, M. (2018). 
Directed qualitative content analysis: The description and elaboration of its 
underpinning methods and data analysis process. Journal of Research in Nursing, 
23(1), 42–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/1744987117741667 
Association for Library Service to Children. (2020). Notable Children’s Books. 
http://www.ala.org/alsc/awardsgrants/notalists/ncb 
Atkinson, D. (1999). Scientific discourse in sociohistorical context, The Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 1675-1975. Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Atkinson, D. (2004). Contrasting rhetorics/contrasting cultures: Why contrastive rhetoric 





Atzil, S., Gao, W., Fradkin, I., & Barrett, L. F. (2018). Growing a social brain. Nature 
Human Behaviour, 2, 624–636. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0384-6 
Averill, J. R. (1980). A constructivist view of emotion. In R. Plutchik & H. Kellerman (Eds.), 
Theories of emotion (pp. 305–339). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0- 
12-558701-3.50018-1 
Averill. J.R. (2012). The future of social constructionism: Introduction to a special section of 
emotion review. Emotion Review, 4(3), 215–220. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073912439811  
Bååth, R. (2010). ChildFreq: an online tool to explore word frequencies in child language. 
LUCS Minor, 16, 1–6. http://childfreq.sumsar.net/ 
Babb, Y. M., McBurnie, J., & Miller, K. K. (2018). Tracking the environment in Australian 
children’s literature: The Children’s Book Council of Australia Picture Book of the 
Year Awards 1955-2014. Environmental Education Research, 24(5), 716–730. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2017.1326020 
Baccianella, S., Esuli, A., & Sebastiani, F. (2010). Sentiwordnet 3.0: An enhanced lexical 
resource for sentiment analysis and opinion mining. In Proceedings of the Seventh 
International Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC'10) (pp. 
2200–2204). European Language Resources Association.  
Bacon, F. (1872). The works of Francis Bacon. Longman, Green, Longman, & Roberts. 
Bader, B. (2013). Persons of interest: The untold rewards of picture book biographies. The 
Horn Book Magazine, 89(5), 11–18. 
Bai, Y., Maruskin, L. A., Chen, S., Gordon, A. M., Stellar, J. E., McNeil, G. D., Peng, K., & 
Keltner, D. (2017). Awe, the diminished self, and collective engagement: Universals 
and cultural variations in the small self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
113(2), 185–209. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000087 
Bailey, J. (2008). First steps in qualitative data analysis: Transcribing. Family Practice, 
25(2), 127–131. https://doi.org/10.1093/fampra/cmn003 
Ball, P. (2013). Curiosity: How science became interested in everything. University of 
Chicago Press.  
Bamberg, M. (1997). Language, concepts and emotions: The role of language in the 





Banerjee, A., & Dave, R. N. (2004). Validating clusters using the Hopkins statistic. In 
Proceedings 2004 IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy Systems (pp. 149-153). 
IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/FUZZY.2004.1375706 
Bang-Jensen, V. (2010). A children’s choice program: Insights into book selection, social 
relationships, and reader identity. Language Arts, 87(3), 169–176. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41804686 
Baram-Tsabari, A., & Lewenstein, B. V. (2017). Science communication training: What are 
we trying to teach? International Journal of Science Education, Part B, 7(3), 285–300. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21548455.2017.1303756 
Barbauld, A. L. A. (1874). A Selection from the Poems and Prose Writings of Mrs. Anna 
Laetitia Barbauld. Osgood. 
Barrett, L. F. (2006a). Are emotions natural kinds? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 
1(1), 28–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2006.00003.x 
Barrett, L. F. (2006b). Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and the experience of 
emotion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(1), 20–46. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1001_2 
Barrett, L. F. (2009). The future of psychology: Connecting mind to brain. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 4(4), 326–339. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745- 
6924.2009.01134.x 
Barrett, L. F. (2012). Emotions are real. Emotion, 12(3), 413–429. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027555 
Barrett, L. F. (2013). Psychological construction: The Darwinian approach to the science of 
emotion. Emotion Review, 5(4), 379–389. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073913489753 
Barrett, L. F. (2016). Navigating the science of emotion. In H. L. Meiselman (Ed.), Emotion 
measurement (pp. 31–63). Woodhead Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08- 
100508-8.00002-3 
Barrett, L. F. (2017a). How emotions are made: The secret life of the brain. Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt. 
Barrett, L. F. (2017b). Functionalism cannot save the classical view of emotion. Social 





Barrett, L. F. (2017c). The theory of constructed emotion: An active inference account of 
interoception and categorization. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 12(1), 
1–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsw154 
Barrett, L. F. (2020). Seven and a half lessons about the brain. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
Barrett, L. F., & Bliss‐Moreau, E. (2009). Affect as a psychological primitive. In M. P. Zanna 
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 41, pp. 167–218). Elsevier 
Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)00404-8 
Barrett, L. F., & Russell, J. A. (2014). The psychological construction of emotion. Guilford. 
Barrett, L. F., & Satpute, A. B. (2013). Large-scale brain networks in affective and social 
neuroscience: Towards an integrative functional architecture of the brain. Social and 
Emotional Neuroscience, 23(3), 361–372. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2012.12.012 
Barrett, L. F., & Satpute, A. B. (2019). Historical pitfalls and new directions in the 
neuroscience of emotion. Neuroscience Letters, 693, 9–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neulet.2017.07.045 
Barrett, L. F., & Simmons, W. K. (2015). Interoceptive predictions in the brain. Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 16(7), 419–429. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3950 
Barrett, L. F., Adolphs, R., Marsella, S., Martinez, A. M., & Pollak, S. D. (2019). Emotional 
expressions reconsidered: Challenges to inferring emotion from human facial 
movements. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 20(1), 1–68. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100619832930 
Barrett, L. F., Lindquist, K. A., & Gendron, M. (2007). Language as context for the 
perception of emotion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(8), 327–332. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.06.003 
Barrett, L. F., Mesquita, B., & Gendron, M. (2011). Context in emotion perception. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 20(5), 286–290. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721411422522 
Barrett, L. F., Wilson-Mendenhall, C. D., & Barsalou, L. W. (2014). The conceptual act 
theory: A road map. In L. F. Barrett & J. A. Russell (Eds.), The psychological 
construction of emotion (pp. 83–110). Guilford Press. 
Barsalou, L. W. (1983). Ad hoc categories. Memory & Cognition, 11(3), 211–227. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196968 





Barsalou, L. W. (2003). Situated simulation in the human conceptual system. Language and 
Cognitive Processes, 18(5–6), 513–562. https://doi.org/10.1080/01690960344000026 
Barsalou, L. W. (2005). Situated conceptualization. In H. Cohen & C. Lefebvre (Eds.), 
Handbook of categorization in cognitive science (pp. 619–650). Elsevier Science Ltd. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008044612-7/50083-4 
Barsalou, L. W. (2007). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59(1), 617–645. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639 
Barsalou, L. W. (2009). Simulation, situated conceptualization, and prediction. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364(1521), 1281–1289. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0319 
Barsalou, L. W. (2010). Grounded cognition: Past, present, and future. Topics in Cognitive 
Science, 2(4), 716–724. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01115.x 
Barsalou, L. W. (2011). Integrating Bayesian analysis and mechanistic theories in grounded 
cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(4), 191–192. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11000197 
Barsalou, L. W. (2012). The human conceptual system. In M. J. Spivey, K. McRae, & M. F. 
Joanisse (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of psycholinguistics (pp. 239–258). 
Cambridge University Press. 
Barsalou, L. W. (2016a). Situated conceptualization: Theory and applications. In Y. Coello & 
M.H. Fischer (Eds.), Foundations of embodied cognition: Perceptual and emotional 
embodiment (pp. 11–37). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. 
Barsalou, L. W. (2016b). Can cognition be reduced to action? In A. K. Engel, K. J. Friston, & 
D. Kragic (Eds.), The pragmatic turn (pp. 81–96). MIT Press. 
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262034326.003.0005 
Barsalou, L. W. (2016c). On staying grounded and avoiding quixotic dead ends. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(4), 1122–1142. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423- 
016-1028-3 
Barsalou, L. W. (2017a). Cognitively plausible theories of concept composition. In J. A. 
Hampton & Y. Winter (Eds.), Compositionality and concepts in linguistics and 
psychology (pp. 9–30). Springer. 
Barsalou, L. W. (2017b). What does semantic tiling of the cortex tell us about semantics? 
Special Issue: Concepts, Actions and Objects: Functional and Neural Perspectives, 




Barsalou, L. W. (2019). Establishing generalizable mechanisms. Psychological Inquiry, 
30(4), 220–230. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2019.1693857 
Barsalou, L. W. (2020). Challenges and opportunities for grounding cognition. Journal of 
Cognition, 3(1), 31, 1–24. http://doi.org/10.5334/joc.116 
Barsalou, L. W., & Wiemer-Hastings, K. (2005). Situating abstract concepts. In D. Pecher & 
R. Zwaan (Eds.), Grounding cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, 
language, and thought (pp. 129–163). Cambridge University Press. 
Barsalou, L. W., Dutriaux, L., & Scheepers, C. (2018). Moving beyond the distinction 
between concrete and abstract concepts. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 373(1752), 20170144. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0144 
Barsalou, L. W., Kyle Simmons, W., Barbey, A. K., & Wilson, C. D. (2003). Grounding 
conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(2), 
84–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(02)00029-3 
Barsalou, L. W., Santos, A., Simmons, W. K., & Wilson, C. D. (2008). Language and 
simulation in conceptual processing. In M. de Vega, A. Glenberg, & A. Graesser 
(Eds.), Symbols and embodiment: Debates on meaning and cognition (pp. 245– 283). 
Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217274.003.0013 
Bauer, M. W., Allum, N., & Miller, S. (2007). What can we learn from 25 years of PUS 
survey research? Liberating and expanding the agenda. Public Understanding of 
Science, 16(1), 79–95. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662506071287 
Bauer, M.W., & Gaskell, G. (1999) Towards a paradigm for research on social 
representations. Journal for the Theory of Human Behaviour, 29(2), 163–183, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5914.00096 
BBVA Foundation. (2011). International Study on Scientific Culture: Understanding of 
Science. Department of Social Studies and Public Opinion BBVA Foundation. 
https://www.fbbva.es/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/dat/Understandingsciencenotalarga.pdf 
Beatty, A. (2013). Current emotion research in anthropology: Reporting the field. Emotion 
Review, 5(4), 414–422. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073913490045 
Bell, A. R. (2008). Science as pantomime: Explorations in contemporary children’s non- 




Benjamini, Y., & Hochberg, Y. (1995). Controlling the false discovery rate: A practical and 
powerful approach to multiple testing. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B 
(Methodological), 57(1), 289-300. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1995.tb02031.x 
Bensaude-Vincent, B. (2001). A genealogy of the increasing gap between science and the 
public. Public Understanding of Science, 10(1), 99–113. 
https://doi.org/10.3109/a036858 
Bergman Deitcher, D., Johnson, H., & Aram, D. (2019). Does book genre matter? Boys’ and 
girls’ word learning from narrative and informational books in the preschool years. 
Journal of Research in Reading, 42(1), 193–211. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
9817.12266 
Besley, J. C., Dudo, A. D., Yuan, S., & Abi Ghannam, N. (2016). Qualitative interviews with 
science communication trainers about communication objectives and goals. Science 
Communication, 38(3), 356–381. https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547016645640 
Biederman, I., & Shiffrar, M. M. (1987). Sexing day-old chicks: A case study and expert 
systems analysis of a difficult perceptual-learning task. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13(4), 640–
645. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.13.4.640 
Bilandzic, H., Kalch, A., & Soentgen, J. (2017). Effects of goal framing and emotions on 
perceived threat and willingness to sacrifice for climate change. Science 
Communication, 39(4), 466–491. https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547017718553 
Blake, W. (2002). Collected poems. Random House. 
Blue, G. (2018) Scientism: A problem at the heart of formal public engagement with climate 
change. ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographers, 17(2), 544–560. 
https://www.acmejournal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/1554. 
Blue, G. (2019). Science communication is culture: Foregrounding ritual in the public 
communication of science. Science Communication, 41(2), 243–253. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547018816456 
Boddice, R. (2018). The history of emotions. Manchester University Press. 
Boddice, R. (2019). A history of feelings. Reaktion Books. 
Boddice, R. (2020a). History looks forward: Interdisciplinary and critical emotion research. 
Emotion Review, 12(3), 131–134. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073920930786 
Boddice, R. (2020b). The cultural brain as historical artifact. In L. J. Kirmayer, C. M. 




brain (pp. 367–374). Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108695374.018 
Boddice, R., & Smith, M. (2020). Emotion, sense, experience (Elements in histories of 
emotions and the senses). Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108884952 
Bodmer, W. F. (1985). The public understanding of science. The Royal Society. 
Boiger, M., Ceulemans, E., De Leersnyder, J., Uchida, Y., Norasakkunkit, V., & Mesquita, 
B. (2018). Beyond essentialism: Cultural differences in emotions revisited. Emotion, 
18(8), 1142–1162. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000390 
Boiger, M., De Deyne, S., & Mesquita, B. (2013). Emotions in “the world”: Cultural 
practices, products, and meanings of anger and shame in two individualist cultures. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 4(867), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00867 
Boiger, M., Mesquita, B., Uchida, Y., & Barrett, L. F. (2013). Condoned or condemned: The 
situational affordance of anger and shame in the United States and Japan. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39(4), 540–553. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213478201 
Bonner, E. T., & Friedman, H. L. (2011). A conceptual clarification of the experience of awe: 
An interpretative phenomenological analysis. The Humanistic Psychologist, 39(3), 
222–235. https://doi.org/10.1080/08873267.2011.593372 
Borghi, A. M., Barca, L., Binkofski, F., & Tummolini, L. (2018). Abstract concepts, 
language and sociality: From acquisition to inner speech. Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 373(1752), 20170134. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0134 
Borghi, A. M., Barca, L., Binkofski, F., Castelfranchi, C., Pezzulo, G., & Tummolini, L. 
(2019). Words as social tools: Language, sociality and inner grounding in abstract 
concepts. Physics of Life Reviews, 29, 120–153. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2018.12.001 
Borghi, A. M., Binkofski, F., Castelfranchi, C., Cimatti, F., Scorolli, C., & Tummolini, L. 
(2017). The challenge of abstract concepts. Psychological Bulletin, 143(3), 263–292. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000089 
Borghi, A. M., Caramelli, N., & Setti, A. (2016). How abstract is risk for workers? Expertise, 





Bradley, B. S. (2011). Darwin’s sublime: The contest between reason and imagination in ‘On 
the origin of species’. Journal of the History of Biology, 44(2), 205–232. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10739-009-9210-3 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2013). Successful qualitative research: A practical guide for 
beginners. Sage. 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2019). Reflecting on reflexive thematic analysis. Qualitative 
Research in Sport, Exercise and Health, 11(4), 589–597. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/2159676X.2019.1628806 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2020). One size fits all? What counts as quality practice in 
(reflexive) thematic analysis? Qualitative Research in Psychology, 1–25. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14780887.2020.1769238 
Bray, A., Ismay, C., Baumer, B., & Çetinkaya Rundel, M. (2018). infer: Tidy Statistical 
Inference, [Computer software]. https:// CRAN.R-project.org/package=infer 
Broks, P. (2006). Understanding popular science. McGraw-Hill Education. 
Brossard, D. (2013). New media landscapes and the science information consumer. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110, (Supplement 3), 14096–14101. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1212744110 
Brown, P., & Scholl, R. (2014). Expert interviews with science communicators: How 
perceptions of audience values influence science communication values and practices. 
F1000Research, 3. 
Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1992). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. Sociological 
Methods & Research, 21(2), 230–258. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124192021002005 
Brunner, J. L. (2019). Teachers’ use of educative features in guides for nature of science 
read-alouds. Science & Education, 28(3), 413–437. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-
019-00039-z 
Brunner, J. L., & Abd-El-Khalick, F. (2017). Representations of nature of science in US 
elementary science trade books. In C. V. McDonald & F. Abd-El-Khalick (Eds.), 
Representations of nature of science in school science textbooks (pp. 135–151). 
Routledge. 
Brysbaert, M., & New, B. (2009). Moving beyond Kučera and Francis: A critical evaluation 
of current word frequency norms and the introduction of a new and improved word 





Brysbaert, M., Warriner, A. B., & Kuperman, V. (2014). Concreteness ratings for 40 
thousand generally known English word lemmas. Behavior Research Methods, 46(3), 
904–911. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-013-0403-5 
Bucchi, M. (2008). Of deficits, deviations and dialogues: Theories of public communication 
of science. In M. Bucchi & B. Trench (Eds.), Handbook of public communication of 
science and technology (pp. 71–90). Routledge. 
Bucchi, M., & Neresini, F. (2007). Science and public participation. In E. Hackett, O. 
Amsterdamska, M. Lynch, & J. Wajcman (Eds.), Handbook of science and technology 
studies (pp. 448–472). MIT Press. 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2016). Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A new 
source of inexpensive, yet high-quality data? In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), Methodological 
issues and strategies in clinical research (pp. 133–139). American Psychological 
Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/14805-009 
Bultitude, K., McDonald, D., & Custead, S. (2011). The rise and rise of science festivals: An 
international review of organised events to celebrate science. International Journal of 
Science Education, Part B, 1(2), 165–188. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21548455.2011.588851 
Burke, E. (1990). A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and 
beautiful. Oxford University Press. 
Byg, A., & Salick, J. (2009). Local perspectives on a global phenomenon: Climate change in 
Eastern Tibetan villages. Traditional Peoples and Climate Change, 19(2), 156–166. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.01.010 
Cabanas, E. (2018). Positive psychology and the legitimation of individualism. Theory & 
Psychology, 28(1), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354317747988 
Cabanas, E., & Illouz, E. (2019). Manufacturing happy citizens: How the science and 
industry of happiness control our lives. Polity. 
Cacioppo, J., Berntson, G., Larsen, J., Poehlmann, K. M., & Ito, T. A. (2000). The 
psychophysiology of emotion. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), The 
handbook of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 173–191). Guilford Press. 
Cain, V. (2012). “Attraction, attention, and desire”: Consumer culture as pedagogical 





Campbell, V. (2016). Science, entertainment and television documentary. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Campos, B., Shiota, M. N., Keltner, D., Gonzaga, G. C., & Goetz, J. L. (2013). What is 
shared, what is different? Core relational themes and expressive displays of eight 
positive emotions. Cognition & Emotion, 27(1), 37–52. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2012.683852 
Canessa, E., Chaigneau, S. E., Lagos, R., & Medina, F. A. (2020). How to carry out 
conceptual properties norming studies as parameter estimation studies: Lessons from 
ecology. Behavior Research Methods, 53(2), 354–370. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-
020-01439-8 
Canfield, K. N., Menezes, S., Matsuda, S. B., Moore, A., Mosley Austin, A. N., Dewsbury, 
B. M., Feliú-Mójer, M. I., McDuffie, K. W. B., Moore, K., Reich, C. A., Smith, H. M., 
& Taylor, C. (2020). Science communication demands a critical approach that centers 
inclusion, equity, and intersectionality. Frontiers in Communication, 5, 2. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2020.00002 
Casasanto, D., & Lupyan, G. (2015). All concepts are ad hoc concepts. In E. Margolis & S. 
Laurence (Eds.), The conceptual mind: New directions in the study of concepts (pp. 
543–566). MIT Press. 
Carpenter S. (2018). Ten steps in scale development and reporting: A guide for researchers. 
Communication Methods and Measures, 12(1), 25–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19312458.2017.1396583 
Cederström, C., & Spicer, A. (2015). The wellness syndrome. Polity. 
Chanes, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2016). Redefining the role of limbic areas in cortical processing. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(2), 96–106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.11.005 
Chapman, D. A., Lickel, B., & Markowitz, E. M. (2017). Reassessing emotion in climate 
change communication. Nature Climate Change, 7(12), 850–852. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-017-0021-9 
Charrad, M., Ghazzali, N., Boiteau, V., Niknafs, A., & Charrad, M. M. (2014). Package 
‘nbclust.’ Journal of Statistical Software, 61, 1–36. 
https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v061.i06 
Chirico, A., Cipresso, P., Yaden, D. B., Biassoni, F., Riva, G., & Gaggioli, A. (2017). 
Effectiveness of immersive videos in inducing awe: An experimental study. Scientific 




Chirico, A., Ferrise, F., Cordella, L., & Gaggioli, A. (2018). Designing awe in virtual reality: 
An experimental study. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 2351. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02351 
Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of 
cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3), 181–204. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12000477 
Clark, S. (2019). Cannibals, runaways and supergiants. New Scientist, 244(3261), 54–56. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(19)32436-4 
Clewis, R. R., Yaden, D. B., & Chirico, A. (2021). Intersections between awe and the 
sublime: A preliminary empirical study. Empirical Studies of the Arts, 0(0), 1–31. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0276237421994694 
Clore, G. L., & Ortony, A. (2013). Psychological construction in the OCC model of emotion. 
Emotion Review, 5(4), 335–343. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073913489751 
Coghlan, A., Buckley, R., & Weaver, D. (2012). A framework for analysing awe in tourism 
experiences. Annals of Tourism Research, 39(3), 1710–1714. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2012.03.007 
Colantonio, J., & Bonawitz, E. (2018). Awesome play: Awe increases preschooler’s 
exploration and discovery. Open Science Framework. 
https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/pjhrq 
Coleridge, S. T. (1969). The collected works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: The 
friend. Routledge and K. Paul. 
Colgan, A., & McGuinness, C. (1998). Measuring conceptual knowledge organisation among 
student nurses using a word association technique. NT Research, 3(1), 36–45. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/174498719800300110 
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading-activation theory of semantic processing. 
Psychological Review, 82(6), 407–428. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.82.6.407 
Connell, L. (2019). What have labels ever done for us? The linguistic shortcut in conceptual 
processing. Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 34(10), 1308–1318. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23273798.2018.1471512 
Connell, L., & Lynott, D. (2012). Strength of perceptual experience predicts word processing 





Connell, L., & Lynott, D. (2013). Flexible and fast: Linguistic shortcut affects both shallow 
and deep conceptual processing. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(3), 542–550. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-012-0368-x 
Connell, L., & Lynott, D. (2014). Principles of representation: Why you can’t represent the 
same concept twice. Topics in Cognitive Science, 6(3), 390–406. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12097 
Conner, T. S., & Mehl, M. R. (2015). Ambulatory assessment: Methods for studying 
everyday life. In R.A. Scott, S.M. Kosslyn & M. Buchmann (Eds.), Emerging trends in 
the social and behavioral sciences: An interdisciplinary, searchable, linkable resource. 
Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0010 
Cordaro, D. T., Keltner, D., Tshering, S., Wangchuk, D., & Flynn, L. M. (2016). The voice 
conveys emotion in ten globalized cultures and one remote village in Bhutan. Emotion, 
16(1), 117–128. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000100 
Cordaro, D. T., Sun, R., Keltner, D., Kamble, S., Huddar, N., & McNeil, G. (2018). 
Universals and cultural variations in 22 emotional expressions across five cultures. 
Emotion, 18(1), 75–93. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000302 
Costello, A. B. & Osborne, J. (2005). Best practices in exploratory factor analysis: four 
recommendations for getting the most from your analysis. Practical Assessment, 
Research, and Evaluation, 10(7). https://doi.org/10.7275/jyj1-4868 
Coverdale, M. (1975). The Coverdale Bible, 1535. Dawson. 
Coxe, S., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2009). The analysis of count data: A gentle 
introduction to Poisson regression and its alternatives. Journal of Personality 
Assessment, 91(2), 121–136. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223890802634175 
Cramer, P. (1968). Word associations. Academic Press. 
Crane, R. S. (1936). Review of the sublime: A study of critical theories in XVIII-century 
England, by Samuel H. Monk. Philological Quarter, 15, 165–167. 
Cree, G. S., & McRae, K. (2003). Analyzing the factors underlying the structure and 
computation of the meaning of chipmunk, cherry, chisel, cheese, and cello (and many 
other such concrete nouns). Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132(2), 
163–201. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.132.2.163 
Cremer, M., Dingshoff, D., de Beer, M., & Schoonen, R. (2010). Do word associations assess 




International Journal of Bilingualism, 15(2), 187–204. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1367006910381189 
Crogan, P., & Kinsley, S. (2012). Paying attention: Towards a critique of the attention 
economy. Culture Machine, 13. 
Cronon, W. (1996). The trouble with wilderness: Or, getting back to the wrong nature. 
Environmental History, 1(1), 7–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/3985059 
Crowe, S., & Prescott, T. (2003). Continuity and change in the development of category 
structure: Insights from the semantic fluency task. International Journal of Behavioral 
Development, 27(5), 467–479. https://doi.org/10.1080/01650250344000091 
Crowther, D. T., Venable, C., & Berman, C. (2005). The making of “The List”: 
understanding the selection process for the Outstanding Science Trade Books list. 
Science Teacher, 72(3), 61–62. 
Cuzzolino, M. P. (2019). Experiences of transformative awe and the “Small Self” in 
scientific learning and discovery [Doctoral Thesis]. Harvard Graduate School of 
Education. 
Dagher, Z. R., & Ford, D. J. (2005). How are scientists portrayed in children’s science 
biographies? Science & Education, 14(3), 377–393. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-
004-7933-2 
Dagnall, N., Denovan, A., Drinkwater, K. G., & Parker, A. (2019). An evaluation of the 
belief in science scale. Frontiers in psychology, 10, 861. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00861 
Danvers, A. F., & Shiota, M. N. (2017). Going off script: Effects of awe on memory for 
script-typical and -irrelevant narrative detail. Emotion, 17(6), 938–952. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000277 
Danziger, K. (1997). Naming the mind: How psychology found its language. Sage. 
Darbor, K. E., Lench, H. C., Davis, W. E., & Hicks, J. A. (2016). Experiencing versus 
contemplating: Language use during descriptions of awe and wonder. Cognition and 
Emotion, 30(6), 1188–1196. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2015.1042836 
Darigan, D. L., Tunnell, M. O., & Jacobs, J. S. (2002). Children’s literature: Engaging 
teachers and children in good books. Merrill/Prentice Hall. 





Daston, L. (2017). The history of science and the history of knowledge. Know: A Journal on 
the Formation of Knowledge, 1(1), 131–154. https://doi.org/10.1086/691678 
Daston, L., & Park, K. (1998). Wonders and the order of nature, 1150-1750. Zone Books. 
Daston, L., & Galison, P. (2007) Objectivity. Princeton University Press.  
Davies, S. R. (2011). The rules of engagement: Power and interaction in dialogue events. 
Public Understanding of Science, 22(1), 65–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662511399685 
Davies, S. R. (2018). Science communication is not an end in itself: (Dis)assembling the 
science festival. International Journal of Science Education, Part B, 9(1), 40–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21548455.2018.1540898 
Davies, S. R. (2019). Science communication as emotion work: Negotiating curiosity and 
wonder at a science festival. Science as Culture, 28(4), 538–561. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09505431.2019.1597035 
Davies, S. R., & Horst, M. (2016). Science communication: Culture, identity and citizenship. 
Springer. 
Davies, S. R., Halpern, M., Horst, M., Kirby, D., & Lewenstein, B. (2019). Science stories as 
culture: Experience, identity, narrative and emotion in public communication of 
science. Journal of Science Communication, 18(05). 
https://doi.org/10.22323/2.18050201 
Davies, S.R. (2021). An empirical and conceptual note on science communication’s role in 
society. Science Communication, 43(1), 116–133. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547020971642 
Davis, C. P., & Yee, E. (2021). Building semantic memory from embodied and distributional 
language experience. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/wymr9 
Davis, C.P., Altmann G.T.M., & Yee, E. (2020) Situational systematicity: A role for schema 
in understanding the differences between abstract and concrete concepts. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 1–2, 142–153. https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2019.1710124 
Dawkins, R., (1998). Unweaving the rainbow: Science, delusion and the appetite for 
wonder. Houghton Mifflin. 
De Bolla, P. (1989). The discourse of the sublime: Readings in history, aesthetics, and the 
subject. Blackwell. 
De Deyne, S., & Storms, G. (2008a). Word associations: Network and semantic properties. 




De Deyne, S., & Storms, G. (2008b). Word associations: Norms for 1,424 Dutch words in a 
continuous task. Behavior Research Methods, 40(1), 198–205. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.40.1.198 
De Deyne, S., & Storms, G. (2015). Word associations. In J. R. Taylor (Ed.), The Oxford 
handbook of the word. Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641604.013.018 
De Deyne, S., Navarro, D. J., & Storms, G. (2013). Better explanations of lexical and 
semantic cognition using networks derived from continued rather than single-word 
associations. Behavior Research Methods, 45(2), 480–498. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-012-0260-7 
De Deyne, S., Navarro, D. J., Perfors, A., Brysbaert, M., & Storms, G. (2019). The “Small 
World of Words” English word association norms for over 12,000 cue words. Behavior 
Research Methods, 51(3), 987–1006. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-018-1115-7 
De Deyne, S., Perfors, A., & Navarro, D. J. (2016). Predicting human similarity judgments 
with distributional models: The value of word associations. In Proceedings of COLING 
2016, the 26th International Conference on Computational Linguistics: Technical 
papers (pp. 1861-1870). https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/C16-1175 
de Groot, A. M. (1989). Representational aspects of word imageability and word frequency 
as assessed through word association. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 15(5), 824–845. 
De Leersnyder, J. (2017). Emotional acculturation: A first review. Current Opinion in 
Psychology, 17, 67–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.06.007 
De Leersnyder, J., Boiger, M., & Mesquita, B. (2015a). Cultural differences in emotions. In 
R.A. Scott, S.M. Kosslyn & M. Buchmann (Eds.), Emerging trends in the social and 
behavioral sciences: An interdisciplinary, searchable, linkable resource. Wiley. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0060 
De Leersnyder, J., Kim, H., & Mesquita, B. (2015b). Feeling right is feeling good: 
Psychological well-being and emotional fit with culture in autonomy- versus 
relatedness-promoting situations. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1–12. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00630 
De Leersnyder, J., Mesquita, B., & Kim, H. S. (2011). Where do my emotions belong? A 
study of immigrants’ emotional acculturation. Personality and Social Psychology 




De Luca, V. A. (1991). Words of eternity: Blake and the poetics of the sublime. Princeton 
University Press. 
Deese, J. (1965). The Structure of Associations in Language and Thought. Johns Hopkins 
Press. 
Dekker, C. J. (2014). Placing the bomb: The pastoral and the sublime in the nuclear age. 
University of Michigan. 
Dekker, E., & de Jong, M. (2017). What do book awards signal? An analysis of book awards 
in three countries. Empirical Studies of the Arts, 36(1), 3–21. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0276237416689636 
Dixon, D. P., Hawkins, H., & Straughan, E. R. (2012). Wonder-full geomorphology: Sublime 
aesthetics and the place of art. Progress in Physical Geography: Earth and 
Environment, 37(2), 227–247. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309133312457108 
Dixon, P. N., Bobo, M., & Stevick, R. A. (1984). Response differences and preferences for 
all-category-defined and end-defined Likert formats. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 44(1), 61-66. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164484441006 
Dobson, J. A. (2015). Examining the psychological consequences of experiencing awe 
[Doctoral thesis]. University of Guelph. http://hdl.handle.net/10214/9235 
Doherty, T. J., & Clayton, S. (2011). The psychological impacts of global climate change. 
American Psychologist, 66(4), 265–276. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023141 
Donovan, C. A., & Smolkin, L. B. (2002). Considering genre, content, and visual features in 
the selection of trade books for science instruction. The Reading Teacher, 55(6), 502–
520. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20205092 
Dove, G. (2009). Beyond perceptual symbols: A call for representational pluralism. 
Cognition, 110(3), 412–431. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.11.016 
Dove, G. (2016). Three symbol ungrounding problems: Abstract concepts and the future of 
embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(4), 1109–1121. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-015-0825-4 
Dove, G. (2020). More than a scaffold: Language is a neuroenhancement. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 37(5–6), 288–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2019.1637338 
Dror, O. E., Hitzer, B., Laukötter, A., & León-Sanz, P. (2016). An introduction to history of 




Du, S., Tao, Y., & Martinez, A. M. (2014). Compound facial expressions of emotion. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(15), E1454–E1462. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1322355111 
Dunn, A. M., Heggestad, E. D., Shanock, L. R., & Theilgard, N. (2018). Intra-individual 
response variability as an indicator of insufficient effort responding: Comparison to 
other indicators and relationships with individual differences. Journal of Business and 
Psychology, 33(1), 105–121. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-016-9479-0 
Durant, J. (1999). Participatory technology assessment and the democratic model of the 
public understanding of science. Science and Public Policy, 26(5), 313–319. 
https://doi.org/10.3152/147154399781782329 
Economides, L. (2016). The ecology of wonder in romantic and postmodern literature. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Edwards, D. (1999). Emotion discourse. Culture & Psychology, 5(3), 271–291. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X9953001 
Einsiedel, E. (2008). Public engagement and dialogue: A research review. In M. Bucchi & B. 
Trench (Eds.), Handbook of public communication of science and technology (pp. 173–
184). Routledge. 
Ekman, P. (1992). An argument for basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 6(3–4), 169– 
200. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699939208411068 
Ekman, P. (2003). Emotions revealed: Recognizing faces and feelings to improve 
communication and emotional life. Times Books/Henry Holt and Co. 
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011). What is meant by calling emotions basic. Emotion Review, 
3(4), 364–370. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073911410740 
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1971). Constants across cultures in the face and emotion. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17(2), 124–129. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0030377 
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1976). Measuring facial movement. Environmental Psychology 
and Nonverbal Behavior, 1(1), 56–75. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01115465 
Ekman, P., Levenson, R. W., & Friesen, W. V. (1983). Autonomic nervous system activity 
distinguishes among emotions. Science, 221(4616), 1208. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.6612338 
Ekman, P., Sorenson, E. R., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). Pan-cultural elements in facial displays 




Elfenbein, H. A., & Ambady, N. (2002). On the universality and cultural specificity of 
emotion recognition: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 128(2), 203–235. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.128.2.203 
Ellsworth, P. C. (1994). Sense, culture, and sensibility. In S. Kitayama & H. R. Markus 
(Eds.), Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence (pp. 23–50). 
American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/10152-001 
Ellsworth, P. C., & Scherer, K. R. (2003). Appraisal processes in emotion. In R. J. Davidson, 
K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective sciences (pp. 572– 
595). Oxford University Press. 
Elo, S., Kääriäinen, M., Kanste, O., Pölkki, T., Utriainen, K., & Kyngäs, H. (2014). 
Qualitative content analysis: A focus on trustworthiness. SAGE Open, 4(1), 1–10. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244014522633 
Engelmann, J., & Pogosyan, M. (2013). Emotion perception across cultures: The role of 
cognitive mechanisms. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 118. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00118 
Eurobarometer (2010) Special Eurobarometer 340: Science and technology. European 
Commission. 
Fahnestock, J. (1986). Accommodating science: The rhetorical life of scientific facts. Written 
Communication, 3(3), 275–296. https://doi.org/10.1177/0741088386003003001 
Farias, M., Newheiser, A.-K., Kahane, G., & de Toledo, Z. (2013). Scientific faith: Belief in 
science increases in the face of stress and existential anxiety. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 49(6), 1210–1213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2013.05.008 
Farland-Smith, D., Finson, K. D., & Arquette, C. M. (2017). How picture books on the 
National Science Teacher’s Association recommend list portray scientists. School 
Science and Mathematics, 117(6), 250–258. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssm.12231 
Fehr, B., & Russell, J. A. (1984). Concept of emotion viewed from a prototype perspective. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113(3), 464–486. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.113.3.464 
Fehr, B., & Russell, J. A. (1991). The concept of love viewed from a prototype perspective. 





Feldman, L., & Hart, P. S. (2015). Using political efficacy messages to increase climate 
activism: The mediating role of emotions. Science Communication, 38(1), 99–127. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547015617941 
Ferreira, F., Bailey, K. G. D., & Ferraro, V. (2002). Good-enough representations in language 
comprehension. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11(1), 11–15. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00158 
Feynman, R. P. (1988). What do you care what other people think?: Further adventures of a 
curious character. W.W. Norton & Company. 
Firth, J.R. (1957). Papers in linguistics. Oxford University Press. 
Fischer, A., Peters, V., Neebe, M., Vávra, J., Kriel, A., Lapka, M., & Megyesi, B. (2012). 
Climate change? No, wise resource use is the issue: Social representations of energy, 
climate change and the future. Environmental Policy and Governance, 22(3), 161– 176. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.1585 
Fisher, P. (1998). Wonder, the rainbow, and the aesthetics of rare experiences. Harvard 
University Press. 
Fiske, J. (2011). Introduction to communication studies (3rd ed.). Routledge. 
Fitzpatrick, T. (2006). Habits and rabbits: Word associations and the L2 lexicon. In S. H. 
Foster-Cohen, M. M. Krajnovic & J. M. Djigunović (Eds.), EUROSLA Yearbook (Vol. 
6, pp. 121–145). John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
https://doi.org/10.1075/eurosla.6.09fit 
Fitzpatrick, T., Playfoot, D., Wray, A., & Wright, M. J. (2013). Establishing the reliability of 
word association data for investigating individual and group differences. Applied 
Linguistics, 36(1), 23–50. https://doi.org/10.1093/applin/amt020 
Fleming, J. S., Longnecker, N., Salmon, R. A., & Hikuroa D. C. H. (2020) Aotearoa New 
Zealand: Participatory science and bicultural knowledge communication. In T. 
Gascoigne, B. Schiele, J. Leach, M. Riedlinger, B.V. Lewenstein, L. Massarani, & P. 
Broks (Eds.), Communicating Science: A Global Perspective (pp. 71–94) ANU Press.  
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The language of thought. Harvard University Press. 
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical 
analysis. Cognition, 28(1–2), 3–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5 
Fontaine, J. R. J., Scherer, K. R., & Soriano, C. (Eds.). (2013). Components of emotional 





Ford, D. J. (2006). Representations of science within children’s trade books. Journal of 
Research in Science Teaching, 43(2), 214–235. https://doi.org/10.1002/tea.20095 
France, B., Cridge, B., & Fogg-Rogers, L. (2017). Organisational culture and its role in 
developing a sustainable science communication platform. International Journal of 
Science Education, Part B, 7(2), 146–160. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21548455.2015.1106025 
Freeman, B. C. (1995). The feminine sublime: Gender and excess in women’s fiction. 
University of California Press. 
Fridman, J., Barrett, L. F., Wormwood, J. B., & Quigley, K. S. (2019). Applying the theory 
of constructed emotion to police decision making. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 1946. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01946 
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge University Press. 
Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & ter Schure, E. (1989). Relations among emotion, appraisal, and 
emotional action readiness. Journal of Personality, 57(2), 212–228. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.57.2.212 
Frouws, J. (1998). The contested definition of the countryside: An analysis of rural 
discourses in the Netherlands. Sociologia Ruralis, 38(1), 54–68. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9523.00063 
Füchslin, T., Schäfer, M. S., & Metag, J. (2018). A short survey instrument to segment 
populations according to their attitudes toward science. Scale development, 
optimization and assessment. Environmental Communication, 12(8), 1–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2018.1461673 
Fuller, G. (1998). Cultivating science: Negotiating discourse in the popular texts of Stephen 
Jay Gould. In J. R. Martin & R. Veel (Eds.), Reading science: Critical and functional 
perspectives on discourses of science (Vol. 113, pp. 35–62). Routledge. 
Funkhouser, G. R., & Maccoby, N. (1971). Communicating specialized science information 
to a lay audience. Journal of Communication, 21(1), 58–71. 
Furr, M. (2011). Scale construction and psychometrics for social and personality psychology. 
Sage. 
Galili, T. (2015). dendextend: An R package for visualizing, adjusting and comparing trees of 





Gallagher, S., Janz, B., Reinerman, L., Trempler, J., & Bockelman, P. (2015). A 
neurophenomenology of awe and wonder: Towards a non-reductionist cognitive 
science. Springer. 
Gallese, V., & Lakoff, G. (2005). The brain’s concepts: The role of the sensory-motor system 
in conceptual knowledge. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(3–4), 455–479. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02643290442000310 
Garner, P. W., & Parker, T. S. (2018). Young children’s picture-books as a forum for the 
socialization of emotion. Journal of Early Childhood Research, 16(3), 291–304. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1476718X18775760 
Gascoigne, T., Cheng, D., Claessens, M., Metcalfe, J., Schiele, B., & Shi, S. (2010). Is 
science communication its own field? Journal of Science Communication, 9(3), 1–6. 
https://doi.org/10.22323/2.09030304 
Gascoigne, T., Schiele, B., Leach, J., Riedlinger, M., Lewenstein, B. V., Massarani, L., & 
Broks, P. (Eds.). (2020). Communicating science: A global perspective (1st ed.). ANU 
Press. https://doi.org/10.22459/CS.2020 
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. Basic Books. 
Gelman, S. A. (1988). The development of induction within natural kind and artifact 
categories. Cognitive Psychology, 20(1), 65–95. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-
0285(88)90025-4 
Gelman, S. A., & Rhodes, M. (2012). “Two-thousand years of stasis”: How psychological 
essentialism impedes evolutionary understanding. In K. S. Rosengren, S. K. Brem, E. 
M. Evans, & G. A. Sinatra (Eds.), Evolution challenges: Integrating research and 
practice in teaching and learning about evolution (pp. 3–21). Oxford University Press. 
Gendron, M. (2010). Defining emotion: A brief history. Emotion Review, 2(4), 371–372. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073910374669 
Gendron, M. (2017). Revisiting diversity: cultural variation reveals the constructed nature of 
emotion perception. Current Opinion in Psychology, 17, 145-150. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.07.014 
Gendron, M., & Barrett, L. F. (2009). Reconstructing the past: A century of ideas about 
emotion in psychology. Emotion Review, 1(4), 316–339. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073909338877 
Gendron, M., & Barrett, L. F. (2018). Emotion perception as conceptual synchrony. Emotion 




Gendron, M., Crivelli, C., & Barrett, L. F. (2018). Universality reconsidered: Diversity in 
making meaning of facial expressions. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 
27(4), 211–219. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417746794 
Gendron, M., Mesquita, B., & Barrett, L. F. (2020). The brain as a cultural artifact: Concepts, 
actions, and experiences within the human affective niche. In L. J. Kirmayer, C. M. 
Worthman, S. Kitayama, R. Lemelson, & C. Cummings (Eds.), Culture, mind, and 
brain (pp. 188–222). Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108695374.010 
Getz, D. (2008). Event tourism: Definition, evolution, and research. Tourism Management, 
29(3), 403–428. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2007.07.017 
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Houghton Mifflin. 
Goldstone, R. L., Kersten, A., & Carvalho, P. F. (2013). Concepts and categorization. In A. 
F. Healy, R. W. Proctor, & I. B. Weiner (Eds.), Handbook of psychology, 2nd ed. (pp. 
607–630). John Wiley & Sons, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118133880.hop204022 
Goldy, S. P., & Piff, P. K. (2020). Toward a social ecology of prosociality: Why, when, and 
where nature enhances social connection. Current Opinion in Psychology, 32, 27–31. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2019.06.016 
Golinski, J. (2017). Sublime astronomy: The eidouranion of Adam Walker and his sons. 
Huntington Library Quarterly, 80(1), 135–157. https://doi.org/10.1353/hlq.2017.0005 
Gooden, A. M., & Gooden, M. A. (2001). Gender representation in Notable Children’s 
Picture Books: 1995–1999. Sex Roles, 45(1), 89–101. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013064418674 
Gordon, A. M., Stellar, J. E., Anderson, C. L., McNeil, G. D., Loew, D., & Keltner, D. 
(2017). The dark side of the sublime: Distinguishing a threat-based variant of awe. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 113(2), 310–328. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000120 
Gordon, S. L. (1989). The socialization of children’s emotions: Emotional culture, 
competence, and exposure. In C. Saarni & P. L. Harris (Eds.), Cambridge studies in 
social and emotional development. Children's understanding of emotion (pp. 319–349). 
Cambridge University Press. 
Görke, A., & Ruhrmann, G. (2003). Public communication between facts and fictions: On the 





Gottlieb, S., Keltner, D., & Lombrozo, T. (2018). Awe as a scientific emotion. Cognitive 
Science, 42(6), 2081–2094. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12648 
Graneheim, U. H., Lindgren, B.-M., & Lundman, B. (2017). Methodological challenges in 
qualitative content analysis: A discussion paper. Nurse Education Today, 56, 29–34. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nedt.2017.06.002 
Graziosi, M., & Yaden, D. (2019). Interpersonal awe: Exploring the social domain of awe 
elicitors. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 1–9. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2019.1689422 
Griskevicius, V., Shiota, M. N., & Neufeld, S. L. (2010). Influence of different positive 
emotions on persuasion processing: A functional evolutionary approach. Emotion, 
10(2), 190–206. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018421 
Gross, A. G. (2018). The scientific sublime. Oxford University Press. 
Gross, D. M., & Preston, S. D. (2020). Darwin and the situation of emotion research. 
Emotion Review, 12(3), 179–190. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073920930802 
Gross, J. J., & Barrett, L. F. (2011). Emotion generation and emotion regulation: One or two 
depends on your point of view. Emotion Review, 3(1), 8–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073910380974 
Gross, J. J., & Levenson, R. W. (1993). Emotional suppression: Physiology, self-report, and 
expressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(6), 970–986. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.64.6.970 
Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and 
religion. Penguin Books Limited. 
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin B. J., & Anderson R. E. (2010). Multivariate data analysis: A 
global perspective. Pearson Education. 
Hales, P. B. (1991). The atomic sublime. American Studies, 32(1), 5–31. 
Hall, G. S. (1897). A study of fears. The American Journal of Psychology, 8(2), 147–249. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1410940 
Hall, S. (2006). Encoding/Decoding. In M. G. Durham & D. Kellner (Eds.), Media and 
cultural studies: Keyworks (pp. 163–173). Blackwell. 
Hall, S., Evans, J., & Nixon, S. (2013). Representation (2nd ed.). Sage. 
Hanauska, M. (2019). Historical aspects of external science communication. In A. 
Leßmöllmann, M. Dascal & T. Gloning (Eds.), Science Communication (pp. 585-600). 




Hansen, A. (2016). The changing uses of accuracy in science communication. Public 
Understanding of Science, 25(7), 760–774. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662516636303 
Harding, J. M., & Pribram, E. D. (2002). The power of feeling: Locating emotions in culture. 
European Journal of Cultural Studies, 5(4), 407–426. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1364942002005004294 
Hari, J. (2019). Lost connections: Why you’re depressed and how to find hope. Bloomsbury 
Publishing. 
Harms, C., Jackel, L., & Montag, C. (2017). Reliability and completion speed in online 
questionnaires under consideration of personality. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 111, 281–290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.02.015 
Harnad, S. (1990). The symbol grounding problem. Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, 42(1– 
3), 335–346. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2789(90)90087-6 
Harpaintner, M., Trumpp, N. M., & Kiefer, M. (2018). The semantic content of abstract 
concepts: A property listing study of 296 abstract words. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 
1748. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01748 
Harper, D. (n.d.-a). Awe. In Online etymology dictionary. Retrieved December 18, 2018. 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/awe 
Harper, D. (n.d.-b). Wonder. In Online etymology dictionary. Retrieved December 18, 2018. 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/wonder 
Harrison, P. (2001). Curiosity, forbidden knowledge, and the reformation of natural 
philosophy in early modern England. Isis, 92(2), 265–290. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/385182 
Hartman, R. O., Dieckmann, N. F., Sprenger, A. M., Stastny, B. J., & DeMarree, K. G. 
(2017). Modeling attitudes toward science: development and validation of the 
credibility of science scale. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 39(6), 358-371. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2017.1372284 
Haviland, W.A. (2005). A cultural anthropology: The human challenge. Thomson 
Wadsworth. 
Hellsten, I., & Nerlich, B. (2008). Genetics and genomics: The politics and ethics of 
metaphorical framing. In M. Bucchi & B. Trench (Eds.), Handbook of public 





Helsing, D. (2016). Uses of wonder in popular science: Cosmos: A personal voyage and the 
origin of life. International Journal of Astrobiology, 15(4), 271–276. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1473550416000124 
Henderson, C. (2017). A new map of wonders: A journey in search for modern marvels. The 
University of Chicago Press.  
Hendrick, J. D. (1998). Biography as interdisciplinary art. In H.K. Bak (Ed.) Writing lives: 
American biography and autobiography (pp. 159–164). VU University Press.  
Hendriks, F., Kienhues, D., & Bromme, R. (2016). Trust in science and the science of trust. 
In B. Blöbaum (Ed.), Trust and communication in a digitized world (pp. 143–159). 
Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28059-2_8 
Hepburn, R. W. (1980). The inaugural address: Wonder. Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume, 54, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/54.1.1 
Hicks, J. R., & Stewart, W. P. (2020). Learning from wildlife-inspired awe. The Journal of 
Environmental Education, 51(1), 44–54. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00958964.2019.1594148 
Hilgartner, S. (1990). The dominant view of popularization: Conceptual problems, political 
uses. Social Studies of Science, 20(3), 519–539. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/030631290020003006 
Hilgartner, S. (2000). Science on stage: Expert advice as public drama. Stanford University 
Press. 
Hirsh, K. W., & Tree, J. J. (2001). Word association norms for two cohorts of British adults. 
Journal of Neurolinguistics, 14(1), 1–44. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0911-
6044(00)00002-6 
Hitt, C. (1999). Toward an ecological sublime. New Literary History, 30(3), 603–623. 
https://doi.org/doi:10.1353/nlh.1999.0037. 
Hodges, C. E. M., Scullion, R., & Jackson, D. (2015). From awww to awe factor: UK 
audience meaning-making of the 2012 Paralympics as mediated spectacle. The Journal 
of Popular Television, 3(2), 195–212. https://doi.org/10.1386/jptv.3.2.195_1 
Hoemann, K., & Barrett, L. F. (2019). Concepts dissolve artificial boundaries in the study of 





Hoemann, K., Devlin, M., & Barrett, L. F. (2020). Comment: emotions are abstract, 
conceptual categories that are learned by a predicting brain. Emotion Review, 12(4), 
253–255. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073919897296 
Hoemann, K., Gendron, M., & Barrett, L. F. (2017). Mixed emotions in the predictive brain. 
Current Opinion in Behavioral Science, 15, 51–57. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.05.013 
Hoemann, K., Hartley, L., Watanabe, A., Solana Leon, E., Katsumi, Y., Barrett, L. F., & 
Quigley, K. S. (2021). The N400 indexes acquisition of novel emotion concepts via 
conceptual combination. Psychophysiology, 58(2). https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.13727 
Hoemann, K., Nielson, C., Yuen, A., Gurera, J., Quigley, K., & Barrett, L. F. (2020). 
Expertise as a unifying framework for individual differences in the mental 
representation of emotional experience. PsyArXiv. 
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/grkcm 
Hoemann, K., Wu, R., LoBue, V., Oakes, L. M., Xu, F., & Barrett, L. F. (2020). Developing 
an understanding of emotion categories: Lessons from objects. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 24(1), 39–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.10.010 
Hoemann, K., Xu, F., & Barrett, L. F. (2019). Emotion words, emotion concepts, and 
emotional development in children: A constructionist hypothesis. Developmental 
Psychology, 55(9), 1830–1849. https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0000686 
Höijer, B. (2010). Emotional anchoring and objectification in the media reporting on climate 
change. Public Understanding of Science, 19(6), 717–731. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662509348863 
Holland, S. & Miller, S. (1997). Science in the early Athenaeum: a mirror of crystallization. 
Public Understanding of Science, 6, 111–130. https://doi- 
org.ezproxy.otago.ac.nz/10.1088/0963-6625/6/2/001 
Holm, S. (1979). A simple sequentiality rejective multiple test procedure. Scandinavian 
Journal of Statistics, 6(2), 65–70. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4615733 
Holmes, R. (2008). The age of wonder: How the romantic generation discovered the beauty 
and terror of science. Pantheon Books. 
Holt, L. E., & Beilock, S. L. (2006). Expertise and its embodiment: Examining the impact of 
sensorimotor skill expertise on the representation of action-related text. Psychonomic 




Hong, H. (2014). Audience responses to television news coverage of medical advances: The 
mediating role of audience emotions and identification. Public Understanding of 
Science, 24(6), 697–711. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662514544919 
Honnibal, M., & Montani, I. (2017). spacy 2: Natural language understanding with bloom 
embeddings, convolutional neural networks and incremental parsing. To Appear, 7(1). 
Hook, D. (2001). The ‘disorders of discourse’. Theoria, 48(97), 41–68. 
https://doi.org/10.3167/004058101782485629 
Hooke, R. (1969). The posthumous works of Robert Hooke. Johnson Reprint Corporation. 
Horlick-Jones, T., Walls, J., Rowe, G., Pidgeon, N., Poortinga, W., Murdock, G., & 
O’Riordan, T. (2007). The GM debate: Risk, politics and public engagement. 
Routledge. 
Horst, M., & Michael, M. (2011). On the shoulders of idiots: Re-thinking science 
communication as ‘event.’ Science as Culture, 20(3), 283–306. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09505431.2010.524199 
Hsieh, H.-F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. 
Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277–1288. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732305276687 
Huang, C.-J., & Allgaier, J. (2014). What science are you singing? A study of the science 
image in the mainstream music of Taiwan. Public Understanding of Science, 24(1), 
112–125. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662514542565 
Hui, C. H. (1988). Measurement of individualism-collectivism. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 22(1), 17–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/0092-6566(88)90022-0 
Humm, C., Schrögel, P., & Leßmöllmann, A. (2020). Feeling left out: Underserved audiences 
in science communication. Media and Communication, 8(1), 164–176. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/mac.v8i1.2480 
Hurtado de Mendoza, A., Fernández-Dols, J. M., Parrott, W. G., & Carrera, P. (2010). 
Emotion terms, category structure, and the problem of translation: The case of shame 
and vergüenza. Cognition & Emotion, 24(4), 661–680. 
Hutchinson, J. B., & Barrett, L. F. (2019). The power of predictions: An emerging paradigm 





Hvidtfelt Nielsen, K. (2010). More than “mountain guides” of science: A questionnaire 
survey of professional science communicators in Denmark. Journal of Science 
Communication, 9(2). https://doi.org/10.22323/2.09020202 
Hwong, Y.-L., Oliver, C., Van Kranendonk, M., Sammut, C., & Seroussi, Y. (2017). What 
makes you tick? The psychology of social media engagement in space science 
communication. Computers in Human Behavior, 68, 480–492. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2016.11.068 
Illouz, E. (2008). Saving the modern soul: Therapy, emotions, and the culture of self-help. 
University of California Press. 
Illouz, E. (2009). Emotions, imagination and consumption: A new research agenda. Journal 
of Consumer Culture, 9(3), 377–413. https://doi.org/10.1177/1469540509342053 
Imada, T., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2011). Proud Americans and lucky Japanese: Cultural 
differences in appraisal and corresponding emotion. Emotion, 11(2), 329–345. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022855 
Irwin, A. (2014). From deficit to democracy (re-visited). Public Understanding of Science, 
23(1), 71–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662513510646 
Jackson, J. C., Watts, J., Henry, T. R., List, J.-M., Forkel, R., Mucha, P. J., Greenhill, S. J., 
Gray, R. D., & Lindquist, K. A. (2019). Emotion semantics show both cultural 
variation and universal structure. Science, 366(6472), 1517. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaw8160 
Jacobsen, T., Buchta, K., Köhler, M., & Schröger, E. (2004). The primacy of beauty in 
judging the aesthetics of objects. Psychological Reports, 94(3), 1253–1260. 
https://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.94.3c.1253-1260 
Jahoda, G. (2012). Critical reflections on some recent definitions of “culture.” Culture & 
Psychology, 18(3), 289–303. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X12446229 
Jasanoff, S. (2011). Designs on nature: Science and democracy in Europe and the United 
States. Princeton University Press. 
Jeffers, A. T., Safferman, A. G., & Safferman, S. I. (2004). Understanding K–12 engineering 
outreach programs. Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education and 
Practice, 130(2), 95–108. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)1052-3928(2004)130:2(95) 





Jenkins, J. J. (1954). Transitional organization: Association techniques. In C. Osgood & T. 
Sebeok (Eds.), Psycholinguistics: A survey of theory and research problems (Vol. 49, 
pp. 114–116). Waverly Press. 
Jiang, L., Yin, J., Mei, D., Zhu, H., & Zhou, X. (2018). Awe weakens the desire for money. 
Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology, 12, Article e4. https://doi.org/10.1017/prp.2017.27 
JiscMail. (n.d.). PSCI-COM home page. https://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/cgi-bin/wa-
jisc.exe?A0=PSCI-COM  
Johns, M. W. (1991). A new method for measuring daytime sleepiness: the Epworth 
Sleepiness Scale. Sleep, 14(6), 540–545. https://doi.org/10.1093/sleep/14.6.540 
Johns, M. W. (1992). Reliability and factor analysis of the Epworth Sleepiness Scale. Sleep, 
15(4), 376-381. https://doi.org/10.1093/sleep/15.4.376 
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Oatley, K. (1989). The language of emotions: An analysis of a 
semantic field. Cognition and Emotion, 3(2), 81–123. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699938908408075 
Johnson, K. E., & Mervis, C. B. (1997). Effects of varying levels of expertise on the basic 
level of categorization. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 126(3), 248–
277. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.126.3.248 
Jones, M. G., Ennes, M., Weedfall, D., Chesnutt, K., & Cayton, E. (2020). The development 
and validation of a measure of science capital, habitus, and future science interests. 
Research in Science Education, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11165-020-09916-y 
Joye, Y., & Dewitte, S. (2016). Up speeds you down. Awe-evoking monumental buildings 
trigger behavioral and perceived freezing. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 47, 
112–125. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2016.05.001 
Kant, I. (2000). Critique of the power of judgment. Cambridge University Press. 
Kappel, K., & Holmen, S.J. (2019). Why science communication, and does it work? A 
taxonomy of science communication aims and a survey of the empirical evidence. 
Frontiers in Communication, 4(55). https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2019.00055 
Kassambara, A., & Mundt, F. (2017). Package ‘factoextra’. Extract and visualize the results 
of multivariate data analyses. [R package].  





Kayyal, M. H., & Russell, J. A. (2012). Language and emotion: Certain English–Arabic 
translations are not equivalent. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 32(3), 
261–271. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X12461004 
Kellert, S. R., & Wilson, E. O. (1993). The biophilia hypothesis. Island Press. 
Kelly, L. B. (2018). An analysis of award‐winning science trade books for children: Who are 
the scientists, and what is science? Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 55, 1188–
1210. https://doi.org/10.1002/tea.21447 
Keltner, D. (2009). Born to be good: The science of a meaningful life. W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Keltner, D., & Haidt, J. (1999). Social functions of emotions at four levels of analysis. 
Cognition and Emotion, 13(5), 505–521. https://doi.org/10.1080/026999399379168 
Keltner, D., & Haidt, J. (2003). Approaching awe, a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic emotion. 
Cognition & Emotion, 17(2), 297–314. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930302297 
Keltner, D., Haidt, J., & Shiota, M. N. (2006). Social functionalism and the evolution of 
emotions. In M. Schaller, J. A. Simpson, & D. T. Kenrick (Eds.), Evolution and social 
psychology (pp. 115–142). Psychosocial Press. 
Keltner, D., Tracy, J. L., Sauter, D., & Cowen, A. (2019). What basic emotion theory really 
says for the twenty-first century study of emotion. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 
43(2), 195–201. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10919-019-00298-y 
Kenett, Y. N., Anaki, D., & Faust, M. (2014). Investigating the structure of semantic 
networks in low and high creative persons. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 407. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00407 
Kenett, Y. N., Kenett, D. Y., Ben-Jacob, E., & Faust, M. (2011). Global and local features of 
semantic networks: Evidence from the Hebrew mental lexicon. PloS One, 6(8), 
e23912–e23912. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0023912 
Kessler, E. A. (2012). Picturing the cosmos: Hubble space telescope images and the 
astronomical sublime. University of Minnesota Press. 
Kiefer, M., & Barsalou, L. W. (2013). Grounding the human conceptual system in 
perception, action, and internal states. In W. Prinz, M. Beisert, & A. Herwig (Eds.), 





Kiefer, M., & Pulvermüller, F. (2012). Conceptual representations in mind and brain: 
Theoretical developments, current evidence and future directions. Language and the 
Motor System, 48(7), 805–825. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2011.04.006 
Kirby, D. (2015, January 25). Evangelizing the cosmos: Science documentaries and the 
dangers of wonder overload. The Science and Entertainment Laboratory. 
http://thescienceandentertainmentlab.com/evangelizing-the-cosmos/ 
Konečni, V. J. (2008). Does music induce emotion? A theoretical and methodological 
analysis. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 2(2), 115–129. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1931-3896.2.2.115 
Konečni, V. J. (2011). Aesthetic trinity theory and the sublime. Philosophy Today, 55(1), 64– 
73. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday201155162 
Koselleck, R. (2002) The practice of conceptual history: Timing history, spacing concepts. 
Stanford University Press.  
Kostova, Z. (2008). Word association test for studying conceptual structures of teachers and 
students. Bulgarian Journal of Science and Education Policy (BJSEP), 2(2), 209–231. 
Kousta, S. T., Vigliocco, G., Vinson, D. P., Andrews, M., & Del Campo, E. (2011). The 
representation of abstract words: Why emotion matters. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 140(1), 14–34. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021446 
Krabbenborg, L. (2012). The potential of national public engagement exercises: Evaluating 
the case of the recent Dutch societal dialogue on nanotechnology. International Journal 
of Emerging Technologies and Society; Hawthorn, 10, 27–44. 
Kraus, M. W., Côté, S., & Keltner, D. (2010). Social class, contextualism, and empathic 
accuracy. Psychological Science, 21(11), 1716–1723. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610387613 
Krause, N., & Hayward, R. D. (2015). Awe of god, congregational embeddedness, and 
religious meaning in life. Review of Religious Research, 57(2), 219–238. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-014-0195-9 
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology (2nd ed.). 
Sage. 
Kroeber, A. L., & Kluckhohn, C. (1952). Culture: a critical review of concepts and 
definitions. Papers. Peabody Museum of Archaeology & Ethnology, Harvard 




Kruse, H., Pankhurst, J., & Sharwood, M. (1987). A multiple word association probe in 
second language acquisition research. Studies in Second Language Acquisition, 9(2), 
141–154. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0272263100000449  
Kuehnast, M., Wagner, V., Wassiliwizky, E., Jacobsen, T., & Menninghaus, W. (2014). 
Being moved: Linguistic representation and conceptual structure. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 5, 1242. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01242 
Kümmerling-Meibauer, B., & Meibauer, J. (2013). Towards a cognitive theory of 
picturebooks. International Research in Children’s Literature, 6(2), 143–160. 
Kümmerling-Meibauer, B., & Meibauer, J. (2015). Picturebooks and early literacy: How do 
picturebooks support early conceptual and narrative development? In B. Kümmerling-
Meibauer, J. Meibauer, K. Nachtigäller & K. J. Rohlfing (Eds.), Learning from 
Picturebooks (pp. 27–46). Routledge. 
Kurath, M., & Gisler, P. (2009). Informing, involving or engaging? Science communication, 
in the ages of atom-, bio- and nanotechnology. Public Understanding of Science, 18(5), 
559–573. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662509104723 
Kvale, S. and Brinkman, S. (2009) Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research 
Interviewing. Sage.  
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). The metaphorical structure of the human conceptual 
system. Cognitive Science, 4(2), 195–208. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog0402_4 
Lamont, P. (2017). A particular kind of wonder: The experience of magic past and present. 
Review of General Psychology, 21(1), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000095 
Landauer, T. K., & Dumais, S. T. (1997). A solution to Plato’s problem: The latent semantic 
analysis theory of acquisition, induction, and representation of knowledge. 
Psychological Review, 104(2), 211. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.104.2.211 
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical 
data. Biometrics, 33(1), 159–174. https://doi.org/10.2307/2529310 
Lanzoni, S. (2018). Empathy: A history. Yale University Press. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. Oxford University Press. 
Lebois, L. A. M., Wilson-Mendenhall, C. D., & Barsalou, L. W. (2015). Are automatic 
conceptual cores the gold standard of semantic processing? The context- dependence of 





Lebois, L. A. M., Wilson-Mendenhall, C. D., Simmons, W. K., Barrett, L. F., & Barsalou, L. 
W. (2018). Learning situated emotions. Neuropsychologia. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2018.01.008 
Lebrecht, S., Bar, M., Barrett, L. F., & Tarr, M. J. (2012). Micro-valences: Perceiving 
affective valence in everyday objects. Frontiers in Psychology, 3. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00107 
LeDoux, J. E. (2012). Rethinking the emotional brain. Neuron, 73(4), 653–676. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.02.004 
Lefsrud, L. M., & Meyer, R. E. (2012). Science or science fiction? Professionals’ discursive 
construction of climate change. Organization Studies, 33(11), 1477–1506. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840612463317 
Leiner, D. J. (2019). Too fast, too straight, too weird: Non-reactive indicators for meaningless 
data in internet surveys. Survey Research Methods, 13(3), 229-248. 
https://doi.org/10.18148/srm/2019.v13i3.7403 
Leiserowitz, A. (2006). Climate change risk perception and policy preferences: The role of 
affect, imagery, and values. Climatic Change, 77(1), 45–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9059-9 
Lemke, J. L. (1990). Talking science: Language, learning, and values. Praeger. 
Leshinskaya, A., & Caramazza, A. (2016). For a cognitive neuroscience of concepts: Moving 
beyond the grounding issue. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(4), 991–1001. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-015-0870-z 
Lessl, T. M. (1985). Science and the sacred cosmos: The ideological rhetoric of Carl Sagan. 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 71(2), 175–187. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00335638509383727 
Lessl, T. M. (1989). The priestly voice. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 75(2), 183–197. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00335638909383871 
Levenson, R. W. (2011). Basic emotion questions. Emotion Review, 3(4), 379–386. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073911410743 
Lewenstein, B. V. (2003). Models of public communication of science and technology. 
Public Understanding of Science, 96, 288–293. 
Lewenstein, B. V. (2017). Science controversies: Can the science of science communication 
provide management guidance or only analysis? In K. H. Jamieson, D. M. Kahan, & D. 




(pp. 73–78). Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190497620.013.7 
Lindquist, K. A., & Barrett, L. F. (2012). A functional architecture of the human brain: 
Emerging insights from the science of emotion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(11), 
533–540. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.09.005 
Lindquist, K. A., MacCormack, J. K., & Shablack, H. (2015). The role of language in 
emotion: Predictions from psychological constructionism. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 
Article 444. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00444 
Lindquist, K. A., Siegel, E. H., Quigley, K. S., & Barrett, L. F. (2013). The hundred-year 
emotion war: Are emotions natural kinds or psychological constructions? Comment on 
Lench, Flores, and Bench (2011). Psychological Bulletin, 139(1), 255–263. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029038 
Lindquist, K. A., Wager, T. D., Kober, H., Bliss-Moreau, E., & Barrett, L. F. (2012). The 
brain basis of emotion: A meta-analytic review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35(3), 
121–143. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11000446 
Linzer, D. A., & Lewis, J. B. (2011). PoLCA: An R package for polytomous variable latent 
class analysis. Journal of Statistical Software, 1(10), 
https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v042.i10 
Litman, L., Robinson, J., & Abberbock, T. (2017). TurkPrime. com: A versatile 
crowdsourcing data acquisition platform for the behavioral sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods, 49(2), 433-442. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-016-0727-z  
Loewenstein, J., Ocasio, W., & Jones, C. (2012). Vocabularies and vocabulary structure: A 
new approach linking categories, practices, and institutions. Academy of Management 
Annals, 6(1), 41–86. https://doi.org/10.5465/19416520.2012.660763 
Loeys, T., Moerkerke, B., De Smet, O., & Buysse, A. (2012). The analysis of zero-inflated 
count data: Beyond zero-inflated Poisson regression.: Zero-inflated Poisson regression. 
British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 65(1), 163–180. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8317.2011.02031.x 
Logan, R. A. (2001). Science mass communication: Its conceptual history. Science 
Communication, 23(2), 135–163. https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547001023002004 
Löhr, G. (2019). Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave 





Longinus. (1996). Dionysius Longinus on the sublime. In A. Andrew & P. De Bolla (Eds.), & 
W. Smith (Trans.), The sublime: A reader in British eighteenth-century aesthetic 
theory. Cambridge University Press. 
Longnecker, N. (2016). An integrated model of science communication: More than providing 
evidence. Journal of Science Communication, 15(5), Y01. 
https://doi.org/10.22323/2.15050401 
Louwerse, M. M. (2008). Embodied relations are encoded in language. Psychonomic Bulletin 
& Review, 15(4), 838–844. https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.15.4.838 
Louwerse, M. M. (2011). Symbol interdependency in symbolic and embodied cognition. 
Topics in Cognitive Science, 3(2), 273–302. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756- 
8765.2010.01106.x 
Louwerse, M. M., & Connell, L. (2011). A taste of words: Linguistic context and perceptual 
simulation predict the modality of words. Cognitive Science, 35(2), 381–398. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01157.x 
Lovelock, J.E., & Margulis, L. (1973) Atmospheric homeostasis by and for the biosphere: 
The Gaia hypothesis. Tellus, 26(1–2), 2–10. https://doi.org/10.3402/tellusa.v26i1-
2.9731 
Lu, H., & Schuldt, J. P. (2015). Exploring the role of incidental emotions in support for 
climate change policy. Climatic Change, 131(4), 719–726. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-015-1443-x 
Lupyan, G. (2012a). Linguistically modulated perception and cognition: The label-feedback 
hypothesis. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 54. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00054 
Lupyan, G. (2012b). What do words do? Toward a theory of language-augmented thought. In 
B. H. Ross (Ed.), Psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 57, pp. 255–297). 
Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-394293-7.00007-8 
Lupyan, G. (2016). The centrality of language in human cognition. Language Learning, 
66(3), 516–553. https://doi.org/10.1111/lang.12155 
Lupyan, G. (2019). Language as a source of abstract concepts. Physics of Life Reviews, 29, 
154–156. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2019.05.001 
Lupyan, G., & Lewis, M. (2019). From words-as-mappings to words-as-cues: The role of 





Lutz, C. A. (1986). Emotion, thought, and estrangement: Emotion as a cultural category. 
Cultural Anthropology, 1(3), 287–309. https://doi.org/10.1525/can.1986.1.3.02a00020 
Lutz, C. A. (1988). Unnatural emotions: Everyday sentiments on a Micronesian atoll and 
their challenge to western theory. University of Chicago Press. 
Lutz, C. A., & Abu-Lughod, L. (Eds.). (1990). Language and the politics of emotion. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lynott, D., Connell, L., Brysbaert, M., Brand, J., & Carney, J. (2020). The Lancaster 
Sensorimotor Norms: Multidimensional measures of perceptual and action strength for 
40,000 English words. Behavior Research Methods, 52(3), 1271–1291. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-019-01316-z 
MacCallum, R. C., Zhang, S., Preacher, K. J., & Rucker, D. D. (2002). On the practice of 
dichotomization of quantitative variables. Psychological Methods, 7(1), 19–40. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1082-989x.7.1.19. 
Macdonald, S. (2002). Behind the scenes at the Science Museum. Routledge. 
Machery, E. (2009). Doing without concepts. Oxford University Press.  
Machery, E. (2015). By default: Concepts are accessed in a context-independent manner. In 
E. Margolis & S. Laurence (Eds.), The conceptual mind: New directions in the study of 
concepts (pp. 567–588). MIT Press. 
Machery, E. (2016). The amodal brain and the offloading hypothesis. Psychonomic Bulletin 
& Review, 23(4), 1090–1095. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-015-0878-4 
MacWhinney, B. (2000). The CHILDES project: Tools for analyzing talk. transcription 
format and programs. Psychology Press. 
Mahon, B. Z. (2015). What is embodied about cognition? Language, Cognition and 
Neuroscience, 30(4), 420–429. https://doi.org/10.1080/23273798.2014.987791 
Mahon, B. Z., & Caramazza, A. (2008). A critical look at the embodied cognition hypothesis 
and a new proposal for grounding conceptual content. Journal of Physiology-Paris, 
102(1–3), 59–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jphysparis.2008.03.004 
Mahon, B. Z., & Hickok, G. (2016). Arguments about the nature of concepts: Symbols, 
embodiment, and beyond. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(4), 941–958. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-016-1045-2 
Matjašič, M., Vehovar, V., & Manfreda, K. L. (2018). Web survey paradata on response time 




Maibach, E. W., Leiserowitz, A., Roser-Renouf, C., & Mertz, C. K. (2011). Identifying like-
minded audiences for global warming public engagement campaigns: An audience 
segmentation analysis and tool development. PLOS ONE, 6(3), e17571. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0017571 
Mäntylä, M. V., Graziotin, D., & Kuutila, M. (2018). The evolution of sentiment analysis—A 
review of research topics, venues, and top cited papers. Computer Science Review, 27, 
16–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosrev.2017.10.002 
Márquez, M. C., & Porras, A. M. (2020). Science communication in multiple languages is 
critical to its effectiveness. Frontiers in Communication, 5, 31. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2020.00031 
Martinez, M., Stier, C., & Falcon, L. (2016). Judging a book by its cover: An investigation of 
peritextual features in Caldecott Award Books. Children’s Literature in Education, 
47(3), 225–241. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10583-016-9272-8 
Maruskin, L. A., Thrash, T. M., & Elliot, A. J. (2012). The chills as a psychological 
construct: Content universe, factor structure, affective composition, elicitors, trait 
antecedents, and consequences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(1), 
135–157. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028117 
Matheson, H. E., & Barsalou, L. W. (2018). Embodiment and grounding in cognitive 
neuroscience. In J. T. Wixted (Ed.), Stevens’ handbook of experimental psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience (pp. 1–27). John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  
Matsumoto, D., Nezlek, J. B., & Koopmann, B. (2007). Evidence for universality in 
phenomenological emotion response system coherence. Emotion, 7(1), 57–67. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.7.1.57 
Matsumoto, D., Takeuchi, S., Andayani, S., Kouznetsova, N., & Krupp, D. (1998). The 
contribution of individualism vs. Collectivism to cross-national differences in display 
rules. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 1(2), 147–165. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
839X.00010 
Mazzuca, C. (2020). Queering abstract concepts: A grounded perspective on gender. 
[Doctoral thesis]. Università di Bologna. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/id/eprint/9306 
Mazzuca, C., Borghi, A. M., Putten, S. va, Lugli, L., Nicoletti, R., & Majid, A. (2020). 
Gender at the interface of culture and language: Conceptual variation between Italian, 




Mazzuca, C., Majid, A., Lugli, L., Nicoletti, R., & Borghi, A. M. (2020). Gender is a 
multifaceted concept: Evidence that specific life experiences differentially shape the 
concept of gender. Open Science Framework. https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/ugv43 
McConnell-Ginet, S. (2008). Words in the world: How and why meanings can matter. 
Language, 84(3), 497–527. https://doi.org/10.1353/lan.0.0040 
McDougall, W. (2015). An introduction to social psychology (14th ed.). Psychology Press. 
McRae, K., Cree, G. S., Seidenberg, M. S., & Mcnorgan, C. (2005). Semantic feature 
production norms for a large set of living and nonliving things. Behavior Research 
Methods, 37(4), 547–559. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03192726 
McShane, K. (2018). The role of awe in environmental ethics. The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism, 76(4), 473–484. https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12595 
Medvecky, F., & Leach, J. (2019). An ethics of science communication. Springer.  
Mehrabian, A. (1970). A semantic space for nonverbal behavior. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 35(2), 248–257. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0030083 
Meijnders, A. L., Midden, C. J. H., & Wilke, H. A. M. (2001). Role of negative emotion in 
communication about CO2 risks. Risk Analysis, 21(5), 955–955. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/0272-4332.215164 
Mellor, A. K. (1993). Romanticism & gender. Routledge. 
Mellor, F. (2013). Twenty years of teaching science communication: A case study of 
Imperial College’s Master’s programme. Public Understanding of Science, 22(8), 916–
926. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662513489386 
Mellor, F. (2018). Book Review: Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dan Kahan and Dietram A. 
Scheufele (eds), The Oxford handbook of the science of science communication. Public 
Understanding of Science, 27(6), 750–752. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662518779838 
Merriam-Webster. (2003). Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dictionary (11th ed.). Merriam-
Webster. 
Mesquita, B., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2001). The role of culture in appraisal. In K. R. Scherer, A. 
Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Series in affective science. Appraisal processes in 
emotion: Theory, methods, research (pp. 233–248). Oxford University Press. 
Mesquita, B., & Leu, J. (2007). The cultural psychology of emotion. In S. Kitayama & D. 
Cohen (Eds.), Handbook of cultural psychology (pp. 734–759). Guilford Press. 
Mesquita, B., Boiger, M., & De Leersnyder, J. (2016). The cultural construction of emotions. 




Mesquita, B., Boiger, M., & De Leersnyder, J. (2017). Doing emotions: The role of culture in 
everyday emotions. European Review of Social Psychology, 28(1), 95–133. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2017.1329107 
Mesquita, B., Vissers, N., & Leersnyder, J. D. (2015). Culture and emotion. In J. D. Wright 
(Ed.), International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences (pp. 542–549). 
Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.24012-9 
Metcalfe, J. (2019). Comparing science communication theory with practice: An assessment 
and critique using Australian data. Public Understanding of Science, 28(4), 382–400. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662518821022 
Metcalfe, J., & Gascoigne, T. (2004). The science communication professional in Australia 
[Conference Paper]. 8th PCST International Conference, Barcelona, Spain. 
https://pcst.co/archive/pdf/Metcalfe_Gascoigne_PCST2004.pdf  
Meteyard, L., & Vigliocco, G. (2018). Lexico-Semantics. In S. A. Rueschemeyer & M. G. 
Gaskell (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of psycholinguistics (pp. 70–95). Oxford 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198786825.013.4 
Meteyard, L., Cuadrado, S. R., Bahrami, B., & Vigliocco, G. (2012). Coming of age: A 
review of embodiment and the neuroscience of semantics. Cortex, 48(7), 788–804. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2010.11.002 
Meyer, G. (2017). Fascinating! Popular science communication and literary science fiction: 
The shared features of awe and fascination and their significance to ideas of science 
fictions as vehicles for critical debate about scientific enterprises and their ethical 
implications. In C. Baron, P. N. Halvorsen, & C. Cornea (Eds.), Science fiction, ethics 
and the human condition (pp. 59–80). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
56577-4_5 
Michael, M. (2002). Comprehension, apprehension, prehension: Heterogeneity and the public 
understanding of science. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 27(3), 357–378. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/016224390202700302 
Miller, A. I. (1992). Scientific creativity: A comparative study of Henri Poincare and Albert 
Einstein. Creativity Research Journal, 5(4), 385–414. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10400419209534454 
Miller, J. D. (1983). Scientific literacy: A conceptual and empirical review. Daedalus, 




Miller, K. (2005). Communication theories: Perspectives, processes, and contexts. The 
McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Miller, S. (2001). Public understanding of science at the crossroads. Public Understanding of 
Science, 10(1), 115–120. https://doi.org/10.3109/a036859 
Ministry of Business, Innovation, & Employment (2014) A nation of curious minds – He 
Whenua Hihiri I te Maha: A national strategic plan for science in society. New Zealand 
Government. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/science-in-society-plan.pdf  
Mollin, S. (2009). Combining corpus linguistic and psychological data on word co-
occurrences: Corpus collocates versus word associations. Corpus Linguistics and 
Linguistic Theory, 5(2), 175–200. https://doi.org/10.1515/CLLT.2009.008 
Monk, S. H. (1960). The sublime: A study of critical theories in XVIII-century England. 
University of Michigan Press. 
Montag, J. L., Jones, M. N., & Smith, L. B. (2015). The words children hear: Picture books 
and the statistics for language learning. Psychological Science, 26(9), 1489–1496. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615594361 
Moore, K. D. (2005). The truth of the barnacles: Rachel Carson and the moral significance of 
wonder. Environmental Ethics, 27(3), 265–277. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics200527316 
Moors, A. (2010a). Automatic constructive appraisal as a candidate cause of emotion. 
Emotion Review, 2(2), 139–156. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073909351755 
Moors, A. (2010b). Theories of emotion causation: A review. In J. De Houwer & D. Hermans 
(Eds.), Cognition and emotion: Reviews of current research and theories (pp. 1–37). 
Psychology Press. 
Moors, A. (2014). Flavors of appraisal theories of emotion. Emotion Review, 6(4), 303–307. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073914534477 
Moors, A., Ellsworth, P. C., Scherer, K. R., & Frijda, N. H. (2013). Appraisal theories of 
emotion: State of the art and future development. Emotion Review, 5(2), 119–124. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073912468165 
Mosco, V. (2005). The digital sublime: Myth, power, and cyberspace. MIT Press. 
Mullahy, J. (1986). Specification and testing of some modified count data models. Journal of 
Econometrics, 33(3), 341–365. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(86)90002-3 




Murphy, G. L., & Wright, J. C. (1984). Changes in conceptual structure with expertise: 
Differences between real-world experts and novices. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10(1), 144–155. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.10.1.144 
Murtagh, F., & Legendre, P. (2014). Ward’s hierarchical agglomerative clustering method: 
Which algorithms implement Ward’s criterion? Journal of Classification, 31(3), 274–
295. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00357-014-9161-z 
Muurlink, O. T., & McAllister, P. (2015). The biographizing trend in popular science writing. 
The International Journal of the Book, 13(3), 1–4. https://doi.org/10.18848/1447-
9516/CGP/v13i03/37046 
Myers, G. (2003). Discourse studies of scientific popularization: Questioning the boundaries. 
Discourse Studies, 5(2), 265–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461445603005002006 
Myers, T. A., Nisbet, M. C., Maibach, E. W., & Leiserowitz, A. A. (2012). A public health 
frame arouses hopeful emotions about climate change. Climatic Change, 113(3), 1105–
1112. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-012-0513-6 
Nabi, R. L., Gustafson, A., & Jensen, R. (2018). Framing climate change: Exploring the role 
of emotion in generating advocacy behavior. Science Communication, 40(4), 442– 468. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547018776019 
Nadelson, L., Jorcyk, C., Yang, D., Jarratt Smith, M., Matson, S., Cornell, K., & Husting, V. 
(2014). I just don’t trust them: The development and validation of an assessment 
instrument to measure trust in science and scientists. School Science and Mathematics, 
114(2), 76–86. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssm.12051 
Nadis, F. (2005). Wonder shows: Performing science, magic, and religion in America. 
Rutgers University Press. 
Nakayama, M., Nozaki, Y., Taylor, P. M., Keltner, D., & Uchida, Y. (2020). Individual and 
cultural differences in predispositions to feel positive and negative aspects of awe. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 51(10), 771–793. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022120959821 
National Science Board (2010) Science and Engineering Indicators 2010. National Science 
Foundation. 
National Science Teachers’ Association. (2020). Outstanding Science Trade Books for 




Nelson, D. L., McEvoy, C. L., & Schreiber, T. A. (2004). The University of South Florida 
free association, rhyme, and word fragment norms. Behavior Research Methods, 
Instruments, & Computers, 36(3), 402–407. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195588 
Nerlich, B., & Jaspal, R. (2014). Images of extreme weather: Symbolising human responses 
to climate change. Science as Culture, 23(2), 253–276. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09505431.2013.846311 
Neuendorf, K. A. (2017). The content analysis guidebook (2nd ed.). Sage. 
Newman, A., Bavik, Y. L., Mount, M. & Shao, B. (2021), Data collection via online 
platforms: Challenges and recommendations for future research. Applied Psychology, 
70(3), 1380–1402. https://doi.org/10.1111/apps.12302 
Nicholson, M. H. (1997). Mountain gloom and mountain glory: The development of the 
aesthetics of the infinite. University of Washington Press. 
Nikolajeva, M., & Scott, C. (2013). How picturebooks work. Routledge. 
Nisbet, M. C., & Scheufele, D. A. (2009). What’s next for science communication? 
Promising directions and lingering distractions. American Journal of Botany, 96(10), 
1767–1778. https://doi.org/10.3732/ajb.0900041 
Nisbet, M. C., Kahlor, L., & Stout, P. (2009). Framing science: A new paradigm in public 
engagement. In L. Kahlor & P. Stout (Eds.), Communicating science: New agendas in 
communication (pp. 54–81). Routledge. 
Nisbet, M., & Markowitz, E. M. (2014). Understanding public opinion in debates over 
biomedical research: Looking beyond political partisanship to focus on beliefs about 
science and society. PLOS ONE, 9(2), e88473. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0088473 
Nissani, M. (1997). Ten cheers for interdisciplinarity: The case for interdisciplinary 
knowledge and research. The Social Science Journal, 34(2), 201–216. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(97)90051-3 
Noble, C. E. (1952). An analysis of meaning. Psychological Review, 59(6), 421–430. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0054087 
Nodelman, P. (1988). Words about pictures: The narrative art of children’s picture books. 
University of Georgia Press. 
Norgaard, K. M. (2006). “People want to protect themselves a little bit”: Emotions, denial, 





Nye, D. E. (1994). American technological sublime. MIT Press. 
Nylund-Gibson, K., & Choi, A. Y. (2018). Ten frequently asked questions about latent class 
analysis. Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 4(4), 440–461. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/tps0000176 
O’Connor, C. (2016). Embodiment and the construction of social knowledge: Towards an 
integration of embodiment and social representation theory. Journal for the Theory of 
Social Behaviour, 47(1), 2–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12110  
O’Neill, S., & Nicholson-Cole, S. (2009). “Fear won’t do it”: Promoting positive engagement 
with climate change through visual and iconic representations. Science Communication, 
30(3), 355–379. https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547008329201 
Ojala, M. (2012). Hope and climate change: The importance of hope for environmental 
engagement among young people. Environmental Education Research, 18(5), 625– 
642. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2011.637157 
Onion, R. (2016). Innocent experiments: Childhood and the culture of popular science in the 
United States. UNC Press Books. 
Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1988). The cognitive structure of emotions. 
Cambridge University Press.  
Otto, R. (1923). The idea of the holy. Oxford University Press. 
Owen, C. (2020). The sublime cosmic abyss and the Bruno Exemplum in Cosmos: A 
spacetime odyssey. The Journal of Religion and Popular Culture, 32(1), 1–14. 
https://doi.org/10.3138/jrpc.2017-0072 
Owens, T. (2009). Going to school with Madame Curie and Mr. Einstein: Gender roles in 
children’s science biographies. Cultural Studies of Science Education, 4(4), 929. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11422-009-9177-6 
Oxford University Press (n.d.-a) Awful, adj, In Oxford English Dictionary Retrieved March 
5, 2021, from https://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/13943 
Oxford University Press (n.d.-b). Aw. In Lexico. Retrieved on December 8, 2020. 
https://www.lexico.com/definition/aw  
Oxford University Press (n.d.-c). Awe, n. In Oxford English Dictionary. Retrieved March 5, 
2021, from http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/13911. 
Oxford University Press (n.d.-d). Awesome, n. In Oxford English dictionary. Retrieved 




Oxford University Press (n.d.-e). Wonder, n. In Oxford English Dictionary. Retrieved on 
March 5, 2021. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/229936 
Oyserman, D. (2017). Culture three ways: Culture and subcultures within countries. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 68(1), 435–463. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych- 122414-
033617 
Painter, C., Martin, J., & Unsworth, L. (2013). Reading visual narratives: Image analysis of 
children’s picture books. Equinox Publishing.  
Paivio, A. (1971). Imagery and language. In S. J. Segal (Ed.), Imagery (pp. 7–32). Elsevier. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-635450-8.50008-X 
Paivio, A., Yuille, J. C., & Madigan, S. A. (1968). Concreteness, imagery, and 
meaningfulness values for 925 nouns. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 76(1), 1–
25. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0025327 
Palinkas, L. A., Horwitz, S. M., Green, C. A., Wisdom, J. P., Duan, N., & Hoagwood, K. 
(2015). Purposeful sampling for qualitative data collection and analysis in mixed 
method implementation research. Administration and Policy in Mental Health and 
Mental Health Services Research, 42(5), 533–544. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10488-013-
0528-y 
Palmer, D. C. (2002). Psychological essentialism: A review of E. Margolis and S. Laurence 
(eds.), Concepts: Core readings. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 
78(3), 597–607. https://doi.org/10.1901/jeab.2002.78-597 
Palmeri, J. (2012). Bringing cosmos to culture: Harlow Shapley and the uses of cosmic 
evolution. In S. J. Dick & M. L. Lupisella (Eds.), Cosmos & culture: Cultural evolution 
in a cosmic context (pp. 489–521). U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotions. 
Oxford University Press. 
Pappas, C. C. (2006). The information book genre: Its role in integrated science literacy 
research and practice. Reading Research Quarterly, 41(2), 226–250. 
https://doi.org/10.1598/RRQ.41.2.4 
Parker, I. (1990). Discourse: Definitions and contradictions. Philosophical Psychology, 3(2– 
3), 187–204. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089008572998 
Pasta, D. J. (2009). Learning when to be discrete: Continuous vs. Categorical predictors. In 




Pelletier, F. J. (2017). Compositionality and concepts: A perspective from formal semantics 
and philosophy of language. In J. A. Hampton & Y. Winter (Eds.), Compositionality 
and concepts in linguistics and psychology (pp. 31–94). Spring International 
Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45977-6_3 
Pennington, J., Socher, R., & Manning, C. D. (2014). Glove: Global vectors for word 
representation. In Proceedings of the 2014 conference on Empirical Methods in Natural 
Language Processing (EMNLP) (pp. 1532–1543). https://doi.org/10.3115/v1/D14-1162 
Pernau, J.M. & Rajamani, I. (2016). Emotion translations: Conceptual history beyond 
language. History and Theory, 55(1), 46–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/hith.10787 
Perrault, S. T. (2013). Communicating popular science: From deficit to democracy. Springer. 
Pew Research Center. (2017). Science news and information today. Pew Research Center. 
https://www.journalism.org/2017/09/20/science-news-and-information-today/ 
Phillips, L. (2011). The promise of dialogue: The dialogic turn in the production and 
communication of knowledge. John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Piff, P. K., Dietze, P., Feinberg, M., Stancato, D. M., & Keltner, D. (2015). Awe, the small 
self, and prosocial behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 108(6), 8 
83–899. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000018 
Pigliuicci, M. (2006) Fundamentalism and science. Journal of Science Communication, 5(2), 
1–4. https://doi.org/10.22323/2.05020306  
Pinto, B. M. L., Costa, J. L., & Cabral, H. N. (2017). How do science communication 
practitioners view scientists and audiences in relation to public engagement activities? 
A research note concerning the marine sciences in Portugal. Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society, 37(3), 159–166. https://doi.org/10.1177/0270467618819683 
Plutchik, R. (1991). The emotions: Revised edition. University Press of America. 
Poetzsch, Markus. (2006). “Visionary dreariness”: Readings in Romanticism’s quotidian 
sublime. Routledge. 
Polk, E., & Diver, S. (2020). Situating the scientist: Creating inclusive science 
communication through equity framing and environmental justice. Frontiers in 
Communication, 5. https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2020.00006 
Pozzebon, J. A., Visser, B. A., Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., & Goldberg, L. R. (2010). 
Psychometric characteristics of a public-domain self-report measure of vocational 
interests: The Oregon Vocational Interest Scales. Journal of Personality Assessment, 




Prade, C., & Saroglou, V. (2016). Awe’s effects on generosity and helping. The Journal of 
Positive Psychology, 11(5), 522–530. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2015.1127992 
Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., MacCallum, R. C., & Nicewander, W. A. (2005). Use of the 
extreme groups approach: A critical reexamination and new recommendations. 
Psychological Methods, 10(2), 178. 
Priest, S. (2013). Can strategic and democratic goals coexist in communicating science? 
Nanotechnology as a case study in the ethics of science communication and the need 
for ‘Critical Science Literacy’. In J. Goodwin, M.F. Dahlstrom, & S.H. Priest (Eds.), 
Ethical issues in science communication: A theory-based approach (pp. 229–244). 
Symposium proceedings, Iowa State University. 
https://doi.org/10.31274/sciencecommunication-180809-45 
Priest, S. (2018). Communicating climate change and other evidence-based controversies: 
Challenges to ethics in practice. In S. Priest, J. Goodwin, & M.F. Dahlstrom (Eds.). 
Ethics and practice in science communication. (pp 55–73). The University of Chicago 
Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/9780226497952-006 
Prinz, J. J. (2004). Furnishing the mind: Concepts and their perceptual basis. MIT Press. 
Pulvermüller, F. (1999). Words in the brain’s language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
22(2), 253–279. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X9900182X 
Purser, R. (2019). McMindfulness. Watkins Media Limited. 
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive 
science. MIT Press. 
QSR International. (1999). NVivo qualitative data analysis software (Version 12) [Computer 
software]. https://qsrinternational.com/nvivo/nvivo-products/ 
Qualtrics. (2019). Qualtrics [Computer software]. https://www.qualtrics.com  
Quigley, K. S., Lindquist, K. A., & Barrett, L. F. (2014). Inducing and measuring emotion 
and affect: Tips, tricks, and secrets. In Handbook of research methods in social and 
personality psychology, 2nd ed. (pp. 220–252). Cambridge University Press. 
R Core Team (2013). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R foundation 
for statistical computing [Computer software]. https://www.R-project.org/. 





Randall, T. M., & Desrosiers, M. (1980). Measurement of supernatural belief: Sex 
differences and locus of control. Journal of Personality Assessment, 44(5), 493-498. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa4405_9 
Rawson, C. H., & McCool, M. A. (2014). Just like all the other humans? Analyzing images 
of scientists in children’s trade books. School Science and Mathematics, 114(1), 10–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ssm.12046 
Ray, G. (2005). Terror and the sublime in art and critical theory from Auschwitz to 
Hiroshima to September 11. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Razavi, P., Zhang, J. W., Hekiert, D., Yoo, S. H., & Howell, R. T. (2016). Cross-cultural 
similarities and differences in the experience of awe. Emotion, 16(8), 1097–1101. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000225 
Revelle, W. R. (2017). psych: Procedures for personality and psychological research. 
[Computer software]. https://www.scholars.northwestern.edu/en/publications/psych-
procedures-for-personality-and-psychological-research 
Rey, G. (1983). Concepts and stereotypes. Cognition, 15(1–3), 237–262. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(83)90044-6 
Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human 
evolution. University of Chicago Press. 
Riemer, N. (2015). Word Meanings. In J. R. Taylor (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the word. 
Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641604.013.009 
Rinker, T. W. (2018). textstem: Tools for stemming and lemmatizing text [Computer 
software]. https://github.com/trinker/textstem  
Roberson, T. M. (2020). Can hype be a force for good?: Inviting unexpected engagement 
with science and technology futures. Public Understanding of Science, 29(5), 544–552. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662520923109 
Robinson, M. D., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Belief and feeling: Evidence for an accessibility 
model of emotional self-report. Psychological Bulletin, 128(6), 934–960. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.128.6.934 
Roeser, S. (2012). Risk communication, public engagement, and climate change: A role for 
emotions. Risk Analysis, 32(6), 1033–1040. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-
6924.2012.01812.x 
Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and 




Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure of 
categories. Cognitive Psychology, 7(4), 573–605. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010- 
0285(75)90024-9 
Rosenzweig, M. R. (1964). Word associations of French workmen: Comparisons with 
associations of French students and American workmen and students. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 3(1), 57–69. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-
5371(64)80059-1 
Rosseel, Y. (2012). Lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling and more. 
Version 0.5–12 (BETA). Journal of statistical software, 48(2), 1-36. 
Rouse, S. V. (2015). A reliability analysis of Mechanical Turk data. Computers in Human 
Behavior, 43, 304–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2014.11.004 
Roversi, C., Borghi, A. M., & Tummolini, L. (2013). A marriage is an artefact and not a walk 
that we take together: An experimental study on the categorization of artefacts. Review 
of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(3), 527–542. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-
0150-7 
Rozelle, L. (2006). Ecosublime: Environmental awe and terror from new world to oddworld. 
University of Alabama Press. 
Rubenstein, M.-Jane. (2011). Strange wonder: The closure of metaphysics and the opening of 
awe. Columbia University Press. 
Rudd, M., Vohs, K. D., & Aaker, J. (2012). Awe expands people’s perception of time, alters 
decision making, and enhances well-being. Psychological Science, 23(10), 1130– 1136. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612438731 
Runge, K. K., Brossard, D., & Xenos, M. A. (2018). Protective progressives to distrustful 
traditionalists: A post hoc segmentation method for science communication. 
Environmental Communication, 12(8), 1023–1045. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2018.1513854 
Rupert, R. D. (2011). Embodiment, consciousness, and the massively representational mind. 
Philosophical Topics, 39(1), 99–120. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics201139116 
Russ, J. (1975). Towards an Aesthetic of Science Fiction. Science Fiction Studies, 2(2), 112–
119. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4238932 
Russell, J. A. (1991a). Culture and the categorization of emotions. Psychological Bulletin, 




Russell, J. A. (1991b). In defense of a prototype approach to emotion concepts. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 60(1), 37–47. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022- 
3514.60.1.37 
Russell, J. A. (1994). Is there universal recognition of emotion from facial expression? A 
review of the cross-cultural studies. Psychological Bulletin, 115(1), 102–141. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.115.1.102 
Russell, J. A., & Barrett, L. F. (1999). Core affect, prototypical emotional episodes, and other 
things called emotion: Dissecting the elephant. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 76(5), 805–819. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.76.5.805 
Sagan, C. (1997). Pale blue dot: A vision of the human future in space. Random House. 
Sage, D. (2008). Framing space: A popular geopolitics of American manifest destiny in outer 
space. Geopolitics, 13(1), 27–53. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040701783482 
Sanders, V. R., Friedlmeier, W., & Sanchez Gonzalez, M. L. (2018). Emotion norms in 
media: Acculturation in Hispanic children’s storybooks compared to heritage and 
mainstream cultures. SAGE Open, 8(3), 1–13. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244018788607 
Santos, A., Chaigneau, S. E., Simmons, W. K., & Barsalou, L. W. (2011). Property 
generation reflects word association and situated simulation. Language and Cognition, 
3(1), 83–119. https://doi.org/10.1515/langcog.2011.004 
Saroglou, V., Buxant, C., & Tilquin, J. (2008). Positive emotions as leading to religion and 
spirituality. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 3(3), 165–173. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760801998737 
Saslow, L. R., John, O. P., Piff, P. K., Willer, R., Wong, E., Impett, E. A., Kogan, A., 
Antonenko, O., Clark, K., Feinberg, M., Keltner, D., & Saturn, S. R. (2013). The social 
significance of spirituality: New perspectives on the compassion–altruism relationship. 
Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 5(3), 201–218. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031870 
Schäfer, M. S., Füchslin, T., Metag, J., Kristiansen, S., & Rauchfleisch, A. (2018). The 
different audiences of science communication: A segmentation analysis of the Swiss 
population’s perceptions of science and their information and media use patterns. 





Schäfer, M., & Taddicken, M. (2015). Opinion leadership, mediatized opinion leaders: New 
patterns of opinion leadership in new media environments. International Journal Of 
Communication, 960–981. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/2778 
Scheer, M. (2012). Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what makes them have a 
history)? A Bourdieuian approach to understanding emotion. History and Theory, 
51(2), 193-220. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23277639 
Scherer, K. R. (1984). On the nature and function of emotion: A component process 
approach. In P. Ekman & K. R. Scherer (Eds.), Approaches to emotion (Vol. 21, pp. 
293–317). Erlbaum. https://doi.org/10.1177/053901882021004001 
Scherer, K. R. (1992). What does facial expression express? In K. T. Strongman (Ed.), 
International review of studies on emotion, Vol. 2 (pp. 139–165). John Wiley & Sons. 
Scherer, K. R. (1997). The role of culture in emotion-antecedent appraisal. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 73(5), 902–922. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.73.5.902  
Scherer, K. R., & Fontaine, J. R. J. (2019). The semantic structure of emotion words across 
languages is consistent with componential appraisal models of emotion. Cognition and 
Emotion, 33(4), 673–682. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2018.1481369 
Scherer, K. R., & Wallbott, H. G. (1994). Evidence for universality and cultural variation of 
differential emotion response patterning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
66(2), 310–328. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.66.2.310 
Scheufele, D. A. (2014). Science communication as political communication. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 111(Supplement 4), 13585–13592. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1317516111 
Schneider, K. J. (2009). Awakening to awe: Personal stories of profound transformation. 
Jason Aronson. 
Schneider, K. J. (2017). The resurgence of awe in psychology: Promise, hope, and perils. 
Humanistic Psychologist, 45(2), 103–108. https://doi.org/10.1037/hum0000060 
Schreier, M. (2012). Qualitative content analysis in practice. Sage. 
Schreier, M., Stamann, C., Janssen, M., Dahl, T., & Whittal, A. (2019). Qualitative content 
analysis: Conceptualizations and challenges in research practice - Introduction to the 





Schroeder, M., Mckeough, A., Graham, S., Stock, H., & Bisanz, G. (2009). The contribution 
of trade books to early science literacy: In and out of school. Research in Science 
Education, 39(2), 231–250. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11165-008-9082-0 
Schurtz, D. R., Blincoe, S., Smith, R. H., Powell, C. A. J., Combs, D. J. Y., & Kim, S. H. 
(2012). Exploring the social aspects of goose bumps and their role in awe and envy. 
Motivation and Emotion, 36(2), 205–217. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-011-9243-8 
Schwan, S., Grajal, A., & Lewalter, D. (2014). Understanding and engagement in places of 
science experience: Science museums, science centers, zoos, and aquariums. 
Educational Psychologist, 49(2), 70-85. https://doi.org/10.1080/00461520.2014.917588 
Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3), 417– 
424. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005756 
Searle, J. R. (1995). The construction of social reality. The Free Press. 
Searle, J. R. (1999). Mind, language and society: Philosophy in the real world. Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson. 
Seaton, C. L., & Beaumont, S. L. (2015). Pursuing the good life: A short-term follow-up 
study of the role of positive/negative emotions and ego-resilience in personal goal 
striving and eudaimonic well-being. Motivation and Emotion, 39(5), 813–826. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-015-9493-y 
Shannon, C. E., & Weaver, W. (1963). The mathematical theory of communication. 
University of Illinois Press. 
Shapiro, L. (2013). When is cognition embodied. In U. Kriegel (Ed.), Current Controversies 
in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. 
Sharifian, F., & Bagheri, M. (2019). Conceptualisations of xoshbaxti (‘happiness / 
prosperity’) and baxt (‘fate / luck’) in Persian. Journal of Historical Pragmatics, 20(1), 
78–95. https://doi.org/10.1075/jhp.16006.sha 
Sharkawy, A. (2009). Moving beyond the lone scientist: Helping 1st-grade students 
appreciate the social context of scientific work using stories about scientists. Journal of 
Elementary Science Education, 21(1), 67–78. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03174716 
Sharkawy, A. (2012). Exploring the potential of using stories about diverse scientists and 
reflective activities to enrich primary students’ images of scientists and scientific work. 
Cultural Studies of Science Education, 7(2), 307–340. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11422-
012-9386-2 




Shiota, M. N., Campos, B., & Keltner, D. (2003). The faces of positive emotion: Prototype 
displays of awe, amusement, and pride. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 
1000, 296–299. https://doi.org/10.1196/annals.1280.029 
Shiota, M. N., Campos, B., Oveis, C., Hertenstein, M. J., Simon-Thomas, E., & Keltner, D. 
(2017). Beyond happiness: Building a science of discrete positive emotions. American 
Psychologist, 72(7), 617–643. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0040456 
Shiota, M. N., Keltner, D., & Mossman, A. (2007). The nature of awe: Elicitors, appraisals, 
and effects on self-concept. Cognition & Emotion, 21(5), 944–963. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930600923668 
Shiota, M. N., Neufeld, S. L., Yeung, W. H., Moser, S. E., & Perea, E. F. (2011). Feeling 
good: Autonomic nervous system responding in five positive emotions. Emotion, 11(6), 
1368–1378. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024278 
Shiota, M. N., Thrash, T. M., Danvers, A., & Dombrowski, J. T. (2014). Transcending the 
self: Awe, elevation, and inspiration. In M. M. Tugade, M. N. Shiota, & L. D. Kirby 
(Eds.), Handbook of Positive Emotions (pp. 362–377). Guilford Press. 
Sideris, L. H. (2017). Consecrating science: Wonder, knowledge, and the natural world. 
University of California Press. 
Siegel, E. H., Sands, M. K., Van den Noortgate, W., Condon, P., Chang, Y., Dy, J., Quigley, 
K. S., & Barrett, L. F. (2018). Emotion fingerprints or emotion populations? A meta- 
analytic investigation of autonomic features of emotion categories. Psychological 
Bulletin, 144(4), 343–393. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000128 
Signorielli, N. (2008). Research ethics in content analysis. In A. B. Jordan, D. Kunkel, J. 
Manganello & M. Fishbein (Eds.), Media Messages and Public Health: A Decisions 
Approach to Content Analysis (pp. 88-96). Routledge.  
Silge, J., & Robinson, D. (2016). tidytext: Text mining and analysis using tidy data principles 
in R. Journal of Open Source Software, 1(3), 37. https://doi.org/10.21105/joss.00037 
Silva Luna, D., & Bering, J. M. (2020). The construction of awe in science communication. 
Public Understanding of Science, 30(1), 2–15. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662520963256 
Silvia, P. J., Fayn, K., Nusbaum, E. C., & Beaty, R. E. (2015). Openness to experience and 
awe in response to nature and music: Personality and profound aesthetic experiences. 





Simis, M. J., Madden, H., Cacciatore, M. A., & Yeo, S. K. (2016). The lure of rationality: 
Why does the deficit model persist in science communication? Public Understanding of 
Science, 25(4), 400–414. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662516629749 
Simmons, W. K., & Barsalou, L. W. (2003). The Similarity in topography principle: 
Reconciling theories of conceptual deficits. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20(3–6), 451–
486. https://doi.org/10.1080/02643290342000032 
Simmons, W. K., Hamann, S. B., Harenski, C. L., Hu, X. P., & Barsalou, L. W. (2008). 
FMRI evidence for word association and situated simulation in conceptual processing. 
Links and Interactions Between Language and Motor Systems in the Brain, 102(1), 
106–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jphysparis.2008.03.014 
Simon-Thomas, E. R., Keltner, D. J., Sauter, D., Sinicropi-Yao, L., & Abramson, A. (2009). 
The voice conveys specific emotions: Evidence from vocal burst displays. Emotion, 
9(6), 838–846. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017810 
Simons, J., Zimmer, R., Vierboom, C., Härlen, I., Hertel, R., & Böl, G.-F. (2009). The slings 
and arrows of communication on nanotechnology. Journal of Nanoparticle Research, 
11(7), 1555–1571. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11051-009-9653-7 
Simpson, J. A., Weiner, E. S. C. & Oxford University Press. (1989). The Oxford English 
Dictionary. Clarendon Press.  
Smith, C. A. (1989). Dimensions of appraisal and physiological response in emotion. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(3), 339–353. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022- 
3514.56.3.339 
Smith, C. A., & Lazarus, R. S. (1990). Emotion and adaptation. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), 
Handbook of personality: Theory and research (pp. 609–637). Guilford Press. 
Smith, E. E., & Medin, D. L. (1981). Categories and concepts. Harvard University Press. 
Smith, N., & Leiserowitz, A. (2014). The role of emotion in global warming policy support 
and opposition. Risk Analysis, 34(5), 937–948. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.12140 
Solomon, K. O., & Barsalou, L. W. (2004). Perceptual simulation in property verification. 
Memory & Cognition, 32(2), 244–259. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196856 
Spratling, M. W. (2017). A review of predictive coding algorithms. Brain and Cognition, 
112, 92–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2015.11.003 
Stearns, P. N. (1990). The rise of sibling jealousy in the twentieth century. Symbolic 




Stein, N. L., & Hernandez, M. W. (2007). Assessing understanding and appraisals during 
emotional experience: The development and use of the Narcoder. In J.A. Coan & J.J.B. 
Allen (Eds.), Handbook of emotion elicitation and assessment (pp. 298–317). Oxford 
University Press. 
Stellar, J. E., Gordon, A., Anderson, C. L., Piff, P. K., McNeil, G. D., & Keltner, D. (2018). 
Awe and humility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 114(2), 258–269. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000109 
Stephens, J. (1992). Language and ideology in children’s fiction. Longman. 
Sterling, P. (2012). Allostasis: A model of predictive regulation. Allostasis and Allostatic 
Load, 106(1), 5–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physbeh.2011.06.004 
Stocklmayer S. M. (2012) Engagement with science: Models of science communication. In: 
Gilbert JK and Stocklmayer S (Eds.). Communication and engagement with science 
and technology: Issues and dilemmas – A reader in science communication (pp. 19–
38). Taylor & Francis.  
Stocklmayer, S. M. (2018). Communicating science. In D. Corrigan, C. Buntting, A. Jones, & 
J. Loughran (Eds.), Navigating the changing landscape of formal and informal science 
learning opportunities (pp. 69–86). Springer. 
Stocklmayer, S. M., & Bryant, C. (2012). Science and the public: What should people know?. 
International Journal of Science Education, Part B, 2(1), 81-101. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09500693.2010.543186 
Storer, N. W. (1967). The hard sciences and the soft: Some sociological observations. 
Bulletin of the Medical Library Association, 55(1), 75–84. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC198502/ 
Storm, C., & Storm, T. (1987). A taxonomic study of the vocabulary of emotions. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 53(4), 805–816. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.53.4.805 
Storm, C., & Storm, T. (1992). The semantics of emotion words: A comparison of three 
taxonomies. Current Advances in Semantic Theory, 169–181. 
Strapparava, C., & Valitutti, A. (2004). Wordnet affect: An affective extension of wordnet. In 
Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Language Resources and 





Suldovsky, B. (2016). In science communication, why does the idea of the public deficit 
always return? Exploring key influences. Public Understanding of Science, 25(4), 415–
426. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662516629750 
Sullivan, E. (2016). Beyond melancholy: Sadness and selfhood in renaissance England. 
Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739654.001.0001  
Sundararajan, L. (2002). Religious awe: Potential contributions of negative theology to 
psychology, “positive” or otherwise. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical 
Psychology, 22(2), 174–197. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0091221 
Takahashi, B., & Tandoc, E. C. (2016). Media sources, credibility, and perceptions of 
science: Learning about how people learn about science. Public Understanding of 
Science, 25(6), 674–690. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662515574986 
Tanaka, J. W., & Taylor, M. (1991). Object categories and expertise: Is the basic level in the 
eye of the beholder? Cognitive Psychology, 23(3), 457–482. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(91)90016-H 
Tannenbaum, P. H. (1963). Communication of science information: Presentations in the mass 
media are often based on a misconception of the public’s interests and views. Science, 
140(3567), 579–583. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1710511 
Tardy, C. (2004). The role of English in scientific communication: Lingua franca or 
Tyrannosaurus rex? Journal of English for Academic Purposes, 3(3), 247–269. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeap.2003.10.001 
Tepper, C. A., & Cassidy, K. W. (1999). Gender differences in emotional language in 
children’s picture books. Sex Roles, 40(3), 265–280. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018803122469 
Terry, G., Hayfield, N., Clarke, V., & Braun, V. (2017). Thematic Analysis. In C. Willig & 
W. Stainton Rogers (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of qualitative research in psychology 
(pp. 17–36). Sage. 
Thagard, P. (2002). The passionate scientist: Emotion in scientific cognition. In P. 
Carruthers, S. Stich, & M. Siegal (Eds.), The cognitive basis of science (pp. 235– 250). 
Cambridge University Press.  
Theriault, J. E., Young, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2020). The sense of should: A biologically-based 





Theriault, J. E., Young, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2021). Situating and Extending the Sense of 
Should. Reply to comments on “The sense of should: A biologically based framework 
for modeling social pressure”. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/yfdb7 
Thwaites, P. (2018). Lexical and distributional influences on word association response 
generation [Doctoral thesis]. Cardiff University. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/119182/ 
Thyme, K.E., Wiberg, B., Lundman, B., & Graneheim, U.H. (2013). Qualitative content 
analysis in art psychotherapy research: Concepts, procedures, and measures to reveal 
the latent meaning in pictures and the words attached to the pictures. The Arts in 
Psychotherapy, 40, 101–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aip.2012.11.007  
Tomkins, S. S. (1962). Affect, imagery, consciousness, Vol. 1: The positive affects. Springer.  
Tong, E. M. W., & Jia, L. (2017). Positive emotion, appraisal, and the role of appraisal 
overlap in positive emotion co-occurrence. Emotion, 17(1), 40–54. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000203 
Tracy, J. L. (2014). An evolutionary approach to understanding distinct emotions. Emotion 
Review, 6(4), 308–312. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073914534478 
Tracy, J. L., & Randles, D. (2011). Four models of basic emotions: A review of Ekman and 
Cordaro, Izard, Levenson, and Panksepp and Watt. Emotion Review, 3(4), 397–405. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073911410747 
Treise, D., & Weigold, M. F. (2002). Advancing science communication: A survey of science 
communicators. Science Communication, 23(3), 310–322. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/107554700202300306 
Trench, B. (2006). Science communication and citizen science: How dead is the deficit model 
[Conference presentation]. IX International Conference on Public Communication of 
Science and Technology (PCST), Seoul, Korea.  
Trench, B. (2008). Towards an analytical framework of science communication models. In D. 
Cheng, M. Claessens, N. R. J. Gascoigne, J. Metcalfe, B. Schiele, & S. Shi (Eds.), 
Communicating science in social contexts (pp. 119–135). Springer. 
Trench, B., & Bucchi, M. (2010). Science communication, an emerging discipline. Journal of 
Science Communication, 9(3), 1–5. https://doi.org/10.22323/2.09030303 
Trench, B., & Junker, K. (2001). How scientists view their public communication 
[Conference presentation]. Sixth International Conference on Public Communication of 





Trench, B., Bucchi, M., Amin, L., Cakmakci, G., Bankole, F., Olesk, A., & Polino, C. (2014). 
Global spread of science communication: Institutions and practices across continents. 
In M. Bucchi & B. Trench (Eds.), Routledge handbook of public communication of 
science and technology (pp. 214–230). Routledge.  
Tsai, J. L. (2007). Ideal affect: Cultural causes and behavioral consequences. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 2(3), 242–259. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-
6916.2007.00043.x 
Tsai, J. L., Louie, J. Y., Chen, E. E., & Uchida, Y. (2007). Learning what feelings to desire: 
Socialization of ideal affect through children’s storybooks. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 33(1), 17–30. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206292749 
Tsfati, Y., Cohen, J., & Gunther, A. C. (2010). The influence of presumed media influence on 
news about science and scientists. Science Communication, 33(2), 143–166. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547010380385 
Turney, J. (2004). The abstract sublime: Life as information waiting to be rewritten. Science 
as Culture, 13(1), 89–103. https://doi.org/10.1080/0950543042000193799 
Vaismoradi, M., & Snelgrove, S. (2019). Theme in qualitative content analysis and thematic 
analysis. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 20(3), 23. https://doi.org/10.17169/FQS-
20.3.3376 
Valdesolo, P., & Graham, J. (2014). Awe, uncertainty, and agency detection. Psychological 
Science, 25(1), 170–178. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613501884 
Valdesolo, P., Park, J., & Gottlieb, S. (2016). Awe and scientific explanation. Emotion, 16(7), 
937–940. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000213 
Valdesolo, P., Shtulman, A., & Baron, A. S. (2017). Science is awe-some: The emotional 
antecedents of science learning. Emotion Review, 9(3), 215–221. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073916673212 
Van Cappellen, P., & Saroglou, V. (2012). Awe activates religious and spiritual feelings and 
behavioral intentions. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 4(3), 223–236. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025986 
Van den Stock, J., Righart, R., & de Gelder, B. (2007). Body expressions influence 





van Elk, M., Karinen, A., Specker, E., Stamkou, E., & Baas, M. (2016). ‘Standing in awe’: 
The effects of awe on body perception and the relation with absorption. Collabra: 
Psychology, 2(1). https://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.36 
Van Rensbergen, B., Storms, G., & De Deyne, S. (2015). Examining assortativity in the 
mental lexicon: Evidence from word associations. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
22(6), 1717–1724. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-015-0832-5 
Vander Wege, B., Sánchez González, M. L., Friedlmeier, W., Mihalca, L. M., Goodrich, E., 
& Corapci, F. (2014). Emotion displays in media: A comparison between American, 
Romanian, and Turkish children’s storybooks. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 600. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00600 
Vargha, A., & Delaney, H.D. (2000) A critique and improvement of the CL common 
language effect size statistics for McGraw and Wong. Journal of Education and 
Behavioral Statistics, 25(2), 101–132. https://doi.org/10.3102/10769986025002101 
Vasalou, S. (2015). Wonder: A grammar. State University of New York Press. 
Verhoeven, P. (2008). Where has the doctor gone? The mediazation of medicine on Dutch 
television, 1961-2000. Public Understanding of Science, 17(4), 461–472. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662506075352 
Vigliocco, G., & Vinson, D. P. (2007). Semantic representation. In M. G. Gaskell (Ed.), The 
Oxford handbook of psycholinguistics (pp. 194–216). Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198568971.013.0012 
Vigliocco, G., Kousta, S.-T., Della Rosa, P. A., Vinson, D. P., Tettamanti, M., Devlin, J. T., 
& Cappa, S. F. (2014). The neural representation of abstract words: The role of 
emotion. Cerebral Cortex, 24(7), 1767–1777. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bht025 
Vigliocco, G., Meteyard, L., Andrews, M., & Kousta, S. (2009). Toward a theory of semantic 
representation. Language and Cognition, 1(2), 219–247. 
https://doi.org/10.1515/LANGCOG.2009.011 
Virtanen, P., Gommers, R., Oliphant, T. E., Haberland, M., Reddy, T., Cournapeau, D., 
Burovski, E., Peterson, P., Weckesser, W., & Bright, J. (2020). SciPy 1.0: Fundamental 
algorithms for scientific computing in Python. Nature Methods, 17(3), 261–272. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41592-019-0686-2 
Volkman, J. E., & Parrott, R. L. (2012). Expressing emotions as evidence in osteoporosis 
narratives: Effects on message processing and intentions. Human Communication 




Vytal, K., & Hamann, S. (2010). Neuroimaging support for discrete neural correlates of basic 
emotions: A voxel-based meta-analysis. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(12), 
2864–2885. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2009.21366 
Wagner, L. (2017). Factors Influencing Parents’ Preferences and Parents’ Perceptions of 
Child Preferences of Picturebooks. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 1448. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01448 
Walls, J., Rowe, G., & Frewer, L. (2010). Stakeholder engagement in food risk management: 
Evaluation of an iterated workshop approach. Public Understanding of Science, 20(2), 
241–260. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662509354543 
Wang, S., Leviston, Z., Hurlstone, M., Lawrence, C., & Walker, I. (2018). Emotions predict 
policy support: Why it matters how people feel about climate change. Global 
Environmental Change, 50, 25–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.03.002 
Warde, A. (2017) Consumption: A sociological analysis. Palgrave Macmillan 
Weger, U., & Wagemann, J. (2021). Towards a conceptual clarification of awe and wonder. 
Current Psychology, 40(3), 1386–1401. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-018-0057-7 
Weiskel, T. (1986). The romantic sublime: Studies in the structure and psychology of 
transcendence. Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Welsh, I., & Wynne, B. (2013). Science, scientism and imaginaries of publics in the UK: 
Passive objects, incipient threats. Science as Culture, 22(4), 540-566. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14636778.2013.764072 
West, R. L., & Turner, L. H. (2007). Introducing communication theory: Analysis and 
application. McGraw-Hill. 
Wherry, F. F., & Woodward, I. (Eds.). (2019). The Oxford handbook of consumption. Oxford 
University Press. 
White, M. D., & Marsh, E. E. (2006). Content analysis: A flexible methodology. Library 
Trends, 55(1), 22–45. 
Wickham, H., Averick, M., Bryan, J., Chang, W., McGowan, L. D., François, R., Grolemund, 
G., Hayes, A., Henry, L., & Hester, J. (2019). Welcome to the Tidyverse. The Journal 
of Open Source Software, 4(43), 1686. https://doi.org/10.21105/joss.01686 
Widen, S. C., & Russell, J. A. (2010). Descriptive and prescriptive definitions of emotion. 




Wiehe, B. (2014). When science makes us who we are: Known and speculative impacts of 
science festivals. Journal of Science Communication, 13(4), C02. 
https://doi.org/10.22323/2.13040302 
Wieland, A., Durach, C.F., Kembro, J. & Treiblmaier, H. (2017). Statistical and judgmental 
criteria for scale purification, Supply Chain Management, 22(4), 321–328. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/SCM-07-2016-0230 
Wiemer-Hastings, K., & Xu, X. (2005). Content differences for abstract and concrete 
concepts. Cognitive Science, 29(5), 719–736. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog0000_33 
Williams Jr., J. A., Podeschi, C., Palmer, N., Schwadel, P., & Meyler, D. (2012). The 
Human-environment dialog in award-winning children’s picture books. Sociological 
Inquiry, 82(1), 145–159. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-682X.2011.00399.x 
Williams, F. (2017). The nature fix: Why nature makes us happier, healthier, and more 
creative. W.W. Norton & Company. 
Williams, R. (2009). Structures of feeling. In J. M. Harding & E. D. Pribram (Eds.), 
Emotions: A cultural studies reader (pp. 35–49). Routledge. 
Wilson-Mendenhall, C. D. (2017). Constructing emotion through simulation. Current 
Opinion in Psychology, 17, 189–194. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.07.015 
Wilson-Mendenhall, C. D., & Barsalou, L. W. (2016). A fundamental role for conceptual 
processing in emotion. In L. F. Barrett, M. Lewis, & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), 
Handbook of emotions (4th ed., pp. 547–563). Guilford Press. 
Wilson-Mendenhall, C. D., Barrett, L. F., Simmons, W. K., & Barsalou, L. W. (2011). 
Grounding emotion in situated conceptualization. Neuropsychologia, 49(5), 1105–
1127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.12.032 
Wilson, R. (1991). American sublime: The genealogy of a poetic genre. University of 
Wisconsin Press. 
Witte, K., & Allen, M. (2000). A meta-analysis of fear appeals: Implications for effective 
public health campaigns. Health Education & Behavior, 27(5), 591–615. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/109019810002700506 
Woodruff, P. (2001). Reverence: Renewing a forgotten virtue. Oxford University Press. 
Wu, L., & Barsalou, L. W. (2009). Perceptual simulation in conceptual combination: 





Wulf, A. (2015). The invention of nature: Alexander von Humboldt’s new world. Alfred A. 
Knopf. 
Wynne, B. (1992). Misunderstood misunderstanding: Social identities and public uptake of 
science. Public Understanding of Science, 1(3), 281–304. https://doi.org/10.1088/0963-
6625/1/3/004 
Wynne, B. (2006). Public engagement as a means of restoring public trust in science–hitting 
the notes, but missing the music? Public Health Genomics, 9(3), 211–220. 
https://doi.org/10.1159/000092659 
Xu, F. (2002). The role of language in acquiring object kind concepts in infancy. Cognition, 
85(3), 223–250. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(02)00109-9 
Xu, F., & Kushnir, T. (2013). Infants Are rational constructivist learners. Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 22(1), 28–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721412469396 
Xu, F., Cote, M., & Baker, A. (2005). Labeling guides object individuation in 12-month-old 
infants. Psychological Science, 16(5), 372–377. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-
7976.2005.01543.x 
Yaden, D. B., Haidt, J., Hood Jr., R. W., Vago, D. R., & Newberg, A. B. (2017). The 
varieties of self-transcendent experience. Review of General Psychology, 21(2), 143– 
160. https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000102 
Yaden, D. B., Iwry, J., Slack, K. J., Eichstaedt, J. C., Zhao, Y., Vaillant, G. E., & Newberg, 
A. B. (2016). The overview effect: Awe and self-transcendent experience in space 
flight. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 3(1), 1–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000086 
Yaden, D. B., Kaufman, S. B., Hyde, E., Chirico, A., Gaggioli, A., Zhang, J. W., & Keltner, 
D. (2019). The development of the Awe Experience Scale (AWE-S): A multifactorial 
measure for a complex emotion. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 14(4), 474–488. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2018.1484940 
Yaeger, P. (1989). Toward a female sublime. In L. Kauffman (Ed.), Gender and theory: 
Dialogues on feminist criticism (pp. 191–212). Blackwell. 
Yang, Y., Yang, Z., Bao, T., Liu, Y., & Passmore, H.-A. (2016). Elicited awe decreases 
aggression. Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology, 10, E11. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/prp.2016.8 
Yee, E., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2016). Putting concepts into context. Psychonomic 




Yeh, W., & Barsalou, L. W. (2006). The situated nature of concepts. The American Journal 
of Psychology, 119(3), 349–384. https://doi.org/10.2307/20445349 
Yeo, S. K., Binder, A. R., Dahlstrom, M. F., & Brossard, D. (2018). An inconvenient source? 
Attributes of science documentaries and their effects on information-related behavioral 
intentions. Journal of Science Communication, 17(2). 
https://doi.org/10.22323/2.17020207 
Zareva, A. (2007). Structure of the second language mental lexicon: How does it compare to 
native speakers’ lexical organization? Second Language Research, 23(2), 123–153. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0267658307076543 
Zareva, A. (2011). Effects of lexical class and word frequency on the L1 and L2 English-
based lexical connections. The Journal of Language Teaching and Learning, 1(2), 1–
17. https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/english_fac_pubs/41/ 
Zareva, A., & Wolter, B. (2012). The ‘promise’ of three methods of word association 
analysis to L2 lexical research. Second Language Research, 28(1), 41–67. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0267658311423452 
Zdrazilova, L., Sidhu, D. M., & Pexman, P. M. (2018). Communicating abstract meaning: 
Concepts revealed in words and gestures. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences, 373(1752), 20170138. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0138 
Zechner, K. (1996). Fast generation of abstracts from general domain text corpora by 
extracting relevant sentences. In Proceedings of COLING 1996, the 16th International 
Conference on Computational Linguistics, Vol. 2 (pp. 986–989). 
https://doi.org/10.3115/993268.993338 
Zwaan, R. A. (2004). The immersed experiencer: Toward an embodied theory of language 
comprehension. In B. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation: Advances 






Appendix A – List of picture book biographies 















A river of words: The story of William Carlos Williams1 2008 William 
Carlos 
Williams4 
Jen Bryant Melissa 
Sweet 
A splash of red: The life and art of Horace Pippin1 2013 Horace 
Pippin4 
Jen Bryant Melissa 
Sweet 





Ada Lovelace, poet of science: The first computer 
programmer1,2  






Ada's ideas: The story of Ada Lovelace, the world's first 
computer programmer2 












Bad news for outlaws : The remarkable life of Bass Reeves, 








Balloons over Broadway: The true story of the puppeteer of 
Macy's parade1 




Barnum's bones: How Barnum Brown discovered the most 













Between the lines: How Ernie Barnes went from the football 







Black Elk's vision: A Lakota story1 2010 Lakota-
Oglala4 
S.D. Nelson S.D. Nelson 
Buzz Aldrin. Reaching for the moon2 2005 Buzz 
Aldrin3 
Buzz Aldrin Wendell 
Minor 





































Dare the wind: The record-breaking voyage of Eleanor Prentiss 










































Electric Ben: The amazing life and times of Benjamin Franklin1 2012 Benjamin 
Franklin4 
Robert Byrd Robert Byrd 












































































Hello, I'm Johnny Cash1 2014 Johnny 
Cash4 
G. Neri  A.G. Ford 
























Isaac Newton2 2006 Isaac 
Newton3 
Philip Steele Stock 
pictures 





















Mack made movies1 2003 Mack 
Sennet3 
Don Brown Don Brown 


























Marie Curie2 2018 Marie 
Curie3 
Demi Demi 






















My journey to the stars2 2017 Scott Kelly3 Scott Kelly Andre 
Ceolin 
























Nothing stopped Sophie The story of unshakable 







Odd boy out: Young Albert Einstein1 2004 Albert 
Einstein3 
Don Brown Don Brown 


















Preaching to the chickens: The story of young John Lewis1 2016 John Lewis4 Jabari Asim E.B. Lewis 












































Shark Lady: The true story of how Eugenie Clark became the 
ocean's most fearless scientist2 
2017 Eugenie 
Clark3 
Jess Keating Marta 
Alvarez 
Miguens 






Solving the puzzle under the sea: Marie Tharp Maps the ocean 
floor2 





Spring after spring: How Rachel Carson inspired the 



















Step right up: How Doc and Jim Key taught the world about 
kindness1 







Strange fruit: Billie Holiday and the power of a protest song1 2017 Billie 
Holiday4 
Gary Golio Charlotte 
Riley-Webb 

















































































The house Baba built: An artist's childhood in China1 2011 Ed Young4 Ed Young Ed Young 




















The right word: Roget and his thesaurus1 2014 Peter Roget4 Jen Bryant  Melissa 
Sweet 




The tree of life1,2 2003 Charles 
Darwin3 
Peter Sis Peter Sis 





















Greg Pizzoli Greg Pizzoli 






Trudy's big swim: How Gertrude Ederle swam the English 
Channel and took the world by storm1 
2017 Gertrude 
Ederle 4 
Sue Macy Matt Collins 




Don Brown Don Brown 
Voice of freedom: Fannie Lou Hamer, spirit of the civil rights 
movement1 


























What to do about Alice? How Alice Roosevelt broke the rules, 








When sparks fly: The true story of Robert Goddard, the father 







When the beat was born: DJ Kool Herc and the creation of hip 
hop1 
2013 DJ Kool 
Herc4 
Laban 
Carrick Hill  
Theodore 
Taylor, III 













1 Recipient of the Notable Children’s Books (NCB) award. 
2 Recipient of the Outstanding Science Trade Book for Children (OSTB) award. 
3 Biographies of scientists. 






Appendix B – Codebook 1: Facial expression of awe in picture book biographies 
Book Title: On its corresponding column in the supplementary spreadsheet, please enter the 
book title.  
Biography of: On its corresponding column in the supplementary spreadsheet, please enter 
the name of the main character. 
Page #: On its corresponding column in the supplementary spreadsheet, please enter the page 
number. 
Date: Fill in the date when the coding form was completed, in the following format: 
dd/mm/yy 
 
Below you will find the questions and how to answer these. Please fill the corresponding 
columns in the supplementary spreadsheet for each of the questions. Please look at each 
individual page of the picture book and evaluate the following characteristics. This includes 
all the pages between and including the front and back covers.  
 
a) Faces: In the corresponding column, please enter the number of faces on each page.  
 
*A face should have at least eyes and mouth.  
*If there are more than five (5) faces on the page, please write down the number five (5) and 
stop counting.  
 
b) Awe facial expressions: In the corresponding column, please enter the number of faces 
with the stereotypical awe expression on each page.  
 
*The stereotypical representation of awe includes raised inner eyebrows, widened eyes, and 
an open drop-jawed mouth.  
*If the faces don’t include eyebrows, the stereotypical representation of awe can include only 
widened eyes and an open mouth. 
*If the author draws all eyes as dots, all mouths closed, or some other regularity in all the 
faces throughout the book, the face should have at least one of the three main characteristics 
to count as awe.  
*Some faces with a similar expression correspond to singing, shouting, or another activity. 



























Appendix D – Dictionary 2: Words related to ‘awe’ according to the taxonomy of 





















Appendix E – Dictionary 3: University of South Florida word association norms for 




























Appendix F – Dictionary 4: Small World of Words’ norms for ‘awe’ (De Deyne et al., 
2019) 
 
admiration gaze sky  
adorable glory  some 
agape  god  speechless 
amaze grandeur struck  
amazement great  stun 
amazing impress stunned  
astonish impressed  stunning 
astonishing impressive surprise  
astonishment incredible  surprised 
astound inspiration wonder  
astounding inspire  wonderful  
awesome  inspired  wondering 
awful  inspiring  wonderment  
beautiful  kitten wondrous 
beauty love   wow 
big  majesty   awe 
breathless marvelous  
childlike mesmerize  
cute  nature   
dazed overwhelm  
dazzle overwhelming  
disbelief rapture  
disbelieve  respect   
entranced revered  
fascinate saw   
fascinating shock  
fear  shock   
gaping  shocked  






Appendix G – Dictionary 5: Fifty smallest Euclidean distances to ‘awe’ using the Global 



































Appendix H – Codebook 2: Elements of the situation of awe in picture book biographies 
 
Book Title: On its corresponding column in the supplementary spreadsheet, please enter the 
book title.  
Biography of: On its corresponding column in the supplementary spreadsheet, please enter 
the name of the main character. 
Visual Unit #: On its corresponding column in the supplementary spreadsheet, please enter 
the visual unit number. 
Date: Fill in the date when the coding form was completed, in the following format: 
dd/mm/yy 
 
Please fill in the corresponding columns in the supplementary spreadsheet for each of the 
questions. Please look at each individual visual unit and evaluate the following 
characteristics.  
 
a) Attention Foci: In the corresponding column, please enter the number corresponding to 
the type of agent, object, or action that is the focus of attention in the situation: 
1. Accomplishment 
2. Human-made artefact 
3. Natural object 
4. Non-human living organism 
5. Person  
6. Other 
99. Unable to determine 
 
b) Social context: In the corresponding column, please enter the number corresponding to 
the number of people present in the situation.  
1. One (alone) 
2. Two (dyad) 
3. Less than five (small group) 
4. Five or more (crowd) 
99. Unable to determine 
 
c) Setting: In the corresponding column, please enter the number corresponding to the place 
where the situation occurs.  
1. Natural (wilderness area, no human presence) 
2. Modified (natural area that has been transformed such as rural farmland or 
gardens) 
3. Built outdoors (outside settings that have been completely built such as cities and 
 suburbs) 






99. Unable to determine 
 
d) Event: In the corresponding column, please enter the number corresponding to the 
background event occurring in such a situation.  
1. Arts, culture and entertainment 
2. Business and trade 
3. Private events 
4. Public and political 
5. Scientific and educational  
6. Sports and recreation 
7. Other 
99. Unable to determine 
 
e) Outcome: In the corresponding column, please enter the number corresponding to the 
outcome of the situation.  
1. Admiration (e.g., object or person) 
2. Entertainment 
3. Learning  
4. Motivation (e.g., curiosity) 
5. Inspiration (e.g., deciding on a career) 
6. Shock 
7. Other 





Appendix I – Codebook 3: Characteristics of the individual experiencing awe in picture 
book biographies 
 
Book Title: On its corresponding column in the supplementary spreadsheet, please the book 
title.  
Biography of: On its corresponding column in the supplementary spreadsheet, please enter 
the name of the main character. 
Individual #: On its corresponding column in the supplementary spreadsheet, please enter 
the visual unit number. 
Date: Fill in the date when the coding form was completed, in the following format: 
dd/mm/yy 
 
Please fill the corresponding columns in the supplementary spreadsheet for each of the 
questions. Please look at each individual and evaluate the following characteristics.  
 
a) Action - Looking direction: In the corresponding column, please enter the number 
corresponding to the direction the individual is looking to: 
1. Across  
2. Down 
3. Up 
99. Unable to determine 
 
b) Action - Direction of movement: In the corresponding column, please enter the number 
corresponding to the direction of movement of the individual.  
1. Towards the object or person 
2. Not moving 
3. Moving away from the object or person 
99. Unable to determine 
 
c) Action - Communication: In the corresponding column, please enter the number 
corresponding to the communicative expression performed by the individual.  
1. Clapping 
2. Communicating verbally  





99. Unable to determine 
 
d) Age: In the corresponding column, please enter the number corresponding to the apparent 







99. Unable to determine 
 
e) Gender: In the corresponding column, please enter the number corresponding to the 




99. Unable to determine 
 
f) Ethnicity: In the corresponding column, please enter the number corresponding to the 
apparent ethnicity of the individual.  
1. African American or Black 
2. American Indian, Alaska Native, or Native American 
3. East or Southeast Asian 
4. Hispanic/Latinx 
5. Middle Eastern/Arab 
6. White 
7. Other 
99. Unable to determine 
 
g) Protagonist: In the corresponding column, please enter the number corresponding to 
whether the individual is the main protagonist of the book.  
1. Yes 
2. No 






Appendix J – Information sheet and consent form 1: Word association task  
 
Assessing word associations in people from different backgrounds 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully 
before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide not to take part, there will be no 
disadvantage to you, and we thank you for considering our request. 
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
The purpose of this project is to observe how people from different backgrounds make word 
associations. This project is being undertaken as part of the requirements of Daniel Silva’s PhD 
research at the University of Otago in New Zealand.  
 
What Types of Participants are being sought? 
To participate in this study, you must: 
1. Be over the age of 18. 
2. Be a US resident 
3. Speak English as your first language.  
4. Use a desktop or laptop. Please don’t use cell phones, mobiles, or tablets.  
5. Not have taken this survey before.  
 
Participants will be recruited through the online survey distributor Mechanical Turk. Participants 
will receive $1.50USD in Amazon Mechanical Turk credit for completed participation. 
 
What will Participants be asked to do? 
 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to: 
 
1. Read and sign a consent form. 
 
2. Perform a continued word association task. In this task, you will receive a cue word. You 
will then have sixty (60) seconds to write down as many associates that come to mind for 
the given cue word.  
 
3. Complete an online survey about your personal background. This includes demographic 
information such as age, ethnicity, gender, level of education, religious affiliation, and 
political orientation. 
 
4. You will be debriefed once you have completed the task and the survey.  
 
 In total, this should take you between 8 -12 minutes. You will be free to exit this study at any time, 
though only completed surveys will receive compensation.  
 




The raw data collected in this study includes: 
1. Your word associations.  
2. Your responses to the survey. This includes your demographic information such as age, 
ethnicity, gender, level of education, religious affiliation, and political orientation.  
The personal data collected in this study includes: 
1. Your email address (if provided).  
All of the data is securely stored in two password-protected hard-drives kept under lock in the 
investigator’s office. Only the two researchers, Daniel Silva and Jesse Bering will have access to 
all of the data. Two independent coders will have access to the word association data, but this data 
will not be linked to you in any way. The raw data (not your personal data) may be publicly 
archived.  
 
Your personal information (i.e., emails) will be destroyed at the completion of Daniel Silva’s PhD 
research project. The raw data will be retained for at least 5 years in secure storage, or possibly 
indefinitely. The raw data will be kept following the University’s standards.  
 
The raw data of this study may be made publicly available in a journal or a conference. It may also 
be part of a PhD thesis which will be kept in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New 
Zealand). In all cases every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity.  
 
Data collected for this study will not be put to commercial use. 
You may withdraw your data from the project at any time and without any disadvantage to yourself 
of any kind. 
 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact 
either: 
Daniel Silva Luna and  Jesse Bering 
University of Otago  University of Otago 
+64 3 471 6147    +64 3 471 6147 
daniel.silva@postgrad.otago.ac.nz    jesse.bering@otago.ac.nz  
This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of Otago 
Human Ethics Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 
8256 or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and 








Assessing word associations in people from different backgrounds 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request further 
information at any stage. 
I know that:  
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw my data from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project. However, 
the raw data from this project may be publicly archived so that it may be used by other 
researchers. All information that could identify me will be removed or changed. 
 
4.  I will receive $1.50USD for completing the task and the survey.  
 
5. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago 
Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity.   
 




.............................................................................   ............................... 
       (Signature of participant)     (Date) 
 
............................................................................. 













Appendix K – Instructions 1: Word association task 
 
On the next screen begins a word association task.  
  
In the task, a cue word will appear at the top of the screen. In the text boxes provided, we 
would like you to type the words that come to mind when you think of this word. Please do 
this as the words come to mind and only type words that are associated with the cue word.  
  
For example, if you receive the cue word 'dog', you might think of the word associates – pet, 
cat, bog, Lassie, in the park, happy, bark, has fur, runs, animal, etc...– which you would type 
into the text boxes as they come to mind. 
  
There are no right or wrong answers.  
  
You will have 60 seconds to provide as many responses as you can for each cue word, after 
which the survey will continue automatically to the next word. The task will take between 3 
and 5 minutes.  
  
You can start typing right away. 
  






Appendix L – Short survey instrument of attitudes toward science (Füchslin et al. 2018) 
 
1. How much do you agree with the following statement: Science plays an important role in 
my life. (1= “strongly disagree” ... 5= “strongly agree”) 
2. How much do you agree with the following statement: I specifically search for 
information about science. (1= “strongly disagree” ... 5= “strongly agree”) 
3. How much do you agree with the following statement: It is important to be informed 
about science. (1= “strongly disagree” ... 5= “strongly agree”) 
4. How interested are you in science? (1= “a great deal” ... 5= “not at all”) (inverted) 
5. How much do you agree with the following statement: Scientific research should be 
publicly funded. (1= “strongly disagree” ... 5= “strongly agree”) 
6. How much do you agree with the following statement: Science and research make our 
lives better. (1= “strongly disagree” ... 5= “strongly agree”) 
7. How much do you agree with the following statement: I would like to partake in scientific 
research once. (1= “strongly disagree” ... 5= “strongly agree”) 
8. How much do you trust science in general? (1= “a great deal” ... 5= “not at all”) (inverted 
scale) 
9. How much do you agree with the following statement: Science should have no limits to 
what it is able to investigate. (1= “strongly disagree” ... 5= “strongly agree”) 
10. How much do you agree with the following statement: Science can sort out any problem. 





Appendix M – Consumption of science communication scale 
 
How often do you do one of the following ... (1= “never” ... 5= “very often”)? 
1. Watch science documentaries on television, streaming, or at the cinema 
2. Listen to science radio or podcast 
3. Read about science on daily/weekly print newspapers or magazines 
4. Read about science in online newspapers, online magazines, or science websites 
5. Visit institutional science websites (e.g., government, organizations) 
6. Read about science on social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) 
7. Read Wikipedia science articles 
8. Visit science museums or exhibitions covering science 
9. Attend events, talks, or discussions concerning science 
10. Read or listen to non-fiction books on science 










Appendix N – Spirituality and religiosity items 
 
1. How religious are you? (1 = “not at all religious” … 5 = “very religious”) 





Appendix O – Demographic questionnaire 
 
1. With what gender do you identify yourself? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Other  
2. Please write down your age.  
3. Which of the following describes your ethnic background? 
a. African American or Black 
b. American Indian, Alaska Native, or Native American 
c. East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, etc)  
d. Hispanic/Latinx 
e. Middle Eastern 
f. Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
g. Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, etc)  
h. South Asian (East Indian, Sri Lankan, etc)  
i. West Asian (Pakistani, Iranian, etc) 
j. White/European American 
k. Other  
4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
a. Some high school 
b. High school diploma or equivalent 
c. Some college 
d. Bachelor’s degree or equivalent 
e. Master’s degree or equivalent 
f. Doctoral or professional degree 
5. What is your political orientation? (1= “Very liberal”, 4= “centre”, 7= “Very 
conservative”) 
6. What is your religious affiliation? 








f. Christian Catholic 









Appendix P – Constructing the Consumption of Science Communication Scale  
 
Introduction 
In modern capitalist societies, consumption is not just at the centre of the economic process, 
but it is linked to the acquisition of cultural capital, the constitution of identities, the 
formation of people’s emotions, and the stratification of our societies, among other things 
(e.g., Illouz, 2009). The elusive role of consumption in our current understandings of the 
individual and society, however, shows how challenging it is to conceptualise academically 
(see Wherry & Woodward, 2019). Warde (2017) provides a simple definition by stating that 
consumption is the “process whereby agents engage in appropriation of a good, service, 
performance, information, or ambience, and which is a product of human work” (p. 66). 
Although quite broad, this definition captures the active role of the agent, the behavioural 
aspect of consumption, its social character, and the importance of learning information.  
 
Various surveys and studies have tried to measure people’s science communication-related 
consumption (e.g., Archer et al., 2015; Eurobarometer, 2010, Pew Research Center, 2017, 
Schäfer et al., 2018). These include forms of engagement associated with traditional mass 
media (e.g., BBVA Foundation, 2011), online resources (e.g., Schäfer & Taddicken, 2015), 
social media (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2017), visiting activities (e.g., Archer et al., 2015; 
Pew Research Center, 2017; Schafer et al., 2018), and talking to others about science (e.g., 
BBVA, 2011). While these studies have used questionnaires to compare people’s use of 
different sources of information (Pew Research Center, 2017), to describe segmented 
populations (Schäfer et al., 2018), or as items in the development of scales (e.g., Archer et al., 
2015), no scale exists on the consumption of science communication specifically. Thus, the 




For the present research purposes, the consumption of science communication was defined 
“as agents engaging in the appropriation of goods, services, performance, information, or 
ambience, produced in the culture of science communication” (modified from Warde, 2017). 
The selected item pool comes from a review of previous studies that have measured people’s 
consumption activities (e.g., Archer et al., 2015; Eurobarometer, 2010; Pew Research Center, 




same set of questions. Schäfer et al., (2018) had done a similar review exercise and, as such, 
most items were taken from their work. The items were reviewed by two experts in science 
communication and then discussed with colleagues. Moreover, three native English speakers 
from the United States reviewed the items for clarity of language. The following final list 
comprises fourteen Likert-type items presented in an end-defined format (i.e., only the end 
points are shown; see Dixon et al., 1984), where (1) is “never” and (5) is “very often”: 
1. cons1 - Watch science documentaries on television, streaming, or at the cinema 
2. cons2 - Listen to science radio or podcast 
3. cons3 - Read about science on daily/weekly print newspapers or magazines 
4. cons4 - Read about science in online newspapers, online magazines, or science websites 
5. cons5 - Read science magazines 
6. cons6 - Visit institutional science websites (e.g., government, organizations) 
7. cons7 - Read about science on social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) 
8. cons8 - Read Wikipedia science articles 
9. cons9 - Watch science videos on YouTube or similar video platforms 
10. cons10 - Visit science museums or exhibitions covering science 
11. cons11 - Visit zoos, aquariums, or botanical gardens 
12. cons12 - Attend events, talks, or discussions concerning science 
13. cons13 - Read or listen to non-fiction books on science 
14. cons14 - Talk about science with family, friends, or acquaintances 
 
Participants 
Three hundred and fifty-four participants were recruited via Amazon MTurk and were paid 
0.50USD cents for their participation. I chose this number of participants based on having 
more than the 20:1 rule of thumb in the participant to item ratio, frequently used in scale 
development (Carpenter, 2018). Fifteen participants who answered extraordinarily fast 
(fastest 5% of survey completion time) were removed from the sample. This is a relatively 
effective way to control for low-quality data such as inattentive responses (see Leiner, 2019). 
Although there are no agreed-upon benchmarks on how to set temporal cutoffs (Matjašič et 
al., 2018), removals based on percentiles have been used successfully in previous research 
(e.g., Harms et al., 2017). One further participant was removed for failing to answer an 






The survey was prepared on Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2019) and posted through 
Turkprime/Cloudresearch (Litman et al., 2017) to MTurk. The study received approval from 
the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Otago as an extension of Category B 
proposal #D20/152 (Appendix S). Participants were asked to provide informed consent 
(Appendix AD) and were then given the following instructions:  
 
“On the next screens, you will be asked some questions about yourself. Please 
respond to the following questions as truthfully and accurately as you can. Remember 
that all your responses are completely anonymous. Press next to begin the survey.”  
 
Each of the statements was presented individually (one item on screen at a time) and in a 
randomized order. After completing the consumption of science communication items, the 
participants were presented with a ten-item short instrument measuring perceptions of science 
(Füchslin et al., 2018). Next, they answered two questions about their level of spirituality and 
religiosity, and this was followed by a demographic survey. Finally, participants received an 
honesty question and were briefly debriefed about the purpose of the survey.  
 
Results 
The Cronbach alpha for the 14 items was .901. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy KMO = 0.919 suggests that the 14 items can be used in factor analysis (³ .60) 
(Carpenter, 2018). Similarly, Bartlett’s test of Sphericity was significant (χ2(2039.02, 91), p < 
0.001). Common factor analysis following principal axis factoring was used to evaluate the 
dimensionality of the scale. This method is preferred over maximum likelihood when there 
are deviations from normality (Carpenter, 2018). 
 
Considering the focus on the behavioural aspect of consumption, I expected the construct to 
have one dimension. The scree plot suggests a one-factor solution (Figure M.1). The loadings 
matrix of principal axis factoring (Table M.1) shows all factor loadings are higher than 4, 
which is above the .32 suggested for retaining the items (Carpenter, 2018). ‘Visit zoos, 
aquariums, or botanical gardens’ had the lowest loading, possibly due to being qualitatively 
different to all the other items in the questionnaire, as it describes activities that are done with 




other words, the motivational structure and cultural mores surrounding the participation in 
these activities may be different from those of the other items in the questionnaire. Given 






















Notes: The extraction method was principal axis factoring 
(Costello & Osborne, 2005). The eleven items selected for the 
final scale are in bold.  
 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for the same sample using the ‘lavaan’ R package 
(Rosseel, 2012), however, suggested that a one-factor model with thirteen had a relatively 
poor fit (χ2 (65) = 204.5014; p < .001; RMSEA = 0.08; CFI = .924, TLI = .908), with two out 
of the four main observed indicators within the acceptable thresholds suggested in the 




redundancies that might be addressed to increase the model’s fit. This was particularly true 
with items one (cons1) and nine (cons9) (MI = 21.22) on the one hand, and items three 
(cons3) and five (cons5) (MI = 20.10), on the other. Upon closer inspection, the wording of 
item one (1) has the word ‘streaming’, which can be interpreted as including ‘watching 
science videos on YouTube or similar platforms’. In that sense, question nine (cons9) may be 
somewhat redundant, as it is included within question one (cons1). A similar situation can be 
found with items three (cons3) and five (cons5), wherein ‘print newspapers and magazines’ 
might be interpreted as including ‘science magazines’. Although it is tempting to add a path 
between these items in the model, I opted instead to increase the parsimony of the scale by 
removing these two possibly redundant items (Cons 5 and Cons9) (see Wieland et al., 2017). 
Removing items five and nine indeed improved the model’s fit, albeit modestly (χ2 (44) = 
122.358; p < .001; RMSEA = 0.073; CFI = .943, TLI = .928).  
  
Discussion 
This section began with a proposal to develop a much-needed science communication 
consumption scale, one that measures consumption behaviour based on fourteen (14) items 
derived from a literature review. However, statistical considerations revealed that an 11-item 
scale is better suited to capture the key construct under consideration. In the next section, I 
provide evidence for the validity of this science communication scale through a CFA, using a 




Appendix Q – Confirmatory factor analysis and convergent and divergent validity of 
the Consumption of Science Communication Scale 
 
Introduction 
To test the scale’s internal structure captures, I collected a new data sample to perform a new 
confirmatory factor analysis (Furr, 2013). Furthermore, to validate the scale, I examined its 
relations to other individual difference measures and test for both convergent and divergent 
validity. As such, the participants in this new study responded to five other short scales, 
including an adapted version from the National Science Board Science Literacy Test 
(National Science Board, 2010), the Belief in Science Scale (BISS) (Farias et al., 2013), the 
Analysis subscale of the Oregon Vocational Interests Scale (Pozzebon et al., 2010), the 
Paranormal Short Inventory (Randall, 1997), and the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (Johns, 
1991). These scales were chosen for their shortness, having been validated, and their use in 




Three hundred participants from the United States were recruited from Amazon MTurk for 
1.00USD. Two participants were removed for failing an honesty question. As in the previous 
study, the fastest 5% of participants were removed based on their survey completion time to 
filter out some inattentive responses common in online surveys (Leiner, 2019). The final 
sample for analysis included two hundred and eighty-three participants (n = 283).  
 
Materials 
Consumption of Science Communication Scale 
Participants responded to the eleven items of the Consumption of Science Communication 
Scale previously developed.  
 
Oregon Vocational Scale - Analysis Subscale  
This scale was developed to test different levels of interest in different vocations. Their 
analysis subscale captures people’s interest in scientific vocations, asking participants 
whether they are interested in various scientific disciplines. This scale has been 




attitudes towards science scales (e.g., Hartman et al., 2017). I predicted a positive correlation 
between this and the Consumption of Science Communication Scale.  
 
Belief in Science scale 
This recently validated scale captures people’s belief in science (Dagnall et al., 2019), 
specifically, the “belief in the value of science as an institution and in its superiority as a 
source of knowledge” (Farias et al., 2013, p. 1211). I expected to observe a positive 
relationship between the Consumption of Science Communication Scale and the belief in 
science scale.  
 
NSF Science Knowledge Survey 
For over three decades, the National Science Foundation has commissioned a version of this 
true/false test to thousands of participants across the United States (see Stocklmayer & 
Bryant, 2012). The ten-question version of the survey adopted for the present study has been 
previously used (e.g., Takahashi & Tandoc, 2016). Six of the questions are true and four are 
false. I expected people with more consumption of science communication to score higher in 
this Science Knowledge Survey. 
 
Paranormal Short Inventory 
This 13-item scale is a simplified version of a longer inventory (Randall & Desrosiers, 1980) 
and captures a diversity of beliefs in the paranormal, including astrology, magic and 
precognition (Randall, 1993). Overall, I expected a negative relationship between scores on 
this measure and the Consumption of Science Communication Scale.  
 
The Epworth Sleepiness Scale 
This very simple 8-item scale is widely used to capture people’s daytime sleepiness and has 
been psychometrically tested on multiple occasions (Johns, 1991, 1992). Overall, I expected 
to find no correlation between this and the Consumption of Science communication Scale.  
 
Procedure 
The study received approval from the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Otago as 
proposal #D20/294 (Appendix AE). Again, the survey was prepared on Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 




Participants were first asked to provide informed consent (Appendix AF) and were then given 
the instructions. Each participant received the six scale items in randomized order, after 
which they received an honesty question. They were then debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. The data were analysed in R using the ‘lavaan’ package (Rosseel, 2012).  
 
Results 
Confirmatory factor analysis 
The Cronbach alpha for the 11 items was 0.913. The indicators for the one-factor solution of 
the CFA showed a good fit (χ2 (44) = 119.5014; p < .001; RMSEA = 0.078; CFI = .941, TLI 
= .926). Similarly, the standardized factor loading for the eleven items derived from the CFA 
using maximum likelihood estimation (Table N.1), are above the 0.5 recommended threshold 




Standardized factor loadings for CFA (n=283) 
Item Component 
Read about science in online newspapers, online magazines, or science websites 0.781 
Visit institutional science websites (e.g., government, organizations) 0.768 
Read about science on daily/weekly print newspapers or magazines 0.703 
Listen to science radio or podcast 0.694 
Watch science documentaries on television, streaming, or at the cinema 0.685 
Read or listen to non-fiction books on science 0.685 
Talk about science with family, friends, or acquaintances 0.653 
Attend events, talks, or discussions concerning science 0.647 
Visit science museums or exhibitions covering science 0.574 
Read Wikipedia science articles 0.570 
Read about science on social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) 0.530 
Note: Maximum likelihood estimation method was used  
 
Convergent and divergent validity 
I ran multiple simple linear regressions with the Consumption of Science Communication 
Scale as the dependent variable and each of the five measures as the independent variable in 
each test. I then revised for false discovery rates using the Benjamini-Hochberg correction 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). The results are presented in table N.2. As predicted, higher 
scores in the Consumption of Science Communication Scale were predicted by the three 
measures of interest, belief, and knowledge of science. Furthermore, there was no 
relationship between the Epworth Sleepiness Scale and the Consumption of Science 




Consumption of Science Communication scale and the Paranormal Short Inventory was not 
significant, suggesting that engagement with science communication is found across people 
with diverse worldviews, including those who hold paranormal beliefs.  
  
Table N.2 
Simple linear regression – Consumption of science communication scale and the examined variables 
Predictor Cronbach Alpha 
Expected 
relationship Estimate SE p (adjusted p) 
Oregon Vocational Scale - Analysis Subscale  0.898 Positive 0.433 0.040 0 (0)** 
Belief in Science scale 0.945 Positive 0.144 0.036 0 (0)** 
NSF Science Knowledge Survey 0.730 Positive 0.053 0.021 0.0101 (0.0168)* 
Paranormal Short Inventory 0.880 Negative 0.002 0.049 0.963 (0.963) 
The Epworth Sleepiness Scale 0.774 None 0.110 0.085 0.198 (0.247) 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.  
 
Discussion 
Overall, the findings from the present study serve to validate the Consumption of Science 
Communication Scale. The results of the CFA suggest a robust internal structure of the 
eleven items. Moreover, the results of the validity tests indicate a convergence with similar 
measures for interest in science, belief in science, and scientific knowledge. Although, as 
predicted, there was no relation of the construct to people’s levels of daytime sleepiness, 
somewhat surprisingly there was also no ostensible connection to paranormal beliefs. One 
speculative interpretation of this latter finding is that many people interested in science may 
also be interested in ufology, ghost hunting, and other practices where the demarcation of 
pseudoscience and science is continuously being contested. Future work can reinforce these 
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Appendix S – Codebook 4: Property type categorization 
 
Coder Name: Please indicate your name at the top box. 
Date: Please fill in the date that the coding form was completed in the following format: 
dd/mm/yy.  
 
Please code each of the cue-response pair with the numbers one (1) through six (6) using the 
following categories. Every word association pair should have only one code. Please choose 
the one you consider the most appropriate.  
 
1. Lexical Feature: An associate that is based on a quick linguistic response to the emotion 
word.  
i. forward completion (e.g., fearàless)  
ii. backward completion (joyàkill) 
iii. part of a word (surpriseàprize) 
iv. orthographic similarity (happyànappy, happen, hazy), (fear àdear, year, feat)  
v. mediation (loveàlovestruckàstarstruck),  
vi. expression (happy à Larry, clam, don’t worry, color) 
vii. meta-comment (love à one syllable word, fearà Ahh; disgust à Ew) 
2. Taxonomic Feature: An associate that is in the same or similar taxonomic category as the 
emotion word.  
i. Synonyms (e.g. happinessàjoy, bliss, gladness) 
ii. Antonyms (e.g., loveàhate, detestation, angeràdelight, calmness) 
iii. Similar (not quite synonyms) (e.g., loveàfondness, angeràenvy, venom) 
iv. Ontological Category (e.g., happinessà emotion, fearàresponse, 
disgustàfeeling) 
v. Superordinate (e.g., happinessà emotion) 
vi. Coordinate (e.g., happinessàfear, anger, disgust) 
vii. Subordinate (e.g., angeràpassive, chronic, verbal 
viii. Individual (e.g., angeràroad rage) 
3. Entity Feature: An associate that indicates a concrete property of the emotion word. It can 
be a physical, metaphorical, or abstract, property of someone who is experiencing an 
emotion. 




ii. Materials (e.g., love à crochet, love à butterflies)  
iii. Behavior (e.g., anger àscream, happinessàlaughter, disgustàmove away from). 
iv. Abstract property (e.g., love à selflessness, disgust à natural, joyàcreativity) 
v. Quantity (e.g., love à lots of, anger à brimming with). 
4. Situational Feature: An associate that indicates a concrete feature of the external situation 
where the emotion word occurs including setting, agents and objects. 
i. Action (e.g., happiness à running, anger à flying) 
ii. Object (e.g., love à apple, happiness à clarinet) 
iii. Person (e.g., love à mother, anger à driver) 
iv. Living Thing (e.g., happiness à dog, anger à cat) 
v. Social Organization (e.g., disgustà Congress, sadnessàhealth insurance) 
vi. Building (e.g., happinessàstable, love à museum) 
vii. Location (e.g., loveàMichigan, joyàforest0 
viii. Time (e.g., angeràmorning, happiness à evenings) 
ix. Event (e.g., love àwedding, sadnessàfuneral) 
x. Manner (e.g., happiness à fast, sadness à long) 
xi. Physical state/property (e.g., happinessàfluffy, sadnessàrainy).  
xii. Quantity (e.g., anger à many, happinessà vast) 
i. Function (e.g., happinessàbonding, disgustàrevulsion) 
5. Introspective Feature: An associate that indicates an internal feature of the person 
experiencing an emotion. This includes feelings, thoughts, and evaluation.  
i. Affect (e.g., joy à positive, loveàcalm).  
ii. Abstract evaluation (e.g., joy à silly, angeràdiscouraging).  
iii. Cognitive state (e.g., joy à disbelief, loveàappreciation).  
iv. Contingency (e.g., loveà requires dedication, happiness à because there  was 
sunshine) 
v. Cognitive operation (e.g., loveàfantasize, happinessàbelieve, joyà appreciate).  
vi. Negation (e.g., anger à not good, love à doesn’t expire).  
6. Miscellanea: Please use this category if the associate doesn’t fit in any other category.  










Manager, Academic Committees, Mr Gary Witte
D20/152
Dr J Bering
 Centre for Science Communication
133 Union St East
Dear Dr Bering,
I am writing to confirm for you the status of your proposal entitled “Assessing people’s
mental representations of awe and perceptions of science through a word association
task and survey.”, which was originally received on May 26, 2020. The Human Ethics
Committee’s reference number for this proposal is D20/152.
The above application was Category B and had therefore been considered within the
Department or School. The outcome was subsequently reviewed by the University of Otago
Human Ethics Committee. The outcome of that consideration was that the proposal was
approved.
Approval is for up to three years from the date of HOD approval. If this project has not been
completed within three years of this date, re-approval must be requested. If the nature,
consent, location, procedures or personnel of your approved application change, please









Appendix U – Codebook 5: Natural kind responses 
 
Coder Name: Please indicate your name at the top box. 
Date: Please fill in the date that the coding form was completed in the following format: 
dd/mm/yy. 
 
Please code the word responses as 1 = natural kind or 0 = other. 
 
Natural kind words refers to objects “not constructed by humans” (Gelman, 1988, p. 69). 
This definition includes both living agents such as rabbits and roots, and non-living objects 





Appendix V – Sample segmentation with Latent Class Analysis (LCA) 
 
Traditional methods of segmenting a sample such as median split or extreme group 
approaches have been largely criticised in social sciences (Preacher et al., 2005). A case can 
be made for segmenting a sample applying taxometric methods when latent classes of 
individuals can be thought of as discrete categories (MacCallum et al., 2002). Multiple 
segmentation studies in science communication have observed considerable attitudinal, 
perceptual, behavioural, and demographic differences between the engaged and the 
disengaged (e.g., Maibach et al., 2011; Nisbet & Markowitz, 2014; Runge et al., 2018; 
Schäfer et al., 2018). These have used methods such as hierarchical clustering and principal 
components analysis to segment these groups (Nisbet & Markowitz, 2014; Runge et al., 
2018). Other studies have used latent class analysis (LCA) (Maibach et al., 2011; Schäfer et 
al., 2018), a common technique used in post-hoc analysis of categorical and ordinal variables 
to describe “latent classes or “hidden groups,” within a population (Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 
2018).  
 
Table U.1 shows the results of the first five cluster solutions using the eleven consumption of 
science communication items. The lowest value for both the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) and the model entropy suggest the three-cluster solution to be the best fit for the 
variables. The entropy value of 0.923 is considered to be a “good’’ model for classifying 
cases (Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 2018). I used the R package ‘poLCA’ (Linzer & Lewis, 2011) 
to conduct the LCA. Following previous work on science communication which has observed 
categorical differences between the engaged and disengaged in this cultural space, I 
segmented the sample from study 1 (n = 259) into three groups using LCA: the engaged, the 
interested, and the disengaged.  
Table U.1       




likelihood resid. df BIC cAIC 
likelihood-
ratio Entropy 
1 -4253.21 215 8750.92 8794.92 5630.76 - 
2 -3865.79 170 8226.13 8315.13 4855.91 0.925 
3 -3724.24 125 8193.1 8327.1 4572.82 0.923 
4 -3665.41 80 8325.5 8504.5 4455.16 0.929 










My name is Daniel Silva and I’m a PhD student at the University of Otago conducting 
research on the uses and roles of emotion in science communication. As part of my PhD 
work, I’m looking for fifteen (15) practising science communicators for an hour-long Zoom 
interview about their ideas on emotion and experiences with these in their life and work.  
 
If you practice science communication in English and are interested in participating, please 
email me at daniel.silva@postgrad.otago.ac.nz. I’d love to hear from you. 
 
Participants will enter a raffle for a €150 gift certificate. 
 






Appendix X – Information sheet and consent form 2: Interviews  
 
The Emotions of Science Communicators 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully 
before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate, we thank you. If you 
decide not to take part, there will be no disadvantage to you, and we thank you for considering 
our request. 
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
The purpose of this project is to apprehend the science communicator’s understanding of 
emotions, the use of awe in their work, and their experiences with this emotion.  
 
What Types of Participants are being sought? 
To participate in this study, you must: 
1. Be over the age of 18; 
2. Work as a science communicator; 
3. Use English as your first language in your work; 
4. Not have done this interview before.  
 
Fifteen (15) interviewees will be recruited via forums. After the interview participants will enter a 
raffle for one €150 gift card.  
 
What will Participants be asked to do? 
 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to  
 
1. Read and sign a consent form. 
 
2. Fill in a form with your personal and work details. 
 
3. Complete a brief demographics survey.  
 
4. Set a date and time for a Zoom/Skype interview via email with the researcher.  
 
5. Complete an hour-long interview with the researcher via Zoom/Skype at a time of your 
convenience. You will be free to exit the interview at any time.  
 
6. You will be debriefed at the end of the interview. 
 
During the interview you will be asked to describe an emotional experience of awe and wonder. 
These are usually regarded as positive emotions, yet some people might find psychological 
discomfort while recollecting their personal emotional experiences. Please be aware that you may 
decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage to yourself. You are also free to 





What Data or Information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
The data collected in this study includes: 
3. Your personal and work data (e.g., name, email, profession, job title, location, 
company/institution) 
4. Your demographic information (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, first language) 
5. Your interview responses.  
The interview follows a semi-structured approach where the questions have been previously 
prepared and vetted by the ethics committee of the University of Otago. The Zoom/Skype 
interviews will be video recorded and transcribed by the researchers. All efforts will be made to 
remove or change any personal information that could identify you in these transcriptions. These 
transcriptions will be the raw data used in the analysis.  
All of the data will be securely stored in two password-protected hard-drives kept under lock in the 
investigator’s office. Only the two researchers, Daniel Silva and Jesse Bering will have access to 
all of the data. The raw data (not your personal data) may be publicly archived. 
 
Your personal information will be destroyed at the completion of the research project. This includes 
the video recording and your personal and work data. The raw data (i.e., the anonymized 
transcriptions) will be retained for at least 5 years in secure storage, or possibly indefinitely. The 
raw data will be kept following the storage standards from the University of Otago. 
 
The raw data of this study may be made publicly available in a journal or a conference as part of 
an article or a presentation. It may also be part of a PhD thesis which will be kept in the University 
of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand). Every effort will be made to remove any information 
that could personally identify you in all published materials. 
 
Data collected for this study will not be put to commercial use. 
 
You may withdraw your data from the project at any time and without any disadvantage to yourself 
of any kind. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact 
either: 
 
Daniel Silva Luna and  Associate Professor Dr. Jesse Bering 
University of Otago  University of Otago 
+64 3 471 6147    +64 3 471 6147 
daniel.silva@postgrad.otago.ac.nz    jesse.bering@otago.ac.nz  
This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the researcher you may contact the University of Otago 
Human Ethics Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 
8256 or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and 







The Emotions of Science Communicators  
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All 
my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request 
further information at any stage. I know that: 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2.   I may withdraw my data from the project at any time without any disadvantage to myself 
of any kind. 
 
3. Personal identifying information (i.e., videos recording, personal and work data) will be 
destroyed at the conclusion of the project but any raw data (i.e., the anonymized 
transcriptions), which results from the project, will be retained in secure storage for at least 
five years; 
 
4.  Every effort will be made to remove any information that could personally identify me in the 
raw data. 
 
5.  The raw data from this project may be shared so that it may be used by other researchers, 
but every effort will be made to remove or change the information that could identify me.  
 
6. I will be talking about my own emotional experience during the interview. I might 
experience a little discomfort while reporting on these emotional experiences. I am free to 
withdraw from the interview at any point without any disadvantage to myself; 
 
7. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago 
Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my 
anonymity. 
 
8.  My name will enter a raffle for a €150 gift card.  
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 
       (Signature of participant)     (Date) 
 
............................................................................. 






Appendix Y – Personal and work details questionnaire 
 
1. Title: 
2. Name:  
3. Surname: 
4. Current country of residence:  
5. Current Job Title: 
6. Brief Job Description: 
7. What science topic do you cover the most in your work? 
a. Biological sciences 
b. Engineering and Technology 
c. Physical and chemical sciences 
d. Space sciences 
e. Medical and health sciences 
f. Earth sciences 
g. Environmental sciences 
h. Formal sciences 
i. Social sciences 





Appendix Z – Interview Questions 
 
Thank you so much for your time talking with me. I’m doing my PhD research on the role of 
emotions and awe in science communication and your experience as a practitioner will 
definitively contribute to our understanding of how these are used and their roles in our field. 
I just want to remind you that there are no right or wrong answers.  
Warm up  
Perhaps you can start by telling me a bit about your work. 
 
First, I would like to ask you about your overall thoughts on emotions.  
1. How would you define the word ‘emotion’?  
2. Why do you think people have emotions?  
3. How important do you consider emotions in the communication of science? Why? 
4. How do you use emotions in your work as a science communicator?  
a. Is this explicit or implicit? 
b. What techniques or practices do you consider important to elicit emotions 
from your audience?  
5. Which emotions do you consider important in science communication? 
Now I would like to ask you about the emotion awe.  
6. How often do you personally experience this emotion? 
7. If you don’t mind, could you think now of a memorable or recent ‘awe’ experience 
that you’ve had. 
a. What was the situation where this emotion occurred?  
b. What specifically caused this emotion? What words would you use to describe 
this? 
c. Where were you exactly? When was this?  
d. How did you feel? How did your body/mind feel during this experience? 
e. How did you express this emotion through your facial or bodily gestures? 
What actions did you perform? Did you say anything?  
f. What did you do afterwards? What was the result of having this experience 





8. I would like to ask you more about this emotion, ‘awe’. How would you define this 
emotion? 
9. What other emotions do you think are related to it?  
10. What is the role of this emotion in the communication of science? 
11. Do you use this emotion in your work? If so, how? 
12. Would you say some particular branch of science is more given for this emotion than 
others? 
13. What practices in science communication do you think get people to experience awe?  
14. How much do you think science communicators incorporate emotions in their work?  
15. Do you think there is a tension between science facts and emotional content?  
16. To conclude, I’d like to ask you can you tell me about a recent or memorable work of 
science communication that you thought was awesome? 











Manager, Academic Committees, Mr Gary Witte
D20/151
Dr J Bering
 Centre for Science Communication
133 Union St East
Dear Dr Bering,
I am writing to confirm for you the status of your proposal entitled “The Emotions of Science
Communicators: Beliefs on emotions and awe experiences of science
communicators.”, which was originally received on May 26, 2020. The Human Ethics
Committee’s reference number for this proposal is D20/151.
The above application was Category B and had therefore been considered within the
Department or School. The outcome was subsequently reviewed by the University of Otago
Human Ethics Committee. The outcome of that consideration was that the proposal was
approved.
Approval is for up to three years from the date of HOD approval. If this project has not been
completed within three years of this date, re-approval must be requested. If the nature,
consent, location, procedures or personnel of your approved application change, please









Appendix BB – Example of transcription excerpt 
 
Name of the research project: Emotions in science communication 
Speakers: Daniel Silva (DS), Interviewee 16 (Int16) 
Date and time of the interview or recording of the event: 14 June 2020, 9pm 
Audio file name or number: Int16.mp4  
Duration of audio file: 00:31:30 
 
DS 
I want to start by asking you: how would you define the word emotion? 
 
Int16 
(laughs) (..) that’s a good question. (..) I suppose emotions are feelings. So non-logical 
responses to the world around you (.) which, yeah, they don’t necessarily come from the 




Why do you think people have emotions? 
 
Int16 
I love these questions. I don’t know. I suppose I always thought of it as mind, body, and soul. 
So emotions are the soul part, so I suppose they are an inherent part of being human, but 
animals also feel emotions too so maybe it is an innate part of being alive.  
 
DS 
How important do you think emotions are for the communication of science? 
 
Int16 
(.) I think that (.) science communicators should have an element of emotion in what they 
deliver and how they speak about science. Scientist can rely a little more on, I suppose an 
objective presentation of facts, but for people to be able to connect to stories and connect the 
facts they need to feel so. I think it is important in science communication to have an element 






Could you perhaps elaborate a little bit more on that? What do you mean with narratives? 
 
Int16 
Well if you are say writing a story about an interesting piece of research, you can deliver all 
the facts you want, but that doesn’t help people connect to either the people doing the 
research or the benefits of the research and make them feel good about what’s being done or 
at least interested in it, you want to have that little ‘wow’ factor and the ‘wow’ factor always, 
well not always, but can be primarily driven by emotions.  
 
DS 
How do emotions show up in your work as a science communicator? 
 
Int16 
(.) When we work with our researchers we try and get them to say things that make them 
seem human which has those emotional elements of things, not just subscribe to what the 
research is but how it made them feel. Or what impressions it had upon them, so we try to 
pull up quotes from them. I suppose, like you are trying to do with me now. But highlight the 
human aspect of what you are doing (.) or else it will turn up very dry. So, usually it will 
work, sometimes in video, so we do some multimedia stuff as well, certain soundtracks, so if 
you select certain piece of music it can make people feel inspired or it can make them feel 
curious, or emotional, as well as the actual content, and the people you choose to put in your 





Appendix CC – Codebook 5: Elements of the awe situation 
 
Coder Name: Please indicate your name at the top box. 
Date: Please fill in the date that the coding form was completed in the following format: 
dd/mm/yy.  
 
Each word or phrase refers to one element of the emotion situation. Please code each 
reference with the numbers one (1) through twelve (12) in the supplementary spreadsheet 
using the following categories. Every reference should have at least one code. Please choose 
the one you consider the most appropriate. 
 
1. Attention foci. The agent, object, or action that is the focus of attention during the 
awe situation.  
2. Social context. Other human agents present during the awe situation.  
3. Setting. Description of the physical place where the awe situation occurs.  
4. Event. Background event or actions in which the awe situation occurs. 
5. Appraisal/evaluation. The evaluation of the agent, object, action, or situation that 
where awe is represented.  
6. Valence. Whether an awe situation is described as positive or negative. 
7. Arousal. Whether an awe situation is described as exiting or calming. 
8. Other emotions. Other emotion categories used to describe awe.  
9. Motivations. Motivations accompanying the awe situation.  
10. Bodily sensations. Bodily sensations used to describe awe.  
11. Action. Behaviour or expressions performed during an awe situation.  
12. Outcomes. Results of the awe situation. 





Appendix DD – Information sheet and consent form 3: Consumption of science 
communication scale development 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully 
before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide not to take part, there will be no 
disadvantage to you, and we thank you for considering our request. 
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
The purpose of this project is to validate an instrument on people’s relationship to science.  
 
What Types of Participants are being sought? 
To participate in this study, you must: 
6. Be over the age of 18. 
7. Be a US resident 
8. Not have taken this survey before.  
 
Participants will receive $0.50USD for completed participation. 
 
What will Participants be asked to do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to: 
 
5. Read and sign a consent form. 
 
6. Complete an online survey about your attitudes towards science, your consumption of 
science and your personal background. This includes demographic information such as age, 
ethnicity, gender, level of education, religious affiliation, and political orientation. 
 
7. You will be debriefed once you have completed the task and the survey.  
 
 In total, this should take you between 3-5 minutes. You will be free to exit this study at any time, 
though only completed surveys will receive compensation. 
 
What Data or Information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
The raw data collected in this study includes: 
6. Your responses to the survey.  
All of the data will be securely stored in two password-protected hard drives kept under lock in the 
investigator’s office. Only the two researchers, Daniel Silva and Jesse Bering will have access to 





Your personal information will remain anonymous as an MTurk ID. This personal information will 
be destroyed at the completion of the research project. The raw data will be retained for at least 5 
years in secure storage, or possibly indefinitely. The raw data will be kept following the storage 
standards from the University of Otago. 
 
The raw data of this study (not your personal data) may be made publicly available in a journal or 
a conference. It may also be part of a PhD thesis which will be kept in the University of Otago 
Library (Dunedin, New Zealand).  
 
Data collected for this study will not be put to commercial use. 
 
You may withdraw your data from the project at any time and without any disadvantage to yourself 
of any kind. 
 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact 
either: 
 
Daniel Silva Luna and  Associate Professor Dr. Jesse Bering 
University of Otago  University of Otago 
+64 3 471 6147    +64 3 471 6147 
daniel.silva@postgrad.otago.ac.nz    jesse.bering@otago.ac.nz  
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee Reference 
Number D20/152. However, if you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research 
you may contact the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee through the Human Ethics 
Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you 









I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request further 
information at any stage. 
I know that:  
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw my data from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project. 
However, the raw data from this project may be publicly archived so that it may be used 
by other researchers. All information that could identify me will be removed or changed; 
 
4. I will receive $0.50USD for completing the task and the survey;  
 
5. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of 
Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand); 
 
6. Every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity; 
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 




.............................................................................   ............................... 
       (Signature of participant)     (Date) 
 
............................................................................. 











Manager, Academic Committees and Services, Mr Gary Witte
D20/294
Dr J Bering
 Centre for Science Communication
133 Union St East
Dear Dr Bering,
I am writing to confirm for you the status of your proposal entitled “Examining convergent
and discriminant validity of the Consumption of Communication scale.”, which was
originally received on September 25, 2020. The Human Ethics Committee’s reference
number for this proposal is D20/294.
The above application was Category B and had therefore been considered within the
Department or School. The outcome was subsequently reviewed by the University of Otago
Human Ethics Committee. The outcome of that consideration was that the proposal was
approved.
Approval is for up to three years from the date of HOD approval. If this project has not been
completed within three years of this date, re-approval must be requested. If the nature,
consent, location, procedures or personnel of your approved application change, please
advise me in writing.
Yours sincerely,
Mr Gary Witte






Appendix FF – Information sheet and consent form 4: Consumption of science 
communication scale validation  
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All 
my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request 
further information at any stage. 
I know that:  
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
2. I am free to withdraw my data from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
3. Personal identifying information will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project. 
However, the raw data from this project may be publicly archived so that it may be used 
by other researchers. All information that could identify me will be removed or changed; 
4. I will receive $1.00USD for completing the survey;  
5. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of 
Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand); 





Appendix GG – Results from QCA 
 
Name References Elements of situation 
1. Attention foci 182 
 
Accomplishment 9 a child learning quickly, a baby making a full sentence, a child 
teaching his grandfather science, completing a work project, an old 
person running for 24 hours, an Olympic accomplishment, 
overcoming fear, someone receiving an award, surviving cancer 
Living organism 23 a fox, a moose, a school of squid., a sea slug that incorporates algae 
into its skin, a worm, aliens, animal eyes, birds of paradise, butterfly 
hatching, charismatic megafauna, life cycle of parasitic worm, life in 
a drop of water, mosquito larvae, moss, parasites, plants, sharks 
Natural object 48 blackholes, British countryside, clouds in the sky, exoplanets, forest, 
galaxies, Grand Canyon, hurricane, mountains, general nature, 
Niagara Falls, panoramic view, space, sunset, supernovas, the birth 
of a star, the change of seasons, the night sky, the ocean, the planet, 
the sky, the universe, the world's largest caldera, weather effects, 
whale skeleton 
Non-science related artefact, 
practice, or idea 
31 a book, animation, architecture, craft in documentary clip, 
everything, exploration, explosion, famous painting, films, god, 
graveyard, Guinness World Records, indoor rainbow, magic, 
metaphysical ideas, a moment of realization, musical instruments, 
New York Skyscape, paintings, philosophy, rioting, slavery, the state 
of the economy, thinking about how lucky you are 
Non-science related person 4 acrobats, community workers, marginalized people, strangers 
Science-related artefact, 
practice, or idea 
61 a new technology, a popular science article, a science metaphor, a 
science narrative, artificial intelligence, deep sea exploration, 
evolution, genome sequencing, nanotechnology, nature 
documentaries, online database, particle accelerators, realizing how 
nature works, robots, rocket launches, science demonstration, science 
installation, science picture book, science talk, scientific 
breakthrough, space exploration, technology, the Galileo project, the 
human brain, the way bodies work, the way gravity works, the way 
life works, the way neutrinos work, vaccines, voyager probes 
Science-related person 6 doctors, science communicators, themselves 




Dyad 8 with one friend, one-on-one with an expert, with a partner 
Small Group 9 close family, in a small group, in a team, small group of friends, with 
some strangers 
Large Group 5 as member of an audience, in a class, in front of a crowd 
3. Setting 75 
 
Natural 16 a cave, Adrian’s wall trail, beach, desert, forest, in nature, in the 
ocean, marsh, national park, park, top of a hill 
Non-science-related built  42 auditorium, bar, car, classroom, graveyard, home, hospital, hotel, in 
front of a screen, non-science museum, school, sports track, street, 
theatre, visitor centre 
Science related built  17 aquarium, science festival stand, natural history museum, 
observatory, pop up museum, science centre, science conference, 
science museum 
 4. Event 71   
Arts, culture, and 
entertainment 
19 at an arts festival, museum visit, online surfing, reading, watching a 
film 





Private  10 driving, family activity, going home, growing plants during 
lockdown, hanging out with friend, talking with a doctor, visiting a 
graveyard 
Scientific and educational 22 doing astrophotography, doing scientific exploration, during a 
gardening workshop, during a science film hackathon, during a 
workshop at a science festival, school visit to science centre, science 
communication workshop, science conference, science show, 
science-related talk, visit to science museum 
Sports and recreation 12 diving, going for a run, on a walk, snorkelling, during a race, 
vacation 
5. Appraisal - Evaluation 309   
Aesthetic of merit 22 ability, diversity, importance, virtue 
Aesthetic of the Burkean 
sublime 
83 coldness, complexity, confusion, contrast, difficulty, dissonance, 
distance, escalation, greatness, horror, limit, power, powerlessness, 
rarity, ugliness, unrelatable, vastness 
Aesthetic of the marvellous 102 amazing, anticipation, catchiness, coolness, disbelief, flashy, 
incredible, magical, novelty, rarity, surrealness, unexpectedness, 
uniqueness, weirdness 
Aesthetic of beauty 44 beauty, caring, comforting, cuteness, diversity, familiarity, fragility, 
safety, silence, simplicity, smallness, stillness, subtlety, tactile 
Aesthetic of the supernatural 46 connectedness, ignorance, immersion, incomprehensible, ineffability, 
numinous, transcendental 
Other aesthetics 12 animated, funny, futuristic, identification, participation 
6. Valence 16   
Positive 10 
 
Positive and negative 6 
 
7. Arousal 15   






8. Other emotions 113   
Stereotypically described 
negative emotions 
7 disgust, fear, jealousy, loneliness, sadness 
Stereotypically described 
positive emotions 
106 admiration, amazement, appreciation, bewilderment, cheerfulness, 
contentment, delight, ecstasy, empathy, enthusiasm, fascination, 
gratitude, happiness, inspiration, joy, love, marvel, pride, surprise, 
togetherness, trust, wonder 
9. Motivation 58   
to act 6 
 
to create 2 
 
to explore 2 
 
to learn 32 
 
to share 8 
 
to stay in the moment 3 
 
to transcend 1 
 
to work 4 
 
10. Actions 70   
Behaviour 21 clapping, engage with the object, freezing, grab nose, move away 
from object, passively watch the object, point at things, seeking 
behaviour, shaking hands 
Communicated to others 9 communicate online, verbal communication 
Expression 40 crying, holding breath, inhaling deeply, open mouth, saying 'wow', 




11. Bodily sensations 56   
Full body sensations 31 being lit inside, being moved, bittersweet pain, buzz, dizziness, 
lightness, nervousness, overwhelm, relaxation, rush, shivering, 
shock, smallness, something growing inside, tension 
Localized sensations 11 choking, different heartbeat, heavy breathing, stomach tingling, 
tunnel vision 
Mental sensations 14 autopilot, euphoria, focus, mindblown, out of body experience, 
present in the moment 
12. Outcomes 106   
General outcomes  63 assign value to a person, assign value to an object, become content 
with not knowing, calm down, care, change in general attitudes and 
perception, constitute a memory, contemplate, disengage from a 
situation, engage with object, idea, or person, family bonding, 
influence short-term decision making, learn something, notice 
something, thwart learning, realization, recover, reinforce identity, 
share with others 
Science-related outcomes 43 build a relationship with science, capture attention at a show or 
exhibition, connect science with daily lives, constitute a science-
related memory, create an expectation about a technology, engage 
with a science communicator, influence career in science decisions, 
learn science, loose trust in science, make people fatigued of science 
hype, make science less accessible, prevent learning, reach out to 
scientist, impede questioning 
Total 1103   
 
